The exploration of appropriate informal settlement intervention in South Africa : contributions from a comparison with Brazil by Huchzermeyer, Marie
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The Exploration of Appropriate Informal Settlement Intervention 
in South Africa: Contributions from a Comparison with Brazil 
Marie Huchzerrneyer 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Sociology 
University of Cape Town 
October 1999 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Marie Hedwig Huchzermeyer 
38 Salisbury Street 
Woodstock, 7925 
South Africa 
20 October 1999 
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Contributions from a Comparison with Brazil 
ABSTRACT (English) 
This study examines the hypothesis that informal settlement intervention in South Africa is trapped in a 
market-oriented paradigm of standardised housing delivery that cannot appropriately address the 
complex reality of informal settlement. I approach this hypothesis through a cross-national comparison 
between South Africa and Brazil. Underlying this choice of methodology is the realisation that current 
informal settlement intervention in Brazil differs considerably from South Africa, despite broad 
parallels in socio-political process throughout the 20th century. 
I introduce the contrast between informal settlement intervention in South Africa and Brazil, by 
situating the debates and practice in each of the two countries in relation to those presented in the 
international literature. I then explore the causes of this contrast through a socio-political comparison of 
the emergence of informal settlements in the two countries throughout the 20th century, and of·the 
responses to informal settlement from the various sectors of society, as portrayed in the South African 
and Brazilian literature respectively. This insight into the evolution of government intervention 
approaches in South Africa, as opposed to Brazil, gives a critical perspective to the South African 
situation. It enables me to expose the dominance of the market-oriented paradigm in current scholarly 
debates on informal settlement intervention in South Africa. It also enables me to expose the impact of 
this intervention paradigm on the strategies of organised informal settlement communities. For this 
purpose, four case studies of informal settlements undergoing intervention through the current South 
African framework were compiled through in-depth interviewing of key role-players in the development 
process. 
The study has confmned a stagnation, among intellectuals and the popular class, in the search for 
appropriate informal settlement intervention in South Africa. It has confmned that this stagnation is 
associated with a powerful market-oriented delivery paradigm, which has caused an exclusive focus on 
the nature of the individual housing product to be delivered through the household-based capital 
subsidy. A shift in paradigm is required in order for alternative intervention, based on the physical, 
social and organisational reality of informal settlement in South Africa, to be developed and debated. 
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Tftulo da Tese: Explorando Polfticas ApropriadaS de )nterven~Ao nos Assentamentos lnformais na 
Africa do Sui: Contribui~Ao a Partir de uma Compara~Ao com 0 Brasil 
suMAruo -ABSTRACT (portugues) 
Este estudo exam ina a hip6tese de que as poHticas sul-africanas de interven~o nos assentamentos 
informais estlo presas a urn paradigma orientado para 0 Mercado e voltado para a oferta de habita~Ao 
padronizada. 0 qual nilo aborda adequadamente a rea!idade compiexa dos assentamentos informais. 
Desenvolvo esta hip6tese atraves de urna compara~ transnacional entre a Africa do Sui e 0 Brasil. Na 
base da escolha desta metodologia esta a consta~ de que as polfticas atuws de interven~Ao nos 
assentamentos informais no Brasil diferem consideravelmente daquelas da Africa do Sui. apesar dos 
amplos paralelos existentes nos processos s6cia-polfticos dos dais pafses ao longo do Secul0 20. 
Come~o por apresentar 0 contraste entre as politicas de intervenc;:ilo nos assentamentos informais na 
Africa do SuI e no Brasil, situando os debates e a pmtica em cada pafs em rela~Ao aqueles discutidos na 
Iiteratura internacional. Em seguida. expJoro as causas desse contraste atraves de uma compara~o socia-
polftica da emergSncia dos assentamentos informais nos dois pafses ao longo do Secuio 20. bem como 
das respostas dadas aos assentamentos informais por parte dos varios setores da sociedade, tal como 
retratado respectivamente na literatu.ra sul·africana e brasileira. Esta percep~o sobre a evolu~o dos 
enfoques sobre a interven~Ao governamental na Africa do Sui, comparadas com as do Brasil, permite 
uma perspectiva crftica em rela~ilo it situa~Ao sul-africana. Permitiu-me expor a predominincia do 
paradigma orientado para 0 Mercado nos atuais debates acadSmicos a respeito das interven~()es nos 
assentamentos informais na Africa do SuI. Pennitiu-me tambem expor 0 impacto desse paradigma de 
interven~o nas estrategias das comunidades organizadas que vivem em assentamentos informais. Para 
este tim. foram compiJados quatro estudos de caso sobre assentamentos informais sujeitos a poHticas de 
'1 
interven~Ao atraves do modelo sul-africano, baseados em entrevistas detalhadas com os atores-chaves no 
processo de desenvolvimento. 
o estudo contirmou a estagna~Ao, entre intelectuais e entre as classes popuiares, da discussilo e da busca 
de uma forma de interven~Ao apropriada para os assentamentos informais na Africa do SuI. Restou claro 
que esta estagna~Ao esta associada com urn poderoso paradigma de presta~Ao de servi~os que e 
fortemente orientado para 0 mercado, colocando urn foco exclusivo na natureza da babita~ilo individual 
como urn produto a ser provido atraves de subsfdios de capital de base domiciliar. E necessaria uma 
mudan~a de paradigma para uma pos£:_ ser desenvolvida e debatida uma forma de interven~Ao 
altemativa baseada na realidade fisica, social e organizacional dos assentamentos informais sul-
africanos. 
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SUMMARY 
The Exploration of Appropriate Informal Settlement Intervention in South Africa: Contributions 
from a Comparison with Brazil 
The starting point of this study is the realisation that the search for appropriate informal settlement 
intervention in South Africa is trapped in a market-oriented paradigm of housing delivery. This 
paradigm was promoted by the influential Urban FOWldation since the late I 970s, and was first adopted 
through the policy of 'orderly urbanisation' in the mid 1980s. It does not acknowledge the complex and 
diverse reality of informal settlement. Instead, it reduces the intervention question to concerns over the 
delivery of standardised Wlits on peripheral land. The hypothesis in this study is that this paradigm has 
not only stagnated popular and intellectual debate in South Africa on informal settlement intervention, 
but has distorted the question of informal settlement intervention into a focus on maximising the 
individual Wlit of delivery, in particular the house. 
A comparison between South Africa and Brazil on the question of informal settlement intervention is 
relevant to the hypothesis in this study, due to the contrasting way in which informal settlements have 
come to be treated in these two cOWltries. On the one hand, an informal process of settlement 
improvement in Brazil (particularly through permanent house construction) prior to formal intervention, 
contrasts with the perpetuation of a temporary status of informal settlements (reflected through 
temporary structures or shacks) in South Africa Wltil formal replacement by standardised units. On the 
other hand, a diversity of intervention approaches in Brazil contrasts with a Wliform treatmeQt of 
informal settlements across South Africa. However, it is the broad parallels in the socio-political 
process of the two cOWltries throughout the 20th century that make this comparison meaningful. The 
question in this study then is, how did the processes of exclusion and democratisation in the two 
cOWltries lead to such different treatment of informal settlements? 
Through the comparison with Brazil, this study critically exposes the shortcomings of the South 
African informal settlement intervention approach. and confmns the dominance of the product-driven 
market-oriented paradigm, also exposing its Wlderpinoings and implications. It contrasts the evolution 
and institutionalisation of this paradigm in South Africa, with the route through which more democratic, 
responsive and less prescriptive intervention approaches came to be institutionalised in Brazil. This 
enables the study not only to give explanations as to why there is a lack of debate in South Africa on the 
question of informal settlement intervention, but also to cast light on the prospects in South Africa for a 
paradigm shift towards more responsive intervention. 
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Situating informal settlement intervention in South Africa and Brazil in relation to shifts in 
international thinking and practice: 
Part I of this study examines international debates with regards to informal settlement intervention 
approaches, and situates current informal settlement intervention in South Africa and Brazil in relation 
to these. It first discusses shifts in the international thinking on informal settlement intervention. Here, 
the twin approach of sites and services and 'slum' upgrading, promoted by the World Bank since the 
early 1970s, may be seen as a benchmark. This approach distorted the concept of self-help, as promoted 
by liberal Western academics, into externally designed, technologically driven interventions. While 
Western Marxist scholars pointed to shortcomings in the liberal concept of self-help, particuJ.a.rly its 
ignorance of political implications, they did not develop alternatives. It was in the developing world, 
that left-oriented academics and practitioners, in close alliance with the poor, developed and promoted 
alternatives to the conventionally promoted technocratic intervention, which serves the profit-maldng 
sector. In the 1990s, these alternatives have gained increasing recognition through the international 
debates on urban poverty, which have applied concepts ofvu1nerability and resilience to promote an 
understanding of poverty as a process, rather than a physical condition. 
The World Bank has recognised the validity of the process-oriented urban poverty concerns, and has 
adopted these into its policies. However, these concerns remain incompatible with the product-oriented 
intervention approach, which the Bank continues to fund. It is the development ofpovmy-oriented 
informal settlement intervention through the Workers Party (PT) in a handful of municipalities in 
Brazil, that indicates the political challenge required in order for alternatives to product-driven, private 
sector oriented intervention to be institutionalised. No such challenge exists in South Africa, where not 
even in situ upgrading, as promoted by the World Bank in the early 1970s, is practised. Instead, a 
rigorous framework for the replacement of informal settlement with standardised housing units has been 
institutionalised, and is legitimised through the entitlement of most low-income households to a once-
off product-linked capital subsidy. 
The study then examines those intervention approaches, internationally publicised, that do not assume 
relocation or replacement of the informal settlements. Here the study differentiates between the 
conventional externally designed comprehensive upgrading, as promoted by the World Bank in 
association with sites and services, and support-based approaches that instead seek to gradually 
transform the social and physical environment. The World Bank funded Slum Improvement Programme 
in Madras, India, illustrates the classic components and shortcomings of the comprehensive upgrading 
approach. However, aspects of this approach, such as resident involvement and institutional 
arrangements, have been improved in projects such as the George upgrade in Lusaka and the Alvorada 
Programme ir Belo Horizonte. Brazil. N~yertheless, common constraints of this app' ;;)ach remain a) in 
accommodating the needs, realities, ideas and capacities of the residents, b) around questions of the 
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ongoing maintenance of the investment in infrastructure, and c) around replicability in relation to the 
scale and growth of the phenomenon of informal settlement. Alternative support-based approaches differ 
in that they give long term support, which enables residents to define priorities, identify projects and 
manage these themselves. 
Where governments are progressively inclined, support-based intervention may be government-initiated. 
One example is from the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka, where 'Community Action Planning', 
'Community Contracts' and the 'People's Housing Process' form three separate components of settlement 
improvement, which may be managed through Community Development Councils. Another example is 
from PT municipalities in Brazil, where community groups are given the option of self-management 
(aulo-geslao) in the improvement offave/as. In South Africa, a government-initiated support-based 
approach to settlement improvement has been attempted through the People's Housing Process of the 
National Ministry of Housing. This; however, is restricted to house construction, not enabling 
community control over other aspects of settlement improvement. 
Where governments have remained hostile to the adoption of support-based approaches, such 
intervention has been initiated by NGOs. A well-publicised example ofNGO-initiated support-based 
intervention is the Orangi Pilot Programme of Pakistan, which has developed community-funded, 
community-managed and community-constructed sanitation. In South Africa, the approach of the NGO 
People's Dialogue, in alliance with the Homeless People's Federation, is modelled on an NGO-initiated 
support-based approa~h from India. However, with regards to informal settlement improvement, this 
approach in South Africa has not been able to address physical intervention beyond house construction, 
once the original settlement is replaced by a formal layout with standardised plots. In Brazil, in contrast, 
the political space for alternative support-based intervention in informal settlements has been contested 
in some municipalities by the PT. 
Comparing the causes of informal settlements in South Africa and Brazil, and the evolution of diverging 
intervention approaches: 
The contrast between South Africa and Brazil is explored in more detail in Part II of this study, which 
examines the socio-political conditions that produced informal settlements in the two countries, and the 
societal responses that shaped the intervention repertoire. First, the study examines the themes 
surrounding exclusion, which are inextricably tied to the production and perpetuation of informal 
settlements. These themes played themselves out relatively unchallenged from the beginning of the 20th 
century up to the mid I 970s, when signals of protracted democratisation and 'inclusion' first emerged in 
South Africa·,and~raziJ. 
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As from the early 20th century, contrasting legislation underpinned the diverging processes of exclusion 
in the two countries. In South Africa, the urban form was shaped by race-based controls. In Brazil, 
spatial exclusion in the urban form was achieved, not through control, but through the rights attached to 
private property. These allowed for unrestricted processes ofland speculation. In both countries, the 
pressures of industrialisation resulted in a degree of liberalisation. In Brazil, a populist government 
selectively responded to demands for informal settlement upgrading, and adopted legislation to curb 
land speculation. In South Africa, the relaxation of racial controls was considered by the state. 
However, in both countries such change was not politically sustainable. Instead, it triggered a swing to 
the far-right. The National Party in South Africa (as from 1948) reinforced race-based control, under its 
policies of 'apartheid'. In Brazil, the military dictatorship (as from 1964) returned to earlier policies of 
unrestricted land speculation. Neglect in the production of formal housing in Brazil led to the 
uncontrolled, poorly serviced expansion of the urban periphery, serving the urban industry as a cost free 
labour reserve. In South Africa, equivalent urban distortions were produced through various nuances of 
racial discrimination, as apartheid was redefmed in pursuit oflegitimacy. Overcrowded urban townships 
and forcefully 'urbanised' rural reserves came to supply labour at a low cost to South African mining 
and industry. In both countries, informal settlement removals were practised at scale. With gradual 
political reform as from the mid 1970s, which allowed the (re )emergence of trade union and 
community-based movement, repressive informal settlement intervention began to give way to more 
responsive forms of intervention. 
The diverging ways in which a substantial proportion of the population was excluded from adequate 
formal housing in South Africa and Brazil has resulted in diverging ways in w!rich this ongoing 
exclusion has been interpreted and challenged in the two countries. This then has differently shaped the 
processes of democratisation and 'inclusion' in South Africa and Brazil. In South Africa, a history of 
race-based control has fostered a consciousness primarily of race, although class has increasingly 
become a barrier to overcoming urban poverty and exclusion. In Brazil, a history of class-based 
exclusion has fostered a consciousness amongst the popular class and intellectuals, of class division and 
of the exploitative and exclusionary nature of market-oriented policies. 
In Brazil then, an intellectual left has critically engaged with informal settlements through the question 
of exclusion. As from the mid 1970s it was able to align itself with popular movements to develop 
strategies to secure a physical and political stake for the poor in the urban environment. Alternative 
approaches to informal settlement intervention were thus developed. Politically, these alternatives were 
promoted by the Workers' Party (PT), which was formed in 1980. The PT provided a political home to 
social movements, to the progressive arm of the Catholic Church that had supported community 
mobilisation throughout the dictatorship, and to progressive intellectuals. With the decentralisation of 
political powers, the PT was able to contest political space in a small number of municipalities for the 
institutionalisation of alternative informal settlement intervention. 
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In South Africa, the civic movement articulated development concepts based on the decommodification 
ofland. In the 1980s and eady 1990s, this approach was applied to informal settlements into which the 
civic movement expanded its organisational network. However, in the negotiations for a national 
housing policy in the run-up to the 1994 elections, this position was overshadowed by a well-articulated 
market-oriented approach to informal settlement intervention, promoted by the business-funded Urban 
Foundation. Central to this approach was the commodification ofland through the issuing of individual 
freehold titles. Though addressing neither the progressive demands from the civic movement, nor the 
increasingly class-based barriers to overcoming poverty, the Urban Foundation position was legitimised 
through its dismissal of racial discrimination. Its concept of a once-off household-based capital subsidy, 
through which the delivery of serviced sites was to be funded, gained broad political appeal, as state 
delivery was demanded as a means to redress the inequalities caused by racial discrimination. The 
Urban Foundation therefore achieved patronage over the popular sector, which discarded its demand for 
an approach that would be more sensitive to the reality of urban poverty and exclusion as manifested in 
informal settlements. 
The national housing policy in South Africa was then based on the approach proposed by the Urban 
Foundation, though promising to deliver not only serviced sites, but also 'incremental' houses. The 
private sector was afforded an important role in delivering the subsidised housing. The policy dictates a 
standardised form of informal settlement intervention across the country. Individual aspects of the 
policy are contested by progressive sectors of the civic movement, and by a new social movement, the 
Homeless People's Federation. However, the household-based entitlement to a capital subsidy has 
prevented any substantial challenge to the underpinnings of the national housing policy, and to its 
dictates regarding informal settlement intervention. In contrast to Brazil, the centralised nature of urban 
policy in South Africa, in which local government acts merely as implementer, has discouraged the 
exploration of alternatives from within local government. Unlike Brazil, the informal settlement 
intervention question in South Africa remains unpoliticisedand poorly debated. 
Exploring prospects for appropriate informal settlement intervention in South Africa: 
Part III of this study turns in more detail to this situation in South African, exploring the prospects for 
more appropriate informal settlement intervention. For this purpose, it examines both the recent debates 
and fmdings in the literature, and the experience of community-based initiatives with the current 
framework of informal settlement intervention. Within the scholarly debates on informal settlement 
intervention, two reports by the Urban Foundation in 1991 had considerable influence. One presented 
the current status of informal settlements through terminology and concepts that focus primarily on the 
nature of the house, thus ignoring diverse social, political and economic dimensions of the phenomenon 
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of infonnal settlement. The other report presented the Foundation's proposal for a national housing 
policy, promoting the delivery of serviced sites and in situ upgrading of infonnal settlements through a 
standardised once-off capital subsidy. By extending the product-oriented capital subsidy system to 
infonnal settlement intervention, the policy proposal inevitably required the replacement of infonnally 
laid out settlements with planned layouts consisting of standardised plots, and therefore considerable 
social disruption. 
The study examines flaws in those scholarly responses that agree with this position on infonnal 
settlement intervention. Firstly, these scholars assume that infonnal settlement intervention is simply a 
form of housing delivery, therefore conveniently ignoring the complexity of infonnal settlements, and 
their relationship to fragile livelihoods. Secondly, they dismiss a role for community-based or civic 
organisations, in favour of direct state delivery (via the private sector) to the individual households or 
beneficiaries. Thirdly, they impose middle class assumptions on the functioning of property markets in 
infonnal settlements, thus promoting freehold tenure despite evidence of its inappropriateness. Where 
the incompatibility of individual freehold tenure with the reality of life in infonnal settlements has 
caused problems to such intervention projects, these scholars portray this as resulting from ignorance on 
the side of the beneficiaries. Lastly, they promote stakes for the profit-making sector, not only in the 
delivery process, but through consumerism, which is triggered by the individualised model of 
development. 
A separate body of South African literature contains evidence that contradicts the Urban Foundation 
position. Firstly, there is evidence of the inappropriateness of the product-linked capital subsidy as a 
vehicle for infonnal settlement intervention. Secondly, there is evidence of the vulnerability of 
community organisations in relation to the imposition of inflexible, individualised, product-linked 
intervention. Thirdly, there is evidence that questions the relevance of individual freehold titles, 
particularly in the context of extreme poverty. Lastly, there is evidence of the detrimental impact of 
individualisation and commodification on poverty. Though presenting this evidence, this literature does 
not rigorously confront the Urban Foundation paradigm as such. A further shortcoming in this literature 
is that various biases in the infonnal settlement research have perpetuated an incomplete or skewed 
understanding of the infonnal settlement situation in South Africa, particularly with regards to the 
capacities of community-based initiatives. In addition, isolation from the international debates on urban 
poverty, particularly around the concepts of vulnerability and resilience, has prevented socially oriented 
evaluations of the current intervention approach. 
The study then finally turns to the experiences ofinfonnal settlement initiatives in the product-driven 
intervention framework. It discusses four case studies of infonnal settlements where well organised 
communities have secured some control over the development, despite the restrictive intervention 
framework. It examines how the community-based initiatives react to the development dictates imposed 
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through the capital subsidy approach. Two of the case study settlements, WeBers Farm (Southern 
Johannesburg) and Gunguluza (Uitenhage), are related to the civic movement and its representative 
structures. The other two case study settlements, Piesang River (Durban) and Kanana (Southern 
Johannesburg), are partly organised through the membership-based structures of the Homeless People's 
Federation. 
Among these case studies, support to community organisation varies. The Homeless People's 
Federation structures (Kanana and Piesang River) are supported by the internationally funded NGO 
People's Dialogue, and have secured space for community control over house construction through the 
Federation's savings and credit schemes. The settlement committee in Gunguluza has been supported by 
the local structure of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). The close relation 
between SANCO and the Uitenhage municipality has resulted in a relatively supportive local 
government, particularly with regards to house construction, which is undertaken through the People's 
Housing Process. The civic organisation at Weilers Farm has received continuous pragmatic support 
and guidance from a sympathetic businessman, this resulting in the appointment of the civic 
~ . 
organisation's legal entity (the Thuthuka Foundation) as developer of the capital subsidy project. Each 
of the case study settlements is undergoing inruvidualisation through the product-linked capital subsidy 
to which most households are entitled. 
The study examines strategies of the community organisation towards improving living conditions in 
the informal settlements. In the cases ofWeilers Farm and Gunguluza, initial strategies were developed 
without knowledge offue entitlement to the product-linked capital subsidy. In Weilers Farm, the initial 
strategy was to secure social facilities, and at a later stage physical development. In this case, a 
pragmatic approach was adopted with regards to the dictates imposed through the capital subsidy 
intervention. While the settlement is remodelled and sites re-allocated, the civic organisation has 
continued to pursue social and economic development. This contrasts with the other settlements, where 
the product-linked capital subsidy intervention appears to have discouraged any consideration of 
collective aspects of settlement improvement such as facilities for social and economic development. 
Indeed, the primary focus was to secure the largest possible individual house. within the capital subsidy 
amount. In the case of Gunguluza, the community organisation's strategy had shifted from initial self-
reliance, to co-operation in the intervention programme. Its decision to co-operate in the People's 
Housing Process, essentially a self-help form of housing delivery, was based on the prospects this 
entailed for maximising the size of the individual house. 
In the case of Kanana, the initial invasion mirrored the surrounding formal layouts, in anticipation of 
co-operation with the authorities. While respecting engmeering dictates, the collective strategy had been 
to challenge the prescribed procedures, which did not allow for self-management by the community 
organisation. However, the individual entitlement to a standardised development product through the 
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capital subsidy weakened the position of the community organisation that, with much foresight, had 
planned and managed the invasion and secured a development commitment from government. The 
majority of the residents shifted their support to the conventional project procedure, through which they 
were secured standardised delivery. In the complex case of Pie sang River, the civic organisation had 
initially submitted to the product-linked dictates of the formal development. However, with the 
emergence of the Homeless People's Federation, a more radical position on development evolved and led 
to the exploration of alternatives. While the initial project, which set out to deliver individual plots and 
infrastructure, was abandoned, the Homeless People's Federation strategy focused on the construction of 
houses. Having secured access to the house construction portion of the capital subsidy through an 
agreement with the Provincial Government, the Federation's energies at Piesang River likewise focussed 
on maximising the size ofthe individual house. The collective aspects of settlement improvement remain 
largely unattended. 
A finding in the study then is that the capital subsidy framework impacts on the strategies of the 
community-based initiatives. The household-based entitlement to a once-off product-linked capital 
subsidy distracts from the collective aspects of development. By co-operating in the prescribed formal 
development, the community organisations do not challenge the relevance of individualisation ana. the 
other market-oriented underpinnings of the approach. Even the Homeless People's Federation, though 
promoting a communal approach of pooling daily savings, and confronting poverty by nurturing 
neighbourhood relations through savings groups, fails to challenge the concept of individualised 
development. The situation in South Africa contrasts with that in Brazil, where a co-ordinated movement 
ofjavela residents, supported by progressive intellectuals and politicians, has managed to promote and 
defend community-based demands against those of the profit-making sector at a national level. In South 
Africa, no such co-ordinated movement and support exists. It is therefore unlikely. that the Urban 
Foundation inspired model of informal settlement intervention will be challenged at the level of national 
policy from within civil society. 
The study concludes that there is a need in South Africa to move towards more appropriate forms of 
informal settlement intervention. While alternative approaches have been developed and practised in 
progressive Brazilian municipalities, this study does not argue for a direct transfer of approaches from 
Brazil to South Africa. Instead, it argues for a change of paradigm in South Africa. A paradigm is 
needed, that would allow the exploration of informal settlement intervention to respond to the reality of 
poverty as experienced in informal settlements in South Africa, and to build on existing community-
based systems for the management and improvement of these settlements. As in Brazil, a change in 
intervention paradigm in South Africa will only occur once a critical awareness is reached of the 
exclusionary nature of market-oriented policies. With regards to informal settlement intervention, there 
is a need for a popular. intellectual and political consciousness ofth,: -unwillingness of those operating 
within the Urban Foundation inspired paradigm. to respond to the diverse and complex reality of 
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UlI()fmal settlement. In this regard, eXl10sure to international ael)atc~s on ... """ .. n ...... may increase 
awareness, both of the shortcomings of the current intervention framework in 
existelilce of alternative, support-based approaches. While aspects of the alternative Brazilian 
intervention approach may be of relevance to the South African situation, it is not the physical "u ...... 'J ..... 
in Brazil that has sought to draw from. Instead, it is the relationship between intellectual, 
political m against urban poverty and exclusion in Brazil that is of 
relevance to more 1InT'lrn1'lrllI'tf' mltorrnaJ set1t1eIneIlt intervention in South Africa. 
Key words: infinmal sc~ttl<ements; land invasion;favelas; sqlllatnng; 10VV-UlCome housing; community 
organisation; urban exclusion; patronage; policy; South Africa; Brazil. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 A stagnation in the development of South African informal settlement intervention? 
The officially unplanned, illegal occupation of urban and peri-urban land for residential purposes is an 
ongoing phenomenon of South African towns and cities. Has government intervention with regardS to 
this phenomenon changed significantly since the closing period of the National Party rule in South 
Africa? The position in this study is that, while significant change towards more equitable access to 
housing has been achieved through the present government's administrative restructuring, a departure 
has yet to occur from the particular informal settlement intervention approach introduced through the 
policy of 'orderly urbanisation', which, after the mid 1980s, replaced the 'influx control' policy that had 
restricted African access to urban areas in South Africa I. The informal settlement intervention approach 
developed in the late apartheid years, and its continuity and added distortion into the current National 
Housing Policy is briefly spelt out in order to introduce the concern this study sets out to address. 
While ending the threat of repeated repatriation of unwanted urbanites (particularly women an\i 
children), orderly urbanisation embodied more subtle forms of restriction and control to the urban and 
urbanising poor (Lemon and Cook, 1994:333; Budlender, 1990:74). It's approach was to allow for 
'controlled squatting' on designated land, through the 'upgrading' of invaded land or the 'orderly 
development' of uninhabited land (Cooper, Shindler et ai., 1987:342). 'Homeownership' and 'realistic 
standards' were to apply to these developments (ibid.:333), while implementation was to occur through 
the private sector (ibid.:333, 334). In practice, this allowed for considerable ambiguity with regards to 
informal settlement. Thus intervention in the late 1980s ranged from repression/demolition to attempts 
at upgrading (Harrison, 1992: 18). However, the mainstream intervention practice was to afford selected 
informal settlements transit camp status until such time as a site and service project was elaborated for 
relocation. Only where relocation was heavily contested, were localised solutions eventually sought? 
The primary focus was on quantifying demand and developing market-driven mechanisms for the 
delivery of serviced sites at scale on peripheral land. 
A proposal for streamlining funding for the delivery of serviced sites within the policy framework of 
orderly urbanisation was put forward by an influential private sector initiative, the Urban Foundation, in 
the late 1980s. This proposal was accepted by government in 1990 through its funding commitment to 
the Independent Development Trust (IDT) which was set up to implement the approach developed by 
the Urban Foundation (Adler and Oelofse, 1996). The IDrs funding mechanism for low income 
I See 1986 White Paper on Urbanisation and the 1986 Abolition of Influx Control Act with its 
amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in Cooper, Shindler, McCaul et al. (1987). 
2 For instance in the Weilers Farm settlement in Southern Johannesburg, one of the case study 
settlements in Chapter 7 of this study, where only a portion of the residents could be coerced into 
relocating to the Orange Farm sites and services project. 
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dev~lopment, which was intended to replace the inequitable, complex and duplicating subsidy 
mechanisms developed through apartheid policies, took the form of a uniform 'capital subsidy'). It was 
allocated to a developer on behalf of the individual household, and covered the cost of a peripherally 
located serviced site with freehold tenure. The residents, on who's courage (and of course desperation), 
infonnal settlements had come into being, were thus reduced4 to subsidy beneficiaries in the externally 
and technically defmed delivery projects. Though including for 'community participation' (ibid.: 118), 
the predetermined project cycle and delivery productS left no space for the defmition of development 
objectives by infonnal settlement communities, which were relatively well organised, mainly through 
the civic movement within the United Democratic Front's collective struggle against the oppressive 
apartheid state. Likewise, the technocracy of the intervention approach left no trace of collective 
popular initiative and innovation, be it in the infonnallayout or in land-use arrangements. 
After the 1994 elections, the content of the orderly urbanisation pOlicy6, with regards to urban infonnal 
settlements, was consolidated through the national housing policy into a centralised system which 
dispenses the capital subsidies, primarily to developers, through Provincial Housing Boards. The 
individual once-off capital subsidy amount was increased to include the provision of a basic 'top 
structure' or house, usually one-roomed. Legitimising the inadequacy of the delivered housing unit, the 
policy was termed 'incremental housing'. With the launch of this policy, the housing minister indicated 
the intention by government to ensure conditions that would support the improvement of such starter 
houses by the residents (Buchanan, 1994). Government pledged to deliver one million such incremental 
housing units in its first five-year term (Department of Housing, 1994:22). However, while professing a 
commitment to 'a development process driven from within communities' (ibid. :23), the policy in 1994 
went no further than stating that 'Government is considering the establishment ... of [a] housing support 
mechanism' (ibid.:53). Not surprisingly, the mainstream intervention then has been the relocation of 
residents from infonnal settlements and other inadequate housing conditions to large scale private 
sector-driven 'greenfield,7 development projects8• The Implementation Manual of the Housing Subsidy 
Scheme, setting out the rules for intervention through the capital subsidy mechanism, acknowledges 'in 
situ upgrade of existing unserviced or minimally serviced settlements' as one of the forms of residential 
property, to which the housing subsidy facilitates access (Department of Housing, 1995:VOL A-P2, 
page 9). However, it does not elaborate any specific procedure for such in situ intervention, other than 
3. Meaning a once-off grant to an individual household. 
4 Though supporters of this policy might argue they were elevated. 
5 See Adler and Oelofse (1996: 118) for the arguments in support of the 'well-defmed product'. 
6 With the exception of its original maintenance of racial segregation of residential areas (Department of 
Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986). 
7 'Greenfield' in South Africa refers to hitherto vacant land, as opposed to land already occupied by 
infonnal settlement. 
8 Thus the Gauteng Province, taking stock of its housing delivery from 1994 to 1998, announces 'some 
61 projects' delivering '55 435 stands and 31 741 top structures thus far' (Gauteng Department of 
Housing and Land Affairs, 1998:3). Alternative approaches were either still under elaboration (e.g. the 
housing support system) or had achieved a scale in the order of only 1000 units. 
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suggesting it be undertaken thIough 'project-linked subsidy applications (home ownership), or thIough 
'institutional subsidies'. Notably, the manual does include a separate procedure for 'hostel re-
development' (Department of Housing, 1995). 
In South Africa then, informal settlement intervention, which in this study means intervention in 
officially unplanned urban or peri-urban settlements that have resulted from land invasions, is 
detennined by mechanisms that are designed for the market-driven (though government-subsidised) 
delivery of new housing units. In practice, therefore, the standardised and product-oriented nature of the 
housing policy still requires that informal settlement residents be relocated, if not to newly developed 
'greenfield' sites, then thIough the orderly re-planning of the informal settlement. Realities such as 
existing community organisation, collective and individual ideas for improvement, and fragile 
livelihoods depending on the informally established land-use pattern and inter-household ties, though 
pointed to by responsive academics, are overridden by the mandate to deliver standardised units. 
Intervention that would sensitively respond to the informal settlement reality, and build on, and 
strengthen, existing community organisation and localised ideas, remains out of the question. 
The starting point of this study is a recognition that the current intervention paradigm has reduced the 
informal settlement question to that of delivering sufficient standardised housing units, thereby 
obscuring important socio-economic, socio-political and socio-spatial dimensions of informal 
settlement and likewise of the intervention. Part I of this study examines how an understanding of these 
dimensions of informal settlement has, to a varying extent, shaped international thinking on informal 
settlement intervention. Part III, reviewing South African literature and practice, in turn finds that recent 
scholarly insights in South Africa have not impacted on South African informal settlement intervention, 
confirming instead my concern that the South African intervention paradigm has trapped administrators, 
policy-makers, community-based organisations, and to a large extent academic researchers (who have 
failed to articulate alternatives) in a vision of a standardised product. A further concern of this study is 
the evidence it fmds, in the intervention experience, of an added distortion in informal settlement 
intervention resulting from the increased emphasis, since the 1994 elections, on 'provision' or 'building' 
of 'houses' - a key element in the 'Meeting Basic Needs' component of the ANC's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) (African National Congress, 1994:7). Thus the universal fixation with 
the dwelling, or 'top structure,9, has become the main detenninant of the intervention. The 
individualised product-oriented confines of the current intervention paradigm, and its emphasis on the 
dwelling, have been reflected in ambiguous official terminology, which draws no clear line between 
informal housing (Le. shacks or shanties) on serviced sites, in the back yards offormal housing or in 
9 In the South African intervention tenninology 'top structure' refers to all above-ground elements of a 
building. 
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settlements resulting from the invasion of land 10. Inevitably this has led to confusion, particularly in the 
scale of the informal settlement phenomenon in South Africa, and has obscured the need for 
intervention specifically tailored to this phenomenon. 
The lack of urgency officially afforded to the informal settlement question in South Africa is further 
reflected in the absence of policy debates directly addressing the phenomenon. Various policy debates 
and enquiries at present skirt the informal settlement intervention question, an example being enquiries 
into urban land tenure, countering the hitherto rural bias of land reform (see Development Works, 
1998). Similarly, there have been policy enquiries into options for house construction, including the 
involvement of residents through a 'People's Housing Process' (see National Ministry of Housing, 
1998). While furthering important aspects of informal settlement intervention, the housing enquiries do 
not have as their primary objective a paradigm shift. Instead, they seek to work within the current 
intervention framework of the once-off capital subsidy system, therefore remaining co fmed to the 
paradigm of individualised, standardised intervention. 
1.2 Confronting the South African intervention paradigm 
This study explores more direct ways of approaching the informal settlement intervention question in 
South Africa, drawing on international debates and practice and on the particular informal settlement 
scenario in Brazil, where a responsive informal settlement intervention approach has been developed 
and practised, particularly in municipalities with strong Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-
PT) mandates. This provides a valuable contrast to the South African informal settlement intervention 
paradigm. Both the progressive Brazilian position and the broader international positions on informal 
settlement intervention! I have evolved from a technocratic, externally defmed and market-driven 
paradigm towards positions that, to a varying extent, acknowledge informal settlement as a social 
process, although it must be noted that the technocratic approach continues to be practised by 
conservative elements, both in Brazil, and internationally through bilateral and multi-lateral agencies. 
With regards to the international positions, liberal academic enquiries since the 1960s, and in particular 
the urban poverty debate of the 1990s, have contributed to this partial shift. The development of the 
progressive l2 approach in Brazil in tum is largely attributed to a struggle of the organised working class 
civil society (including the informal settlement orfavela movement) which has shaped the particular 
10 The term 'informal settlement' is confusingly applied in official language to shack housing, be it in 
backyards, on serviced sites or on invaded land. Though the term 'squatting' (synonymous to my use of 
the term 'informal settlement') has gained negative connotation in South Africa and is generally avoided, 
it does remain the only term unambiguously referring to the unauthorised and officially unplanned 
occupation ofland, and is thus still applied officially in South Africa to avoid confusion. In this study, I 
use the term 'informal settlement' synonymously with 'squatting', although I apply the latter only where 
it captures the official attitudes that earned it a negative connotation. 
11 Here international positions refer to those represented, for instance, in the Habitat Agenda leading 
from the 1996 UNCHS (Habitat) conference in Istanbul, other UN declarations, World Bank policy 
papers, and scholarly debates in international journals. 
12 Here referring to the political and not procedural meaning of the word 'progressive'. 
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mandate of the PT and its associated scholars and practitioners. The decentralisation of adrrrinistrative 
and policy-making powers of government in Brazil with the 1988 constitution has allowed for the 
development of institutional arrangements for the implementation of responsive informal settlement 
intervention approaches in the small number of municipalities that the PT controls. 
Recognising on the one hand the validity of treating informal settlement as a people-managed social 
process, and on the other hand the important political dimension to informal settlement intervention, 
this study draws attention to the urgent need to develop space for more responsive and progressive 
intervention in South Africa. In order to do this, the study penetrates the current intervention coal face 
in South Africa through a number of case studies that examine the interface between initiatives of 
organised informal settlement communities and the rigid intervention framework, thereby revealing the 
absurdities of the current intervention practice. Through its various components, this study exposes a 
strong neo-liberal agenda driving informal settlement intervention in South Africa, and related to this, 
shallow and largely unsubstantiated market-driven arguments in support of the current intervention 
paradigm., obscured by people-centred rhetoric. An examination of the evolution of intervention 
paradigms both internationally and in Brazil (contrasted with the evolution of the neo-liberal paradigm 
in South Africa), enables this study to realistically engage with the possibilities, in South Africa, for the 
development of an intervention paradigm that builds on informal settlement as a social and political 
process. 
1.3 Some theoretical considerations on the question of informal settlement intervention 
Enquiries into the question of informal settlement intervention have traditionally fallen into either the 
Marxist or the liberal framework, although common uncertainties associated with a rapidly changing 
globalising future appear to hav  reduced the paradigmatic divides between scholars more recentlyl3. 
The question here, is how these paradigms relate to the topic of this study. Both the liberal and Marxist 
frameworks have contributed to an understanding of the informal settlement question. Concerned 
primarily with the contradictions in the capitalist mode of production, the Marxist framework has 
enabled an understanding of informal settlements as a manifestation of social exploitation by the 
dominant capitalist class. Marxist studies have focused on the socio-political rather than physical 
dimension of informal settlement, emphasising the role of informal settlement mobilisation as a means 
to incite fundamental societal change that would bring an end to capitalist exploitation. From the 
perspective of this framework, the alleviation of physical conditions within informal settlements, 
through measures such as infrastructuralupgrading, is critiqued in its perpetuation of the status quo, and 
more strategically in its potential for quietening of the protest l4• The liberal framework, in tum, 
13 See Burgess, Carmona and Kolstee (1997) bringing together various angles of ' critical analysis of 
contemporary neoliberal approaches,' (ibid.: 11) including those ofliberal scholars such as Turner. 
Oestereich (1996:61), in relation to constructive preparations to the Habitat II conference, welcomes 
that scholars have become less distracted by ideological battles. 
14 See Burgess, 1982 and 1985 for a review on Marxist thinking on the subject of informal settlement 
intervention. 
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implicitly accepts the capitalist continuum and its inherent exploitation; which leads to the ongoing 
formation of new informal settlements. Its studies on informal settlement intervention have sought not 
to fundamentally challenge the structure of society, but to reduce the consequences of exploitation in 
the reproductive sphere. Scholars working within this framework have enabled a better understanding of 
the coping mechanisms through which informal settlement residents survive on their minimal share in 
the economy. In the 1 960s, such enquiries led social researchers to conclude that conventional 'squatter 
removal' and re-housing were doing more damage than good in the absence of meaningful economic 
upliftment of the beneficiaries. They suggested, instead, approaches that would build on processes 
already existing within informal settlements. This included dweller's involvement in an approach 
broadly termed 'self-help,ls. 
Neither of these frameworks, however, has informed the informal settlement paradigm in South Africa. 
Indeed, internationally, mainstream informal settlement intervention since the 1970s has been driven 
not by the Marxist or the liberal insights, but by a separate framework, which is 'market-driven', or 
'neoliberal'. It discards the relevance of the Marxist perspective, but has adopted liberal ideas, though 
submitting them to overriding economic policies of structural adjustment, privatisation and the 
reduction of the role of the state16• The responsive 'self-help' approach developed by scholars such as 
Turner in the 1 960s and early 1970s was thus reduced into technocratic ally defined 'sites-and-services' 
and 'upgrading' approaches, leaving little space for social processes. Largely associated with the World 
Bank, this neoliberal framework then was the reference point in the development of the current 
intervention paradigm in South Africa 17. Chapter 2 of this study examines the World Bank paradigm in 
greater detail, tracing its shifts in relation to critiques from the liberal and Marxist frameworks, and 
more recent critiques from cross-paradigmatic debates such as that on urban poverty in the early 1990s. 
The absence, largely, of such critiques in South Africa, and therefore of any significant scholarly 
pressure for shifts in informal settlement intervention in this country, gives some explanation of the 
current distorted intervention paradigm in South Africa. 
Further explanation of the distortion in the South African intervention paradigm is derived from a 
comparison of the evolution of the South African paradigm with that of a particular informal settlement 
intervention paradigm in Brazil, which, as mentioned earlier, is associated with the Workers' Party (PT). 
IS See for instance Abrams (1966) and Turner (1968, 1976). 
16 See Petras and Leiva, with Veltemeyer (1994:65), for a summary of the neoliberal framework. 
17 As from the late 1970s the Urban Foundation, funded by the South African business Sector and hence 
supporting primarily market interests, promoted the liberal notion of orderly urbanisation with reference 
to international trends which were being promoted largely by the W orId Bank. Though the Urban 
Foundation stated that it did not accept World Bank views 'in full' (Urban Foundation, 1991:53), it is 
generally perceived that the Urban Foundation operated within the World Bank paradigm (see Bond, 
1995: 158). The continuity from the early Urban Foundation thinking on informal settlement 
intervention, through the policy shifts of the final years of National Party rule, to the current National 
Housing Policy, is traced in Chapter 5 in comparison to the evolution of a contrasting paradigm in 
Brazil. 
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This diverges significantly from the neoliberal paradigm in South Africa, drawing instead on the 
Marxist paradigm, by emphasising the importance of social movements in achieving societal change. 
However, it does not discard the relevance of physical intervention in informal settlements. Its informal 
settlement intervention approach, and the institutional framework within which it is based, was 
developed, not from the ideas ofliberal scholars such as Tumer, but from the demands of the organised 
favela communities, who's autonomy is supported within the PT framework (see Abers, 1996). The 
position in this study is that the PT framework is of relevance to the South African informal settlement 
situation. However, it's tenets are incompatible with the broader neoliberal policy and associated 
regulatory framework in South Africa, which, with regards to the practical aspects of informal 
settlement intervention, has largely remained unreformed since the closing period of National Party 
rule. Progressive Brazilian scholars' finding that even within Brazil, the PT approaches cannot be 
implemented without 'a degree of critical consciousness on the part of both the local state and of the 
civil society' (Souza, personal communication, 199918), then also applies to South Africa. By exposing 
the jCurrent intervention paradigm in South Africa, in contrast to paradigms that more consciously 
engage with the question of informal settlement, this study seeks to arouse a critical awareness in South 
Africa of the need for a paradigm shift. 
1.4 On comparing informal settlement intervention in South Africa and Brazil 
The cross-national comparison in this study, between the development of divergent informal settlement 
intervention paradigms in South Africa and Brazil (Part II), is embedded in an understanding of the 
development of influential international positions on informal settlement intervention (Part I). This in 
tum informs a closer examination of the micro-level informal settlement intervention situation in South 
Africa through literature and case studies (Part III). The central question in the comparative section of 
this study then is why a restrictive informal settlement intervention approach is maintained, relatively 
unquestioned, in a democratised South Africa - such understanding being necessary in order to defme 
what chances there are, realistically, of departing from the dominant framework. The comparative 
perspective of the contrasting situation in Brazil provides a useful tool to further this question. As 
Ribeiro (1994:65) argues, comparing Brazil and South Africa 'within an approach that is sensitive to 
both similarities and differences, may cast new and interesting light on internal processes of both 
societies, making their special traits stand out.' He adds that by looking at the other, 'we may be better 
able to look at ourselves and discover what we are all about,' (ibid.). The purpose of the comparison in 
this study then is to cast light on the 'special traits' of the South African informal settlement intervention 
situation, at the same time opening for consideration, innovative alternatives from Brazil, though not 
separating these from the political context and consciousness that enabled them to be developed and 
consolidated. For one 'special trait' of the current South African situation, which is evident from the 
outset, is that there may not be mainstream political interest in, nor bureaucratic support for, such 
18 Professor Marcelo Lopes de Souza, geographer and urban planner in the Department of Geography, 
Federal University of Sao Paulo, was commenting (bye-mail) on the prospects of having the Brazilian 
concepts and innovations of urban reform applied elsewhere. 
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progressive innovation. The conclusion, therefore, may not simply be that innovation be transferred 
from Brazil to South Africa. More importantly it needs to raise key questions which have to be seriously 
confronted by those hoping to further more democratic informal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
Such questioning might not necessarily come from within government. As Sitas (1998:49) recently 
argued in conclusion to a discussion of the political transition in South Africa: 'Without a constant 
challenge from below, poverty, inequality and powerlessness will continue into the 21st century.' 
The comparative approach in this study is tailored to the country of comparison, Brazil, and the 
parallels and contrasts it offers in relation to South Africa, for the furthering of the South African 
informal settlement intervention question. The broad parallels in socio-political process (nationally, 
throughout the 20th century), despite fundamental differences, justify pursual of the comparison. 
However, it is the contrasts in current informal settlement intervention in the two countries that trigger 
interest in a comparison. An exploration of these contrasts through the broad parallels then exposes 
those 'special traits' in the South African and Brazilian society that have conditioned the diverging t 
informal settlement intervention. 
A primary contrast between South Africa and Brazil is the diversity in informal settlement intervention 
in the latter, compared to the uniform intervention across South Africa. The range of informal 
settlement intervention across Brazilian cities from the capital intensive demolition and replacement by 
high rise low-income housing blocks (Cingapura Programme of the centre-right administration of Sao 
Paulo - see Figure I), to community managed improvement programmes (e.g. upgrading in the PT 
(Workers' Party) municipality of Diadema), is indicative of decentralised policy-making in Brazil. In 
addition, capital intensive comprehensive upgrading of selected settlements is guided and co-funded 
(through loans or grants) by bilateral or multilateral agencies (Guarapiranga Programme in Sao Paulo 
(see Figure 2), Alvorada Programme in Belo Horizonte, Novos Alagados programme in Salvador 
Bahia, Favela-Bairro Programme in Rio de Janeiro) adding a further level to the intervention debate and 
practice. With the exception of the Cingapura Programme of Sao Paulo (introduced in 1993), the 
tendency has been towards the recognition of informal settlements, and their improvement through a 
technical, social and legal intervention termed 'urbanizat;iio defavela,19. This term should not be 
confused with the English term 'urbanisation', which refers to the difference in population growth in the 
city as opposed to the rural hinterland (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). 'Urbaniza<;iio defave/as', 
instead, would translate into South African English as 'in situ upgrading of informal settlements.' 
However, in Brazil, urbaniza<;iio de fave/as encompasses more than the often narrowly technical and 
standardised interpretation of ' in situ upgrading' in South Africa. In Brazil it entails land regularisation, 
the extension of infrastructure (both with minimal disruption to the existing urban fabric), and social 
integration through the provision of educational and health facilities and social programmes -
19 It should be noted, however, that even in the case of the relatively conservative Cingapura 
Programme, the relocation of informal settlement residents to a separate location in the city is not 
considered acceptable. 
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intervention of such multi-sectoral nature does not exist within the South African framework. While 
many challenges, particularly legal, are yet to be resolved in relation to urbanizat:;ao de Javelas in Brazil 
(Fernandes, 1998), the intervention question there (unlike in South Africa) has progressed towards 
tailoring cross-sectoral interventions to the informal settlement real" 
r-----~----------------------~ 
Figure I. Cingapura Programme: the favela on 
the left side of the street has been replaced by 
low cost apartment blocks (Bairro Sao Luis, 
Sao Paulo). 
Figure 2. Guarapiranga Programme: 
upgrading of Favela Dionisio (Sao Paulo). 
It is, however, not only the intervention debate and practice in Brazil that differ from those in South 
Africa. The informal settlement process, from shack settlement (or shantyto\VJ1) to the building of 
permanent structures, from borrowing or pirating of services to the formal reticulation of infrastructure 
networks, from illegal occupation to individual rights to the irregularly laid out plots, presents a further 
contrast to that in South Africa. In Brazilian cities this process, for a considerable number of informal 
settlements, even in Sao Paulo, has taken its course. In most instances, permanent dwelling construction 
does not await the extension of the service and infrastructure networks and the property cadaster. Thus 
the Brazilian term 'Javela', first coined, popularly, in Rio de Janeiro around the tum of the century20 and 
since adopted into official language, has come to represent a brick and concrete jungle on steep slopes 
in the cities (see Figures 3 and 4) 21, although the term is also applied to recent, more peripherally 
located and less consolidated informal settlements22 . When services and property cadasters are extended 
20 The first land invasion to be named 'Javela' was that of penniless soldiers returning to Rio de Janeiro 
after crushing the sectarian uprising at Canudos in the North East of Brazil. The hill above Canudos, on 
which the soldiers had camped, was named 'Favela', after a shrub in which it was covered. As the 
returning soldiers, were nick-named 'Javelados', their informal residential settlement in Rio de Janeiro 
was then referred to as 'Javela' (Mangurian, 1997). For an account of the battle at Canudos from the 
Morro de Favela (Favela Hill), historically faithful, though presented in the form of a novel, see Uys, 
(1986). 
21 This inspired books such as Drummond, D (1981): Architectes des Favelas (Architects of the 
Favelas), Bordas, Paris, analysing the physical consolidation process in Rio de Janeiro's well-knmVJ1 
Javela Rocinha. 
22 It should be noted, however, that informal settlement processes vary considerably across Brazil. Thus 
the invasion of swamps and shallow bays (termed 'mocambos' in Recife) remain as 'palaft/as' or timber 
structures on stilts. In Salvador-Bahia a slow process ofland filling occurs under each palaft/a, with 
masonry structures built only after the invaded plot has been 'dried' or land-filled (Machado and 
Cardoso, 1995). In the case of Brasilia, informal settlements are not termed 'Javelas' but 'invasoes' or 
'invasions' (see Aubertin, 1992:463). A more recent term for informal settlement is 'occupQ(;ao' or 
'occupation' (see Souza, 1991:66). 
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into lavelas, such intervention takes consideration of the intricate pattern of land-use, circulation and 
permanent building that is informally established. In South Africa, in contrast, infonnal settlements 
remain as unserviced shantytowns or shack settlements (see Figures 5 and 6), often under the 
ambiguous status of 'transit camps' until replaced by (or removed to) formally laid out and standardised 
townships (see Figures 7 and 8). The inflexibility of the South African intervention framework, as 
becomes evident in the discussion of the case studies in Chapter 7, prohibits and effectively 
discourages the construction of formal dwellings prior to the standardisation of the layout. This process 
neither takes account, nor leaves any trace, of popular initiative.2J 
Figure 3. Informal housing consolidation on steep 
slopes (Favela Fim de Semana, Silo Paulo). 
Figure sett ement under temporary 
status since 1985 (Bloekombos, Cape Town). 
re 6. tcating temporary 
right to occupation (Bloekombos, Cape Town). 
Figure . HOUSIng options: capital subsidy 
units (Delft South, Cape Town). 
2} As the term Tavela' thus represents a particular situation in Brazil, that has no equivalent in the 
technically inspired term 'informal settlement' in SOUln Alri(;d. iilis study henceforth uses the word 
'favela' (without italics) as synonymous with informal settlement in Brazil. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
II 
I now turn to the broad societal parallels that enable a socio-political comparison around the contrasts 
spelt out above - they span historic, political and economic dimensions. Such parallels have been 
pointed out, for instance, by Lawrence (1994), who seeks 'contours' relevant to a comparison between 
the ANC in South Africa and the PT in Brazil. Many of these apply equally to a comparison of 
informal settlement intervention in the two countries. In broad tenns then, there are parallels in the 
succession of dominant politics and associated economies in the two countries. Colonial structures and 
values endured well into the 20th century, supporting the interests of key exports (coffee in Brazil as 
opposed to gold and diamonds in South Africa) through which the economies experienced 
unprecedented growth. This generated in both countries regional disparities and social inequalities. 
Enclaves of privilege, fonning part of the global market, developed in vast disparity to the 
'impoverished rural or semi-rural peripheries' (Lawrence, 1994:92). Industrialisation took place 
relatively late in both countries. Requiring adjustment in government priorities, it challenged some of 
the conservative structures. However, in both countries, attempts at liberalisation (in Brazil this 
included early upgrading of urban informal settlements) triggered an authoritarian period of extreme 
repression., replicating and sharpening social inequalities. Lawrence (1994) identifies, on the one hand. 
parallels in the politics and tactics of the National Party government in South Africa and the military 
dictatorship in Brazil, particularly in the central role of the military in government and, linked to this, 
the repression of political opposition. On the other hand, he parallels the partial democratisation of 
South Africa in the 1940s up to the switch to National Party rule and Apartheid policies, and of Brazil's 
populist period from 1946 up to the take-over by the repressive military in 1964. In both countries this 
early democratisation was limited by restrictions on the political franchise. Literacy as a voters' 
qualification criteria was maintained in Brazil up to the late 1970s, achieving (as argued by Lawrence, 
1994:93) a similar exclusion of the rural and urban working class population as did the withholding of 
the vote from the African population, maintained until the early 1990s in South Africa (ibid.). 
Importantly, the mid1970s signalled change in both countries24, setting in motion a protracted process 
of democratisation, drawn out by periods of state ambiguity with particular implications for the 
informal settlement situation. In both countries popular resistance broke out in the mid 1970s, 'leading 
to the rise of radical mass-based movements from the eighties to the present' (Lawrence, 1994:93). Of 
particular relevance to the question of informal settlement intervention was community mobilisation 
around self-detennined development objectives. In Brazil this included the organised demand for 
legalisation and upgrading' of informal settlements. Parallels then also lie in the responses to the 
~4 Some analysts compare a drawn out political transition in Brazil from 1974 to 1988 with a brief five 
year transition in South Africa from 1990 to 1994 (see for instance Schmitter, (996). However, for the 
purpose of comparing policies towards informal settlement, a political transition in South Africa, 
though ambiguous, clearly began in the rrud 1970s. This then also is the position of Seidman (l990b) in 
her comparison of political unionism in South Africa and Brazil. She notes that in both Brazil and 
South Africa 'divisions between the state and dorrunant classes' in the 1970s 'created an opening for 
labour mobilisation' (ibid.:3), In both countries there is a relationship between unionism and 
community mobilisation in that period (ibid.: 13), this is of relevance to a comparison of the informal 
settlement situation. 
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popular development objectives, from repression to patronage and clientelism. In both Brazil and South 
Africa, the mass-based movements of the 1980s have become players in the democratisation, or 
'redemocratisation' as it is termed for Brazil (for instance by Souza, 1997: 181). However, in both 
countries the privileged elite have maintained considerable power - in Brazil through a gradual process 
of democratisation (Sader and Silverstein, 1991 :20; and Diniz, 1988:9), in South Africa through a 
negotiated process (see Marais, 1998). 
The broad parallels then allow for a thematic and periodised exploration of the processes that have 
resulted in such a divergence in current informal settlement intervention across the two countries. It is 
by examining what appears similar, through the literature inion each country, that the subtle or more 
blatant differences emerge, which enable the comparison to raise questions that may otherwise have 
remained absent from a debate on appropriate informal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
How then, does the comparative aspect of this study relate to other Brazil-South Africa comparisons on 
topics related my subject? Broadly, three comparative approaches can be identified in the Brazil-South 
Africa literature relating to my study, each with separate objectives. Firstly, the practical question of 
informal settlement intervention, and closely related urban issues, have been addressed by South 
African scholars through comparisons with Brazil, (for instance Arrigone, 1987,1996; Mabin, 1991, 
1992; Abbott, Huchzermeyer and Martinez, 199725; Lubisch, Brown and Hart 1996, ). Though 
presenting interesting alternatives and scenarios, and engaging at varying depth in a comparison 
between the urban contexts, these studies have not significantly challenged the current mindset on the 
urban informal settlement question in South Africa. In part, this may be due to the fact that they have 
neither sought to gain a deep understanding of the societies from and to which lessons were to be 
transferred, nor have they been situated within a broader socio-political debate. A separate set of 
comparative studies has indeed engaged deeply with aspects of the Brazilian and South African society 
(for instance Seidman, 1990a, 1990b and 1994; Marx, 1998). Though contributing to a better 
understanding of the two societies, they have primarily sought to further understanding on universal 
questions rather than to confront particular concerns about South Africa26. The third comparative 
approach is at a political level, with interest in the Brazilian PT (Workers' Party), both in a popular 
form within the trade union movement in South Africa (as described by Mayekiso, 1996) and in 
25 The Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Cape Town has set up an action-oriented 
research programme to analyse and draw upon the experience of the GIS-supported comprehensive 
upgrading approach of the Alvorada Programme in Belo Homonte, Brazil (see also Abbott, Martinez 
and Huchzermeyer, forthcoming). Local interest exists in the approach, particularly in one informal 
settlement in Cape Town with which the research programme has created links, and a broad agreement 
for in situ intervention has been gained from the local authority. However, various factors, including 
the inflexibility of the official intervention framework, have been delaying the practical piloting of the 
approach. The questions raised in my study were inspired, in part, by involvement in this programme in 
1996 and 1997, which included a visit to a range of informal settlement intervention programmes in 
Sao Paulo, Salvador Bahia and Belo Homonte. 
26 Seidman (l990a, 1990b, 1994) uses the Brazil-South Africa comparison to address the question of 
labour movements in newly industrialised countries; Marx (1998), comparing Brazil, South Africa and 
the United States, addresses the question of mobilisation from the perspective of racial identities and its 
relationship to enforced segregation and, implicitly, white supremacy. 
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scholarly debates (Desai and Habib; 1994, Lawrence, 199427; Mayekiso, 1996). It is this popular and 
scholarly debate, which has engaged realistically with the divergence in socio-political context between 
Brazil and South Africa, that is of direct relevance to the question of my study. My position with 
regards to this debate, however, is that it would be enriched by engaging with the concern of informal 
settlement intervention, a question that has remained largely untouched by progressive debates in South 
Africa. 
1.5 From the international to the local: some remarks on the South African case studies 
The case studies of current intervention practice in South Africa, discussed in Chapter 7, are preceded 
by a critical examination of the framework of recent scholarly thinking on the informal settlement 
question in South Africa (Chapter 6). What then should my case studies add to our understanding of the 
informal settlement question in South Africa? I do not claim to rectify the omissions and biases that I 
identify in the South African literature on informal settlements. However, there is one very powerful 
bias, which I argue needs to be confronted, in order to promote a paradigm shift in South African 
informal settlement intervention. It is the degree to which informal settlement organisation and 
leadership has been either ignored or portrayed as a problem. In Chapter 6, I ask and to some extent 
answer why this is so, finding that it appears to be convenient to the current intervention paradigm. My 
case studies in Chapter 7 then are selected specifically from settlements where organised communities 
have, with some success, taken the initiative of driving their development, though inevitably coming up 
against the inflexible product-oriented intervention framework. In tracing the development process in 
four such settlements, the dictates of formal development, and the degree to which these override many 
of the people-driven initiatives, are brought to the fore. Inevitably, the case studies also expose 
conflicts and contradictions related to the people-driven initiatives and their strategies. However, my 
finding is that in many instances, such contradictions are a result of the intervention framework. The 
experience in the four settlements then raises challenging questions about the relevance, of the current· 
national housing delivery framework, to informal settlement intervention. 
Which then are the settlements that I have chosen to examine? With respect to settlement development, 
two broad types of initiatives exist in informal settlements in South Africa. Firstly, there are those 
linked to the 'people-driven' development thinking of the civic movement, and secondly, those 
associated with the Homeless People's Federation movement (which is supported by the NGO People's 
Dialogue), with a somewhat different interpretation of 'people-driven' development. Two significantly 
different settlements were chosen from each of these categories: the case studies ofWeilers Farm28 in 
Southern Johannesburg and Gunguluza in Uitenhage are related to the civic movement, while those of 
Piesang River in Durban and Kanana south of Johannesburg are related to the Homeless People's 
27 Desai and Habib's (1994) suggestion of such a party for South Africa, triggered Lawrence's (1994) 
comparison of the ANC with the Brazilian PT, in turn triggering Ribeiro's (1994) useful discussion on 
comparative approaches. 
28 Also spelt 'Weiler's Farm'. 
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Federation. In each ofthese cases I examined, through an account of the settlement history to date29, 
what obstacles these settlement/community-based initiatives experienced when trying to carry through 
their development objectives within the development framework through which government funding is 
accessed and development implemented. When seen from this perspective, the current intervention 
framework appears grossly unresponsive to the informal settlement reality, making evident the need for 
a search for more appropriate informal settlement intervention in South Africa. It is at this point, that 
the progressive innovations from Brazil, in offering an alternative that gives space to organised 
informal settlement communities, though not directly transferable to South Africa, may make a 
contribution to the informal settlement intervention question in South Africa. 
1.6 Exploring appropriate informal settlement intervention: a map 
Broadly, this study explores the question of appropriate informal settlement intervention in South 
Africa from the wider international debates, to a Brazil-South Africa comparison, and then to the local 
level of informal settlement intervention in South Africa. In Part I (Chapters 2 and 3), I ask how the 
question of appropriate informal settlement intervention has been developed in international debates, 
what influential positions and approaches have emerged and how these are critiqued. My reason for 
examining th~se debates and positions is that it is then possible to measure the South African 
intervention paradigm against the international shifts, this bringing to the fore the stagnation in the 
progression of the informal settlement intervention question in South Africa since the late 1980s. 
Chapter 2 examines how the international positions and debates have shifted, asking too, to what extent 
South Africa and Brazil contributed to, and responded to, these debates. The urban poverty debates of 
the early 1990s are significant in challenging the paradigm of conventional project-oriented informal 
settlement intervention, and in promoting alternative approaches. These alternative approaches, as well 
as the conventional project-oriented approach, are subject of Chapter 3, which identifies three broad 
categories of informal settlement intervention that have been internationally acclaimed, and hence 
evaluated and debated in the literature. Core aspects of each of these categories have in some form 
come to be practised in South Africa and in Brazil. An initial look at how these approaches are 
practised in these two countries introduces particular traits associated with informal settlement 
intervention in the two countries. In Brazil these approaches, and in particular the alternative 
approaches, are embedded in local government. In South Africa this is not the case. Instead, the 
centralised intervention framework leaves little space for any departure from the standardised product it 
seeks to deliver. It therefore requires a distortion of these 'acclaimed' approaches. This distortion, I 
argue, affects even the alternative approach that has been developed independently of gove~ent 
(through the Homeless People's FederationJPeople's Dialogue alliance) and in opposition to its 
framework. 
Part II (Chapters 4 and 5) explores the roots of the divergence in informal settlement intervention in 
Brazil and South Africa. To understand this divergence, it is necessary to trace the position that 
29 Loosely structured interviews were conducted with key residents in the settlement initiatives, with 
Ward Councillors, officials oflocal and/or provincial government, development consultants and other 
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informal settlements have had in both the Brazilian and the South African society, since the beginning 
of the 20th century. My argument is that it is the long history of control in South Africa, as opposed to 
largely unchecked property speculation in Brazil, that have shaped similar levels of inequality, yet 
diverging informal settlement processes in the two countries. Chapter 4 then compares the production 
of informal settlements in Brazil and South Africa, through themes of division and exclusion. This 
exposes the extent of government control in South Africa as opposed to government negligence in 
Brazil. each shaping, in a particular way, the informal settlement situation. Chapter 5 in turn examines 
the diverging societal responses to informal settlement, discussing to what extent organised informal 
settlement residents themselves took part in the definition of intervention approaches. My argument is 
that in this process of democratisation and supposed inclusion lie the roots to the contrasting informal 
settlement intervention repertoires (and the underlying paradigms) of the two countries. 
Part III (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) turns to the current situation in South Africa, asking to what extent the 
informal settlement intervention question is being furthered. Chapter 6 examines the scholarly 
responses to the Urban Foundation inspired paradigm of standardised informal settlement intervention 
(as currently practised). It identifies, on the one hand, flaws in the arguments that support the Urban 
Foundation paradigm for informal settlement intervention and, on the other hand, evidence of the 
inappropriateness ofthis paradigm for informal settlement int rvention. It further identifies biases in 
the body ofliterature that prevent the furtherance of alternative intervention approaches. A different, 
though also limited, challenge to the current informal settlement intervention framework is found in the 
settlement-based initiatives that are attempting to define and control their own development. These are 
the subject of Chapter 7, which examines the interface between organised informal settlement 
communities and the intervention framework. There, my finding is that an important obstacle to the 
self-determination of development objectives by such organised communities is the government's once-
off capital subsidy funding structure, and the regulatory and institutional arrangements that have been 
designed for its implementation. The fmal chapter then draws together the discussion across this study, 
consolidating the argument for a paradigm shift in informal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
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PART I. DEBATES AND PRACTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL PRESPECTIVE ON 
SOUTH AFRlCAN AND BRAZILIAN INFORMAL SETTLEMENT 
INTERVENTION 
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Chapter 2. International thinking: from the (neo)liberal-Marxist divide to socio-political 
pragmatism 
2.1 Introduction 
For the purposes of this study, international thinking on informal settlement intervention is represented 
by the positions and debates of influential bilateral and multi-lateral lenders and donors, and by the 
discourse and polemics in international journals. This chapter examines the shifts in such international 
thinking. The question throughout this chapter is: where is the South African informal settlement 
intervention paradigm situated in relation to the international thinking? In other words: how does the 
international thinking help us make sense of the current informal settlement intervention situation in 
South Africa? The chapter introduces Brazil as a useful contrast to the South African situation, touching 
on how the two countries have differently responded to, and contributed to, the international thinking on 
informal settlement intervention. 
The twin approach of sites and services and slum upgrading has come to represent mainstream informal 
settlement intervention, promoted internationally and practised since the early 1970s. On the one hand, 
this approach may be considered an important benchmark in the development of informal settlement 
intervention, on the other hand, its mainstreaming into technocratic project-oriented delivery has, in 
many countries including South Africa, been accompanied by a stagnation in the development of 
intervention practice. Its shortcomings have long been subject of much international debate leading 
influential agencies such as the World Bank to depart, in their policy papers, from its initial project-
oriented tenets. This chapter starts by tracing the shift from public housing to the twin approach of sites 
and services and informal settlement intervention, and subsequently the adjustments and shifts beyond 
this mainstream approach. This is paralleled by the response, since the 1970s, of Marxist scholars. 
Importantly, an alternative category of approaches to informal settlement intervention, which is support-
based rather than project-oriented, has come to the fore in various countries and is gaining increasing 
recognition. While the evaluation of these support-based approaches, in comparison to the project-
oriented upgrading approach, is subject of the next chapter, this chapter examines the thinking that has 
promoted these alternative approaches internationally. Here, an understanding of informal settlement as 
a social process, rather than a physical condition, presents a challenge to externally defmed project-
oriented physical intervention. A further translation of this understanding into concepts of urban 
poverty, has assisted in promoting a recognition of alternative support-based approaches. To some 
extent this is reflected in the initiatives surrounding the Habitat II Conference in 1996. The divergence 
in the extent to which South Africa and Brazil participated in, and responded to, such initiatives gives 
more perspective to the extent of stagnation in the development of informal settlement intervention in 
South Africa. 
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2.2 Western solutions: From public housing to sites and services and 'slum' upgrading 
Shifts in informal settlement intervention have not been unrelated to shifts in perceptions of (and 
attitudes to) the phenomenon of informal settlement. In this sense, the inductive research of Western 
scholars in the 1960s, particularly on informal settlements in Latin America, had a significant impact on 
international thinking on how to deal with the phenomenon of unauthorised housing on illegally 
occupied land. For the first time, social insight into the functioning of informal settlements was being 
introduced into the international development literature and into international consultancy and advisory 
work, influencing the positions of the World Bank, the United Nations and other international agencies 
(see Ward, 1982). 
Unplanned or informal settlement was a phenomenon uncommon to Western cities, thus unknown to its 
town planners whose urban wisdom was being transferred to the developing world. In the 1950s and 
1960s the Western approach of quantifying deficit and mass producing public housing, closely 
associated with a faith in modernisation, was being promoted internationally (Pugh, 1995; Ward, 1982). 
This required demolition of substandard 'informal' housing and relocation ofthe population to 
designated development sites. However, these low cost public housing projects largely failed to meet 
the target population's need in scale, cost and location, thus never effectively replacing informal 
settlement. Instead, informal settlements grew and co-existed with the failed attempts at their 
replacement: Little understood, and to Western town planners unknown, the phenomenon of informal 
settlement was seen as a rural intrusion into the planned city (Ward, 1982). Socially it was associated 
with pathologies!, marginalisation, and receptivity to political radicalism (ibid.). Throughout the 1960s 
and 70s, the analysis or understanding of poverty was limited largely to economic rather than social 
indicators, the West promoting the misconception that poverty in the developing world would be 
eliminated through economic growth and modernisation, of which the benefits would trickle down to 
the poor. Further, poverty was not associated with cities, but was understood as being a characteristic of 
rural areas, where indeed, the majority of the developing world population was concentrated, and where 
the productivity level of subsistence agriculture was low (Wratten, 1995). Urbanisation, implying the 
transfer oflabour to 'high-productivity modem industry', was seen as the solution (ibid.). 
This then was the context within which Western scholars in the 1960s sought to expose the 
misinterpretations of urban informal settlements by closely examining their functioning. From their 
insights they developed ideas of housing intervention that would build on existing processes underway 
within the settlement2• The central recommendations, mainly ascribed to John Turner (see Nientied and 
van der Linden, 1988) were that housing should be understood not merely as a product, but as a 
process, therefore acknowledging human, rather than merely material values of housing. Further, it was 
argued that individual human needs are diverse and changing, and therefore cannot be met by 
I Such as alcohol and drug abuse, crime and violence. 
2 See Abrams (1966), Mangin (1967), Turner (1968), Turner and Fichter (1972). 
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standardised procedures and products - instead, choice should be enabled. This was to occur through 
decentralised institutions, while the role of government should be in a) the planning and delivery of 
bulk infrastructure, b) the formulation of proscriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) laws, defIning 
boundaries between actions of people and of local institutions, and c) providing access, for the users, to 
'the elements of the housing process' (Nientied and van der Linden, 1988:139,140). In summary, their 
argument was for greater autonomy or dweller control in housing intervention, be it in informal 
settlements, or on new development sites. 
Various factors led to the adoption, but also distortion, of these ideas into mainstream international 
thinking. The failure of economic growth to redress poverty had become evident. Thus attention was 
drawn, in the 1970s, to the need for poverty alleviation policies to be explicitly targeted to the poor and 
to directly address 'basic needs' (food, water, shelter) (Wegelin and Borgman, 1995). This replaced the 
former exclusive reliance on the trickle-down of economic benefIts and associated economic indicators 
of poverty. However, new poverty alleviation strategies were focused on rural areas, where the majority 
of the population still lived (Wratten, 1995:19). In the urban areas, in turn, the failure of the imported 
public housing approach in addressing the growing problem of urban informal settlement was becoming 
evident to governments and to international agencies such as the United Nations and the World Bank. 
The liberal scholars3, operating in advisory capacity to these agencies, were promoting the concept of 
greater dweller involvement in, and control over, the development process. Van der Linden (1986:28) 
acknowledges that the 'Turner-school' no doubt had a strong influence on World Bank policy. However, 
their ideas were distorted. Firstly, they were conveniently collapsed with already existing 'self-help' 
housing concepts used in the West, which transferred responsibilities for housing that had traditionally 
rested with the state, onto the poor themselves (see Harms, 1982). Secondly, the World Bank moulded 
the self-help approach to its own neoliberal framework, which relied on free markets, individualism, 
and payment by users (rather than state subsidies). World Bank lending required cost recovery. 
Therefore, if housing products were to be constructed through World Bank loans, they needed to be 
affordable to the poor (see Pugh, 1995). Important aspects of the Turner concept, such as sophisticated 
roles for government, and decentralised institutions enabling choice as well as dwellers' control over the 
housing process (and providing access to its various components), were thus discarded. Governments of 
developing countries were, at the time, pressing the World Bank to extend its development loans into 
the housing and infrastructure sector (Pugh, 1995). This gave the Bank, with its entry into the housing V 
sector in 1972, considerable leverage to enforce, at least on a project basis, a departure from public 
housing and an introduction of the twin approach of sites and services and 'slum upgrading,4. Upgrading 
3 Though the school of thought associated .with scholars such as Turner and Mangin is referred to as 'the 
liberal approach' (Nientied and van der Linden, 1988: 139), it may be noted that John Turner's ideology 
is that of 'limited anarchy' (Grose, 1979:64). Burgess (1982:468), from the Marxist perspective, refers 
to it as 'bourgeois empirical theory'. 
4 The term 'twin approach .. .' is used, for instance, by van der Linden (1986:29). The approach of 'sites 
and services' is defmed by the World Bank as: 'Government assembles the land and provides the basic 
infrastructure but relies on self-help for superstructure [or dwelling] construction .... [C]osts are 
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was to deal with the existing inadequate and illegal housing, infrastructure and tenure conditions, whil~r / 
the delivery of sites and services at scale was to forestall the development of new informal settlements V 
(Nientied and van der Linden, 1988). 
The influence of the World Bank over international development thinking has been substantial. Baken 
'~ 
and van der Linden (1993: 1) refer to the Bank as 'a trendsetter for development thinking,' arguing that it 
has been giving direction to -the consultant community, which is largely dependent on funding from the 
World Bank, as well as the United Nations family, and European Economic Community and United 
States governments, which all 'largely follow the example of the Bank' (ibid.). The World Bank's 
influence over developing country policies, however, has been varied. While by 1990 it had directly 
participated in the finance of ' some 116 sites and services projects and complementary slum upgrading 
schemes ... in some 55 countries' (Pugh, 1995:36), this has not meant that governments and 
bureaucracies in these countries necessarily reformed their development approaches. Menezes (1995) 
mentions, with particular reference to sites and services, that such projects were often treated as 
exceptions to the regulatory framework. This realisation led to later shifts in World Bank urban policy, 
which placed the twin approaches of sites and services and slum upgrading within a wider policy 
framework (Pugh, 1995 :67). 
Curious then, that South Africa, which was denied World Bank loans until the mid I 990s, should, in the 
1980s, reform its regulatory framework to adopt some central tenets of World Bank thinking with 
regards to sites and services. Indeed, the voluntary conformity by South African policy-makers to 
World Bank thinking has allowed its policy advisors to pick and choose. They largely ignored the one 
side of the twin approach, namely 'slum upgrading'. Instead, 'in-situ upgrading' in South Africa to date is 
interpreted as the replacement of informal settlements by standardised serviced sites (currently 
amplified by minimal housing units through a capital subsidy). As I turn to the later adjustments to 
World Bank policy on informal settlement intervention, it is again evident that South Africa only 
selectively adopted World Bank policy regarding informal settlements, shying away from many of the 
policy adjustments that were introduced to the Bank as a result of hindsight and critiquing. South 
African policy-makers have therefore also ignored the various advancements in international thinking 
on informal settlement intervention, beyond the project-oriented sites and services and slum upgrading 
approach. It is to these that this chapter now turns. 
minimised by self-help construction, and also by reducing standards (both in layouts and buildings)' 
(Menezes, 1995: 1 - the author is an official of the World Bank). The term 'slum' usually refers to a built 
environment in its fmal decaying stage, whereas an 'informal settlement' would be an initial stage 
(Turan, 1987:77). However, the term 'slum ~pgrading' in the international intervention discourse has 
included intervention in what is commonly (and in this study) referred to as 'informal settlement'. 
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2.3 Beyond sites and services and slum upgrading: productivity and enablement or alternative 
approaches? 
The twin approach of sites and services and slum upgrading, and the project-by-project manner in 
which it was first promoted by the W orId Bank in the 1970s, came under varied criticism in the 
international literature. One strand of criticism was identifying reasons for limited effectiveness of the 
approach, in the hope that the World Bank and other agencies that were promoting it would take heed 
\ 
'\ and make adjustments. Such concerns first found space within various initiatives of the United Nations, 
'\1; and the platforms they created for international discussion. Thus the 1976 Vancouver conference 
(Habitat I) organised by the UNCHS (Habitat)s, where the World Bank presented 'some preliminary 
results' of its informal settlement upgrading projects as a 'revolutionary tum in the handling of the 
squatter problem' (Oestereich, 1996:57), also allowed discussion on many aspects of self-help that were 
not incorporated in the World Bank's pilot projects. I will first discuss the subsequent adjustments in 
World Bank policies, in their relevance to informal settlement intervention. Then I tum to the other 
strand of criticism, which came from Marxist scholars, before examining how these positions bear on an 
understanding of current South African informal settlement intervention. 
Adjustments to World Bank poliCies 
World Bank policy shifted in the early 1980s in two broad areas. While initially the sites and services 
and slum upgrading projects were carried out as pilot projects to demonstrate the approach, it was 
recognised that their adoption by governments required adjustments to housing policy frameworks 
(Pugh, 1995). At the macroeconomic level, the World Bank was following the economic policy shifts of 
Western countries from welfare states to more market-oriented economies (Baken and van der Linden, 
1993), thus imposing 'tighter fiscal and monetary policies, deregulation in fmancial markets, and anti-
inflationary policies' on developing countries (Pugh, 1995:66). Structural adjustment (market efficiency 
and a reduction in the role of government) was therefore to replace the former 'basic needs' approach. A 
further shift occurred in 1986 with a focus on the development and growth of the housing sector and the 
urban economy as 'vehicles for promoting general economic growth and productivity' (Pugh, 1995:67). 
Central to this new focus was the concept of 'enablement', meaning the provision of a fmancial, 
institutional and legislative framework, 'whereby entrepreneurship in the private sector, communities 
and among individuals can effectively develop the urban sector' (ibid.:67,68). This new approach of the 
World Bank was seeing the need to constrain the power of politicians, bureaucrats and governments, 
due to their perceived narrow interests (ibid.) The W orId Bank's shifting of housing responsibilities to 
the private sector represented a further departure from John Turner's proposals, which saw a clear role 
for the public, private and community sectors, with control resting with'the latter (van der Linden, 
1986:29,30). 
S United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), Oestereich (1996:56) notes that around 1970 
the term 'human settlements', 'embracing urban and rural settlements' had become fashionable, while the 
added term 'Habitat' is believed to acknowledge awareness of the dependence of humans on the 
environment. 
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Although this further shift in World Bank policy (1986) coincided with the formation of the Urban 
Management Programme (UMP), a technical support collaboration between the W orId Bank, the 
UNCHS (Habitat) and the UNDp6, with the aim of developing 'a common approach to urban problems' 
(W orId Bank, 1991: 83), the W orId Bank and UN organisations to a large extent continued to develop 
their policies independently7. Thus the concept of enablement was refmed and elaborated by the 
UNCHS (Habitat), giving governments a new role as enablers or facilitators8 (Vaa, 1995: 192). Taking 
heed, the World Bank accepted in the 1990s that liberalism and enablement require 'good governance, 
institutional reform and sophisticated roles in government (Pugh, 1995:68). 
The experience of structural adjustment of the 1980s resulted by the end of the decade, in a growing 
recognition of its social costs. This was accompanied by a growing awareness that the spatial 
concentration of poverty had shifted from rural areas to towns and cities (Drakakis-Smith, 1996:692). 
The attention of poverty alleviation was therefore turned onto urban areas. Moser (1995c:225) refers to 
this new focus in poverty agenda development as 'responses to cities in crisis'. Tools of poverty analysis 
and intervention which had been developed through the previous focus on rural poverty, started to be 
applied to urban conditions (see Mitlin and Thompson, 1995), initiating a new discourse on 'urban 
poverty', prominent in the international literature, and in UNCHS (Habitat) initiatives in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This new concern too was incorporated into World Bank policy in 1991. 
A brief review then of the 1991 policy publication of the World Bank9 gives context to informal 
settlement intervention in the 1990s. Four key areas structure this policy document. Firstly, urban 
productivity is to be increased by lifting the constraints to the urban economy. These constraints are 
understood as minimising the urban economy's contributions to the macro-economy. Lifting the 
constraints includes improvements to the regulatory framework to increase market efficiency. Secondly, 
urban poverty is understood as being manifested in the vast informal settlements 'outside the legal 
framework of the city' (World Bank, 1991 :9), associated with the impact of structural adjustment. 
Separate policy areas are assigned for economic aspects of poverty, social aspects of poverty and safety 
net assistance. Thirdly, urban environment as a policy area implies recognition of the link between 
poverty and environmental degradation. Fourthly, urban research, includes research on the urban poor 
and the informal sector, and the government role in processes of urban development and the urban 
environment. (World Bank, 1991). 
6 United Nations Development Programme. 
7 UMP publications have sparked some confusion between the policies of these organisations and the 
UMP - see Jones and Ward (1994), Cohen and Leitman (1994), Lee (1994). 
g This was included in the Global Shelter Strategy for the Year 2000, endorsed in 1988 (UNCHS 
(Habitat), 1991). 
9 Titled Urban Policy and Economic Development: an Agenda/or the 1990s (World Bank, 1991). 
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A careful reading of this policy suggests that the World Bank would see infonnal settlements treated as 
manifestations ·of urban poverty, and not as opportunities for urban productivity, i.e. for macro-
economic growth. This requires that intervention be directed at the economic and social aspects of 
poverty, and would include some form of safety net. Infonnal settlement intervention is thus taken 
outside of the realm of private sector delivery of sites and services. I will return to this position in 
comparison to current South African infonnal settlement intervention, after having discussed a second 
strand of criticism levelled against the influential 'self-help' approach, namely that of the Western 
Marxist scholars. 
The Marxist position 
The 1970s Marxist position on infonnal settlement intervention presented (though only indirectly) a 
separate criticism of the World Bank approach. This strand of criticism was identifying root causes of 
poverty within the structure of capitalist society. In the 1970s Marxist urban analyses by French 
scholars, for instance Caste lis (1972), were placing the infonnal settlement phenomenon within the 
conflict between dominant and subordinate classes in capitalist society. Particular interest was in the 
social movements that emerged out of the struggles of the exploited under-housed populace. The 
eradication of exploitation required a fundamental restructuring of society, and to this the social 
movements were seen to contribute 10. Burgess (1977, 1978) applied the Marxist critique more directly 
to the intervention concepts being promoted internationally, engaging in an academic debate with 
Turner, not suggesting adjustments to Turner's intervention proposals, but attacking the framework 
within which they are based ll . Marxist scholars did not see it as their role to develop alternatives to the 
self-help approach'2 - indeed, they reject the depoliticisation of urban demand-making, inherent in the 
imposition of development approaches by the West. With regards to Turner~s self-help approach, 
Burgess (1982:467) traces this depoliticisation back to the 'vast body of bourgeois empirical literature 
in Latin American urban studies.' This, he argues, has failed 'to unite in one theoretical structure, an 
account of the low-income settlement process for the Latin American city with the political activities of 
the state and the various classes centred on their provision,' thus artificially separating the settlement 
process from its political dimensions (Burgess, 1982:466,467). Indeed, the contradiction in Turner's 
thinking lies in the fact that its radical aspects, namely autonomy or dweller control, together with the 
10 See for instance Zukin (1980), reviewing 1970s writings of Marxist scholars such as Castells. 
II This debate is reviewed by Grose (1979) and Nientied and van der Linden (1988), both articles 
concluding that it was not a constructive debate, as each tended 'to avoid the other's central issue' 
(Grose, 1979:66). 
12 Burgess (reviewed in Grose, 1979:55) does, however, imply that he measures Turner's approach 
(including security of tenure, which Burgess argues fosters individualism), against the improvements 
that may be achieved through 'co-operative community organisations' and the associated collective 
consciousness. 
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necessary release of resources, require radical political support. While Turner acknowledges the need 
for grassroots action and radical change in power structures, he assumes there would be sufficient space 
for incremental changes within the plurality of government (Grose, 1979:45, reviewing Turner's 
position). 
It is then precisely the radical aspects of the self-help approach, whereby the grassroots would be truly 
empowered, that have not been incorporated into mainstream sites and services and upgrading as 
promoted by the W orId Bank. Instead, the twin approach promoted by the Bank has remained primarily 
concerned with economic efficiency and cost recoveryl). However, even in situ upgrading of informal 
settlements, as promoted by the Bank, has required some acknowledgement of de facto rights ofland 
invaders, and an engagement with the complexity of unplanned environments. It is the less complex 
sites and services component of the Bank's twin approach that has found support with conservative 
sectors of society, particularly the construction industry which recognises major profit-making 
opportunities in its mass delivery. Indeed, as will be evident in Chapter 5 (tracing policy evolution in 
South Africa in comparison to Brazil), the stakes of the construction industryl4 are considered a major 
interest behind the current informal settlement intervention approach in South Africa, which is distorted 
into the delivery of sites and services with a minimal housing structure. 
While it was not the prerogative of the Western Marxists scholars to put forward alternative informal 
settlement intervention that would be internationally promoted, alternative approaches (though also 
along the lines of , self-help') that may be broadly associated with the political left were developed in 
various countries, often in close collaboration with grassroots organisations and their demands IS. More 
explicitly, they emerged in opposition to the conservative interests of private sector or government 
bureaucracies that support conventional technocratic top-do\VIl approaches. To some extent these 
alternative approaches have been embraced by the international literature (see for instance Denaldi. 
1997; Hasan and Vaidya, 1986; Pathirana and Sheng, 1992/6• They have been evaluated against the 
conventional or mainstream approach, and suggested as alternatives. Chapter 3 of this study thus 
examines two broad categories of informal settlement intervention, one the conventional externally 
defined and project-based upgrading, the other being support-based (either government-initiated or 
CBOINGO-initiated). It may be observed that the political dimensions of these alternative approaches, 
13 See van der Linden (1986:30). 
14Represented, with other business sectors, by the Urban Foundation. 
IS Harms acknowledges that self-help, when initiated by people themselves as collective self-help, can 
be 'a tool in the class struggle from below', potentially increasing self-determination, whereas if 
individualised self-help is initiated by the state, it can be 'a tool in the class struggle from above that 
attempts to increase integration into the existing social order and to perpetuate capitalist accumulation 
and domination' (Harms, 1982:20). 
16 Note that in many cases it is non-Western researchers that submit such experience for international 
attention. 
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i.e. the political space within which they were developed and implemented, and the political strategies 
on which they depend, are still not adequately addressed in the literature. Instead, these approaches are 
promoted largely through the 1990s international discourse on urban poverty. 
The contribution then, of this new discourse on human vulnerability and resilience associated with the 
many-dimensional processes of informal settlement (to which I turn in more detail below), is that it 
presents a powerful argument for alternative approaches, therefore for releasing informal settlement 
intervention from the dictates of broader macro-economic agendas. It is of particular relevance to South 
Africa, where not even 'upgrading' (as the more responsive aspect of the World Bank-promoted twin 
approach), which might be less driven by macro-economic concerns than the mass delivery of sites and 
services, is practised. As argued before, upgrading has to engage to a far greater extent with the realities 
of informal settlement and the many associated dimensions of poverty, since it cannot easily impose 
ready-made solutions as does the sites and services approach. Upgrading, too, due to the complexity of 
the environment in which it intervenes, is less easily quantifiable, therefore less attractive to the profit-
driven interests of the private sector. Nevertheless, upgrading at scale may indeed provide opportunities 
for profit-making by the construction industry. This will be evident in the discussion of the Brazilian 
informal settlement intervention in contrast to that in South African, to which I now turn. 
Situating South Africa and Brazil 
Where then is the South African informal settlement intervention situated in relation to current 
positions? With regards to earlier World Bank policy, an obvious conformity lies in the neoliberal 
framework, with housing delivery through the national housing budget intended to contribute to the 
macro-economy17. Within this framework, significant roles and opportunities are afforded the 
private/profit-making sector, with mainstream intervention being developer-driven. Thus the 
individualised capital subsidy through which hous~g delivery (and informal settlement intervention) is 
fmanced, may be considered not so much a safety-net than a government conunitrnent to boost, through 
the construction industry which contributes to urban productivity, the macroeconomy. Understandably, 
the construction industry is not interested in implementing complex, socially responsive in-situ 
upgrading that would minimise social disruption and build on existing processes in informal 
settlements. Instead, the state of the art remains unchallenged. Informal settlements continue to be 
replaced by standardised sites and services, albeit with a minimal housing structure. 
This then is a far cry from current World Bank policy which, as mentioned earlier, would have informal 
settlements treated as manifestations of urban poverty, intervention therefore being released from the 
broader agendas of macro-economic growth. As will be evident in Chapter 3 of this study, the project-
based and externally defined comprehensive in situ upgrading of informal settlements, as promoted by 
17 See Department of Housing (1994:26) where conunitments are made for the South African housing 
policy to contribute to the programmes of the RDP, one being 'building the economy'. 
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the World Bank within the 'twin approach', remains product-driven, the intervention process (including 
community participation) being tailored to project efficiency rather than to poverty alleviation. The 
alternative approaches, also examined in Chapter 3, are then more in line with the current policy that the 
World Bank professes to have adopted for informal settlement intervention. 
Brazil provides an interesting case, first as a contrast to the South African informal settlement 
intervention, and second as an indication of the distance between current World Bank policy and the 
intervention for which it provides fmance. As is discussed more explicitly in Chapter 5, a left-oriented 
sector in Brazil has developed, in close collaboration with organised informal settlement population, an 
alternative approach to informal settlement intervention, of which poverty alleviation is a central 
concern. The few municipalities with a strong PT (Worker'S Party) mandate are consolidating 
experience in this form of intervention. However, conservatively run municipalities, particularly the 
wealthy municipality of Sao Paulo, are using selective informal settlement intervention as a tool for 
increasing urban productivity, thus for boosting the urban economy. The 'Cingapura' Programme 
which, since its inception in 1993, demolishes highly consolidated favelas and replaces themwith 
standardised high-rise low income blocks of flats, with a considerable boost to the construction 
industry, is in part financed through the World Bank (Jose, personal communication, 1997 18). 
Conventional project-based and product-oriented upgrading of informal settlements in Sao Paulo, such 
as the Guarapiranga Programme targeting 180 favelas (548 000 people) within a water catchment basin 
in the South of Sao Paulo, is likewise fmanced, in part, through a World Bank loan (Yamazaki, Franc;:a, 
Araujo and Pini, 1996). In this project, even resident participation had been sidelined due to the rigid 
time constraints associated with the civil works contracts through which the programme was being 
implemented (Araujo, personal communication, 199i9). 
The civil works-oriented approach to informal settlements, be it the replacement of informal settlement 
by serviced sites or by high rise flats, or through externally defmed and tertiarised upgrading projects, 
has clearly survived the recent shift in World Bank policy, and continues to be supported through 
international fmance. The conservative interests it serves makes externally driven intervention a 
powerful approach, which would have the realities of informal settlement obscured rather than exposed. 
It is around such powerful interests that the development of informal settlement intervention has 
stagnated in South Africa. I now turn to the contributions of the urban poverty debate in challenging 
such stagnation. 
18 Maria Jose was working at a consultancy contracted to give social work assistance to the Cingapura 
Programme beneficiaries in their relocation from temporary housing (after the demolition of the favela) 
to the high-rise flats. 
19 Ricardo Araujo was working in a consultancy fum, which had been contracted by the Municipality of 
Sao Paulo for the approval of plans of the Guarapiranga Programme. Most administrative aspects of the 
programme had been tertiarised. 
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2.4 Contributions of the urban poverty debate: recognising alternative intervention 
approaches? 
While John Turner in the late 1960s and early 1970s directly inferred an intervention approach from his 
investigations into the housing processes in informal settlements, the informal settlement enquiries of 
the 1980s and 1990s have been more cautious. Primarily, they have exposed many dimensions of 
complexity and change, though identifying processes that appear to apply universally to informal 
settlements. Concepts have been developed for an understanding of the strategies by which poverty is 
handled in informal settlements, also enabling a conceptualisation of the social impact of intervention 
programmes, or other processes of change. No clear answers are provided for appropriate intervention. 
Indeed, the intervention principles that logically lead from the urban poverty enquiry raise many 
unresolved questions about roles and procedures. These are diametrically opposed to the conventional 
intervention apparatus, including funding structures, regulatory frameworks, the decision-making 
structure and roles and functions of professionals. I argue then that the main contribution of the urban 
poverty discourse is not that of generating alternatives, but of supporting diverse initiatives that have 
developed in informal settlements in various countries, in opposition to conventional externally defined 
and product-oriented intervention. However, the political dimension, i.e. the political support and 
strategies on which these approaches depend, remain largely absent from the urban poverty discourse2o• 
I first discuss the various dimensions of vulnerability that the urban poverty enquiries have associated 
with informal settlement, before turning to the concepts that have crystallised, and the implications for 
intervention. Finally, I examine the international platforms where the poverty discourse has found 
space, and to what extent South Africa and Brazil have participated and contributed. 
Understanding infonnal settlement as a social process (vulnerability) 
A first set of processes may be identified around the formation and growth of informal settlements. This 
phenomenon can be explained as resulting from an imbalance between the rate ofurbanisation21 and the 
nature of urban development. Two characteristics apply for most cities in the developing world. Firstly, 
formal land release and infrastructure provision are not in balance with rates of urbanisation. Secondly, 
the cost of authorised housing is excessive in relation to the wage structure (AnTIs, 1989: 17). An aspect 
that is intrinsically tied to informal settlement formation, therefore, is a population increase in the 
poorest sector of the population, which is not matched by the supply of affordable housing delivery. 
Increase in demand in the 'poverty' sector of housing can be related, on the one hand, to economic 
recession, which decreases the level at which housing is affordable, thus pushing the lower middle class 
into the housing sector previously occupied by the poor, and in turn displacing these into more marginal 
housing conditions such as sublet rooms or new peripheral informal settlements (Volbeda, 1989:158). 
20 Indeed, a recent meeting of the Network-Association of European Researchers on Urbanisation in the 
South (N-AERUS) identified (among other concerns) the need for an increase in 'the amount of research 
on political issues, particularly on the relationship between urban strategies and the interests of 
important political actors' (N-AERUS, 1999:2). 
21 'Urbanisation' meaning the difference in growth of urban population, as opposed to rural population. 
Such difference arises out of number of births as well as migration (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). 
I 
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On the other hand, economic changes trigger the migration of the poor into the city - severe rural 
poverty will cause movement to the cities, irrespective of the economic development in the cities 
themselves (Drakakis-Smith, 1996:676). The dynamics around urbanisation then comprise one set of 
long tenn processes or changes that bear on the formation of informal settlements, and are beyond the 
control of the poor, therefore placing them in a position of vulnerability. 
While there is a body of literature examining the social processes surrounding migration, also 
indirectly related to informal settlement (see for instance Amis, 1989; Beall, 1993; Gilbert, 1994; 
Gilbert and Gugler, 1992; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989), I now turn more specifically to processes 
around the actual formation of informal settlement. Alsayyad (1993) identifies four process of informal 
settlement formation: a) gradual, whereby individuals spontaneously seek shelter by gradually invading 
land, avoiding confrontation (examples of this he draws mainly from the Middle East, but also from 
Latin America), b) communal, whereby the act of invasion is co-ordinated and collective (here he draws 
examples from Venezuela; c) mobilised, whereby political parties or other agents initiate the invasion as 
a means of social mobilisation (examples being in Colombia); and d) generated, whereby invasions are 
endorsed officially or unofficially by the govenunent (Alsayyad, 1993:35). However, a more important 
differentiation in the settlement formation process, with regards to vulnerability, may be whether or not 
it is linked to fmancial transactions22 . Amis (1984) argues that where subsistence shelter, or access to 
shelter without a financial transaction, does occur, this is likely to be a transitional phenomenon, as 
commercialisation and political integration seem inevitable. This leads Amis to a main concern in his 
work on informal settlements in Kenya, namely the mechanisms of commercialisation, and their 
implications for the poor. Amis fmds a gradual change from communal to private rights to land in 
informal settlements in Nairobi, albeit in the absence oflegal title to land - residual subsistence housing 
is replaced in-situ by rental units, the profitability of such activities lying in the high demand for 
accommodation (ibid.:89). Amis thus summarises: 'yesterday's squatter is today's tenant' (ibid.:90). 
Indeed, while very few data are available on rental markets in Africa, it is believed to be the most 
common fonn of tenure in many African countries (Tipple and Willis, 1991: 128). Returning to the 
concept of vulnerability in the housing market, it appears common across the developing world, that 
sublet rooms in informal settlements rank lowest in the housing hierarchy, and are most often occupied 
by female-headed households, which are generally amongst the weakest competitors (Volbeda, 
1989:162; Yapi-Diahou, 1995). 
Insights into the functioning of housing markets in informal settlements, and the processes that surround 
movement in these markets, are crucial, if one is to gauge the impact or appropriateness of intervention. 
Vulnerability within these markets is important evidence against the often-held neoliberal assumption 
that the principles of middle-income property markets apply to, or can be imposed on, informal 
settlements. Chapter 6, examining South African literature on informal settlements, discusses the extent 
22 Yapi-Diahou (1995:25) refers to the commonly held 'myth of free land.' 
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to which such asswnptions have driven and supported current South African informal settlement 
intervention. Such intervention ties beneficiaries not only into fully registered freehold title, which is 
costly to transfer, but also into a system of rates and service charge billing23. Amis (1984) raises 
concern about the compromises households have to make when under pressure to pay high rentals. The 
same concern would apply to any new expenses imposed through an intervention. Amis (1984) fmds a 
nutritional compromise evident in child malnutrition. Thus he warns of ' a relatively well housed but 
malnourished population' (ibid.:95). Further, when the nutritional compromise does not free sufficient 
money to cover the cost of housing, the poorest are pushed out of the market and in turn seek 
subsistence shelter on the city's periphery (ibid.:94). A more complex interpretation of the 
consequences of fmancial pressures is through the gender-division oflabour within the household. 
Reichenheim and Harpham (1991) find that mothers, forced to seek work outside of the home while still 
responsible for their own domestic work and child rearing, may be strained to the extent that their 
mental health is impaired. Such insights address the common asswnption that 'women have plenty of 
time to spare for community participation' (Volbeda, 1989: 160), particularly in 'participatory' 
intervention. The insecurities associated with financial pressures .and associated threats of displacement 
(i.e. insecurity of tenure), are a further component that may cause mental problems among women in 
informal settlements (Reichenheim and Harpham, 1991). 
Risk and insecurities (meaning the exposure to changes that are beyond the individual or household's 
control) then are an important aspect of vulnerability related to informal settlement. Beyond the 
psychological risks already mentioned, the health and survival risks associated with inadequacies in the 
physical environment in informal settlements have been relatively well docwnented (Hardoy, 
Cairncross and Satterthwaite, 1990; Diaz, 1992; Fadare and Mills-Tettey, 1992). They are, for instance, 
inadequate sanitation, contaminated standing water, poor ventilation, inadequate insulation of shelter, 
inflammable building material, geological instability or flooding. These obvious inadequacies indicate 
further dimensions of health compromises taken by those joining a land invasion or gradual expansion 
of an existing informal settlement. 
Further dimensions of risk and insecurity play themselves out in the settlement cycle24, which Volbeda 
(1989) fmds paralleled in the family cycle, seeing as it is often newly formed, young households that 
will compete for land in an invasion (see also Hardoy and Hardoy, 1991; Shakur and Madden, 1991). 
Important here, is the shifting between different forms of compromise, as the dimensions of 
vulnerability change. That intervention itself may introduce new dimensions of vulnerability is a reality 
which, in the standardised intervention framework of South Africa, has not been considered, nor been . 
23 Although indigent policies are realistically applied in some municipalities. One example is the 
Municipality ofUitenhage, where needy individuals from settlements such as Gunguluza (one of the 
case studies discussed in Chapter 7) may apply for temporary exemption from rates and service charge 
payments. 
24 Alsayyad (1993) describes the settlement cycle as follows: a) land invasion, b) social formation, c) 
physical consolidation and d) urban maturity. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
34 
taken into account in project evaluations (see Chapter 6). Volbeda's (1989) observations then are that 
during the expansion stage of the family, when household demands on the women are strongest, women 
are most likely to stand together in a struggle for living space. Thus women's survival networks often 
go back to the invasion period of their life, which is followed by a stage of consolidation of family size, 
housing and networks. Economic recession will impact on the form and speed of physical consolidation, 
and will cause those unable to consolidate to be squeezed out of the owner-occupying sector in the 
settlement. The stage of settlement legalisation often coincides with the stage in the family cycle when 
fmancial burdens are greatest, as children require education, and are not contributing substantially to the 
household income. During such pressures, it is Common for male heads to leave the household25 • 
Female household heads, flrstly, seek new economic opportunities, often at the expense ofliving space 
(rooms are sublet or home enterprises initiated), and secondly, turn to neighbourhood networks for 
support. New pressure arises as beneflts from these networks in turn require contributions. Competition 
continues as adult children seek their own accommodation and the fragile elderly fmally rejoin the 
weakest sector, requiring support from other household members. (Volbeda, 1989) 
A further important factor of change (and therefore vulnerability) in informal settlement, and again of 
particular relevance for the question of intervention, is the relationship between settlement community 
and the state. The degree of community organisation, on which the relationship with the state depends, 
is subject to various conditions. Firstly, there may be government strategies to dampen such 
organisation. One common strategy is 'clientelism', which Alsayyad (1993:36) defmes as politicians 
taking 'advantage of the urgency of the needs of the urban poor to advance their own needs.' Another is 
the co-optation of settlement leadership through promises of personal favours or political gain, while a 
further strategy is repression (Gilbert, 1994: 134, 135). Secondly, the informal settlement cycle bears on 
the level of organisation - in the initial stages of the settlement formation, and at times of threat to its 
continued existence, popular participation in community politics is usually high (Gilbert, 1994). Levels 
of mobilisation are reduced with a) the domestic responsibilities of daily life, b) with social 
stratiflcation as temporary households (tenants) with short term interests infiltrate the settlement, and c) 
with party political competition (ibid.). Thirdly, outside intervention in the form ofpatemalist charity 
may dampen participation by fostering mistrust (Hardoy and Hardoy, 1991). The poor's vulnerability in 
relation to the state then is increased as accountable and cohesive community organisation is eroded. 
That such cohesion can be eroded by insensitive state intervention is clear. In South Africa state 
orchestrated erosion of community cohesion (the tactic being referred to as 'divide and rule') through to 
the closing years of National Party rule is well documented in the South African literature (see Chapters 
5 and 6). In Chapter 6, I argue that ongoing erosion of community cohesion through the current South 
African intervention framework, which still requires considerable social disruption through settlement 
25 Arnis (1996:280) notes the same tendency in informal settlements in Kenya. 
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replanning, partial relocation and individualisation, is largely left unchallenged in the South African 
literature. This gives particular relevance, in South Africa, to the concepts of urban poverty to which I 
now turn. 
Urban poverty concepts, and implications for intervention 
How then have insights of complex social processes in informal settlements been conceptualised in the 
urban poverty discourse to challenge the entrenched and persistent bias to economic rather than social 
analysis of poverty? One set of concepts is directed at clarifying the condition of vulnerability or 
insecurity. Another set is directed at resilience, or the ability of the poor to react against insecurity, 
rather than becoming its victim. Intervention, based on these concepts, would be cautious not to create 
new dimensions of vulnerability, instead acting to strengthen resilience. Interest in strengthening 
resilience, of course, implies that such intervention, though multi-dimensional, will not remove all 
aspects of insecurity, therefore not challenging fundamentals of the exploitative framework as such. 
Nevertheless, Drakakis-Smith (1996:686) argues that, for the urban poverty concerns to be taken 
seriously, 'fundamental questions of human rights and democracy' will have to be addressed. 
Vulnerability, or the 'condition of insecurity' (World Bank 1995, quoted in Moser, 1997:60) is 
conceptualised through short term shocks and long term trends, both acting to increase exposure and 
defencelessness. Those at the receiving end of shocks and trends adjust by entering into compromises 
and dependencies. Amis (1995: 149) defmes shocks as 'short term incidents that push a previously self-
sufficient household over the edge.' He fmds that shock or stress events that have the greatest impact on 
households are illness and the loss of an income earner. Compromising responses to such events are the 
increase of female employment and indebtedness. He emphasises that 'shocks are the most important 
element of urban poverty and protecting the urban poor from such shocks is a critical policy area' 
(ibid:: 156). Trends, in turn, may be long term changes caused by policies such as structural adjustment, 
which affect the labour market. Other trends are related to the increasing commercialisation of urban 
assets, with the result that the urban poor have to purchase services and basic needs that they previously 
accessed free of charge (Amis, 1995: 149). 
Resilience, in turn, is defmed as the means of 'exploiting opportunities and resisting or recovering from 
the negative effects of the environment' (Moser, 1995a:2). Here the concept of asset ownership at the 
level of individuals, households and communities represents resistance to insecurity (ibid.). Moser 
(1995a and 1997) lists the following assets which partly defme vulnerability and partly explain 
responses to vulnerability: flrstly, labour, meaning the poor's ability to mobilise additional workforce, 
mainly that of women, and in severe cases that of children; secondly, human capital, meaning the 
income earning capacity related to levels of social infrastructure, services, health, skills and education; 
thirdly, productive assets, primarily housing, but also land, which have direct implications for a 
households' ability to earn an income; fourthly, household relations, meaning household composition 
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and structure, which can be changed or adjusted to reduce vulnerability; and lastly, social capital, being 
the relationship between people in the community, through social networks, reciprocal arrangement and 
trust. Moser (1995a) emphasises that these assets should be analysed at the level of the individual, the 
household and the community. 
Chambers (1995) and Amis (1995) interpret the concept of assets differently to Moser (l995a and 
1997). They differentiate between tangible assets, namely stores and resources, and intangible assets, 
namely claims and access. These can be seen to supplement Moser's assets in determining livelihood 
capabilities or the ability to cope with shock. Amis notes that assets of the urban poor are more 
monetised than those of the rural poor, a factor that is reflected in the widespread commodification of 
urban housing26, which above is referred to as one of the long term trends that can push households into 
dependency. Amis further concludes that the urban poor are less likely than the rural poor to have 
communal assets to fall back upon. Therefore, debt (or credit) can be a critical survival strategy of the 
urban poor, in coping with shocks and trends (Amis, 1995: 154). 
Resilience, as well as vulnerability, are further linked to the concept of entitlement, which captures the 
degree to which households, or individuals within households, have command over resources (Wratten, 
1995: 18). A difference in entitlement among individual members of a household, which may be linked 
to household survival strategies, means that poverty may be experienced with different intensity within 
the same household (Wratten, 1995). 
What then are the implications of these social concepts of urban poverty for the intervention debate? 
Poverty alleviation, guided by an understanding of these concepts, will seek to understand vulnerability 
in relation to the local dimensions of shocks and broader dimensions of trends, and the resilience 
inherent in the ownership of, and entitlement over, various forms of assets. It will intervene to reduce 
vulnerability and strengthen resilience. The danger of poverty alleviation intervention impacting 
negatively on multi-dimensional asset ownership applies particularly where economic indicators of 
poverty dominate. Housing intervention in particular has a tendency to be designed around economic 
factors, such as the household's assumed ability to repay. In addition, technical assessments concerning 
the required improvement of housing and infrastructure often justify the destruction of existing 
environments and with it a complexity of fragile social assets, in favour of standardised developments. 
Recent literature suggests a new agenda for poverty alleviation, which challenges professionals and 
politicians alike. Chambers (1995), a main proponent of this new agenda, identifies four broad aspects. 
Firstly, he argues that intervention based on the social concepts of urban poverty must be people 
centred, participatory, empowering and sustainable (Chambers, 1995:200). He draws attention to 
measures that have low financial costs, yet 'make a big difference to the poor' (ibid.:20 1). He lists: 
26 This fmding is supported by Drakakis-Smith (1996:693) and Wratten (1995:25), 
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'Rights, security, the rule of law, information, access, changes in procedures, removals of restrictions, 
polite behaviour by officials, timing actions for the right season, timely delivery, providing diverse 
"baskets of choices" , (ibid.). Secondly, Chambers argues for analysis by the people themselves, and 
refers to the teclmiques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA), which are increasingly applied in an 
urban context (ibid.). Thirdly, he argues that 'every activity should be carried out as low down as 
feasible,' this requiring 'decentralisation, democracy and diversity' (ibid.:202). This corresponds with 
Douglas's (1992:25) call for 'a mode of planning which moves away from the paternalism of societal 
guidance designed and carried out by the state and corporate economy toward one which emanates fr~m 
processes of social mobilisation.' He adds that this requires hierarchical and non-democratic structures 
of government to be opened up (ibid.). The fourth aspect of the 'new' poverty alleviation agenda is 
directed at the role of professionals. Here Chambers (1995 :203,204) calls for a self-examination by 
professionals, for a greater awareness of their deceptions and the limitations attached to their 
terminology and use of concepts, as well as their relative positions of power over the destinies of the 
poor in the development process. He calls for greater levels of 'participatory management' in the entire 
range of development institutions (ibid.:204). This would require a move away from top-down 
approaches t~ 'interactive learning' not only at universities and colleges, but also between professionals. 
and the poor (ibid.). While Moser (l995b) emphasises the need for cross-sectoral approaches to poverty 
alleviation, Wegelin and Borgman (1995) extend this to local government, for which they perceive a 
central role in cross-sectoral co-ordination of poverty alleviation. Thus a further aspect of this new 
agenda may be associated with the functioning oflocal government, and its interface with poverty. 
It may be noted that these concerns are neither new, nor restricted to the international development 
community, on whose publications I have been drawing in this section. Particularly questions around 
the role of professionals or 'intellectuals' in relation to the poor or 'popular class' were furthered by the 
progressive arm of the Catholic Church in Brazil since the late 1960s when the appropriate relationship 
between pastoral agents and ecclesiastic base commWlities in poor urban neighbourhoods was being 
sought (see Mainwaring, 1984). Remaining, however, with the recent international debate on urban 
poverty, I now turn to the international platforms through which urban poverty concerns have been 
promoted, examining the different extent to which South Africa and Brazil participated and contributed,. 
International forums for urban poverty debates: involvement by South Africa and Brazil 
The most visible international forum promoting urban poverty concerns since the late 1980s has been 
the UNCHS (Habitat), with numerous international declarations committing developing world 
governments as well as multi-and bilateral agencies to urban poverty alleviation. In 1988 the Global 
Strategy for Shelter for the Year 2000 (UNCHS (Habitat), 1991) was endorsed drawing urgent attention 
to the shelter needs of the urban poor. In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Urban Development (UNCED)27, hosted in Rio de Janeiro, resulted in the Agenda 2 J, which gives 
27 Though itself not an initiative ofUNCHS (Habitat). 
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support to the tenets of the Global Shelter Strategy (among other international declarations) (UNCED, 
1992). Further declarations resulted from preparatory events leading to the 1996 Habitat n conference 
ofUNCHS (Habitat), such as the Recife Meeting on Urban Poverty held in March 1996, attended by 35 
countries. The resulting Recife Declaration (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996c), titled 'Urban Poverty: a World 
Challenge' includes, among its focus areas, the need to understand the unity and diversity of poverty, the 
need for new relationships with the poor, in order to transform public and private action, and a central 
role for local government (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996c). 
A more complex agenda resulted out of the Habitat II conference itself. The Habitat Agenda (UNCHS 
(Habitat), I 996b) only indirectly refers to informal settlements, focusing instead on enabling aspects 
such as building of local government capacity for governance and management, the reform of cadastral 
systems, streamlining ofland registration procedures, the revision of by-laws and building and planning 
standards - once addressed, these would ease informal settlement intervention as well as the release of 
new serviceable land and provision of affordable shelter. The twin approach of sites and services and 
slum upgrading is no longer promoted as the solution to informal settlement or urban poverty. Instead, 
the Habitat Agenda states 'there are no universal solutions that can be fairly applied' (UNCHS (Habitat), 
1996c:7). This lines up with the Best Practice initiative (or competition) of Habitat II, which invited 
developing country governments to document innovative and successful practices in areas such as 
poverty alleviation and shelter provision and submit these for scrutiny by a panel of experts which 
would select a list quali£Yingfor Best Practice awards to be presented at the conference. With the focus 
on sharing experiences, knowledge and skills, new initiatives were born out of the Habitat n 
conference, one being the International Forum on Urban Poverty (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996a). The 
theme of urban poverty thus remains a driving concern. 
The divergence between participation of South Africa and Brazil in the preparations for the Habitat II 
conference give a useful indication of the different extent to which debates on urban concerns have 
matured in the two countries. This then also places into context informal settlement intervention 
practice in each of the two countries. In South Africa the Minister of Housing, on request by the 
UNCHS (Habitat), took the lead in the South African preparations for the Habitat II conference (van 
Broembsen, 1999). Meetings were convened in the various provinces and a country Action Plan 
submitted, as requested. No South African publication is available on this plan28 or the initiative as a 
whole. Nor has it sparked much debate in civil society. 
28 In a recent telephone enquiry with the Ministry of Housing (November 1998), no information could 
be obtained regarding the South African preparations for Habitat II, nor initiatives leading from it. At a 
March 1999 conference van Broembsen (Director of Human Settlement Policy, National Department of 
Housing, Pretoria) presented the National Urban Development Framework as 'South Africa's response 
to the Habitat Agenda,' yet made no reference to the contents of the Habitat Agenda (van Broembsen, 
1999). The Urban Development Framework itself (Department of Housing, 1997), makes scant 
reference to the Habitat Agenda. The executive summary is introduced with a quote from Paragraph 5 
of the Habitat Agenda promoting cities as 'engines of growth', and its main text includes three Habitat 
Agenda slogans (,adequate shelter for all', 'the development of sustainable human settlements' and 
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Brazil, in tum has generated several publications, leading from active responses from civil society. The 
documentation of 'best practices' across Brazil, irrespective of their acceptance by the Habitat II 
selection committee, was compiled into a valuable resource on Brazilian urban practice, including the 
wide range of Brazilian informal settlement intervention (see Bonduki, 1996). The context of the 
intense Brazilian response to Habitat II was the Urban Reform Movemenf9, which disagreed with the 
government's Action Plan (in preparation for the Habitat II conference). This it saw as 'a sum of sectoral 
policies,' not reflecting the riclmess of the country's debate (Federal(ao Nacional dos Arquitetos e 
Urbanistas, 1996:22). It therefore turned the Habitat II conference into 'an unique opportunity for 
uniting sectors of the Brazilian society around the urban and housing issues' (Maricato, 1996: 10). As it 
had been sidelined in government's official elaboration o( an Action Plan, the urban reform movement 
developed its own proposals, negotiating these with the government. For the purpose of developing 
such proposals, it united religious, popular, class and non-governmental organisations in preparation for 
the Brazilian Conference on Habitat, with mobilisation through the four largest urban movements 
(Federal(ao Nacional dos Arquitetos e Urbanistas, 1996). The conference, focusing on the democratic 
management of cities, was the largest Brazilian meeting thus far regarding urban reform. Internal 
disputes within the urban movement were overcome by a common understanding of the political 
importance of the event (ibid.). The conference became the main topic of the local press, while 
international meetings brought the Brazilian discussion closer to the international debate and 'reaffirmed 
the rnaturity of the Brazilian position' (Federal(ao Nacional dos Arquitetos e Urbanistas, 1996:22). 
A further initiative (and resulting comprehensive publication - see UNCHS (Habitat), 1995), reflecting 
the riclmess in urban informal settlement intervention experience and debate in Brazil was a preparatory 
seminar titled 'Challenge of the Informal Town: Routes Towards the Integration of Peri-urban 
Settlements', organised jointly by organisations involved in favela upgrading in Belo Horizonte, 
including the Italian NGO A VSI, and supported by the UNCHS (Habitat) and the Italian government 
(UNCHS (Habitat), 1995). It reflects the debates on the social, legal, teclmological and managerial 
techniques that have been developed for the purposes of informal settlement intervention in Brazil. 
Unquestionably then, debate on the informal settlement question in South Africa, when compared to 
'people build cities' (ibid.: 1 ». However, it rnakes no reference to the urban poverty concerns arising 
from the international discourse I have alluded to thus far. Only brief reference is made to 'informal 
"shack" settlements' and their negative attributes (squalor, pollution, lack of infrastructure, social 
disintegration, crime, unemployment) under the heading 'Persistence of inequality and poverty' (ibid.:4). 
29 Souza (1999: 1) explains that Brazilian Marxist intellectuals had shifted from denouncing urban 
planning as an instrument of capitalist interests at the expense of the poor, to accepting 'in principle the 
representative democratic regime,' though not necessarily giving up 'their commitment to a radical 
transformation of society.' Thus progressive academics and town planners developed instruments of 
'urban reform,' as part ofa national movement with the purpose of influencing the content of the 1988 
constitution. While the 'front' of the Urban Reform Movement has since been transferred to municipal 
level, where, in accordance with the new constitution the challenges of poverty reduction have to be 
faced, nation-wide debates continue to take place (Souza, 1999:2). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
40 
Brazil, has indeed stagnated. Urban poverty,as a cross-sectoral concern, has yet to capture the attention 
of the South African government and civil society alike, and be applied to the question of informal 
settlement intervention. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Informal settlements may be viewed either as physical environments, deficient of basic infrastructure 
and services, or as complex and changing social processes that play themselves out in intricate spatial 
arrangements. The former view would have external agents intervene through provision of the lacking 
infrastructure and services, treating residents as passive recipients in technologically designed 
interventions. Primary concerns in the intervention would be around technological efficiency. The latter 
view would have agencies in close alliance with the residents, intervene by communicating with and 
encouraging organised residents' initiatives, recognising their endeavours for improvement, acting on 
their demands, while also responsive to their vulnerabilities. Its central concern would be to build long 
term capacity among the residents, for ongoing survival and upliftment. 
This chapter has examined how these opposing views and the associated approaches have been 
promoted internationally, discussing the role of a) Western academics in challenging the public housing 
approach in the late 1960s and early 1970s by presenting alternative intervention ideas, though with 
little reference to the political implications (as pointed out by Marxist critiques), and b) the World Bank 
in distorting these ideas into externally designed and technologically driven interventions in the form of 
the twin approach of sites and services and slum upgrading. Concerns for poverty alleviation at the time 
focused on rural areas, leaving urban informal settlement intervention in the realm of housing and 
infrastructure development. Subsequent shifts in World Bank policy incorporated growing concern in 
the international development community over the ineffectiveness of isolated sites and services and 
slum upgrading projects, thus incorporating them into a wider review for more supportive urban policy 
frameworks. A further shift came with the emergence, in the late 1980s, of urban poverty concerns, with 
a particular emphasis on understanding (and acting upon) poverty as a process rather than a physical 
condition. This led to the incorporation of urban poverty concerns into World Bank policy, which now 
no longer views informal settlements within the technocratic framework merely as technically deficient 
environments, but instead within the framework of urban poverty, thus recognising the complexity of 
social processes and the need to intervene responsively. 
While the World Bank does not discard its previous technocratic framework, still emphasising the 
importance of infrastructure delivery, it no longer promotes this as the solution to existing informal 
settlement. The Bank acknowledges that informal settlements are a manifestation of poverty, poverty in 
tum being associated with the adverse effects of structural adjustment. By ascribing to the concerns of 
the urban poverty debate in relation to informal settlements, the Bank implicitly separates informal 
settlement intervention from its policy component of boosting urban productivity {and thereby the 
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macro-economy) with which it associates infrastructure delivery. Implicitly, it supports alternative 
intervention for informal settlements that seeks to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. Such 
approaches have been developed in various countries, in alignment with the poor, and in opposition to 
the conventionally promoted technocratic intervention which serves the profit-making development 
sector. Being based on the concepts of urban poverty (though not necessarily consciously so), such 
intervention is diametrically opposed to the externally designed technologically driven sites and 
services and slum upgrading projects. Thus responsive, urban poverty oriented World Bank policy in 
the area of informal settlement may be regarded as mere rhetoric, in response to the intense concern 
over urban poverty in international platforms created by the UNCHS (Habitat). Indeed, the Bank 
continues to finance project-oriented and technologically and profit-driven informal settlement 
intervention, for instance in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Nevertheless, the Bank, through the Urban Management 
Programme collaboration, is committed to bringing its policies closer to the thinking in the UNCHS 
(Habitat) and UNDP. 
While such contradictions cause relatively slow change within structures such as the W orid Bank, the 
progressive sector of Brazilian society appears to be quite far ahead. Having developed an alternative 
approach to urban governance, and having conquered the political space, in a handful of municipalities, 
for the institutional framework to support this approach (which includes a particular form of informal 
settlement intervention) it has been able to consolidate and document a poverty-oriented and democratic 
experience which is gaining international recognition (see, for instance, Sandercock, 1998, and 
Douglass and Friedmann, 1998). Informal settlement intervention in South Africa in turn has stagnated 
around the paradigm of sites and services, which is imposed on informal settlements. There continues to 
be little will to depart from this simplistic framework (which creates much opportunities for the profit-
making development sector, which in its own interest is opposed to change) to, instead, implement the 
more responsive, and indeed more complex, twin approach of upgrading (as promoted by the World 
Bank since the 1970s). Even less is there awareness of the poverty concepts associated with 
vulnerability and resilience, and the support-based intervention approaches that would be built around 
these concepts. Thus in South Africa informal settlements continue to be conveniently perceived as 
technically deficient environments. While Part II of this study (Chapters 4 and 5) examines the 
development of such divergence in informal settlement intervention thinking (and experience) between 
South Africa and Brazil, bringing this in relation to the socio-political process in the two countries 
throughout the 20th century, the following chapter (3) picks up on the conventional World Bank 
promoted informal settlement upgrading approach, contrasting this with the alternative support-based 
approaches (from various countries) that have been acclaimed in the international literature. It refers to 
similar approaches in Brazil and attempts thereof in South Africa, noting however, that the latter have 
been distorted by the universal fixation on the housing product (a minimal house on an individual 
serviced plot), associated with the individual entitlement to a once-off capital subsidy and the powerful 
technocratic framework to which this is linked. 
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Chapter 3. International practice: imposed comprehensive upgrading versus support-based 
approaches 
3.1 Introduction 
Leading from the debates in the previous chapter, the point of departure in this chapter is that externally 
imposed replacement of informal settlements by standardised sites and services (with or without formal 
house structures) in the same or another location, is not a solution to existing informal settlements. Such 
intervention, though heavily subsidised, is generally not conceived of in the interest of the occupants, 
particularly where relocation involves freeing illegally occupied land for profitable development (see 
Durand-Lasserve and Pajoni, 1995:25). It takes account neither of intricate spatial and social 
arrangements and their relationship to the livelihoods of residents, nor of their ideas, initiatives and 
capacities for improvement. Instead then, this chapter examines those intervention approaches, 
acclaimed and evaluated in the international literature, that engage with the existing situation in 
informal settlements. As concluded in the previous chapter, two broad categories have emerged for such 
intervention. One is concerned primarily with the technological deficiencies, thus packaging a once-off 
physical intervention. For the purposes of this study it is referred to as comprehensive externally 
designed upgrading. The other is socially or radically inspired, concerning itself primarily with the 
people that experience the many and changing dimensions of poverty. This I refer to as support-based 
intervention l . Extending the enquiry of the previous chapter, the question here is: what is known about 
these approaches, that helps us think differently about the South African informal settlement 
intervention situation? 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the support-based category as an 'alternative' to the World Bank 
promoted twin approach of sites and services and slwn upgrading. I pointed out that these alternative 
approaches emerged in various developing countries with socially or radically oriented practitioners 
seeking solutions in close alliance with the poor, and since the late 1980s have been increasingly 
recognised and promoted internationally through the discourse on urban poverty. It is then through this 
focus on the complexities of urban poverty, that the comprehensive externally designed, and the 
support-based approaches have been subjected to evaluations in the international literature, questioning 
not only the effectiveness of cost and technologies, but also the social processes through which the 
intervention occurs, and which the intervention sets into motion, these being of direct relevance to the 
reduction of poverty. Other concerns in the evaluations have been the impediments to mainstreaming 
1 The term 'support paradigm' is used by those aiming to promote the merits of such alternative 
intervention as opposed to 'conventional thinking and planning approaches' - see Lankatilleke 
(1990:24). From the perspective of resident involvement, the support-based approaches have also been 
referred to as 'participatory', in contrast to the less participatory comprehensive upgrading - see Mitlin 
and Thompson, (1995). 
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the various approaches, in relation to the alarming scale of settlement outside of the official/legal 
framework. Inevitably, such evaluations examine the structure of government, its bureaucracies and 
frameworks. 
Among these alternative support-based approaches then, I differentiate between those initiated by 
government and those initiated by non-governmental organisations. The distinction is particularly 
relevant to questions regarding the appropriate institutional framework. While government-initiated 
support-based approaches are accommodated within some form of institutional framework, which may 
be evaluated, the NGO-initiated support programmes often operate outside of, and in opposition to, 
unresponsive institutional frameworks. Both government and NGO-initiated support-based approaches 
respond to and encourage collective initiatives of organised communities. The government-initiated 
support programmes have developed bureaucratic mechanisms to channel government resources into 
the support of such collective initiatives, whereas the NGO-initiated approaches depend on a) the 
resources of the poor, and b) external, mainly international, donor funding. The NGO-initiated 
approaches mostly do, however, work towards being appropriately institutionalised and thus towards 
securing government resources for cOl1l111unity-based initiatives. The obstacle in this regard is that the 
particular nature of their funding requirements is largely at odds with conventional bureaucratic 
procedures (see Anzorena, Bolnick, Boonyabancha et al., 1998) 
This chapter examines evaluations and discussions of approaches in the three categories I have 
mentioned (comprehensive externally designed upgrading, and government- and NGO-initiated 
support-based intervention). I present the main characteristics of each intervention category through a 
typical example from each. The Madras Slum Improvement Programme serves to illustrate externally 
designed comprehensive upgrading as promoted by the World Bank in the 1970s, components of the Sri 
Lankan Million Houses Programme serve to illustrate government-initiated support-based intervention, 
and the Orangi Pilot Project of Pakistan in tum serves to illustrate the characteristics ofNGO-initiated 
support-based intervention. Other cases documented in the international literature are drawn into my 
discussion to illustrate within each category the diversity, and in part the limitations. I further make a 
connection, within each category, to intervention experience in South Africa and in Brazil. I argue that 
in South Africa, all three approaches have been attempted or introduced, but have been distorted or 
restricted through the rigid framework of the once-off capital subsidy system. The support-based 
approaches in South Africa (both government- and NGO-initiated), though modelled on the 
international experience, have been unable to effectively address aspects of informal settlement 
improvement other than house construction once the settlement layout has been standardised. This 
argument I substantiate through the discussion of South African case studies in Chapter 7. In Brazil, in 
turn, experiences with informal settlement intervention in all three categories have been developed. I 
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make reference particularly to the case of Belo Horizonte, where limitations associated with the 
ambitious Alvorada Programme, an externally designed comprehensive upgrading prograrnrile, have led 
the municipality to develop institutional mechanisms for support-based alternatives. 
3.2 Externally designed comprehensive upgrading 
Externally designed comprehensive upgrading seeks, within a relatively short period, to transform an 
illegal and substandard environment to acceptable standards through a capital-intensive intervention. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the relevance of the approach has been questioned by academics and 
practitioners. On the one hand, problems inherent in the approach have prevented externally designed 
comprehensive upgrading from achieving its own objectives. Usually introduced through pilot projects 
to test or demonstrate technologies and approaches, it has seldom been replicable at the broader scale 
(Durand-Lasserve, 1998:238). On the other hand, it does not acknowledge the social reality in informal 
settlements. Sirivardana and Lankatilleke (1988:7) thus state that the approach is based on an 'implicit 
ideology of paternalism. social control and non-reciprocity between professionals and "helpees".' 
Although the approach, as promoted by the World Bank in the 1970s in parallel to sites-and-services, 
has been replaced within World Bank policy by less project-oriented urban reforms, comprehensive 
upgrading continues to be practised in many countries and fmanced by international agencies such as 
the World Bank. Much current favela upgrading in Brazil displays the very characteristics of the 1970s 
projects piloting comprehensive upgrading, whereas in South Africa many of the deterministic elements 
of this approach, which to a large extent are associated with the prescribed planning and 
implementation procedure, are encompassed in the current South African housing policy, although this 
does not promote in situ upgrading a  such. In this section I present the Madras Slwn Improvement 
programme in India as a typical model of comprehensive upgrading as promoted by the World Bank, 
while exploring adjustments that have been made to the approach through the cases of the George 
upgrade in Lusaka (Zambia), and in the Alvorada Programme in Belo Horizonte (Brazil). . 
The comprehensive upgrading model: Slum Improvement, Madras India 
The Madras Slwn Improvement Programme initiated in 1977 illustrates the classic components and 
sequence of comprehensive upgrading. The aim of the World Bank in funding the programme was, 
flrstly, to demonstrate feasibility and replicability of non-subsidised low"cost technology, and secondly, 
to reorient government policy in the housing sector. The programme relied on cost recovery (this 
comprising material, labour, contractor's proflt and government overheads) from the resident 
households via a deposit, monthly instalments and maintenance charges. (Hasan and Vaidya, 1986) 
The methodology applied by the metropolitan authority responsible for the Slwn Improvement 
Programme was as follows: Settlements were selected externally according to criteria such as location 
and physical condition. A cut-off date was set for household eligibility, barring newcomers from project 
I 
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benefits. Once identified for upgrading, the local leaders were given the task of promoting the 
programme, while the programme officials played the role of providers and the residents that of 
beneficiaries. A conventional planning and implementation approach was applied, commencing with the 
surveying of existing services and plots, and the enumeration of households. This formed the basis for 
an externally designed layout proposal presented to the residents for approval, followed by the 
estimation of the construction cost, official approval and formal tendering by contractors. The 
construction by contractors and service providers, and the signing of a lease agreement and associated 
payment of a deposit by the beneficiaries, preceded the formal hand-over of the project to the municipal 
corporation for maintenance. Accompanying the infrastructure upgrading were social programmes 
directed at small business development and maternal and child health care. Ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation remained the responsibility of the metropolitan authority. (Hasan and Vaidya, 1986). 
The critical evaluation of the Madras slum improvement experience by Hasan and Vaidya (1986) 
identifies the lack of involvement by the local community as the main factor responsible for limited 
success. Coupled with lack of capacity and co-ordination in the government departments, this has led to 
the deterioration of the programme's infrastructural benefits. Thus, as local level organisation was not 
developed, and residents were excluded from any responsibility in the upgrading process, the 
'beneficiaries' expected the authorities to take full responsibility for the maintenance. As a result then, 
the residents' commitment to regular payments was low. Hasan and Vaidya (1986) emphasise that, prior 
to the intervention, local community structures had indeed taken responsibility for a degree of 
maintenance and construction within the settlement, also collectively lobbying for land rights. The costs 
of these collective activities had been shared among the residents. Such initiative, however, had been 
thwarted by the Slum Improvement Programme. 
The characteristics of the Slum Improvement Programme, which to date comprises the mainstream 
approach to in situ upgrading of informal settlements in many countries, then are: a) external project 
identification; b) a project sequence starting with social and physical surveying, followed by design and 
cost estimation with some form of community consultation, and then conventional tendering and 
contractor delivery of civil worksz; and c) delivery of formal tenure as a means to tie residents into 
regular payments. Variations in other examples of comprehensive upgrading, to which I now turn, have 
been, either in the degree of involvement of the community after external project identification, or in the 
institutional arrangement through which the programmes are implemented, this including the manner in 
which settlements are incorporated into the legal framework. 
2 Sirivardana and Lankatilleke (1988:7) refer to this as a 'centralised project cycle', 
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Degree of resident involvement 
As the comprehensive upgrading methodology is essentially based on that of conventional infrastructure 
deliverl with the main difference being the presence of a resident population, the scope of resident 
involvement does not go beyond the promotion of the programme objectives4• Resident participation 
then serves two purposes, the flrst being to narrow the gap between those responsible for the planning 
decisions (planning and engineering professionals) and those living in the settlement. Rakodi 
(1981 :61 ,62) thus refers to the 'flow of information' from the residents to the planners to improve the 
planners' technical decisions, and from the planners to the residents to convince residents of the 
'rationality' and 'public interest' of the decision-making. In the Alvorada Programme (Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil, initiated in 1994) two innovations are applied to this end. On the one hand, detailed information 
gathering (requiring contact with each beneflciary household) and computerised data management have 
enabled design decisions to be more sensitive to the local social and physical conditions. On the other 
hand, the interdisciplinary professional team includes sodal workers as intermediaries between the 
programme and the residents. The social work component combines the development of community 
organisation (for collective resident participation), with individual beneflciary access to the project staff 
via a resident social worker, also providing access to socio-economic upliftment programmes (Novara, 
personal communication, 1997\ 
The second purpose of resident involvement is to ease project implementation. Beneficiary involvement 
~ in construction works is mainly practised not out of the principle of resident empowerment, but where it 
lis considered as contributing to the product-oriented project objectives6• This is illustrated by the partly 
(
liWOdd B.nk funded Gwrr.pu.ng. upg"de P'"g"nune in S'o P.ulo, wh"e the conINctm dnws. 
I i quota of labour from the resident population because this eases entry for the construction works into 
1:, less accessible sections of the settlement (Araujo, personal communication, 1997\ In the case of the if Alvorada Programme in Belo Horizonte it was said that while the employment of the local population in 
the construction activities is not enforced, contractors do give preference to local residents when 
recruiting labour. The labour recruitment agency run by the programme's social workers for the 
purposes of socio-economic upliftment, however, did not link up with the temporary employment 
3 Survey, planning/design, cost estimation, detailing, tendering, construction, hand-over. 
4 At a broad level such 'participation' has been severely critiqued, for instance by Azevedo (1998:264), 
. in contrast to frameworks that afford civil society a role in the defmition of policies and priorities. 
5 In 1997, Enrico Novara of the Italian NGO A VSI (Voluntary Association for International Service) 
was Co-ordinator of the Alvorada Programme which was being undertaken in partnership between the 
NGO, the Municipality ofBelo Horizonte and other organisations. 
6 An exception being South Afhcan policy, which explicitly prescribes local employment by contractors 
(Department of Housing, 1994:24). However, the meaningfulness of such a policy within a framework 
that denies residents' any defmition of intervention objectives (see case study discussion in Chapter 7) 
must be questioned. 
1 See footnote 19 of Chapter 2. 
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opportunities generated through the upgradirig works (Pinheiro and Andrade, personal 
communication, 19978). 
Clearly, there are benefits to resident participation within the continuum of comprehensive upgrading. 
These have been recognised and discussed in the literature. In the interesting, and much evaluated 
comprehensive upgrading of George settlement in Lusaka (Zambia)9, infrastructure construction took 
place partly through mutual self-help. Specially trained community development workers had the role of 
stimulating 'a process of self-detennination and self-help within the projects' through activities such as 
'mutual self-help trenc,h digging projects' (Jere, 1984:59,61). This, coupled with a strong tradition of 
mutual help in the settlement, was found to have encouraged the residents to take some responsibility 
for ongoing maintenance of the works when it became evident that the local authority did not have the 
capacity to fulfil its mandate (Rakodi, 1981). Similarly, in the case of the Kampung Improvement 
Programme in Surabaya, Indonesia, where construction was by outside contractors, some 
responsibilities, such as the planting of trees, were placed with the residents. Maintenance of the trees, 
communal baths and toilets and the collection of garbage were later handled by the residents on an 
ongoing basis (Silas, 1992). 
While the extent to which public participation is incorporated into development programmes depends 
partly on the degree to which the dominant political orientation supports participatory democracy, the 
structuring of external funding may be the decisive limitation to resident involvement. Both Rakodi 
(1981) and Jere (1984), in their evaluations of the upgrading of the George settlement in Lusaka, 
emphasise the need for greater flexibility in funding from organisations such as the World Bank, in 
order to allow for meaningful local participation. On the one hand, time schedules need to be flexible, 
as 'participation by residents can be time-consuming' (Jere, 1984:67, emphasis in the original). On the 
other hand, 'less detailed project planning and estimates' should be required before the signing ofloan 
agreements (Rakodi, 1981:77). While these recommendations were made in the early 1980s and official 
World Bank policy has been amended since (see Chapter 2), World Bank as well as government 
funding in many countries in the 1990s continues to be made available under tight time schedules and 
with prescribed planning and implementation procedures. In South Africa, the rigidity of the IDT 
(Independent Development Trust) capital subsidy scheme in the early 1990s (see Chapter 5) and 
currently the capital subsidy system of the 'incremental' housing policy have frustrated locally defmed 
objectives and approaches for in situ upgrading (see discussion on the attempted Besters Camp in situ 
upgrade, in Chapter 6). Similarly, the current World Bank funded comprehensive upgrading of 
8 Flavia Lucia Coelho Mota Pinheiro (Social Assistant) and Izabel de Andrade (Civil Engineer) w~re 
officials of the Belo Homonte Municipality's housing and upgrading company URBEL (Compauhia 
Urbanizadora de Belo Homonte), and in 1997 were working in the site office at favela Senhor dos 
Passos, the first settlement to benefit from the physical improvements of the Alvorada Programme. 
9 See for instance Jere (1984), Rakodi and Schlyter (1981), Schlyter (1987), Martin (1987), Martin and 
Ledogar (1977), Pasteur (1979). 
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numerous favelas in the Guarapiranga basin (the (";'",,,,,,,,,,,i,,,,,,,,,,. PrO~it"rumrle), as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, sidelined resident participation due to time constraints lmIPO!.ed thrlou,!h the civil 
works pro~ammes (Araujo, personal communication, 1997).10 
A further limitation associated with the conventional finance mechanisms of comprehensive externally 
designed intervention is related to the need for a cost estimation before finance is 
approved. This, with the external selection of settlements for leads to the denial to the 
resident population of information on official intentions to in the case of the state (or 
provincially) funded up~ading of the favela Fim de Semana in Sao 
section of the settlement were busy in concrete and brick 
, residents in the densest 
,..,....,,, .. ("JI""n .. "IT~ to their homes, while 
planning consultants (on their drawing boards) were Identl1tYltlg the very same area as particularly 
insalubrious, therefore proposing removal and the relocation of the affected residents within the 
project area. The plartning and social work '"'VI''''''''''''''''', wary were unable to 
inform the residents ofthe 1.1''''01'''",," intervention until such time as the construction costs were estimated 
(on the basis of their proposal) and the n .. u,yLt.,F. al,nr,l'Iv/,,1"I . Rakodi mentions a similar dilemma with the 
George up~ade in Lusaka, where '[iJt was considered desirable not to raise the expectations of 
squatters, who had been nrClml<;:l'fl uPJ~aarnlg on ....... ""nc u""""",,,,,uU", before the loan funds were 
guaranteed to be available, and so decisions on 
taken by the project planners' \"'''',,"V''', 1981 
cornp()nents and mode of implementation were 
Rakodi qUC:Stl~lns the value of the information on 
resident priorities which the plalnn,ers of the ""VF,'"'''' derived from ,""',VUUUI sources such as 
documented political activity by the rp",np'nt" media --•• "t"~'l:>~' selHlleln nrOtlects and an earlier 
sample survey. She argues that this could not suc:ce~;sttlll)l direct consultation with the residents 
(ibid.). 
It appears then that are signitllcallt obstacles to meaningful resident involvement within the 
framework of comprehensive """'"""",':1 "'"""'i"'''''''' ulpgramng. From the following section, it becomes 
evident that even where to institutional arrangements for such upgrading, 
key aspects of the approach remain u.ru;uccesisfilil. this ""~, ....... rtu .. .,, the need to explore alternatives. 
10 It should be noted that liberal arguments continue to be put forward in support of extending 
conventional methods of project elaboration and execution into informal settlements, see for instance 
Pamuk and Cavallieri's (1998:459) evaluation of the Favela-Bairro Programme in Rio de Janeiro. 
II This settlement was to be as a pilot of the programme 'Sanear Sao Paulo' of 
SABESP (Saneamento Basieo do Estado de Slio Paulo - Basic Sanitation of the State of Sao Paulo) 
(Scazutka, personal communication, 1997 - Mauro Scazufka was an architect with the consultancy 
Diagonal, tasked in 1997 with the and cost estimation for the physical upgrading of Favela 
Fim de Semana). 
12 This contradiction was out on a site visit to favela Fim de Semana, Sao Paulo, 1 L 7.97, with 
the staff of the ~~~._ .. 1'. __ 
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Institutional arrangements 
In the evaluation of the Madras Slum Improvement Programme discussed earlier, the problem oflack of 
capacity and co-ordination within government was raised. I now examine two institutional responses to 
this and other bureaucratic demands of comprehensive upgrading, one from the George upgrade in 
Lusaka and one related to the Alvorada Programme in Belo Horizonte, before turning to the demands of 
comprehensive upgrading on the regulatory and tenure frameworks. 
The challenge of co-ordinating between the different sectors involved in the comprehensive upgrading 
intervention was addressed in the case of the George upgrade in Lusaka in the 1970s by creating a 
separate Housing Project Unit within the City Council. The purpose of this unit was to avoid 'the usual 
local government bureaucracy,' and to enable resident participation (Jere, 1984:59). However, the hand-
over of the completed projects from the Housing Project Unit to the City Council was not successful, 
one reason being the lack of funds for ongoing maintenance (Jere, 1984:64). As participation through 
the unit had not gone beyond the agendas of the project management (though I made mention above of 
some mutual self-help implementation), the residents had not acquired the necessary skills to take full 
responsibility for the maintenance of the infrastructure themselves. Both Schlyter (1981) and Jere 
(1984) in their evaluations of the George upgrade identify this problem, relating it, on the one hand, to 
the lack of resident involvement (which I referred to above) and, on the other hand, to the lack of 
appropriate institutional reform. 
The institutional context of the Alvorada Programme in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, then is an example of 
relatively far reaching institutional reform to accommodate comprehensive infonnal settlement 
upgrading. I will briefly review the steps in this reform, before turning to those institutional aspects of 
comprehensive upgrading in Belo Horizonte that have remained unresolved. In 1983 pressure from civil 
society, in association with unique political circumstances, had led to the passing of a municipal law in 
Belo Horizonte for the regularisation of favelas (Lei PROF A VELA - Program a Municipal de 
Regulariza<;iio de Favelas), introducing a land use zoning categoryl3 that recognised favela residents' 
rights to the land they occupied (see Afonso and Azevedo, 1987, and Fernandes, 1993). While the 
favela movement (which included the influential Pastoral de Favelas, an initiative of the progressive 
arm of the Catholic Church) set a 10 year target for the regularisation of the city's 120 favelas 
(Bernareggi, personal communication, 1997 (4), lack of political will, coupled with complicated 
bureaucratic procedures, was delaying implementation (Afonso and Azevedo, 1987). Problems 
experienced with the ad hoc titling of land had led to the adoption of integrated intervention in the form 
of comprehensive upgrading. This in turn required intersectoral co-ordination, which under the existing 
13 Originally this zoning was termed Special Sector 4, (Prefeitura Municipal de Belo Horizonte, 1985), 
but is now referred to as Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social - ZEIS (Special Zones of Social Interest) 
(Bede, personal communication, 1997, see footnote 20). The original cut-off date for favelas included 
in this zoning was in 1981. In 1986 it was extended to include more recent land invasions (ibid.). 
14 Father Bernareggi was Co-ordinator of the Pastoral de Favelas in Belo Horizonte until its crumbling 
in 1986. He has remained strongly committed to its revival. 
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. bureaucratic system further slowed down implementation. The favela movement responded, on the one 
hand, by requesting technical support from a Catholic NGO A VSI from Italy (Bernareggi, personal 
communication, 1997). On the other hand, it proposed the creation of a separate public body charged 
with the implementation of the PROFA VELA Law (Afonso and Azevedo, 1987: 134). This resulted in 
the creation, in 1985, of URBEL (Companhia Urbanizadora de Belo Horizonte - Upgrading Company 
of Belo Horizonte). 
Various circumstances then led to the elaboration of a comprehensive upgrading approach within the 
municipal upgrading company URBEL. While the Italian NGO was initially working in alliance with 
the Pastoral de Favela movement, the disbanding of the same in 198615 led to an alliance, instead, 
between the Italian NGO (A VSI) and URBEL. Thus favela intervention was no longer controlled by 
public demand. Instead, URBEL and A VSI worked towards improving the upgrading approach, 
recognising major advancement in data capturing and management through the introduction of GIS 
(geographic information systems) technology. The victory of the PT (Workers' Party) in the 1993 
municipal elections in Belo Horizonte in turn led to a political commitment to the implementation of the 
PROF A VELA Law. In this context, the Brazil-Italy co-operation was seen as an opportunity for 
piloting, in three favelas within the municipality, the GIS-supported comprehensive upgrading 
methodology. This then took form in the Alvorada Programme (Novara, personal communication, 
1997). The programme is in part funded by the Italian government (URBEL, 1996). 
Based on the tenets of the PROF A VELA Law, the Alvorada Programme intervention recognises the 
rights of favela occupants to legalisation of their residence in the favela. Where geo-technical risks 
(primarily due to occupation on steep slopes) or the introduction of access routes (which double up for 
service reticulation) require the removal of some of the existing houses, their relocation is guided by the 
principles of a) minimising social disruption by relocating affected residents within the settlement or as 
nearby as possible, b) involving affected residents in the decisions over the place and form of 
relocation, c) basing the size of the reconstructed dwelling on the size of the original dwelling (subject 
to minimum standards) and d) providing temporary housing in the interim (Capitanio, personal 
communication, 199i6). While sound in principle, such housing tenets comprise an ambiguous cost 
factor in a project-based intervention, as their expense is quantifiable only once geo-technical tests are 
IS This is associated with the order by a newly elected conservative Bishop (believed to be acting in the 
interest of the land speculating class which was increasingly threatened by the consequences of the 
PROFA VELA Law), that the city-wide network of ecclesiastic base communities in favelas (the 
Pastoral de Favelas) be dismantled and recreated according to new district boundaries of the Church -
none of the districts had the capacity to maintain the ecclesiastical base community (CEB) structures in 
favelas, once the city-wide structure was dismantled (Bernareggi, personal communication, 1997). 
16 Giorgio Capitanio, an architect with the NGO A VSI in 1997, was involved in the planning and 
implementation of the Alvorada Programme. 
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undertaken, infrastructural designs elaborated, and decisions made over the partial relocation. A further 
cost ambiguity is caused by unforeseen delays in project implementation, requiring extension to the 
time span for which temporary housing is provided and managed (ibid.). 
Delays in the implementation of the Alvorada programme in Belo Horizonte were a cause for concern 
to URBEL and to the Italian NGO. The pilot projects were intended to be completed in the three-year 
period from 1994 to 1997, however, in 1997 physical implementation was underway only in one of the 
three settlements. Several factors were being associated with the delay in implementation, these leading 
to rethinking on the question of appropriate intervention. Besides political interference in the transfer of 
national funding via the State of Minas Gerais to the Municipality ofBelo Horizonte (Valdares and 
Alvarenga, personal communication, 199i\ funding shortages were ascribed to unanticipated costs in 
the intervention. The required relocation of 10 to 15% of households in order to carry' through 
infrastructure upgrading was established only after initial budgeting (Jacinto, personal communication, 
1997 18). The latter experience again places in question, the appropriateness of applying a conventional 
infrastructure delivery procedure or project cycle (preliminary planning and cost estimation followed by 
funding approval and then implementation) to informal settlement intervention that aims to be socially 
responsive. The cost ambiguity was then amplified by the ambitious scale of the pilot project, which 
sought to reach 4 400 households (Valdares and Alvarenga, personal communication, 1997). Further, it 
was recognised that, in the quest for broad-based political support, there is a tendency within 
administrations to spread resources thinly over a large number of favelas, rather then concentrating 
resource allocation in a few individual settlements (Novara, personal communication, 1997). While 
other concerns, such as the lack of professional capacity and procedural norms were being creatively 
addressed by URBEL and the NGO A VSI, who were arranging training and research through a 
partnership with the Pontifical (Catholic) University of Minas Gerais (Novara. personal communication, 
1997), the umesolved concerns over resources had led both URBEL and A VSI to explore alternatives 
to comprehensive upgrading. This thinking I return to below, under government-initiated support-based 
approaches. 
In the case of Belo Horizonte, I mentioned regulatory reform through the adoption of the PROFA VELA 
Law. This law, when applied to favela areas, recognises permanent but officially substandard houses 
and layouts, exempting them from the general planning standards and norms that regulate urban 
development, and replacing these with special norms issued by decree, together with the approved 
spatial plan (which is based, as far as is practical, on the existing land-use in the settlement) (Prefeitura 
Municipal de Belo Horizonte, 1985). Similarly then, in the case of the George upgrade in Lusaka, 
Zambia, popular building standards were accommodated by declaring the settlements "improvement 
areas", in which the official Zambian building regulations did not apply' (Schlyter, 1981 :51). The 
17 Pio XI Procopio de Alvarenga, was Director ofURBEL in 1997. Jessica Valdares was Co-ordinator 
of the Planning Section. 
18 Claudinea Ferreira Jacinto was Co-ordinator of the Alvorada Programme at URBEL in 1997. 
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flexibility in land use in these areas was further maintained by issuing to residents 'a license 
the to occupy the land on which their houses were standing for a period of thirty (ibid.:50). 
The 'absence of defmed plot boundaries' enabled the continuity of the particular use of domestic space 
that had n .. ,~ .. II"In,,'n in the informal settlements of Lusaka (ibid.:51). 
The innovative tenure arrangement in the Lusaka upgrade stands in contrast to the cumbersome 
conventional of individual freehold titles to informal settlement households. Durand-
Lasserve (1998:244) points out that security of tenure, from a 'conventional n"'r·"n~·,..tiv"'· is 
'achieved and complex procedures.' It is widely held that full individual title is 
'the residents of illegal settlements would prefer a :>VlI.",,';'U rrl .... 11"0 their 
basic """'I'TIPlnt of freedom of the fear of eviction' (Durand-Lasserve, 1998:244). Thus the decision to 
deliver individual freehold title infavela regularisation in Belo Horizonte in response to pressure from 
movement, pnJD<:I.DlY occurred in the absence of any viable official alternative. Fernandes 
19) criticises the 'lack " .. ,."tn/1TV in formulating legalisation POlllCII:S in where '[m]ost 
solutions are still deeply conditioned by ""'J.UU.II,,' ideas of individual nrt\n .. ·1'1v 
ownCI'Smp, when the collective dynamics oflife in favelas suggests 11 ''tt''.r ... .t still 
The expense LVAumu""cuf, tenure (be it through a leasehold or freehold has 1"."""""'''-1' been 
the need to tie households into the system, which allows the collection 
payments. However, as in the case of the Madras Slum Improvement mentioned such cost 
recovery has been low. In the case of the up~,.a(le in .I. • .<I.';)".!I.<;I., low '--J'''-'''' rates are 
ascribed to various factors. Jere (1984) lists 'inadequate debt collection """"'111.11"" IH""UULY of some 
residents to pay even if they wanted to; poor maintenance of services by of 
certain services which had been promised; lack of continued community eOlJlcatlon and ineffective 
sanctions against defaulters' (Jere, 1984:67). Rakodi (1981) adds 'the unfairness' of the 
the 'lack of a tradition of payment,' and the contradictions between the multiple roles 
of politicians who were needing to secure votes, advocate 'for more efficient service provision,' and 
collect debt (Rakodi, 1981 :75,76). Bringing the l""l-U~lYHJl<:1 in relation to the social concerns 
associated with urban poverty that I discussed in the previous (1981 :75) notes that a 
high proportion of the residents would have to on other essential in order to 
make pajrmems. Schlyter (1981 :51) <;lUVU":>l:>o;;;;:> the detrimental nutritional compromises this 
may lead to, while Asthana (I 994:69), reviewing mt~:gra,ted slum unrlrmreITlent in Visakhapatnam, 
raises concern over indebtedness of the nn,r>r .. "t households and associated (1!Sp13tCelme:nt and 
gerltnUc~ltlon. In the case ofBelo H"lri7 .... nl~'" a ...... L".''"'''. GVlrlaEnIC mll)acts on the recovery of costs from 
beneficiaries. Politicians, wary COI1Stlltu~:ncy, were resisting the 
19 Note that page numbering is based on the authors' draft manus,crilPt and might not correspond with the 
forthcoming published version. 
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enforcement of property tax payments after the expiry of the five year exemption after upgrading (as 
stipulated in the PROFAVELA Law, see Prefeitura Municipal de Belo Horizonte, 1985). The same 
non-enforcement applied to the payment of the small symbolic sum that beneficiary households were to 
make at hand-over of the property title. Government subsidisation in this case was not planned. Instead, 
it was the outcome of the political reality of clientelism (Bede, personal communication, 1997, 19992°). 
With growing evidence of the serious shortcomings of comprehensive upgrading as practised in the 
cases referred to above, there is a need to consider alternatives. I have mentioned that such a 
reconsideration was taking place in the municipality ofBelo Horizonte. I return to its contents in more 
detail below. At a more general level, there has been a call for the current debate to 'break with 
traditional urban and land upgrading which has dominated this century' - instead, it is suggested that the 
city be viewed differently, 'considering it essentially as the product of the urban society which inhabits 
it' (Durand-Lasserve and Tribillon, 1995 :35). This then challenges externally defmed upgrading 
procedures, and the conventional institutional frameworks to which they are tied. While not condoning 
the urban society that produces informal settlements, the position in this study is, that the alternative 
support-based approaches to informal settlement intervention, both government and NGO-initiated, 
must be considered, as they constitute a fundamental break with conventional thinking and practice. 
Realistically acknowledging informal settlements as products of the urban society, these approaches 
intervene to strengthen the societal position of their inhabitants on an ongoing basis, rather than 
submitting them to once-off physical upgrading through externally defmed procedures. 
3.3 Government-initiated support-based intervention 
It is then partly the direct experience of shortcomings with conventional comprehensive upgrading that 
has led administrations to explore alternative informal settlement intervention approaches. This has 
meant a departure from the conventional project cycle or procedure for a once-off physical intervention 
designed externally and delivered by commercial contractors. Instead, the intervention is broken into 
individual components that may be managed from within organised settlement communities. In this 
section I discuss the support-based experience of the National Housing Development Authority of Sri 
Lanka2! as a model of government-initiated support-based intervention. Its particular relevance to the 
current intervention situation in South Africa is related to an initiative within the South African national 
Ministry of Housing, that is developing a support-based housing approach as alternative to the 
mainstream housing delivery by commercial contractors. This initiative is advised by Lalith 
Lankatilleke (seconded to the South African Ministry of Housing by the UNCHS (Habitat), and also 
20 In 1997, Monica Cadaval Bede was Technical Director at URBEL. Currently, in 1999, she is 
secretary of the Municipal Council for Urban Policy in Belo Horizonte. 
21 Mitlin and Thompson (1995:243) refer to this as' [o]ne of the most comprehensively documented 
examples of participatory methods in urban development.' 
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heading the People's Housing Partnership Trust in South Africa), who has direct experience as Deputy 
General Manager of Urban Housing Development in the National Housing Development Authority in 
Sri Lanka. 
The divergence between the Sri Lankan approach and that implemented to date in South Africa (the 
latter focusing on house construction through the capital subsidy) gives some indication of the 
constraints ofthe policy framework in South Afric~. The development of Brazilian support-based 
approaches, and its association with' oppositional politics, in tum gives insight into the political 
challenges related to the institutionalising of support-based intervention approaches (here I discuss 
innovations of the Workers' Party (PT) local administrations in Sao Paulo and Belo"Horizonte). I pursue 
this theme in greater detail in Part II of this study, where I compare the socio-political evolution in 
Brazil and South Africa in relation to informal settlement intervention throughout the 20th century. My 
argument in doing so is that for support-based intervention to be seriously considered, the debate must 
be lifted above the mere merits oftecbniques (which is the focus of this chapter) to take into account the 
socio-political dimensions around which the official adoption of alternative intervention approaches 
hinge. 
Support-based intervention through the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka 
Within the Million Houses Programme of the Sri Lankan National Housing Development Authority, 
support-based intervention is divided into separate processes. The three sub-components discussed here 
are Community Action Plamring (land regularisation and 'blocking out' or layout planning), Community 
Contracts (the construction of collective infrastructure) and the People's Housing Process (house 
construction). By separating these activities, and submitting each to a people driven process, a break is 
made with the characteristics of once-off comprehensive upgrading, namely external project 
identification, the conventional project cycle, and the rigid procedures and time frames related to 
comprehensive cost estimation. 
The concept of , support' in this intervention approach is described by Sirivardana and Lankatilleke 
(1988: 15) as covering 'a wide-ranging variety of non-dominating but facilitating processes, which assist 
the local bodies, communities and families in playing the deciding and doing roles.' This requires a 
'non-dominating and sensitive professionalism of supporting individuals and groups, ... the opposite of 
the traditional, packaged, all-knowing professionalism, where the bureaucrat and teclmocrat have all the 
answers' (ibid.: 19). It also requires community development, which spans across the different 
components of the programme, with the formalisation of existing leadership into community 
development councils (CDCs) formally recognised in the policy of the Urban Housing Sub-programme. 
CDCs are given general roles of organising community matters, primary health care, savings and other 
economic issues (ibid.:6), as well as specific roles in relation to the three support-based components 
covering layout plaIUling, the construction of communal infrastructure and the building of houses. 
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Institutional restructuring for this support-based or participatory approach entailed the formation of 
Housing and Community Development Committees at municipal level, charged with programming and 
monitoring. At the national level, it entailed the development of small housing loan packages, as well as 
guidelines and procedures for local authorities charged with the implementation (Sirivardana and 
Lankatilleke, 1988). I now tum to the concept of support in relation to each of the three support-based 
components of the Sri Lankan Million Houses Programme. 
- Land regularisation through 'community action planning': The support-based approach to the legal 
defmition of land rights within the Million Houses Programme is through community action planning. 
This commences with the defmition of planning principles and technical guidelines with the community 
via workshop interaction. Once it is ensured that all residents understand the agreed principles, layout 
planning is undertaken on the ground. This entails decision-making between neighbours over the exact 
positioning of boundaries, with officials giving technical assistance during this process. The physical 
dimensions are subsequently verified by the officials against the collectively agreed-upon layout 
principles, before land surveyors record measurements, place permanent boundary markers, number the 
plots and prepare cadastral plans for the registration of title deeds. The community-based layout 
planning also entails the alignment of roads, the placement of toilets and wells, the placement of refuse 
bins (determined by women as the direct users), the reticulation of electricity (guided by an engineer), 
and the placement of public buildings and open space. (National Housing Development Authority, 
1988) 
Clearly this approach is time consuming for both residents and those officials that are directly involved. 
The National Housing Development Authority (1988), however, found this justified for two reasons. 
One, the process as a whole was found to be faster than the conventional external planning procedures. 
Two, residents were found to be satisfied with their direct involvement in detailed layout decision-
making, an aspect that beneficiaries of comprehensive externally designed upgrading are largely denied. 
- Construction of collective infrastructure though 'community contracts': The support-based approach 
to the construction of collective infrastructure is through the direct awarding of construction contracts to 
organised community groups (Community Development Councils - CDCs), thus heavily relying on trust 
in the ability of residents to effectively take on responsibilities that, with conventional comprehensive 
upgrading, are placed in the hands of commercial contractors. Indeed, it was lack of trust in commercial 
contractors, with a record of high profit margins and low quality of work, that led the National Housing 
Development Authority to opt for the awarding of construction contracts to community groups 
(Pathirana and Sheng, 1992). 
The community contract procedure allows CDCs, jointly with the National Housing Development 
Authority, to identify construction projects, these being individual civil works, for instance a 
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conununity facility, drain or footpath, with a limit on the maximum cost. A bill of quantities and cost 
estimate are drawn up for individual construction projects by the authority, which then invites the CDCs 
into a contract. Once this is signed, a conununity fund is established. After introductory training 
workshops the CDC is given the freedom to recruit and pay skilled labour at its own discretion. The 
CDC may draw labour from local residents, from outside, or may sub-contract the entire work to others. 
Payments are made by the National Housing Development Authority to the CDC in accordance with the 
phases of work, and subject to the authority's satisfaction thereof. (Pathirana and Sheng, 1992) 
As with the support-based approach to land regularisation or layout planning, this approach to basic 
infrastructure delivery was found to be faster than delivery by conunercial contractors, as it excludes 
tender procedures. Likewise, resident satisfaction was found to be high. Indeed, the National Housing 
Development Authority found the majority of the work to be of good quality. Beyond time and quality, 
other direct benefits to residents and the authority could be identified. Residents were afforded the 
opportunity for temporary labour, for the development of skills and, if the contract work was profitable, 
for reinvestment in further collective improvements. To the authorities, in tum, it was beneficial that 
ongoing responsibility for the constructed facilities was remaining successfully with the CDC. Such 
responsibilities comprise the collection of money from the users, organisation of cleaning and repairs 
and notification of the municipality when necessary, for instance for the collection of sewerage (by 
truck). An important contrast then to conventional once-off upgrading intervention is that investment in 
conununity development and training through the conununity contracting system sets in motion a long-
term process of settlement improvement. (Pathirana and Sheng, 1992) 
- House construction through the 'People's Housing Process': The support-based house construction 
approach of the National Housing Development Authority is based on the recognition that the 
production of the majority of housing is in the absence of government intervention, thus through a 
'people's housing process' (Sirivardana and Lankatilleke, 1988). Rather than to parallel this with a 
government process of housing production, the decision was taken to give government support to the 
existing process, primarily through information and training. In contrast to the conventional top-down 
dissemination of educational material such as posters and pamphlets, the Housing Information Service 
developed practical tools to assist families with budgeting, construction and small loan repayment 
(ibid.). Self-construction to lower than conventional standards was legalised through a provision in the 
building regulations. Where settlements have been regularised through Conununity Action Planning, 
specific building codes, and the means through which they are to be enforced, are formulated with the 
conununity representatives (Mitlin and Thompson, 1995:244). 
Of the three support-based components of the Sri Lankan Million Houses Progranune, the People's 
[t Housing Process has been incorporated into the South African national Housing Ministry, and 
1 developed into a workable alternative to housing delivery by conunercial contractors. It appears that in 
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South Africa, as in the docwnented case of Sri Lanka, unsatisfactory delivery by commercial 
.contractors led the national housing authority to increasingly rely on community-based construction 
(through the People's Housing Process) as a means to reaching its housing target (see Patrurana and 
Sheng, 1992:4). A significant distinction between the official people's housing processes in the two 
countries, however, lies in the system offmancial support. The South African People's Housing Process 
is moulded to the dictates of the once-off capital subsidy, while in the Sri Lankan case a longer-term 
support is provided through credit. It is then also the dictates of the capital subsidy system and the 
associated regulatory framework that have prevented the govenunent-initiated support approach to 
function as a form of informal settlement intervention in South Africa. Instead, as will be evident in the 
case study discussion in Chapter 722, informal settlements are replaced by an externally planned 
standardised layout, and infrastructure is delivered though the commercial contract procedure, before 
housing support is permitted to take place. Thus the conventional project cycle or procedure in South 
Africa has not been successfully challenged. Understandably then, Community Action Planning and 
Community Contracting, as in the Sri Lankan support-based intervention, have as yet not found space in 
the South African informal settlement intervention framework. It is relevantthen to turn to the very 
different framework, both from South Africa and from Sri Lanka, within which govenunent-initiated 
support-based approaches to informal settlement intervention have found space in Brazil. 
Government-initiated support-based intervention in Brazil 
As with the Sri Lankan experience, the benefits of a support-based approach in Brazil have been found 
to lie in rapid production, quality of workmanship and level of organisational capacity obtained within 
the community associations (Bonduki, 1993:57). However, the institutionalisation of support-based 
development approaches in Brazil did not emerge merely out of pragmatism on the side of central 
govenunent, as appears to be the case in South Africa (with the People's Housing Process), and as the 
docwnentation on the Sri Lankan Million Houses Programme suggests. Instead in Brazil a support-
based, community-controlled approach was developed out of strong demand by housing movements 
(Bonduki, 1993). Thus the concept of'auto-gestiio' (self-management), giving organised communities 
control over all aspects of their development, was first developed in the early 1980s within the housing 
movements of Sao Paulo, out ofan awareness of the exploitative aspects of self-construction (Le. use of 
future occupants' labour) in externally designed and managed development projects (ibid.). This then 
led to 'a collective process of production of an entire residential area, managed by a co-operative or 
community organisation charged with all aspects of the productive process' (ibid.:57 - my translation 
from Portuguese). 
Politically, the self-management concept was coupled with an awareness of the housing crisis, and of 
the need to create autonomous space for community organisation (Bonduki, 1993), these being 
concerns of the left-oriented PT (Workers Party), which had been formed in 1980 (see Abers, 1996). 
22 Particularly in the case of the Gunguluza settlement in Uitenhage. 
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The self-management concept was therefore first institutionalised at local government level in those 
municipalities over which the PT gained control through municipal elections. In Sao Paulo this 
occurred with the Erundina administration (PT) from 1989-1992 and was subsequently discontinued 
with a swing back to more conservative municipal policy (see Denaldi, 1997; Bonduki, 1993). In the 
municipality of Diadema23 in turn, the PT won control of the municipality as early as 1983, with several 
consecutive PT administrations allowing for relative continuity of the self-management approach 
(Denaldi, 1995). While self-management was originally piloted for new housing areas (Bonduki, 1993), 
it was applied to favela intervention with the first PT administration in Diadema (1983-1988) (Denaldi, 
1995). As the approach relies on high levels of community mobilisation, self-managed intervention is 
not viable in all favelas. Therefore, it is offered as an option to externally managed construction, be it 
through external labour or through the involvement of local residents in the construction (Denaldi, 
Bagnariolli and Klink, 1997). 
The overall approach then to informal settlement intervention in Diadema was not that of 
comprehensive upgrading in a small number of pilot projects, but instead gradual intervention through 
community managed processes in a large number of settlements (Denaldi et at., 1997:46). For this 
purpose, the first PT administration of Diadema introduced a law to allow for land use concessions to 
favela residents, while its successor introduced Special Zones of Social Interest exempting favela 
intervention from conventional development standards (Denaldi, 1995), as pioneered in the 
Municipality of Belo Horizonte in the form of the PROF A VELA La~4. Through such institutional 
means, the 1989 to 1992 administration of Diadema supported (with municipal resources and not 
external or foreign fmance) intervention in 80 different favelas (Denaldi, 1995). 
In 1997 the Workers' Party aligned administration in Belo Horizonte was reflecting on its experience 
with comprehensive externally designed (and internationally subsidised) intervention through the 
Alvorada Programme, which as mentioned above had, at the time, led to physical intervention in only 
one of three settlements. Within the municipality, self-management for the development of new housing 
areas had already been institutionalised and implemented in association with the annual participatory 
budget allocation process (Orfamento Participativo), whereby housing demand is channelled into a 
decision-making process involving organised civil society and local government. This budget allocation 
process occurs through a series of well-publicised public meetings in which development projects are 
proposed and elected by organisations of civil society, thus contributing to transparent administration 
23 Diadema is one of the important cities in the industrialised region of Sao Paulo referred to as ABeD 
('D' standing for 'Diadema'). It was out of the metal worker's union militancy in this region that the PT 
(Workers' Party) was born, thus Diadema became one of the strongholds of the Workers' Party 
throughout the 1980s and up to 1996, when the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB - Partido Socialista 
Brasileiro) won the municipal elections (see Sader and Silverstein, 1991; Kowarick and Singer, 1994; 
Saule Jr., 1998) - in Chapter 5, I discuss the particular local government context which allowed the PT 
to take win control over Diadema in 1983. It may be noted that in 1996, 30% of Diadema's population 
was living in favelas (Saule Jr., 1998:13). 
24 As mentioned above, also see Fernandes (1993). 
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and dialogue between civil society and local government (Bretas, 1996; Souza, 1999). However, in 
1997 self-managed projects (with resources procured through the participatory budget process) had as 
yet not been applied as a form of informal settlement intervention in Bel0 Horizonte (Magalhaes and 
Puertas, personal communication, 199725). To enable this shift, the municipality, in collaboration with 
the Italian NGO A VSI and its CAD and GIS computer technology, was developing a broad brush 
holistic plan ('plano globaf) for each favela26, based on a preliminary survey, and identifying the broad 
technical constraints and opportunities around which community-based organisations can then articulate 
individual development projects, e.g. drainage works, water reticulation roads, steps, pavements etc. 
(Bede, personal communication, 1997). 
In South Africa it was the absence of any such government-initiated support-based housing intervention 
in the early 1990s that led to the formation of an NGO-initiated support-based approach through the 
People's DialoguelHomeless People's Federation alliance, modelled largely on Asian experience. As 
evident from South African case studies discussed in Chapter 7, this approach in South Africa is largely 
restricted by the capital subsidy framework, from achieving support-based informal settlement 
intervention other than house construction once the settlement has been formally replanned and 
infrastructure delivered through an externally managed process. It is relevant then, to contrast the South 
African NGO-initiated support-based experience with that developed in other contexts. It is to these that 
I now tum. 
3.4 NGO-initiated support-based intervention 
Governments commonly cause two key problems for informal settlement residents and their community 
organisations. One is the vacuum created by non-intervention, with residents facing either ignorance or 
hard-handed repression. Even in cities where governments have articulated comprehensive upgrading 
programmes, these seldom reach more than a small percentage of informal settlements, leaving many to 
their own devices or struggling against eviction. The other is the social damage caused by inconsistent 
intervention. Due to the heavy reliance on external fmance be it national or international, 
comprehensive upgrading may be discontinued when such funding is delayed or cut as a result of 
political changes. A documented example of such damage is from the Barrio San Jorge in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, where constant political change had resulted in little continuity in social policies and 
intervention. This had caused discouragement and resignation among low-income groups (Hardoy and 
Hardoy with Schusterman, 1991). 
2S Maria Cristina Fonseca Magalhaes was Co-ordinator of the Section for Enterprises in 1997, and 
Antonia Puertas was Co-ordinator of Self-management, both at the Upgrading Company of Belo 
Horizonte, URBEL). 
26 In 1995 Belo Horizonte had a total of 139 favelas, accommodating a total of 337 000 people (17% of 
the city's population) (Prefeitura Municipal de Belo Horizonte, 1995). 
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In this context then of non-intervention by government and discouragement of the informal settlement 
residents, non-governmental support programmes have emerged with two objectives. Firstly, they 
attempt to challenge the poor to explore what they are capable of achieving without the assistance of 
gov.ernment, and to empower them to successfully engage with government to win support for their self-
defined local objectives. With the growing awareness in the international development community of 
urban poverty processes, success with the various approaches that have been developed to this end has 
been documented in the international literature (Environment and Urbanisation, 1995; Cabannes, 1997; 
Schusterman and Hardoy, 1997; Bolnick, 1996). Secondly, they attempt to challenge funders to refonn 
the regulations to which their fmance is tied, that is to break with the product-oriented funding 
mechanisms designed for the conventional contractual procedures of comprehensive upgrading (see 
Anzorena et al., 1998) . 
. The Orangi Pilot Project 
Possibly the best known non-governmental support programme is the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), 
initiated in 1980 in an informal settlement of 800 000 people in Karachi, Pakistan. Its central thrust is 
'the creation of effective local organisation and dissemination of technical skills among local people' 
(Hasan and Vaidya, 1986:226). The project was initiated around the need for appropriate, affordable 
sanitation solutions in a context where foreign funded intervention was offering conventional sanitation 
which the residents would not be able to maintain, and at a cost they could not afford to repay 
(Environment and Urbanisation, 1995:228). The OPP set out to break technical, economic, 
psychological and sociologic;:!.l barriers in order to enable residents to take control of their sanitation 
problem. This involved research into a simpler and more affordable sanitation system, convincing the 
residents of the benefits of taking control of their sanitation problem, and creating levels of 
organisational structures to take collective responsibility for the various levels of the sanitation system, 
this also requiring technical and managerial training (ibid.). Thus the main inputs were in research, 
'extension' (organisational development) and support/guidance (Hasan and Vaidya, 1986:226). 
The sanitation planning and installation is managed at the organised street level, similar to the 
community contracts of the government-initiated Sri Lankan approach, with technical support from the 
OPP staff. However, two distinctions must be made between the OPP and the Sri Lankan govemment-
initiated support approach. Firstly, while the Sri Lankan programme channels government funding into 
basic infrastructure construction, such funding in the case of the OPP is generated by the residents, with 
only the OPP support operations being externally funded. ~asaI1~al1d~~id!,_a (1?86:227) I?oint out that 
'[ t ]hrough proper research, extensi~n a,nd support, OPP has managed. to~ make a break-through in a self-
. ..... --' ... '. .... .... - -.--~.-. 
-----_. -.-.- --~ ,-
managed people's programme without subsidising actual work. OPP subsidy has been only in research 
and extension; construction has been carried out entirely through local resources.' Secondly, while 
infrastructure developed through community contracts in Sri Lanka are officially recognised, the 
sanitation installations through the OPP, while functioning well, remained unofficial. though disposing 
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waste water into the existing waste water drainage systems which lead to waste water treatment plants. 
The newsletter of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (Housing by People in Asia, 1998) recently 
highlighted the determinism of conventional infrastructure programmes in Karachi in the face of 
existing people-managed systems of the OPP . An externally planned sewerage upgrading programme 
funded by the Asian Development Bank had taken no account of the well functioning sewer lines laid 
by the residents, and instead set out to duplicate these with a capital intensive sewerage approach. 
Opposition, by the Orangi Pilot Project and other organisations, to the capital intensive project had, at 
the time of writing in 1998, led to an official commitment to integrate the existing sewerage system 
(ibid.: 15)27. 
While official acceptance of the OPP approach has been reluctant, demonstration of the successful 
sanitation solution has led to widespread demand from informal settlement communities for support 
from the Orangi Pilot Project (Hasan and Vaidya, 1986:227). The project has expanded to develop 
further programmes for low-cost house building, health and family planning, women's work centres, 
family enterprises and social forestry (food gardening and tree planting), while also introducing a rural· 
pilot project (Environment and Urbanisation, 1995). 
Common principles of NGO-initiated support-based approaches 
Various non-governmental support programmes have developed in Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
They appear to have in common not a unitary methodology, but universally applicable principles 
through which a variety of approaches have been developed, depending on the localised deprivations as 
well as localised innovations of the poor themselves. The central principle is that of trust in the abilities 
of the poor, with the aim, therefore, not to provide for them, but instead to increase the options open to 
them. To this end, initiatives of the poor are encouraged and improved through appropriate 
organisational development, fmancial, technical and managerial training, and by increasing their ability 
to effectively interact with authorities. 
One approach that has been developed to encourage the poor in their abilities has been that of exchange 
at the grassroots level, initiated in Asia by Father Jorge Anzorena (Bolnick, personal communication, 
199828). This has led to the formation of the National Slum Dwellers Federation in India, linking 
increasing numbers of informal settlement communities within India. Activities of the Federation are 
supported by the NGO SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres), which seeks to 
27 Also see Abbas (1998). 
28 In 1998 Joel Bolnick was Executive Director of the South African NGO People's Dialogue which 
supports the Homeless People's Federation - these two initiatives emerged together, drawing on the 
Asian NGO-initiated support-based experience, particularly that of grassroots exchange. 
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empower women by linking isolated communities, and to support the existing efforts of communities by 
setting up resource centres (Environment and Urbanisation, 1990:91). The development of savings 
schemes as a means of mobilisation are central to the approach (Bolnick, personal communication, 
1998). 
International networking of this Indian NGOlFederation alliance led to the development of a similar 
approach in Southern Africa in the early 1990s, with a network comprising South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (see Bolnick, 1993). The circumstances that led to the emergence of the Homeless People's 
FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance in South Africa are discussed in Chapter 5, in comparison to the 
emergence of government-initiated support-based favela intervention through the PT in Brazil. In 
Chapter 7 in turn, the interface between the Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue initiative 
and the rigid government capital subsidy framework is examined through case studies, my fmding being 
that the Federation activities appear to be distorted into primarily house construction due to the 
entitlement of low income households to the once-off capital subsidy (the FederationINGO alliance has 
creatively negotiated access to the capital subsidy for its members). It is important to note however, that 
due to the p~nciple of networking and exchange at grassroots level through the Homeless People's 
Federation, the concept of non-governmental support is gaining increasing recognition among the poor. 
While still largely misunderstood by officials and planning professionals in South Africa (Bolnick, 
personal communication, 1998), this presents a growing challenge to the conventional project cycle that 
relies on external project identification and design, and implementation by commercial contractors. 
A further common thrust ofNGO-initiated support-based intervention then is that of credit and savings 
mechanisms. International exchange and debate around the question of appropriate fmance has sparked 
the development of new initiatives. Thus a 1993 workshop on alternative housing fmance funded by the 
International Habitat Coalition and attended by representatives from South Africa, Namibia, Mexico, 
India, Thailand, Colombia, England, Brazil and the Philippines, 'resulted in the idea of creating an 
alternative housing fmance strategy in Fortaleza [Brazil] based partially around credit' (Cabannes, 
1997:45). The Casa Melhor (,Better House') programme, supported by the French NGO 'Group for 
Research in Technological Exchange' (GRET) and the Brazilian NGO 'Cearah Periferia' (Centre for 
Study, Co-ordination and Reference concerning Human Settlements) in Fortaleza, enables low-income 
earners particularly in/ave/as in Fortaleza to access a combination of savings, subsidy and credit to 
improve their houses (Cabannes, 1995a, 1995b, 1997). Due to the government subsidy component in 
the funding scheme, a partnership with the local authority was required for the programme. Cabannes 
(1997:52) highlights the breakthrough of the programme as representing 'the first time in Brazil that a 
municipality has been willing to offer loans to those living in informal squatter areas who are without 
land titles. And despite a deep-rooted distrust among low-income households for government savings 
schemes, people are now encouraged to save - and in so-doing to obtain public fmance for housing' 
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(Cabannes, 1997:52). This poses a challenge to South African local government, which has yet to set a 
precedent of tolerating permanent house construction before township establishment and 
standardisation of settlement layout, and then of accommodating such permanent structures in the 
regularisation process (as will be evident in the case study discussion in Chapter 7). Another innovation 
of the GRET-Cearah Periferia support to the popular movement in Fortaleza is that of offering training 
for community leaders. The Urban Planning and Popular Research Course is designed to improve active 
community leaders' abilities to propose development ideas, to negotiate with public authorities, and to 
manage development projects. This is coupled with popular study centres and a fund for popular 
publications (Cearah Periferia, 1995). 
Clearly, the diverse activities within the category ofNGO-initiated support-based informal settlement 
intervention require very different funding arrangements from the conventional project-based and 
product-oriented funding requirements of externally defined comprehensive infrastructure upgrading to 
which national and international funding organisations have become accustomed. Despite the diversity 
among the NGO-initiated support activities, common funding principles may be identified. As inflexible 
funding mechanisms remain a significant obstacle to the expansion ofNGO-initiated support-based 
intervention in informal settlements, and likewise to the adoption of support-based approaches by 
governments, I will briefly examine the debate on such funding requirements. 
Common call to funders by the supporting NGGs 
While much of the literature on NGO-initiated support programmes focuses on successful intervention 
as a means to promote relevant alternative approaches, not all support-based intervention can display 
tangible results. The ten year experience of support to the Barrio San Jorge informal settlement in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Hardoy and Hardoy with Schusterman, 1991; Schusterman and Hardoy, 
1997), exposes the challenges to support-based intervention in the face of extreme poverty, low levels 
of organisation and ambivalent government interventions. The fmding is that over the ten years the 
NGO lIED-America Latina (International Institute for Environment and Development - Latin America) 
was giving support to the settlement residents, no ways were found for accelerating the process of 
improvement in the settlement (Schusterman and Hardoy, 1997: 119). While some progress had been 
made over the ten years, the NGO staff warns that '[t]he reconstruction of social capital could take very 
long, even longer than NGO support staff will stay in communities, than aid agency officers will remain 
in office, or than development banks and governments will sustain their own policies' (Schusterman and 
Hardoy, 1997: 119). Based on their experience, Schusterman and Hardoy (1997) make a call for 
external funding to be long-term and flexible, not bound to individual projects and not requiring visible 
results (ibid.). They argue that unless such change in external funding takes place, the temptation will 
always be, even for supporting NGOs, to seek communities that display conditions that will make such 
results likely. From their experience in Barrio San Jorge, they admit that: 
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'Many a time we have been tempted to give up and move to work in a community with a high level 
of organization, located in a municipality where local government is more responsive. Only our 
commitment to working with people who not only live in absolute poverty but also are least likely 
to receive support from government agencies and international donors prevented us from doing 
so' (Schusterman and Hardoy, 1997:119). 
The cormnon call to funders in Anzorena et al. (1998) (representing various NGOs supporting 
development processes in informal settlements across the developing world, including those I have 
referred to in this chapter) is for new channels of fmance. They highlight the constraints that funding 
organisations face, on the one hand having 'to show demonstrable results quickly,' on the other hand 
needing to reduce staff expenditure, i.e. increase the amount of funding managed by each of their staff 
members. 'Within such constraints it is easier for them to fund a few large, standard, capital projects' 
(Anzorena, et al., 1998: 177). The authors contrast such projects with the achieveme ts of cormnunity-
based support initiatives in reducing poverty, these typically having begun 'with a relatively small 
amount offunding from some international agency' for an activity 'for which there was no support from 
local government. But once the initiative was established and had demonstrable achievements, there 
were increased possibilities for negotiating support from national or local sources' (Anzorena et al., 
1998: 179). 
Anzorena et al. (1998) surmnarise the main challenges to those funders that seek seriously to tackle 
urban poverty reduction: a) the individuality of the funding requirements of each initiative, b) the 
tendency for these initiatives to require funding for long term social processes rather than short term 
projects, and c) the unpredictability and often immediacy of the funding requirements. The authors 
challenge donors to 'recognise the importance of channelling resources direct to low-income groups and 
their organizations' (Anzorena et al., 1998: 184) (rather than channelling resources to external 
consultants and cormnercial contractors). At a city level they suggest the setting up oflocal funding 
sources, which would be informed as to what is locally required to 'promote effective and inclusive 
urban development,' and would then 'support initiatives that address such needs' (Anzorena et al., 
1998: 184, 185). They further suggest 'intermediary institutions through which all official donors could 
channel funds to reduce urban poverty in any particular city' (ibid.: 185). This discussion on alternative 
funding mechanisms is of particular relevance to the question of appropriate informal settlement 
intervention in South Africa, where the rigidity and product-orientation of the once-off capital subsidy, 
as the national funding mechanism for informal settlement intervention, is resulting in standardised 
intervention products. As will be evident from the case study discussion in Chapter 7, this applies even 
in settlements where the Homeless People's Federation (supported by the NGO People's Dialogue) is 
seeking alternative poverty-oriented means of settlement improvement. There I argue that, the 
Federation members' entitlement to the capital subsidy appears to have channelled Federation activity 
into a very restricted focus on achieving the largest possible house product within the subsidy amount. 
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In drawing attention to this distortion, my intention is not to discredit the substantial contribution of the 
Federation in South Africa, but rather to highlight the far-reaching impact of the once-off capital 
subsidy system as the only mechanism for government funding to be channelled into informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of informal settlement intervention experience in this chapter then suggests that in order 
for such intervention to impact positively on the processes of poverty, there has to be a shift away from 
comprehensive externally designed and managed intervention in selected settlements through once-off 
capital intensive projects. Such intervention fails to meaningfully take into account residents' needs, 
realities, ideas and capacities. Nor does it realistically consider institutional limitations in two important 
areas, a) that of ongoing maintenance of the investment in physical infrastructure, and b) that of 
replicating the externally imposed procedure in proportion to the scale and rate of growth of the 
informal settlement phenomenon. 
Alternative approaches have been developed and institutionalised in various countries, each arising out 
of particular socio-political circumstances. These approaches have in common that they provide a 
longer-term support to informal settlement residents (and their organisations) for the gradual 
transformation of their social and physical environments. In Brazil, such alternative approaches have 
found political support from within the PT (Workers' Party), and have therefore been institutionalised 
and practised in municipalities with mandates of the PT. In Sri Lanka in tum, support-based informal 
settlement intervention (in the form of Community Action Planning, Community Contracts and a 
People's Housing Process) is incorporated into the policy of the National Housing Development 
Authority. South Africa, which likewise has a centralised housing policy, has dra\VD. on the Sri Lankan 
experience, however, to date adopting only the house construction component (the People's Housing 
Process) from the Sri Lankan model. I argue that the South African housing fmance framework, the 
once-off capital subsidy system, is at odds with some of the key support-based tenets of the Sri Lankan 
model. The South African framework, therefore, allows only for a people-centred house construction 
process (in South Africa likewise termed the 'People's Housing Process') once an informal settlement 
has been externally redesigned to a standardised layout, and conventional infrastructure has been 
delivered by external and usually commercial civil contractors. Community decision-making over 
layout dimensions around the existing pattern ofland occupation, as in the case of the Sri Lankan 
Community Action Planning, has no space in the current South African framework Nor has the 
identification and management of infrastructural projects by organised communities been possible in 
South Africa. 
In contexts where governments have not sho\VD. willingness to support people-managed processes for 
the improvement of informal settlements, NGO-initiated support approaches have emerged, fulfilling 
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the important function of assisting informal settlement residents in strengthening their position in 
society and in relation to the state. In the case of the Orangi Pilot Project in Pakistan, in the context of 
detenninistic state intervention that takes little account of the needs and capacities of the poor, such an 
initiative supports the development of collective sanitation systems. In Fortaleza, Brazil, it trains 
community leaders in urban planning, thus strengthening their ability to develop ideas for improvement, 
to propose projects, to negotiate with government and to manage project implementation. In South 
Africa, in the context of a centralised and deterministic framework for intervention, an alternative 
support-based non-governmental initiative has likewise emerged (prior to the incorporation of the 
People's Housing Process into the national housing policy). However, as is evident from the case study 
discussion in Chapter 7, its activities are largely dictated to by the official framework. The entitlement 
to the once-off capital subsidy system has channelled much of the activities of this non-governmental 
initiative into house construction, in competition with both the mainstream housing delivery by 
commercial contractors and the government's People's Housing Process (all competing for capital 
subsidy allocations). The many important aspects of support-based informal settlement intervention that 
would take into consideration the collective needs that may be expressed, for instance, in the informal 
pattern ofland use, are overridden by an individual entitlement (through the product-linked capital 
subsidy) to a standardised plot with individualised access to conventional services, and to a house. Thus 
informal settlements are remodelled into highly individualised and standardised settlements in which the 
support-based house construction may then take place. A stark contrast is presented by the Brazilian 
experience, which allows for house construction (in Fortaleza even with government assistance) prior to 
government intervention in the form of settlement formalisation. Early permanent house construction in 
Brazil thus forecloses subsequent standardisation oflayouts. 
The right to housing then, in the favela context in Brazil, is interpreted not as the right to a standardised 
housing unit replacing the informally developed environment, as is the case in South Africa. Instead, it 
is interpreted in Brazil as the right to have the permanent house legalised, or as the 'right to occupation' 
(see Aubertin, 1992:475). In Belo Horizonte this right was recognised in the PROF A VELA Law. 
Comprehensive intervention in the case of the Alvorada Programme (in Belo Horizonte) was further 
responding to this right by compensating those households whose houses were demolished in the 
interest of collective infrastructure and access. Their original living space was being rebuilt (at project 
cost) within the same settlement or as nearby as possible, thus minimising social disruption - a stark 
contrast to the standardised and uncompromising government intervention framework that I examine 
through the South African case studies in Chapter7. 
It is the wide disparity between South Africa and Brazil displayed in the current informal settlement 
intervention situation, which I have introduced through an international discussion in this chapter, that 
the following two chapters of this study (Part II) seek to address. By examining the emergence of 
informal settlements in the two countries, and the similarities and contrasts in societal responses to this 
.1 
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" 
phenomenon, Chapters 4 and 5 give insight into the particularity of the contrast between Brazil and 
South Africa with regards to informal settlement intervention. This then enables a deeper and more 
critical examination in Part III of the study, of current debate and practice in relation to informal 
settlement in South Africa. 
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Chapter 4. Divisionand exclusion: the production ofinformal settlements in South Africa 
and Brazil 
4.1 Introduction 
Informal settlements by deflnition result from the exclusion of a section of society from the formal 
processes of settlement formation. This chapter examines how this process of exclusion has differently 
shaped the informal settlement situation in Brazil and in South Africa. The exclusionary socio-political 
processes discussed in this chapter form the basis for an understanding of the more compromising 
societal responses to informal settlement in the two countries. These are subject of Chapter 5. The aim 
across these two chapters is to grasp the roots of the signiflcant divergence of current informal 
settlement intervention in Brazil and South Africa, in order to thereby to develop a critical position 
regarding the South African situation. 
In Part I of this study I have examined intervention debates and experiences by those directly concerned 
with the question of informal settlement intervention, identifying shifts, themes and tendencies iIi 
interpretations of the informal settlement phenomenon, intervention thinking and practice. At that level 
I have introduced differences between South Africa and Brazil, in relation to international debates and 
practice. In Part II then I step back and examine the position of informal settlements within broader 
society in South Africa and Brazil. The questions here are: how wasthe informal settlement situation 
shaped in these two countries? Why have particular informal settlement interpretations dominated? And 
why have particular intervention approaches developed and been afforded political space? In this 
chapter, I examine societal themes associated with exclusion, which have played themselves out 
relatively unchallenged from the beginning of the 20th century up to the mid 1970s, when signals of 
democratisation and 'inclusion' emerged both in Brazil and in South Africa. Chapter 5 then examines 
the different societal responses to informal settlement within the processe~ of democratisation or 
'inclusion' in the two countries, and the informal settlement intervention approaches that have thus been 
developed and afforded political space. My position is that the difference in processes of 'inclusion' in 
Brazil and South Africa is partly rooted in the divergence in the processes of exclusion, which I contrast 
in this chapter. 
In this chapter then I flrst examine, for South Africa and Brazil, broad contrasts in the processes of 
exclusion (social, economic and political), which are inextricably tied to the production and 
perpetuation of informal settlements. In South Africa these processes have been marked by legislated 
racial control deliberately creating racial divisions. In Brazil unchecked market forces or speculation 
resulted primarily in class-based divisions. A degree of controlled and racially based exclusion in 
Brazil's history, and increasing class-based exclusion in South Africa, however, add societal complexity 
to the informal settlement question. This leads to varying interpretations and consciousness of these 
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processes, in challenging the societal conditions that produce and maintain informal settlement. While a 
comparative discussion of societal responses to the processes of exclusion follows in Chapter 5, this 
chapter then turns to a periodised comparative examination of the largely uncompromising forces that 
have both produced and reproduced informal settlement. Contrasting exclusionary measures in the 
pattern of land regulation in the two countries set the basis for diverging informal settlement processes. 
Common, however, are the unrelenting removals and displacement, which recur in this comparative 
discussion. It traces the sharpening of oppressive intervention through a political swing to the far-right 
(in both countries), preceded, and followed, by state ambiguity with respect to informal settlements, 
giving limited space to a more compromising treatment. It is such gradual compromises from the mid 
1970s onward that lead into Chapter 5, which (as mentioned above) more explicitly examines the 
emergence of the current informal settlement intervention repertoires in South Africa and Brazil in 
relation to interpretations and consciousness of the processes of exclusion discussed in this chapter. 
4.2 Societal themes surrounding informal settlement in South Africa and Brazil 
Social divisions creating and maintaining exclusion 
For the largest part of the 20th century, political regimes in Brazil and South Africa have not only 
caused the production of informal settlements, but have also intervened to exacerbate rather than 
alleviate informal settlement conditions. This_practiceoCsocio~politicaLexclusion,_w.hichjs.directly tied 
to-the-exclusive-ma-intenanee-of-pri-v-ilege-for a portion-ofsociety,-has-taken-a-ditTerent·for-m-m-South 
Africa-thantiYBrazi1:-'In South Africa exclusion has been distinguished by a) its racial nature, and b) the 
rigorous means by which it was legislated and thus controlled by the state. In Brazil, exclusion has been 
characterised primarily by unchecked exploitative market forces or speculation. It is relevant to unpack 
these opposing processes, as they have shaped contrasting consciousness of exclusion, and therefore of 
the phenomenon of informal settlement. This in turn has produced divergent intervention thinking, thus 
giving background to an understanding of the contrast in current intervention in South Africa and 
Brazil. 
In South Africa the legalframework-regulated-raciaLexc.lusiQ,n. This encompassed restrictions .2!!. 
.--. --- -- -
political activity, on employment, commercial and investment opportunities, on social relations and 
spatially on access to accommodation in the city. Such state intervention interfered with the processes 
~y which market (or capitalist) forces shape class divisions in society. By rigidly discriminating against 
blacks, the state induced a white race unified across different classes and cultural identities. Racial 
exclusion thus served to avoid class consciousness and inter- and intraclass conflict in South Africa 
(Marx, 1998:14, 15). Marx notes that while racial segregation served the economy in that it supplied 
cheap black labour, there were economic costs associated with the maintenance of the racial order. To 
some ex~ent then the South African state subordinated economic interests to its racially based social 
plan, part of which was to create unity within the white 'race' (ibid.). This, in turn led to unforeseen 
f -
social complexities. By the late 1940s, the modern economy had engendered 'new class forces' which 
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were flourishing within the racial framework, posing a new threat to white domination (Mamdani, 
1996:95). The National Party in the early 1950s responded to this threat by submitting these class-based 
forces (that had emerged among the African population) to tribal confmes, there 'contained by 
traditional authorities' that themselves depended on the South African state (ibid.). A white race, unified 
across class differences, could thereby dominate over a tribally divided black race l . 
Divisions among Africans were further fostered by the South African state through selective rights to 
the city. Linking such urban rights to employment situation, place of birth and past duration of the urban 
sojourn, a division was fostered between a (relative) elite of permanent African urbanites, and 
temporary and illegal African urbanites, whose tribal identities were maintained (see Posel, 1991; 
Lemon and Cook, 1994). Differential rights to the city were further polarised into separate forms of 
urban accommodation, a) those with formal leases to public housing, b) those residing legally in single-
sex hostels, c) and those residing illegally, either in back yard shacks offormal housing areas, in 
overcrowded hostels (later spilling into shacks surrounding hostel buildings), or in shacks on invaded 
land. In the 1980s such divisions were furthered deliberately as a means of gaining control over the 
growing Afri?an anti-apartheid protest which had emerged in the UDF (United Democratic Front). In 
the reproductive sphere this took the form of the civic movement. Measures applied to win selective 
support for the Apartheid government were, for instance, the upgrading of townships (see Boraine, 
1988), the affording of restricted political expression to Africans with permanent urban rights through 
the creation of 'black local authorities' (Shubane, 1991 :67; Orner-Cooper, 1994:229), and the 
introduction of market delivery of African housing, by defmition exclusive to the relatively well 
employed (Crankshaw, 1993). At the same time the patterns of African employment were changing. A 
fall in the demand for unskilled jobs, and therefore lower wages, was contrasted by an upward mobility 
into semi-skilled and skilled jobs (Crankshaw, 1997). This led to a rise in class differentiation among 
Africans, with the result that class has increasingly become a barrier among those more broadly 
discriminated against by race (ibid.). 
In Brazil in tum exclusion was primarily a matter of class. Similar to the ruling white South African 
minority of the mid 20th century, the Brazilian elite of the late 19th century, having experienced slave 
uprisings, was fearful of a unified black consciousness (Marx, 1998: 15). Its response, however, was not 
to divide the African population, but instead to incorporate racial difference into a national identity. In 
effect, the Brazilian state denied the existence of racial inequality, and promoted miscegenation as a 
means of'whitenmg' and unifying the population (ibid.). Economic interests, in tum, were allowed to 
play themselves out through a largely unrestricted class-based exclusion2• Nevertheless, there is 
I Mamdani (1996:96) draws direct parallels between this practice and.the concept of 'indirect rule' 
practised by the British in colonial Africa. He thus argues against the particularity of the South African 
experience, and instead equates it with colonial experience across the African continent. 
2 With reference to the pre-l 964 populist period in Brazil, Alves (1989:279) mentions the dependency 
of the process of capital accumulation on 'state structures capable of enSuring a high rate of 
exploitation.'. _-
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evidence of racially discriminatory state practice, legislated political exclusion and state control over 
the reproductive sphere in Brazil. However, these measures in Brazil primarily served capitalist 
interests, and did not systematically dictate to the market, as they did in South Africa. Since they add 
complexity to the question of exclusion and its relationship to the production of informal settlement in 
Brazil, it is relevant to discuss them briefly. 
The European racial doctrines of the 19th century, which legitimised South African racial practice, had 
likewise been imported to Brazil in the 19th century (Burns, 1970:264) and determined, for instance, 
the exclusive immigration of European workers to Brazil after the abolition of slavery. It is interesting 
to note that with the estimated 3.6 million Africans imported as slaves to Brazil, whites constituted a 
minority until the early 20th century, by which time almost 4 million Europeans had been encouraged to 
immigrate to Brazie. This resulted in the current ratio whereby whites barely constitute a majority 
(Oliveira, 1996:73,74). As in South Africa, a coding of racial categories was developed in Brazil. 
However, this was not applied 'as a basis for domination' (Marx, 1998: IS). Instead, the racial doctrine 
began to be rejected by the beginning of the 20th century, in favour of a national identity, which 
acknowledged the contribution of Africans (former slaves) to Brazilian society. Referring to Brazilian 
publications of the beginning of the 20th century, Burns (1970:268) writes that 'racist doctrines seemed 
to 20th century Brazilian intellectuals as one more European effort to subjugate their country'4. The 
dominant view then is that racial inequality, though present in Brazil, is produced by poverty, and 
perceived inferiority is associated with class rather than with race (Burns, 1970:268). This has, 
however, been challenged as the 'myth' of 'racial democracy', with evidence of subtle but persistent 
policies aimed at 'whitening' the Brazilian population and reducing black collective consciousness 
(Carneiro, 1996: 179; Marx, 1998: 15). A combination of class- and race-based exclusion therefore 
exists in both South Africa and Brazil, though with different emphases. 
Turning to legislated exclusion, labour laws regulating 'the exploitation of labour' were introduced by 
Vargas' Estado Novos (Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994:128). Further, a limitation on the political 
franchise, in the form of a literacy criteria, applied in Brazil until 1979. The limitation on the franchise 
largely denied the rural peasant population and the urban and urbanising poor a voice through the vote, 
thus reinforcing class-based domination. Lawrence (1994) compares this form of discrimination to the 
racial limitations on democracy in South Africa - in both cases mostly the non-white and largely 
illiterate sector of the population was excluded. Burns (1970) notes that in 1920 more than 64% of the 
Brazilian population above 15 years of age was illiterate (Burns, 1970:271), while by 1970 this still 
applied to half of the Brazilian population (ibid. :5). As the fIrst Brazilian ruler to capitalise on working 
3 Immigration took place between 1880 and 1930 (Oliveira, 1996:74). 
4 A separate interpretation is that of Marx (1998: 15), who argues that 'Brazilian elites found that they 
could maintain their long-established social order of white privilege without enforcing racial 
domination'. 
S 'Estado Novo' or 'New State' refers to the 1937 to 1945 dictatorship (see Bonduki, 1994). '., 
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class or popular support, rather than exclusively that of the elite, Gerulio Vargas, in his 15 year rule 
from 1930 to 19456 introduced the franchise for working women (ibid.:300), and through his education 
programmes7 achieved an increase in the electorate. However, legislated political exclusion in Brazil 
returned in an almost absolutist form during the military dictatorship, with a complete ban on political 
activity applying from 1968 to 1974. This wa~ also a period of extreme repression exercised towards 
favela residents, with large numbers offorced removals. Valladares and Figueiredo (1983:74, reviewing 
Valladares 1978) draw attention to 'the politicaVelectoral significance offavela constituencies,' with the 
result that 'extensive removal policies can only occur when favela populations lose their bargaining 
power represented by the vote.' 
The denial of such political bargaining power has therefore allowed for repressive informal settlement 
intervention in South Africa for the greater part of the 20th century. However, it is less through political 
exclusion than through political patronage, that uncompromising aspects of informal settlement 
intervention have endured beyond National Party rule in South Africa. In this regard, parallels may be 
suggested between current South Africa and the pre-l 964 populist period in Brazil, which is described 
by practices of'clientelism', 'patronage' and 'systematic co-optation of the working class' (Souza, 
1993: 195 - my translation from German). It is in the ambivalence of the populist period then that 
relocations from selected centrally located favelas to segregated 'proletarian parks' were enforced in Rio 
de Janeir08, not unlike the continuing current mainstream practice in South Africa of relocating informal 
settlement residents to peripherally located housing developments through the housing subsidy 
framework. In their management, the Brazilian 'proletarian parks' however, have parallels with earlier 
South African practice, with control and disciplining having been exercised over residents' lives. Even 
access to these segregated settlements was controlled by identity documents (Leeds and Leeds, 1978, 
referenced in Souza, 1993). Though in vastly different dimensions, the Brazilian and South African 
histories then do share themes of social control around the question of informal settlement. 
Returning to the current situation, socio-economic exclusion remams evident in both South Africa and 
Brazil in the high degree of inequality, although both countries have undergone democratisation and 
have abandoned legislated political exclusion. Among middle income countries, South Africa and 
Brazil display the highest levels of inequality according to the Gini-coefficient (Ministry in the Office 
of the President, RDP, 1995). In both countries ten percent of the population control approximately half 
of the country's wealth (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996). Physically, such exclusion is manifested in informal 
settlements and other deprived forms ofurban residence. As discussed in Chapter 2, international 
debates around the politically neutral term 'urban poverty' have drawn much attention to this condition 
in recent years, in the hope of channelling much-needed intervention or 'alleviation' in this direction. 
6 Vargas ruled again from 1951 to 1954. 
7 The centralised schooling system served primarily to foster nationalism (Burns, 1970:303). 
8 This affected 8 favelas in Brazil between 1941-1943, and is interpreted as a concession by Vargas to 
elite interests (Souza, 1993: 196). 
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However, as will be evident in this and the following chapter, the question of informal settlement 
intervention in South Africa, as in Brazil, has been inextricably linked, not primarily to international 
debates and declarations, but to national, regional and localised socio-political dynamics, where the 
struggle for inclusion takes place. Inevitably, in the context of maintained socio-economic exclusion, 
the attainment of living space and improvements thereof depends, to a large degree, on forms of 
patronage by politically influential figures. Intervention is arranged with the purpose of securing 
political loyalty, and to counter class-based challenges to the socio-economic order. This leaves little 
space for organised informal settlement communities to articulate their own development objectives 
(invariably based on their own experiences) and to have these translated into responsive intervention 
approaches. In this context then the political space won by the PT (Workers' Party) in Brazil in the 
1980s and 1990s and translated into non-patronising democratic urban practices grounded in an 
awareness of class-based exclusion are of significance. While the emergence of the PT and its approach 
to informal settlement in Brazil is discussed in Chapter 5, my discussion now leads to questions around 
the awareness of exclusion by class and race, and its relationship to the challenging or perpetuation of 
the informal settlement situation. 
Interpretations and consciousness - implications for redressing exclusion 
While for Brazil a 'more formidable barrier than race may well be class' (Burns, 1970:269), the 
relationship between class and race in the analysis and redressing of exclusion in the country remains 
unresolved. The PT (Workers' Party) leadership has been criticised for fa consciousness of class at the 
expense of ' a consciousness ofrace' (Marx, 1998:259). The question here remains: which consciousness 
is more relevant in challenging the exclusion hat is manifested in the informal settlement phenomenon? 
Certainly the deracialisation of the South African state has not led to the elimination of the phenomenon 
of informal settlement, with poverty (and in effect class) remaining the primarily barrier to adequate 
residential conditions. With reference to the class-based struggle from within racially mixed favelas in 
Brazil as opposed to the race-based struggle from within the racially uniform ghettos of the United 
States, Oliveira (1996:72) suggests that 'political engagement around class issues' may impact more 
effectively on policy-making than that centred around race. This then is the position of the PT in Brazil, 
and that of the Brazilian left more generally (Marx, 1998:259,260). Souza (1999:4) makes direct 
reference to the engagement of 'alternative planners' of the Brazilian left with the concept of class and 
the "conflicts and tensions that are inherent features of class societies.' He argues that as practitioners 
they 'do not aim at the building of harmony through instrumental rationality; instead, they contribute to 
a process of negotiation and regulation during which the contradictions become explicit and the options 
can be freely debated on the basis of political transparency and participation of the ordinary citizens' 
(Souza, 1999:4,5). 
Indeed, the Brazilian intellectual left has politically engaged with and furthered (among other things) 
the demands of those housed in informal settlements. Critical analysis in South Africa in turn is 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
83 
particularly sensitive to the complex questions of race, ethnicity and identity that the South African 
situation raises9• As is evident in the discussion of South African literature on informal settlement in 
Chapter 6, the South African intellectual left has not significantly furthered the informal settlement 
intervention question. Instead, this literature is dominated by neoliberal or market-oriented arguments 
that are not based on a consciousness of class. In Brazil then there is an intellectual awareness that the 
main cause of deprivation and impoverishment is the result of various forms of tolerated exploitation of 
the working class, through low wages, lack of efficient and affordable transportation, and negligence in 
the provision of housing, thus reliance on people's own resources in acquiring land and constructing 
houses (see Kowarick, 1985). There is an awareness that workers and the urban unemployed were left 
to their own devices, and were progressively displaced to the expanding urban peripheries through 
unchecked property speculation of the land owning class. This process of exploitation in the 
reproductive sphere or 'in the community' (as opposed to the work place) has been conceptualised by 
Brazilian urban sociologist Lucio Kowarick as 'urban spoliation' (see Kowarick, 1979, 1985, 1997, 
2000), a concept that has focused the analysis of informal settlements and other forms of residential 
deprivations in relation to class conflict and notions of citizenship 10. 
Political programmes addressed at the informal settlement situation have been driven by two opposing 
interpretations. One sees the harsh experience of a low quality of life for a large proportion of the urban 
population as a consequence of class-based exploitation, the other (dominant among the formally 
housed) sees the informal settlement phenomenon as a threat to the security, health and well-being of 
formal, mainly middle class society. Sachs (1981 :24), for instance, identifies two tendencies in the 
Brazilian debate on informal settlement, one seeking to humanise favelas, the other unrealistically 
wishing to eliminate the phenomenon. These opposed views may be compared to two separate 
discourses which Kowarick and Ant (1994) identify around the phenomenon of overcrowded inner-city 
tenements or 'cortifos' of Sao Paulo in the 1930s. One associated cortifos with exploitation, and at the 
time was also calling for their eradication (i.e. replacement with adequate living conditions), the other 
associated cortifos with epidemics and disorder and, driven by the fear of contamination, was calling 
for the segregation of workers' residential quarters from those of the middle class (Kowarick and Ant, 
1994: 65-67). The representations of informal settlement as class-based exclusion on the one hand, and 
of threats to the middle class on the other, may each create political pressure for government 
intervention. The intervention ideas they produce are opposing - one seeks improvement and 
integration, the other wishes to remove the phenomenon of informal settlement from the middle class 
existence. Complexity is added, however, as the state may also view informal settlements as a cheap 
labour pool, as is illustrated in the case of Rio de Janeiro in the 1940s: Souza (1993: 198) highlights the 
paradoxical situation whereby the well located favelas were, on the one hand, unpleasant to the middle 
9 Lawrence (1994:95) argues that in South Africa 'the discourse on class distinctions has been often 
blurred by - indeed, almost to the point of being indistinguishable from - that of 'racial identity'.' 
10 The concept of citizenship in Brazil refers 'both to the membership in the political community of all 
Brazilians that guarantees them the right to voice, and to residence in a locality' (Friedmann, 1998:25). 
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class and obstacles to the real estate, yet on the other hand, a cost-free solution to the problem of 
workers housing; this resulted in variations in state intervention, depending on subtleties of political 
conjuncture and location of the favela (Souza, 1993:198). 
For reasons then of discriminatory political representation or exclusion, government intervention has 
mostly been driven by the perception of informal settlement as either a threat or a convenient labour 
pool, and not by the experience of poor living conditions or a conviction of class-based exploitation. 
The inclusion of the informal settlement reality into government priorities, therefore, requires an intense 
struggle against the practices of socio-political exclusion. In South Africa, a largely unchallenged 
neoliberal intervention programme imposes middle class assumptions on the informal settlement reality 
(as will be evident in the discussion of South African intellectual debates in Chapter 6). In Brazil in turn 
the PT, backed by a cohesive body of intellectuals that are aware of the functioning of class division 
within capitalist society, has developed and implemented, at municipal level, urban practices grounded 
in an awareness of the reality of class-based exclusion and of practices of patronage and clientelism that 
largely maintain such exclusion. In order to understand the different histories from which the neoliberal 
approach developed in South Africa as opposed to the PT's awareness in Brazil, this chapter then turns 
to a periodised discussion of the opposing processes of explicit exclusion from the beginning of the 
20th century to the mid 1970s when signals of a gradual shift towards political inclusion started to 
emerge in the two countries. This is followed in Chapter 5 by an examination of the subsequent 
processes of 'political opening,ll, within which the mainstream neoliberal approach to informal 
settlement in South Africa and the PT's approach in Brazil developed. 
Before turning to the periodised discussion of the socio-political processes, it is relevant to emphasise 
two further distinctions between South Africa and Brazil. They are the military and the Catholic 
Church, which have acted as significant socio-political forces in Brazil, and as such have no direct 
equivalent in South Africa. Both have, in specific periods, impacted on the informal settlement situation 
in Brazil, the military furthering conservative middle class interests, the Catholic Church in turn 
furthering the demands of the favela residents. 
The military in Brazil has functioned as an independent political force, with interests vested in the status 
associated with its ranks, as well as in the progress of the middle groups (neither the extremely wealthy 
former coffee plantation owners nor the impoverished former slaves), and later the urban middle class, 
II The term 'political opening' (abertura I) was coined in Brazil in 1974 by General Ernesto Geisel, the 
then military head of state, in his announcement of a gradual process of reinstatement of political rights 
(Sader and Silverstein, 1991 :20). In my interpretation it may also be applied to the protracted and 
ambiguous process of reform by the National Party in South Africa through the third and fmal phase of 
National Party policy initiated in 1973174, which Orner-Cooper (1994:223) refers to as 'multi-racial co-
optation'. This reform was driven by deep economic and political crisis. It led to the flIst temporary 
concessions to illegal squatters (Crossroads Emergency Camp in Cape Town) in 1976, a gradual reform 
of property rights and urbanisation policy with a milestone in 1986 (the White Paper on Urbanisation), 
and eventually the unbauning of African political movements in 1990. 
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from which they were mainly 1970:202). As its loyalties thus shifted, the military 
ret:lealtea.lY ~111"I1"I,nrt,.tl undemocratic of government. This occurred fIrst with the overthrow of the 
Uluual"" .. in 1889 when the sided with the in 1930 with the overthrow of the 
republic, in 1945 to end the 15 year in 1954 to end the subsequent populist presidency 
and in 1964 a lal .. o,.;.UI:>lHg go'vernment and dictatorial powers in 
1968 (Bums, 1970). 
The """"""'1'" Church in was indleoc:nd.ent J..>lCa.GII:1"U state since 1889, and despite attempts by 
the state to maintain power over it, was able to societal causes in opposition to the state (Bums, 
In 1922 the Catholic Church turned its attention to the plight of the poor. 
This coincided the of the which likewise addressed itself to social 
Both were in a movement that was protesting against the increasingly 
inefficient republic, to its overthrow in 1930 1970:281). The Catholic Church and the 
Communist have been instrumental in communities in the unserviced subdivisions and 
favelas on the urban perlpl1lenes in the 1920s the Catholic Church started by organising 'Workers' 
Circles' and social services 1970:281). While the Communist Party was 
repeatedlybarined (until '''5QW''U''Vll in the Catholic Church maintained legitimacy and was 
therefore able to ensure continuity community organisation, even during the most 
repressive years of the in the late 1960s and 1970s (Mainwaring, 1984; 
Banck and Doimo, 1988:75). By the late 1970s political movements took over the function 
of organising and .... """11'U .. '.>< the socially The however, retained an influential role, 
particularly within the PT, in which many Catholic activists, pastoral workers, nuns and priests found a 
political home. their involvement in the ecclesiastic base communities (Comunidade Eclesial 
de Base - CEB) they 'tried to counterbalance, so to the negative influence of party bureaucracy,' 
promoting instead 'the of base and The role of the 
Catholic Church in relation to favelas will be particularly 
evident in the discussion of societal responses to settlement in 5, whereas that of the 
military fonns part of the discussion production of informal settlements in the following section 
of this chapter. 
4.3 The production of informal settlements in South Africa and Brazil 
Setting the pattern nwnp,:~hin rlil<h·ih,ltir ... and re~:Ul(mo'n 
Since the 19th century, informal settlements have been an element of the Brazilian and South African 
urban landscape. In the colonial centres of Rio de .1""1'<:;11'''. informal settlements are 
fIrst associated with the abolition and the 
lack of official urban socio-economic nt .... ",."'hn" access to land. From this common 
starting point, different processes in the ofland nurn ... ,r"hi" and 11;1:.UlaUUI in the two 
countries have caused the informal settlement situation to One must bear in mind, 
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however, that the contrasting processes (legislated racial segregation and control as a means to 
protecting white privilege in South Africa, and the process of uncontrolled land speculation by the land-
owning class in Brazil), though each shaping the phenomenon of informal settlement in a particular 
way, have compelling similarities in outcome towards the end of the 20th century, with respect to 
poverty, inequality and urban socio-economic segregation (as partly noted in the previous section). 
Land-related legislation of the early 20th century then forms the basis of these opposing, yet similar, 
trends. 
In South Africa the expansion of the white domain to its current boundaries occurred through a land 
distribution pattern that formed the basis of white privilege throughout the 20th century. Africans were 
restricted to 'native reserves' while the system of migrant labour ensured non-permanence of their much 
needed presence in urban areas, where they served the interests of mining and industry, and were to be 
housed in segregated areas. The 1913 Land Act entrenched permanent racial separatio  and prohibited 
Blacks from purchasing or leasing land outside of the designated reserves. This act, and the 1923 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act, are referred to as the 'key pillars of segregation' in South Africa (Omer-
Cooper, 1994: 169). The equivalent legislation regulating land in Brazil, and ensuring privilege of the 
land-owning class, was the civil code of 1916, legislating that 'the economic uses to which a given 
property can be put are determined by the individual interests of its owner' (Fernandes and Rolnik, 
1998: 143), thus attaching absolute rights to private property. This allowed for an unchecked land 
speculation process; continually displacing informal settlements from profitable land. In South Africa 
and in Brazil this early legislation later became the basis of land regulation during both countries' far-
right authoritarian regimes (of the 1948-94 National Party rule in South Africa 12 and of the 1964-84 
military dictatorship in Brazil). 
Thus, while in the early 1900s planned, racially segregated city structures were established throughout 
South Africa, Brazilian cities remained largely unplanned into the 1960s, although inner cities were 
subjected to avenue/transport planning (see Taschner, 1995: 187,188). The practice of letting inner city 
tenements (cortic;os) to a maximum number oflow income tenants meant that, in the early years of 
industrialisation, Sao Paulo was 'not a highly segregated city' (Kowarick and Ant, 1994:62). In the city 
of Sao Paulo, the overcrowded tenement was the main form of low income housing up to the 1950s 
(ibid.), and the first informal settlements were noted only in the 1940s (Taschner, 1995: 189). In cities 
such as Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, where informal settlements were common since the late 
19th century, these had to give way repeatedly to administrative buildings, or speculative development 
as the occupied land became profitable for formal up-market development (Taschner, 1995). In South 
Africa illegal 'squatting' and racially mixed sub-letting in slums in turn fell victim to deterministic 
intervention aiming to racially segregate the urban sphere. Such action was justified by concerns for 
12 It may be noted that certain land-related reforms were introduced by the South African government as 
from the mid 1980s. 
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public health, with the outbreak of plague in 1904 (Parnell and Pirie, 1991: 130), and until the 
promulgation of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act it was supported by legislation such as the 
Location Acts of 1902 and 1905 in Natal, modelled on the example set by the Cape Colony (Davies, 
1991:76). 
Evictions were common in both countries. However, South African urban control was more severe than 
the displacement caused by the Brazilian urban land speculation, as it legislated exclusion from the 
economic benefits of the city. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act not only legislated for segregated urban 
environments, but also restricted African access to cities through municipal employment registers, 
whereby unregistered Africans could be removed from urban areas (Davenport, 1991 :8). The act further 
enabled local authorities to control trade in African 'locations', and municipal monopolies on the sale of 
traditional beer increasingly became a means of raising revenue for the administration of African 
'locations' (ibid.). The acquisition and accumulation of economic benefits with an African urbanisation 
process, i.e. the integration of urbani sing Africans into the urban socio-economy, was therefore 
prevented. The implementation of this law across South Africa's .cities led to the removal of cross-racial 
sub-letting in inner-city slums and the creation of peripherally located townships (Parnell and Pirie 
1991: 131; Hattingh and Horn 1991: 147; Cook, 1991 :29). Forced removals were increased with the 
Slums Act of 1934, based on the Cape Town City Council's recommendations to Parliament (Cook, 
1991 :29). At the same time, insufficient formal housing production and the harsh control exercised over 
African townships led to the formation of new informal settlements. 
, 
While policies in South Africa did not change course in the first decades of the 20th century, in Brazil 
the military overthrow of 1930, with the installation of Gerulio Vargas, first as chief of a provisional 
government, later as dictator and thereafter as elected president, led to some change in policy. Vargas' 
balance of power depended on support from business, labour, the military and the nationalists (Burns, 
1970:303). He therefore introduced 'contradicting and inconsistent' policies, his state never 'submitting 
itself exclusively to the immediate aim of any single class' (Bonduid, 1994: 100). Thus the 1930s saw 
attempts at urban land-use planning, and in Rio de Janeiro the application ofland-use zoning as a 
preventative measure against favelas (Oliveira, 1996:75). However, 'neither this legal instrument nor 
constant police intervention aimed at destroying the rudimentary houses built by the poor prevented the 
increase offavelas in the city' (ibid.:75). Other policies at the time were directed at the needs of the 
poorly housed population. These included a decree to regulate the land sales to low income people on 
the urban peripheries, a home loan system and subsidised housing programmes (Bonduki, 
1994: 100,101). Significant, too, was an adjustment to the rights associated with property, with the 
introduction in the 1934 Constitution of the concept of a 'social function' of property, requiring private 
property to serve not exclusively the economic interest of the individual owner, but to submit to the 
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social interests of the broader public (Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998:145)13. As the legitimacy of his 
continued rule depended on a degree of support from labour, Vargas introduced 'a new form of 
clientelism' into Brazilian politics, with the 'distribution of houses' through government programmes 
proving 'highly useful for the creation of political support for the regime' (Bonduki, 1994: 101). This 
dynamic entered South African politics in a significant way only with the adoption of universal adult 
franchise. Thus in the run-up to the first fully democratic national election in 1994, the National Party 
government made generous housing concessions to new Coloured and African constituencies in order to 
secure votes (Tomlinson, 1995:8). In Chapter 5, I return to the clientelist relationship between the 
Brazilian state and civil society in the period of rule by Vargas and subsequent governments up to the 
1964 overthrow by the military, examining how they both encouraged the organisation of favela 
communities, and gave favela residents some say (though very limited) in the defmition of state 
intervention. 
Pressures of industrialisation 
In South Africa, as in Brazil, informal settlements mushroomed in the 1940s. With the exception of Rio 
de Janeiro's large informal settlements spreading over inner city hillsides, informal settlements in 
Brazilian cities have tended to be relatively small and spread across the urban periphery. To date few 
favelas in Sao Paulo consist of more than 1 000 dwellings, the majority comprising less than 100 houses 
(Mautner and Bueno, 1994). In contrast, the nature of formal land development in South African cities 
meant that informal settlements tended to develop in large concentrations on segregated portions of 
peripheral land. In Durban the 1940s squatting concentrated in Cato Manor, initially outside the 
municipal boundaries (Hindson, Byerley and Morris, 1994). In Cape Town, it extended along the 
railway line on the eastern edge of the city, from Retreat to Windemere, where alone 20 000 shacks 
were concentrated (Cook, 1991 :29). In Johannesburg it concentrated on the western edge of the city, 
where land had been purchased by the municipality for the establishment of townships (Parnell and 
Pirie, 1991), which later became known as greater Soweto 14. 
In Brazil the mushrooming of informal settlements in the 1940s were only in part the result of massive 
migration to the cities. The shortage of formal housing has also been linked to the contradictions in 
populist policies during the Vargas rule. Bonduki (1994) argues that the tenancy law, passed in order to 
foster popular support, indirectly led to a shortage of housing and the formation of informal settlements. 
This law was intended to control rent in the tenements or 'cortif;os'. However, as the provision of 
tenancy to the low-income population thereby became unprofitable, the production of private tenements 
declined, and private urban investments instead were made in industry. A dramatic housing shortage 
13 Though progressive in content, the practical meaning of a 'social function of property' was only 
clarified in the 1988 Constitution. Thus the relationship between the 1916 Civil Code, which attached 
highly individual rights to private property, and the defmition of the social function of property in the 
constitution from 1934 onwards remained largely unresolved until a new legal framework was drawn up 
in the Constitution of 1988 (Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998:145). 
14 The name Soweto was derived from the first two letters of the words 'South Western Townships'. 
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ensued in the 1940s, intensified by the influx of rural people into the cities, and sparking unplarmed 
development on the urban periphery (Bonduki, 1994). This took two forms. On the one hand, portions 
of land were invaded (forming favelas). On the other hand, small unserviced plots were sold unofficially 
through illegal subdivisions IS, as a process of private speculation. Successive governments' seemingly 
laissez faire attitude to this uncontrolled, 'anarchic' production of the urban periphery is interpreted as a 
deliberate encouragement of 'this type of housing as the only way of maintaining in the cities the 
growing waves of new inhabitants at as Iowa cost as possible to the authorities' (Kowarick and Ant, 
1994:68, also see Seidman, 1994:211). It may be noted that for Sao Paulo in the period from the 1950s 
to the early 1970s, unauthorised subdivisions were the most common form of low-income access to 
urban land (Imparato, 1998 :2). In 1979, when a law was finally passed to criminalise the action of 
illegal land-subdividers, unauthorised subdivisions comprised 35% ofSiio Paulo's urban area (ibid.). 
While the 1979 legislation is said to have reduced the rate of unauthorised subdivision, the rate ofland 
invasion in turn has increased (ibid.). 
Turning to South Africa, industrialisation brought a trend towards economic realism in the 1940s and 
associated with this a pause in implementation of some of the harsh policies applying to the African 
urban existence. The operation of pass laws was temporarily relaxed to facilitate the unprecedented 
urbanisation that was responding to the labour demand of the industrial boom of the war years (Omer-
Cooper, 1994: 183). This temporary relaxation was followed by recommendations to the ruling United 
Party in 1948 by the Fagan Commission that urbanisation 'should be facilitated to satisfy the labour 
needs of industry and that the urban black population should be recognised as a permanent part of the 
urban population' (ibid.: 188). Though rejected by the white electorate in 1948, the contents of the 
Fagan Commission were essentially those introduced through the policy of 'orderly urbanisationtl6 in the 
1980s. 
A swing to the far-right 
Instead of liberalisation and orderly urbanisation, the franchised section of South African society in the 
late 1940s chose the policy of Apartheid (separateness), put forward by right wing Afrikaner 
intellectuals of the National Party in opposition to the United Party government (Orner-Cooper, 
1994: 192). This racist policy WaS translated into a complex legislative system, which set aside and 
protected the most attractive portions of the urban areas as enclaves for the development of an exclusive 
white property market. While the thorough, racially discriminatory framework that was created in South 
Africa had no equivalent in Brazil, a compelling parallel with the conservative project of the military 
\5 Dishonest speculators, referred to as 'grileiros' (meaning 'cricket', as they were believed to darken the 
false documents they used in the transactions by burning crickets) would acquire parcels of land on the 
urban periphery, illegally subdivide the land and trick individuals into believing in the legality of their 
purchase of the land (Imparato, personal communication, 1997 - in 1997 Ellade Imparato was giving 
legal support to residents of illegal subdivisions in Sao Paulo's Eastern Zone through the NGO CEPAR. 
16 Meaning the controlled settling of new arrivals to urban areas, and not to be confused with the 
Brazilian term 'urbanizafiio' applied to the upgrading of informal settlements. 
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dictatorship in Brazil (as from 1964) may be seen in the degree to which the system supported the 
interests of real estate. Under the apartheid plan; South African cities were restructured along racial 
lines, through a determined project of state intervention removing racially mixed slums and informal 
settlements from desirable land to make way for white business and residential investment, while a 
comprehensive regulatory framework of racial exclusion was consolidated for the maintenance of 
segregation. In Brazil, urban spatial restructuring took the form of state intervention in the removal of 
slums and informal settlements. However, the state did not enforce an urban spatial framework to 
regulate subsequent development17• Instead, the military regime returned to the contents of the 1916 
Civil Code, discarding the concept of social function of property and reinstating highly individualised 
rights to private property (Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998). This gave virtual autonomy to land speculators, 
and resulted in the displacement, peripheralisation and segregation of the working class. Under both 
regimes, any form of popular protest was repressed. 
It is estimated that at the National Party's entry into government in 1948,58% of the urban African 
population was illegally occupying unserviced land (Posel, 1991:20). Particularly women and children 
in this squatter population were considered, by the new rulers, as unnecessary to the urban economy, 
and therefore programmes were directed at their removal and restriction to their rural areas of origin. 
New acts were introduced for population registration, the promulgation of racially exclusive 'Groups 
Areas', and the control of influx to the cities (preference being given to already urbanised labour). Fully 
urbanised Africans were afforded the right to live in the segregated cities irrespective of employment, 
whereas new arrivals were not permitted to settle permanently (Pose I, 1991 :21). Thus permanent 
residential rights of Africans who had lived and worked in an urban area for a number of years were 
extended, permitting them also to raise their children in the city (ibid.), while at the same time influx 
control was tightened through an amendment to the system of passes, placing severe restrictions on the 
urban sojourn of migrant labour (Orner-Cooper, 1994). I have already mentioned the divisions that such 
biased policies fostered within the urban African population. It follows that any form of radical political 
opposition to these policies, including African trade union activity, was outlawed (ibid.). 
The first stage of Apartheid, the height of legalised discrimination and segregation, lasted through the 
1950s and was based on an ideology of white supremacy. In Brazil, the military government, though not 
considering itself racially supreme, viewed 'the bulk of the population as ignorant and backward,' while 
politicians were regarded as 'inherently opportunistic and corrupt' - the only civilians trusted by the 
rulers were 'industrial entrepreneurs and foreign trained intellectuals and high-skilled technicians' 
(Bolam, 1992: 10 1). Thus the regime 'attempted to establish complete tutelage over the country and the 
whole civilian society' (ibid.). Control over political activity was progressively increased, first through 
the banishing of politicians that were seen as corrupt or subversive (ibid.), and by 1968 through the 
17 Although the urban planning discipline flourished during the repressive years of the dictatorship, 
urban masterplans that were elaborated were never implemented (see Bolam, 1992:103). 
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temporary shutting down of congress and suspension of the Brazilian constitution, and with it most 
political and civil rights (Sader and Silverstein, 1991 :20). 
The scale of squatter removal during the fIrst decade of military dictatorship in Brazil was similar to 
that in the fIrst decade of National Party rule in South Africa. For Rio de Janeiro, removal fIgures from 
1963 to 197218 are in the order of23 000 units (Seidman, 1994:213), affecting over 120 000 people. In 
Cape Town, between 1957 and 1961, 100000 Coloured and Indian people were relocated to segregated 
residential areas, while on average 9 000 Africans were repatriated yearly to the rural reserves Transkei 
and Ciskei for fIve years (Cook, 1991 :32). In Durban, the entire informal settlement of Cato Manor, 
comprising a population of 120000 was removed between 1958 and 1960 (Hindson et al., 
1994:325,327). 
In both Brazil and South Africa, the removals were accompanied by a massive low income housing 
thrust. The state production of South African townships could thus be compared to the housing estates 
created by Brazil's National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional da Habita/yGo - BNH)19. However, in 
South Africa and in Brazil the removal of informal settlements outstripped the production of formal 
low-income housing20 and led to renewed land invasions in less obtrusive locations. Thus while Rio de 
Janeiro's southern zone was 'temporarily effectively cleared of squatter settlements, ... new favelas 
sprung up in less-coveted areas ofthe city' (Seidman, 1994:213). With the removal of Cato Manor in 
Durban to the township of KwaMashu in the nearby Mlazi reserve, some 30 000 people 'dispersed and 
relocated outside of the process of offIcial removals' (Davies, 1991 :327). However, the situation in 
Durban was atypical of South African cities. Most urban areas were not bordered by rural reserves, and 
urban removals often implied repatriation to distant reserves. If Durban, with its neighbouring rural 
reserves was at one extreme, then Cape Town was at the other, with a distance of900krn to the nearest 
rural reserve. For Pretoria these reserves were in commutable distance from the city, while for 
Johannesburg, they were at a distance of at least 100krn. This spatial differentiation, became more 
signifIcant with policies of the later phases of Apartheid, when these reserves were offIcially 'urbanised'. 
In Brazil the mismatch between removal and production of houses was a result of the tolerated 
deviation from the intended low-income housing goal. The National Housing Bank (BNH), which 
operated on compulsory deductions from workers' salaries through the Housing Finance System 
18 In Rio de Janeiro favela removal programmes had intensifIed as from 1960 (Valladares and 
Figueiredo, 1983:73). The peak of state removal offavelas was between 1968 and 1973 (Souza, 
1993:204). 
19 However, in concept the BNH housing delivery might have more in common with that of the current 
South African housing policy. The BNH promised home ownership to low income households (though 
on a mortgage system and not through a once-off household subsidy as is currently the case in South 
Africa), at the same time 'channelling non-inflationary fmandal assets to the building industry and large 
contractor companies' (Bolaffi, 1992: 100). 
20 However, low income housing production in Brazil ebbed off faster than in South Africa, where 
planned townships were nevertheless produced at a vast scale. 
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..' t- . ~.. >, ,..! I-(Sistema Financeiro da Habitafiio - SFH), fmanced instead the production of middle income housing 
(Bolaffi, 1992: 102).The unattended housing need in Brazil led to further unplanned tolerated and 
officially ignored expansion of the urban periphery. Seidman (1990) thus compares the Apartheid state's 
role in the production of African townships to 'the role of Brazil's military state in creating the urban 
'periphery' - the huge sprawl of working-class housing, tenements and informal/avelas, denied adequate 
services or security of tenure' (Seidman, 1990: 10). 
While aspects of the living conditions might be comparable to the Brazilian periphery, the South 
African townships were characterised by vastness of scale, uniform and wasteful planning standards and 
full segregation from white residential areas. 'Buffer strips', several 100 metres wide, were established 
as 'ideological friction-prevention zones' (Krige, 1991: 109), spatially separating different 'Group Areas'. 
In the 1980s, with the increasing population pressures in townships coupled with government ambiguity 
and growing ideological redundancy of the buffer zones, these offered space for extensive informal 
settlements. An urban characteristic of South Africa today, therefore, is the band of informal settlement 
surrounding formal townships. The wasteful spatial standards applying to undeveloped 'public open 
space' and road reserves too were subject to reinterpretation under the pressures of the 1980s, with 
'interspersed squatting' on unused land within townships. 
Urban distortions 
The second phase of Apartheid, the guise of continued white control through the concept of racial self-
determination or separate development (1960 to mid 1970s), brought new and lasting effects on South 
African urbanisation patterns. In this period, the South African government deliberately displaced rural 
labour tenants and 'squatters' (so-called 'surplus people') from white-owned farms, and from other rural 
areas where Africans had legal title (so-called 'black spots'), to African reserves (Lemon and Cook, 
1994:323). Close on a million people were relocated in the 1960s (ibid.), thus being driven into poverty 
and dependence in the rural homelands, which were henceforth to be 'urbanised' under the policy of 
'territorial separateness' (Hattingh and Horn, 1991: 149), also justifying the freeze of African housing 
production in 'white' cities. While the reserves had previously been under white trusteeship, the policy 
of Separate Development was to afford them independent status. This was ridiculed, however, by the 
imposition of prime-ministers and appointment, in the Assembly, of chiefs, who henceforth supported 
the concept of separate development (Orner-Cooper, 1994:213). 
In Brazil, particularly during the military dictatorship as from 1964, rural displacement led to urban 
distortions of a different sort. While displaced urbanisation (through 'urbanisation' of the homelands) 
has since marked the South African urban structure, Brazilian cities were distorted in scale. Rural land 
ownership patterns, technological advances, economic policies and rural labour practices conditioned 
migration to the Brazilian cities (Sader and Silverstein, 1991 :59; SELAVIP, 1981 :6): Sader and' 
Silverstein (1991 :59) point out that 95% of arable land was owned by 5% of the Brazilian population, 
-- -~--~- -.---~--- --- .. - --- -~~--------
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the mid 1970s concessions such as the proclamation of th_e Crossroads transit camp were signs not only 
of transition towards a new phase of Apartheid, but also of a gradual and inevitable crumbling of the 
power of the National Party. 
In Brazil the gradual process of political opening introduced in 1974 was out of 'the regime's own 
confidence that its opponents were thoroughly defeated and conditions for a long period of capitalist 
expansion established' (Sader and Silverstein, 1991 :20). Subsequent economic and political pressures 
then forced the way to further reform in Brazil (ihid.).In South Africa in tum, the state in the mid 1970s 
was more directly forced to react toa complex set of pressures, both from the African opposition 
movement and from industry (Orner-Cooper, 1994:223-226). In effect then, in both Brazil and South 
--' 
Africa,the state increasingly was adjusting to societal responses to the harsh conditions its policies had 
produced and reproduced. Increasingly, initiatives from outside of government influenced official 
informal settlement intervention policy. A contrast, however, exists between the resulting intervention 
approaches in South Africa and Brazil, this being the subject of Chapter 5. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In South Africa the processes of exclusion, which have been manifested in .informal settlement, have 
taken different forms to those in Brazil. I have discussed in this chapter how the South African situation 
was primarily marked by racially based exclusion, as opposed to the mechanisms of class-based 
exclusion, which characterised Brazil. Thus class barriers in Brazil are contrasted by racial barriers in 
South Africa. Class barriers in South Africa were, however, introduced, fust deliberately by the 
apartheid state's tactics of divide-and-rule of the African population, and subsequently sharpened by the 
market as it increasingly gained access to this divided sector of society. Barriers have further been 
created through the urban structures that have been shaped by social exclusion throughout the 20th 
century. In South Africa the racially segregated spatial pattern to date is maintained through class-based 
segregation, affordability being a major barrier to residcmtial mobility (Houssay-Holzschuch, 1999) In 
Brazil the speculative process of urban spatial formation, which has likewise resulted in distinct class-
based segregation (Souza, 1993), also creating a degree of racial segregation (Telles, 1994: 191), has 
remained largely unchallenged by state intervention. Both spatial processes were implemented through 
extensive relocations and displacements, never resolving the informal settlement situation, instead 
replicating it in increasingly distorted dimensions. Interests that were served by such distortions were 
never those of the broader pub'lic. In Brazil the privilege of a class-based elite ~as upheld, and in South ' 
Africa that of a white minority. 
In both countries tendencies towards greater inclusion, driven by the interests of industry and stability, 
were overturned by a swing to the far-right, reinstating ultra-conservative policies of the early 20th 
century, for instance around land-related legislation and political rights. Gradual 'political opening' after 
the mid 1970s in both countries then reintroduced policy directions of those earlier liberal tendencies. 
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In Brazil clientelism characterises particularly informal settlement intervention in that period, while in 
South Africa the policy of 'orderly urbanisation' introduced new, more subtle fonTIS of bureaucratic 
control, though increasingly deracialised. The following chapter examines the differences in societal 
responses to informal settlement that gained space through political opening as from the mid 1970s. The 
dominance ofneoliberal informal settlement intervention proposals in policy negotiations in South 
Africa contrasts with the clear articulation and promotion, through the PT (Workers Party) of 
progressive governance and intervention proposals, based on a consciousness of mechanisms of 
exclusion and of class barriers. The variation in awareness of the exclusionary processes discussed in 
this chapter then appears to have determined the shape of societal response to informal settlement, arid 
therefore what is considered appropriate intervention in South Africa and Brazil. 
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Chapter 5. Inclusion or patronage? Emergence of the current informal settlement intervention 
repertoire in South Africa and Brazil 
5.1 Introduction 
In South Africa the centralised infonnal settlement intervention framework is dominated by neoliberal 
notions. In Brazil, a strongly decentralised framework allows space for socially oriented, progressive 
and democratic practice at municipal level. In the previous chapter I have argued that this contrast may 
be partly rooted in the diverging processes of exclusion that have differently shaped both the infonnal 
settlement situation and the consciousness thereof within the various sectors of society. In Brazil 
infonnal settlements are more consciously associated with an exploitation of the working or 'popular' 
class, whereas a consciousness of racial barriers in South Africa has resulted in a racial (and to a lesser 
extent a class-based) understanding of the infonnal settlement phenomenon. This chapter examines in 
more detail, how the Brazilian and South African society have responded differently to the phenomenon 
of infonnal settlement, and how these responses have developed into the current intervention repertoires 
in the two countries. The aim thereby is to develop a critical position on current infonnal settlement 
intervention in South Africa, which is then deepened in the following chapters that turn more 
specifically to the South African thinking and practice. The leading question in this chapter therefore is: 
what critical aspects of the South African infonnal settlement intervention paradigm are exposed 
through a comparison between the emergence of South African and Brazilian intervention approaches? 
This chapter is addressed through two broad enquiries. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 examine the range of 
responses within civil society to the phenomenon of infonnal settlement. There, returning fIrst to the 
1940s, I trace contrasts between societal responses during populism in Brazil and limited economic 
realism in South Africa, through subsequent repression in both countries, to the responses that 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s with the (re-)emergence of unionism, community mobilisation, 
political activity, NGOs and private (business) sector initiative. Section 5.5 then examines to which 
extent these responses from civil society were adopted into a process of government reform, and to 
which extent they have thereby shaped the current infonnal settlement intervention repertoire. This 
outcome is largely defmed by the process through which such reform look place. In the Brazilian case, 
redemocratisation, constitution-making and decentralisation, in which an organised progressive sector 
of civil society participated with well articulated and consistent demands, were important processes 
where civil society exercised influence over the state. In South Africa, the process of change took place 
primarily through negotiations, largely dominated by the strong position of the private sector, which 
gave little space to the more fragile proposals put forward by the left-oriented civic movement (and 
later by the People's DialoguefHomeless People's Federation). Through this comparison, I draw 
attention to the important influence of critical progressive urban thinking on infonnal settlement 
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intervention in Brazil, and the absence of a articulation of equivalent thirlkirlg in SA. Chapter 6 
takes this further, by examining the SA informal settlement of the and 7 
examining current South African intervention pnlctl.ce. 
5.2 The liberalising post war years: different forms of .'."t .. "" .. "" in Brazil and South Africa 
As mentioned in the previous the 1940s in Bmzil and in South Africa saw an unprecedented 
in informal settlements in the cities. In both countries the mobilisation of 
informal settlement communities was by different kind. In Brazil 
.... "., vu .. ",,,, was exercised by the state which on from labour the 
dictatorship, 1937-45), and later depended more on electoral from the literate sector of 
the informal settlement population (during the 1945-64 populism), In South Africa in the 1940s, in the 
absence of African political rights, patronage was exercised by individual ,ulI,,,n,,r leaders'. I will 
briefly discuss, how each of these forms of mobilisation responded to the particular "'V\.!V'·jJV'uu"",,,! 
context. 
While during his 15 year rule of Brazil (1930 to 1945) had introduced clientelism to ensure 
political support of his regime, and created an 'official apparatus' for the of labour 
(Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994: 128), it was only in the populist period after his rule and up until the 
1964 coup, that demands of organised communities were translated into go'vernm.ent programmes. For 
the short period of its unbanning from 1945 to 1947, the Brazilian Communist (Partido 
Comunista Brasileiro - PCB) became 'the primary pr<)ponellt Issl11e-lonc:mtc:d movements' 
setting up 'Popular Democratic Committees' (CDPs) within communities, a centralised 
and disciplined structure at municipal level (Bonduki, 1994). Unlike the anarchist movement earlier that 
(,"T'hn"\! the PCB was holding the state responsible for the conditions. Its aim was 
'to take over the state and strengthen it', and to this overall strategy, the activities of the CDPs had to 
submit Souza notes that in the 1947 elections it was from the 
favela population that the PCB won votes in Rio de Janeiro. Although CDPs were 
disbanded with the of the Communist Party later in 1947, the 'practice 
to the state left a very in local grassroots (BondOO, 1994: 11 
In the following (1947 to 1964), neighbourhood associations were encouraged, and were used 
governments (Kowarick and BondOO, 1994: 130). 'tended to become 
vehicles of political support for populist governments, rather than institutional conduits for 
class 1989:278), although their roles varied according to the orientation of individual 
governors or mayors. These tendencies are illustrated by the case ofBelo Horizonte (as by 
Afonso and 1987), where a favela movement resisted expulsions and Vl~~"U,""'U 
thus challenging the status quo. As from the mid 19505, it received support from 
the 'I'lrrIPTI~~~'IV~ sector of the Catholic Church, While the official intervention approach remained that of 
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relocation to new housing, the demand from within the favela movement was for H;;l'l,4U;~4','Vll and 
regularisation of land occupations. A mayor, elected with strong support from residents on 
... rr,,,,,;,, .. ,, of regularisation, once in office responded by .... HI;an';;;uo'u .... ,' .. l' harldirlg out and 
apartments to those favela residents to which he had links. Those less in order to 
create pressure for action on the election promises. This in turn was tolerated the state governor, who 
opposed the Belo Horizonte mayor (Afonso and AZleveuu. 1987:116-118). In Rio de Janeiro it was 
through an a2I'eeluellt between the Catholic Church and the mUllU;lpi1U.Y In lUllll111JII! the 'Cruzada 
Siio Sebastiiio', that several favelas benefited from improved basic services (i.e. in situ LUJ~~U"~lU;i;\1 
without j""',Y'\t;,," of the layout (Taschner, 1995:203). The mUllllclpal towards favelas in 
Rio de Janeiro, !.,,"'''''',,'',. rc:ma:mc::uthat of relocation (ibid.). Ambiguity thus "'h",.",..t .. ri,, .. rI informal 
settlement intervention of that period. 
Goverrm1ent concern with popular housing receded in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with government 
interest instead diverted to modernisation and the automotive industry, and the construction of the 
new of Brasilia (Taschner, 1995:204). However, the Cuban revolution in 1959, and the 
urban reform of Fidel inspired a progressive movement of professionals and 'fostered 
about the future of Latin American countries' (Maricato, 1996:8). In 1963 nro,l?ressnre Brazilian 
architects convened a seminar on 'Housing and Urban Reform', based within a movement 
pr{)m()tmlg 'Basic Reforms' (ibid.:7). The content of the urban reform proposals in the 1960s was that of 
centralised planning and strong intervention by government to ensure access to land and nOllSIrl1!: for the 
low income population (ibid.:9), notably very different from the thinking in the urban reform movement 
that in the 1980s to which I return later in this chapter. Ironically, these early urban reform 
pro,pQ!.als were translated into the national housing policy of the subsequent military (Maricato, 
1993b:213). Housing provision through this policy, however, exposed 'an 
distance between discourse and practice', which Maricato (1996:9) refers to as one of the 'hallmarks of 
Brazilian ,"U:1""V 
In South Africa in the I 940s, political exclusion I required informal settlement mobilisation ofa 
different sort from that of BraziL Stadler the informal settlement dVllaUlUCS in 
JotlannesibUlrg from 1944 to 1947, speaks of'squatter movements' (note the plural), driven by individual 
1979:93). These movements depended on the particular orientation and power of their 
the well known James Mpanza, who mobilised the ~ ... ~.~ ... , r referred to 
'Sofasonke lli1,UI:lUU. 1992: 12; Mamdani, 1996:98). Such mobilisation 
t"l" ....... ,ri,,"'rI the recruitment of a following by the leader, sometimes in authoritarian style, the collective 
lm'aSllon ofland and the maintenance ofautonomy from the municipality. Autonomy was enabled 
of the U~~;UP;i:lUlJln and the authority exercised by the leader (Stadler, 1979:94). 
I This refers to exclusion from national and municipal elections. A very limited degree of political 
was afforded the urban African population through the election of advisory boards. At the 
the ANC and the Communist Party were not outlawed. (Stadler, 1979: 109) 
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While BOIUler (1990:97) makes mention of individual squatter leaders at the time having set up food co-
operatives, which might suggest socialist orientatiotis, it appears that the squatter mobilisation did not 
entail political conscientisation of the followers. Instead, it created a dependency on the tactics and 
vision of the leader. With political disenfranchisement, the possibility of squatter demands being taken 
up as contending policy proposals, as was the case in Brazil, did not exist in South Africa. Indeed, 
squatters at the time were considered less than human - the official process, that was undertaken to 
identifY individual perpetrators of the pass laws was officially referred to as 'culling,2 (Stadler, 
1979:101). 
Within this context, the particular form that squatter mobilisation took in Johannesburg was the only 
effective means of securing living space for the landless urban African population. Patronage by the 
squatter leaders may have some parallels in Brazil with the middle-men or 'grileiros,3 that illegally sold 
land to the working class on the urban periphery. However, this was an officially tolerated and even 
deliberately encouraged process that was relieving the state of the acute housing shortage (Kowarick 
and Bonduki, 1994: 125), whereas squatting in Johannesburg in the 1940s provoked confrontation with 
the state. Indeed, by 1948 the state had gained control over most of the Johannesburg squatter 
movements, their members being resettled in municipally controlled emergency camps. Mobilisation, 
then took the form of rent strikes within these camps, and therefore renewed confrontation with the state 
(Stadler, 1979:103). 
The relationship between the favela movement and a broader left-oriented movement in Brazil, with the 
progressive sector of the Catholic Church and political parties of the left, did not have an equivalent in 
South Africa. The South African squatter movements avoided compliance with the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party, the two main African political organisations at the time 
(Sapire, 1990). The ANC had been founded in 1912 by an elite of Western-educated Africans, strongly 
supporting the civilised values on which 'white' society 'claimed to be based' (Orner-Cooper, 1994: I 62). 
Initially they sought the extension of equal rights to all in the civilised sector of society (ibid.), not 
dissimilar from the limited franchise applying to Brazilian society at the time. It was only with the harsh 
racial discrimination experienced across the board, that the ANC identified with the 'wider African 
population' (Orner-Cooper, 1994:162). Thus in 1943 the ANC drafted a Bill of Rights, which included 
universal political rights. The ANC continued to pursue moderate liberal principles, though with 
pressure from the more radically inclined Youth League, it adopted tactics of mass passive resistance, 
and reluctantly participated in mass protest action initiated by the Communist Party (ibid.). However, 
Stadler (1979: 108) notes that the ANC, though concerned with miners' strikes, 'does not seem to have 
taken up the issue of squatting'. The same appears to apply to the Communist Party at the time (ibid.). 
2 'Culling' is conventionally applied to the selection and killing of surplus animals from a herd. 
3 See footnote 15 in Chapter 4. 
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5.3 The re-emergence of mobilisation as from the 1970s: new responses to informal settlement? 
In both Brazil and South Africa, the social mobilisation in the work place and the community, which 
had developed in the post-war years, was repressed with the political swing to the far-right (1964 in 
Brazil, 1948 in South Africa). Some of the earlier (post war) political trends around informal 
settlement, however, endured or re-emerged with gradual political reform after the mid 1970s. In Brazil 
clientelism and patronage again characterised the relationship between favela communities and the 
state. In South Africa, the informal settlement question remained largely ignored by African 
oppositional politics, although increasingly informal settlements became the locale of politically 
motivated confrontation between community and state. In Brazil progressive mobilisation confronted 
the dominant practice of clientelism, and aimed to replace the associated political patronage with 
political inclusion and self-determination through the concept of participatory democracy. The newly 
formed PT (Workers' Party) in the 1980s became the political vehicle for the promotion of the 
autonomy of grassroots or base' organisations4, and their direct participation in the defmition of 
intervention programmes. In South Africa progressive thinking on alternative forms of local governance 
was developed within the civic movement. However, continued government repression in the 1980s, 
and professional patronage into the 1990s left little space for the emergence of alternative practice. In 
Section 5.4 below, I turn more directly to the patronage entailed in the influential thinking on informal 
settlement intervention put forward by the Urban Foundation, a neoliberal private sector initiative, 
which strongly promoted a technocratic solution to informal settlement, namely the delivery of sites-
and-services through the individualised capital subsidy. 
The Catholic Church and favela mobilisation in Brazil 
The Catholic Church in Brazil played an important role in organising and conscientising at the 
grassroots level and building an understanding of the exploitative nature or injustices of capitalism as it 
was playing itself out in Brazil. Repression by the military, as well as the 1968 decision by the Latin 
American Bishops' conference in Medellin, Columbia, to serve the cause of the poor, led to an 'internal 
transformation' of the Catholic Church (Alves, 1989:286; Vink, 1985: 100; Mainwaring; 1984:98, Sader 
and Silverstein, 1991 :58). Throughout military repression, a degree of community mobilisation was 
kept alive through the ecclesiastic or Christian base communities (Comunidades Eclesial de Base -
CEBs), which the emerging Catholic left had flrst set up in the early 1960s as a new means of working 
with the popular sectors, overcoming the previous paternalistic practices of the Church (Mainwaring, 
1984:97,98). As 'the only institution in civil society that had sufficient autonomy vis-a-vis the state to 
continue progressive pedagogic work with the popular classes', it had become by 1973 'the most 
signiflcant institution defending human rights' (Mainwaring, 1984:98). The concept of Christian base 
communities or CEBs was extended into the informal settlements through the 'pastoral de favelas' 5, 
4 The Brazilian term for grassroots, 'base', is often adopted into English in texts on Brazil (see for 
instance Vink, 1985). 
5 Through the pastoral de favelas, priests were given the responsibility for spiritual welfare of favela 
residents in their parishes, by setting up Ecclesiastic Base Communities (CEBs). Previously, the 
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which provided structured space for debate on the situation in infonnal settlements. The 'democratic 
participatory practices' developed by the CEBs in favelas and elsewhere had no precedent in the pre-
1964 popular organisations (Mainwaring, 1984:100). 
After the fIrst relaxation of repression in 1974, the political role that the Church had fulfIlled was taken 
over to some extent by unions, political parties, neighbourhood associations and progressive 
professional groups (Mainwaring, 1984:98). However, the Church continued to play an important role 
in 'strengthening the struggles of unions, peasant leagues, and neighbourhood associations' (ibid.). What 
then were the Church's responses to the favela question? Three examples illustrate that the Church 
confronted the question of social rights related to land and housing, thus the legal position of favelas, 
besides the continuing role of the pastoral de favelas / in community organisation, fonnation of 
leadership, and articulation of, and lobbying for, localised development objectives. In the case of Rio de 
Janeiro, the Archdiocese created a juridical service in 1978 with lawyers fostering 'a critical 
consciousness' among favela residents (SELA VIP, 1981 :8). Together with the pastoral de favelas, the 
aim was to ensure that favelas were not removed, that paternalism (or the solving of problems from 
outside) be avoided and that existing socially responsive laws be implemented and new laws be enacted 
(ibid.). In the Diocese ofVit6ria, the Church undertook particular activities around the question of 
housing rights, promoting the concept that invasions by poor people are not a crime but an act of 
survival, and therefore a human right. It therefore challenged the government to become involved not 
through its police force, but through social welfare (SELA VIP, 1981 :9). In Belo Horizonte, the pastoral 
defavelas was increasingly engaged with the question of rights to land, whereas a separate movement 
offavela residents, the Union of Workers of the Periphery (Uniiio dos Trabalhadores da Periferia-
UTP) was concerned with the more immediate demands generated by evictions, for instance the demand 
for better compensation (Afonso and Azevedo, 1987: 122). 
In terms of rights to occupied land, the long-standing popular demand was for individualised freehold 
title or home-ownership. Bolaffi (1992: 1 00) notes that in 1961 a survey by the American Institute of 
International Relations had concluded that 'one of the most frequent aspirations ... of the Brazilian 
urban population was to own a house.' This it associated with 'conservative political attitudes', and 
indeed such correlation had inspired the home ownership thrust of the military dictatorship (ibid.). 
However, Kowarick and Ant (1994:71), acknowledging the widespread home ownership aspiration, 
place this trend in relation to exclusion and insecurity faced by the urban working class. Thus they 
argue'that 'it is surely not for ideological reasons alone that workers set their sights on freeing 
themselves from the obligation to pay rent' (ibid.). With this understanding then, the progressive sector 
of the Catholic Church, and the left-oriented professionals supporting the favela movement and its 
demands, then sought to promote instruments that would enable favela residents to gain individual 
existence of favelas had not been officially acknowledged by the Church (Bernareggi, personal 
communication, 1997). Similarly, a 'Labour Pastoral' was later set up in the workplace, allowing 
unionists to 'reflect on their activities in the light ofthe Gospel' (Vink, 1985: 1 07). 
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freehold tenure. Some opposition was voiced from an ideologically focused left sector, wishing instead 
to promote forms of communal tenure in the expectation that individual home ownership would lead to 
a demobilisation of the working class (Michelini, personal communication, 19976). Its proposals, 
however, found no popularity among the favela population. More rigorous opposition was in turn 
voiced from the conservative land owning class, which saw its real estate interests impeded by the 
proposed instruments for favela land regularisation (ibid.). 
As from the mid 1970s, there were endeavours to unify the various localised urban struggles, including 
those for rights to land. Through the land related initiatives of the Catholic Church, and in particular a 
'National Network for Urban Land' {ArticularyQo Nacional do Solo Urbano - ANSUR)7 which was 
created in the early 1980s, a national Urban Reform Movement was initiated, as a counterpart to the 
movement advocating agrarian reform (Maricato, 1994:310). In 1988 this movement, through the 
participation of various popular and professional national entities including the Movement for the 
Defence of Favela Residents (Movimento de DeJesa do Favelado), submitted a constitutional 
amendment on urban refonn, supported by 160000 signatures (ibid.). Central aspects of this proposal 
were, on the one hand, the social function of property and of the city, and on the other hand, popular 
participation in the definition and management of urban policies (Lago, 1992:42), i.e. democratic urban 
management through structures such as democratic councils, public audiences and popular referendums 
(Maricato, 1994:311). With specific regards to the favela situation, the movement was promoting 
mechanisms for the regularisation ofland (ibid.), thus reflecting the localised struggles I have referred 
to above. The overriding objective of the urban reform movement remains that of achieving a more just 
city, thus combating two processes that have shaped the Brazilian city: on the one hand, the excessive 
real estate speculation, which has resulted in both over-densifIcation and the holding ofvac~nt land; on 
the other hand, the inequitable spatial distribution of public investment in infrastructure (Souza, 
1993b:208). 
The contribution oflegal and planning scholars of the left was in the articulation of urban reform 
instruments that would address the popular concerns. Being oriented to the overriding concern of social 
justice, these alternative professionals, unlike their conventional rational counterparts in Brazil, 
emphasise the 'political-technical process' of planning rather than the 'technical product' (Souza, 
1999:4). Concerning their relationship with the popular class, Souza (1999:4) argues that: 'Alternative 
planners are not afraid of conflicts; instead of conceiving disharmony as an undesirable and avoidable 
thing (as conventional planners do), they know that conflicts and tensions are inherent features of class 
societies.' The understanding then is that harmony cannot be built through 'instrumental rationality' 
(ibid.). Instead, these alternative planners 'intend to contribute to a process of negotiation and regulation 
6 Dr. Anna Conigliaro Michelini was speaking of her experience within the Italian NGO A VSI in 
supporting the struggle of the Pastoral de Javelas in Belo Horizonte in the early 1980s. In 1997 she was 
co-ordinator of the Novos Alagados project (favela intervention) for AVSI in Salvador-Bahia. 
7 See Barbosa, Cabannes and Moraes (1997:30). 
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of conflicts during which the contradictions become explicit and the options can be freely debated on 
the basis of political transparency and participation of ordinary citizens' (ibid.). The orientation of these 
alternative Brazilian professionals, in their consciousness of class and conflict, contrasts with the 
product-oriented professional input in the South African urban reform with regards to informal 
settlements. I will emphasise this point below, particularly with regards to the 'professional' position 
developed by the influential Urban Foundation. In Chapter 6, I more specifically trace the scholarly 
thinking behind this approach, fmding there the professional endeavour to stabilise mobility and inter-
community conflict and violence through a technically defmed intervention product: the serviced site 
with individual freehold title. 
It should be noted that, apart from the mobilising activities of the Catholic Church through CEBs, the 
late 1970s in Brazil saw a strong growth in resident associations, this being ascribed to both the 
worsening conditions in favelas as well as the 'political opening' which allowed the earlier populist 
relationship between state and citizens to re-emerge8• Support for community associations came both 
from politicians, for whom they represented a vehicle for making themselves known and to lobby for 
support, and from the state programmes that laid increasing emphasis on 'participatory' approaches 
(Afonso and Azevedo, 1987: 124). A different political vision for community organisation and its 
relationship with the state then emerged with the formation of the PT (Workers' Party) in 1980. Though 
having its roots in the 'radical labour union movement that emerged in south-eastern Brazil's heavy 
industrial sector at the end of the 1 970s,' the PT had been formed in an alliance between the labour 
unions and other progressive and radical groups in Brazilian society, including the progressive arm of 
the Catholic Church (Abers, 1996:36). 
Politicisation: the PT approach in Brazil 
The PT is considered 'a novel development among Brazilian institutions' for three reasons (Keck, 
1992:239): firstly, it set out to express at a political level 'the interests of workers and the poor'; 
secondly, it strove to be 'internally democratic'; thirdly, it emphasised accountability to its members. 
These concerns have remained central to the party's identity (ibid.). The particular concept of the PT 
then lies in the role it foresees for grassroots organisations. Abers (1996:37) defmes this concept as 
'autonomous grassroots control and direct participation', noting however, that the party's heterogeneity 
did not lend itself to an official ideology. Indeed, it shurmed 'the elitism, dogmatism, and revolutionary 
vanguardism of earlier Brazilian socialist parties' (ibid.). Autonomy of the grassroots movements (as 
opposed to their integration into the ruling system) was then considered necessary for the active 
participation of the population in the implementation of democracy (Wolf, 1994:348). The party's 
8 Assies (1993 :40) refers to a 'neo-populism' that emerged with clientelism in the late 1970s, while 
Teixeira (1993:52) notes that in the 1990s the culture of clientelist politics is still dominant in various 
regions of Brazil. 
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decentralised and democratic internal structure (Abers, 1996:37) reflected its vision for governance: on 
the one hand the party was to be carried by the base movement, on the other hand, it was to take the 
demands of the base movement into the political system (Wolf, 1994:350). 
Mainwaring (1984: 115) notes that in its early years, the PT was 'explicitly more concerned about 
conscientisation and supporting popular movements than about coming to power in the short run.' 
Popular awareness grew over the difference between the PT approach and the patronage and clientelism 
offered by other politicians (Seidman, 1994:209). Conscientisation also encompassed a broad anti-
capitalist sentiment through an awareness of the exclusionary process of capital accumulation in Brazil 
(ibid.:225). The concepts of class and citizenship were popularised and 'increasingly appealed to a 
. constituency that found itself excluded from the benefits of capitalist growth' (ibid.:227). 
Although the PT had won control over the municipality of Diadema as early as 1982 (as noted in 
Chapter 3), and two further municipalities in 1985, it was only in preparation of the 1988 municipal 
elections that 'the PT began to define what a PT municipal administration should look like' (Abers, 
1996:37). Abers lists the PT's key governance principles as 'decentralisation of power, government 
accountability to autonomous social movements, and a reversal of priorities away from elite groups 
toward the poor and disadvantaged' (ibid.:37,38). Popular councils were to play an important role in 
controlling the decision-making of the municipal administrations (ibid.). In a practical sense, then, the 
PT hoped to challenge the widespread practices of clientelism, both in the deals between leaders of 
residents' associations and politicians (with electoral support being exchanged for promises of 
development) and in the deals between the business sector (particularly construction and real estate) 
and politicians, with business giving financial support to political campaigns, in return for 'the right to 
reap super-profits in overcharged government contracts' (Abers, 1998:42). Both these forms of 
clientelism were bearing on the informal settlement situation, and on the form that intervention was 
taking. 
The civic movement response in South Africa 
Before returning to the institutionalisation of the PT's alternative concepts in Brazil later in this chapter, 
I now contrast the Brazilian societal responses with those that emerged in South Africa as from the mid 
1970s. As in Brazil, the societal responses to informal settlement in South Africa were embedded in 
oppositional politics. A clear distinction, however, emerged between the response of the white liberal 
opposition and the African community-based opposition. In 1976, in reaction to the instability sparked 
by the brutal police massacre of protesting school children in Soweto, Johannesburg, the white business 
sector in South Africa created the Urban Foundation (Urban Foundation, 1994). This private sector 
funded initiative, which I discuss in more detail below, undertook policy-oriented research on questions 
of urbanisation (including informal settlements), and proposed and piloted a neoliberal informal 
settlement intervention approach. The African opposition, in turn responded to informal settlements 
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through the civic movement, which had emerged in African townships in the late 1970s (Shubane, 
1991 :64). As from 1983, the civic movement was co-ordinated by the newly formed UDF (United 
Democratic Front)9, which also spread the movement beyond formal townships into informal 
settlements. This then included the new generation of informal settlements that emerged with the 
administrative ambiguities of the 1980s (see Crankshaw, 1993:49). 
The civic movement received support through a response from the sympathising professional sector, 
with the formation of development NGOs. However, as I argue below, development thinking within 
these NGOs, in practice appears to have been closer to that of the Urban Foundation than the civic 
movement. A later societal response to the persistence of the informal settlement phenomenon was 
developed in the early 1990s in the form of an internationally inspired social movement, the Homeless 
People's Federation. The community-based responses of both the civic movement and the Homeless 
People's Federation have sat uncomfortably with the well fmanced and thus slickly articulated proposals 
of the Urban Foundation which were embraced by the dominant African opposition movement, the 
ANC-SACP-COSA ru lO alliance. The Urban Foundation proposals thus informed current South 
African housing policy and by implication policy on informal settlement. This demonstrated that the 
informal settlement question, remained on the fringe of dominant African politics into the 1990s. 
Turning then to the activities of the civic movement in the 1980s, it must be noted that while developing 
its own longer term ideology and concepts on development, the movement was primarily required to 
respond to immediate circumstances created by ambivalent state reforms. A widespread cause of 
contention was the implementation of 'Black Local Authorities' (BLAs) in urban African townships in 
1983, which had previously been administered by officials of white City Councils, Administration 
Boards or Divisional Councils II (McCarthy, 1992). Elections of the new BLA councillors were severely 
boycotted by the contesting constituencies (Shubane, 1991 :68). Notably, only 'Section 10' residents, 
meaning those with permanent urban status, were afforded political expression through these local 
elections (Orner-Cooper, 1994:229; Shubane, 1991 :67). A related point of contention then was the raise 
in rent and services charges. This increase was introduced by the new BLA councillors who were faced 
with virtually no revenue base, as their constituencies were separate from business and industrial areas 
(McCarthy, 1992)12. Further contention among urban African communities arose from the establishment 
9 McCarthy (1992:33) describes the UDF as a 'coalition of civic associations, smaller trade unions, and 
related groups,' noting that it was the fIrst signal of 'an internal coalition offorces dedicated to the 
establishment of a strong unitary state pursuing non-racial and social-democratic policies.' Mayekiso 
(l996:67) notes that the UDF was in many ways the 'ANC's surrogate', co-ordinating 'the national 
protest campaigns against apartheid.' He too emphasises that it was 'a broad multi-class and non-racial 
coalition' (ibid.). 
10 African National Congress - South African Communist Party - Congress of South African Trade 
Unions. 
II Divisional Councils were intended for the administration of non-urban areas, and in the late 1980s 
were replaced by RSCs - Regional Services Councils. 
12 The revenue dilemma was eased to some extent in 1984 by the state's decision to include BLAs into 
Regional Service Council (RSC) areas (Shubane, 1991 :6). 
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oftricameral parliament in 1983, giving preferential treatment to Coloureds (through the House of 
Representatives) and Indians (through the House of Delegates), by allowing these groups control over 
their budgets and priorities. While this bode well for the production of Coloured and Indian housing, it 
had no impact on the inadequate African housing stock (Parnell, 1992). Instead, the African residential 
sphere was subjected to the privatisation of state assets in the area of housing and transport. African 
housing stock was thus sold to legal occupants, and government expenditure on commuting was 
reduced through the privatisation of bus companies and the promotion of the informal combi-taxi 
industry (McCarthy, 1992). 
The civic movements' response then (and that of the UDF) was to orchestrate boycotts in order to 
cripple the BLA structures l3 • Rent boycotts had been organised since the early 1980S14, However, 
incidents such as brutal police intervention in rent marches in 1985 led to calls for more comprehensive 
challenges. Besides consumer boycotts of white outlets, this included the creation of alternative 
governance structures. The civic movement thus encouraged participation in its street and section 
committees, the boycotting of police stations by taking disputes to 'people's courts', and attempts at 
people's education associated with the boycotting of government schools (Boraine, 1988). These 
alternative structures or people's initiatives, however, were not given space to govern IS. In 1986 they 
became the target of the nation-wide state of emergency declared in June 1986. 34 townships in South 
Africa were designated 'strategic bases', from which the security forces believed they could 'regain 
control' over the African population (Boraine, 1988: 1). One so-called 'oil spot' was the Crossroads 
transit camp adjacent to the Cape Town township ofNyanga (Cole, 1989). 
The state approach then was that of creating division through repression and selective co-optationl6 , 
While the BLA structures in themselves were a means of dividing the urban African society by 
privileging those with permanent status, from whom the state was hoping loyalty 'in defence of the 
system' (Orner-Cooper, 1994:227,228), in 1986 the security forces intervened directly. Control by the 
civic movement was crushed through the isolation of townships (e.g. disconnecting telephone lines), a 
ban on public gatherings, house-to-house searches and detention of civic and youth leadership, trade 
unionist and members of street committees (Boraine, 1988). Divisions were then fostered through 
selective improvement of infrastructure and facilities in townships (with central government funds) 
13 In early 1985, the ANC had made a call for 'ungovernerability', thus spurring the boycotting that was 
already underway (Mayekiso, 1996:67). 
14 Mayekiso (1996:98) notes that rent boycotts were supported by residents 'not only for political 
purposes', but also in response to declining income levels, therefore as 'a cry for economic justice.' 
Mayekiso thereby refutes the concept of a 'culture of non-payment' which is commonly associated with 
the continuing boycotting of rents.· . 
IS Mayekiso (1996:67), referring to his involvement in the civic movement in the Alexandra township of 
Johannesburg notes that: 'Our most heady period of township organizing was the few months in early 
1986 when we could really claim that apartheid rule was being displaced, street by street, by our own 
form of self-government. It was a liberating experience, though it did not last for long'. 
16 Interestingly, Mayekiso (1996: 100) refers to the state's torturing and killing of leaders, and giving of 
handouts to their followers, as 'the "Brazilian Option".' 
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(ibid.). Tragically, groups of vigilantes emerged, many of which sided with the security forces and 
attacked ANC supporters (Orner-Cooper, 1994:239). The most publicised case possibly was that of the 
war in the Crossroads transit camp in Cape Town. In Durban, these dynamics, which 'assumed the 
character of a long running civil war' (Orner-Cooper, 1994:239) had a particular bearing on informal 
settlements. Seeing as this dynamic has led to a widespread assumption (particularly by the middle-
class, including urban researchers as will be evident in Chapter 6) that informal settlements per se are 
associated with violence, it is relevant to briefly review the shifts in such violence in the Durban 
situation. 
As a result of the state's undertaking to incorporate Durban townships l7 into the Inkatha-run KwaZulu, 
conflict shifted from protest (boycotts) against the apartheid state to a struggle between the UDF and 
Inkatha l8 (Hindson, Byerley and Morris, 1994:338). This violence then shifted increasingly from 
Durban's core townships to the squatter settlements ofKwaZulu, taking the form of mutually destructive 
clashes between communities of different squatter settlements, and squatter settlements and townships, 
though also including clashes between townships and with hostel residents. (ibid.:340). Harsh measures 
employed under the state of emergency led to the removal of virtually all UDF leadership from 
townships. This promoted the spread oflawlessness and brought the youth constituency to the fore. 
Thus UDF-supporting youth, )oined at times by criminal elements' came 'to dominance in most of the 
formal townships,' whereas Inkatha leaders re-emerged in the squatter settlements 'where they teamed 
up with local shack lords' (in control of single sites), and 'warlords' (in control of entire settlements) 
(Hindson et aI., 1994:340). Within this conflict, Inkatha was given support fIrst by the South African 
police and later by the KwaZulu Police, founded in 1987. However, by the late 1980s the ANC won 
over large portions of the squatter periphery, whereas 'Inkatha retreated into fortress-like pockets of 
ground,19 (ibid.:4l). 
The shift from Inkatha control over informal settlements to that by the UDF with its civic structures 
then brought with it the particular ideology of the civic movement. Firstly, this meant democratic 
representation of communities. It should be noted, however, that this did not always materialise. Van 
Horen (1996: 13), analysing the change from Inkatha to ANC control in the Besters Camp informal 
settlement in the early 1990s, points out the limitations of what was described as 'democratic' at the 
time: 'In the absence of adequate organisational structures, or reporting lines and lines of accountability, 
power cliques operating under the banner of the ANC or civics were in many instances no less guilty of 
violent intolerance of dissenting viewpoints, than their Inkatha predecessors had been'. Secondly, the 
UDF and civic structures introduced free access to land. In informal settlements, this meant a shift from 
!7 This affected the townships of Lamontville, Chesterville and Clermont (Hindson et al., 1994:338). 
18 The Inkatha Freedom Party, 'representing black traditionalist interests' in K wa-Zulu and since 1994 in 
the new KwaZulu-Natal province, is considered the 'third major political force' in South Africa's 
transition, alongside the National Party and the ANC (Friedman, 1996:49). 
19 For instance 'Lindelani and Mshayazafa in lnanda, and also parts of Malukazi near Umlazi' (Hindson 
et aI., 1994:341). 
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rental tenure towards a system that may be associated with 'communal land holding in rural areas,' with 
entry through sponsorship and screening (Cross, 1994: 180). Again, clandestine selling of sites in ANC-
aligned settlements was not entirely out-ruled (ibid.:34). 
Turning then to the development thinking in the civic movement, ideas of grassroots democracy and the 
decommodification of land may be considered central concepts. Mayekiso (1996:21), writing about his 
first hand experience within the civic movement in the Alexandra township of Johannesburg, which, is 
considered one of the most militant areas in South Africa (Mayekiso, personal communication, 19982°), 
mentions that as early as 1985 the Alexandra civic (then called the Alexandra Action Committee -
ACC), was discussing its role in community development. Grocery co-operatives for the unemployed, 
centres providing after school care, and other communal self-help projects were considered. However, 
such early work on a popular development programme was thwarted by the state-orchestrated violence 
that diverted the attention of the civic movement (ibid.). Nevertheless, decommodification of basic 
needs commodities, including land and housing, remained central to the development ideology of the 
civic movement into the 1990s (Mayekiso, 1996: 155, 165). This then is a remarkable contrast to the 
Brazilian popular movement that was demanding individual freehold tenure. As win be evident in the 
discussion of the Urban Foundation thinking, it was the private sector in South Africa that advocated 
the concept of individual freehold title and 'home ownership' for informal settlement residents. In my 
analysis of the South African research literature on informal settlement in South Africa in Chapter 6, 
I return to the simplistic thinking behind the home ownership concept. 
Support to a people's movement or deradicalisation? The development NODs 
Early development endeavours of the civic movement, particularly from within informal se~lements, 
found support in various cities from sympathetic development professionals. Thus, besides church 
organisations and humanitarian NGOs such as the Black Sash2t, that were engaged in non-political 
relief work in assistance of informal settlement communities, a new form of 'development NGO' 
emerged in the 1980s. In 1982 the Built Environment Support Group (BESG) was created at the 
University of Natal (Durban). This was followed in 1985 by the founding of Plan act in Johannesburg, 
and in 1986 the Development Action Group (DAG) in Cape Town22 • Starting on a voluntary basis, 
these groups with time formalised into largely foreign aid funded NGOs. The formation of DAG was 
directly linked to the 'squatter crisis' in Cape Town: during the Crossroads war, activists had directed a 
20 Mzwanele Mayekiso, author, activist and urban planner (and brother of the 199211993 president of 
SANCO Moses Mayekiso, who now heads SANCO Investment Holdings), in 1998 was leading activist 
in a new civic movement National Association of Residents and Civic Organisations (NARCO), also 
heading the Development Research Institute, which gives professional support to the civic movement. 
21 And in the Cape Town area the Catholic Welfare Bureau (later Catholic Welfare and Development) 
and the Surplus People's Project. 
22 Other such development NGOs were Afesis-Corplan in East London and the Urban Services Group 
in Port Elizabeth. In Chapter 7, I make reference to the Urban Services Group's involvement with the 
Gunguluza settlement in Uitenhage, and BESG's involvement with the Piesang River settlement in 
Durban. 
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petition at development professionals to refuse participation in government plans to reorganise the 
Crossroads transit camp without involvement of the original squatte~ population. After consultation with 
the civic organisations and the UDF, DAG was formed to 'contribute to the growing resistance to 
undemocratic planning methods used by the State to achieve its own political objectives' (DAG, 
1996:4). DAG's role is said to have varied according to the demands directed at it from the grassroots. 
Its activities thus ranged from the formulation of upgrading approaches in resistance to squatter 
removals, technical input in the drafting oflegal documents in resistance to squatter demolitions, advice 
to civic organisations, drafting of fund raising proposals and in the late 1980s increasingly assistance to 
communities in development negotiations (DAG, 1996). 
Why then, did such NGO support not lead to an implementation of communal or decommodified 
development programmes as the civic movement envisioned? In part, this may be explained through the 
shifts in relationship between the development NGOs and the communities they were serving. In the 
early years of these NGOs, they operated in direct partnership with the civic movement. However, the 
state's endeavour to regain control over the townships, leading to the elimination of the civic leadership 
in the second half of the 1980s, left the development NGOs without a 'client base' (Abbott, 1996:200). 
Abbott notes that whereas those NGOs that directly promoted community organisation and media 
presentation were considered serious threats to the state, the development NGOs operated 'in a political 
space which allowed them a significant amount of freedom of action' (ibid.). They therefore found 
various ways 'to continue their operation and to grow over the period of oppression' (ibid.). The shift 
then was one from a means towards an end (which was defined by the civic movement), to an end in 
itself. Towards this latter end, the Urban Sector Network was formed in 1988, enabling co-operation 
and co-ordination between the various localised development NGOs across South Africa (DAG, 
1996:9), thus strengthening an independent nation-wide development NGO movement. In the late 
1980s, when the civic leadership was released from detention and could rebuild the civic movement, 
civic organisations were increasingly in a position to focus on development rather than resistance. 
However, the development NGOs had by then developed a language and agenda of their own. 
Development thinking in the Urban Sector Network NGOs towards the late 1980s and early 1990s then 
was closer to that promoted by the Urban Foundation (which I discuss below), than that of the civic 
movement. Though respectful of the progressive contributions of development NGO staff, Mayekiso 
(1996:258), from his own experience as both a Planact employee and a civic leader, criticised that the 
NGO professionals were 'usually oriented towards the deradicalisation of the grassroots.' Thus 'many 
disagreements about strategy between the NGOs and civics ... flowed from professional arrogance and 
community vulnerability' (ibid.). The NGO bias to conventional neoliberal (or deradicalised) 
development approaches had a further reason. In 1990 the Urban Foundation's thinking on informal 
settlement intervention had been semi-institutionalised through the Independent Development Trust 
(IDT, to which I return later in this chapter), thus increasingly dictating the shape of development. The 
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Urban Sector Network NGOs found a niche in project managing such development (this being fmanced 
through the lOT projects), thus placing themselves in an uncomfortable position between civics and a 
rigid development framework from which they were no longer independent. Although the Urban Sector 
Network NGO approach to project management was more participatory than that of conventional 
development consultants, the NGOs had to abide by the dictates of the development framework, 
including its time constraints and individualised site-and-service product. This then was the context in 
which conflict arose around the involvement of the NGO BESG in the Piesang River informal 
settlement, one of the case studies discussed in Chapter 7 (although this development was not funded by 
the IDT, it was contemporary, and based on similar tenets) . 
. The People's Dialogue/Homeless People's Federation alliance in South Africa 
A further societal response to informal settlement is the People's DialoguelHomeless People's 
Federation alliance which, though only emerging in the 1990s, developed an intervention approach that 
contrasts with that of the civic movement that I have already discussed, and more so with that of the 
Urban Foundation to which I turn below. The radical nature of this approach, and hence its conflict with 
the current Urban Foundation inspired informal settlement intervention framework, are aspects that I 
examine in relation to two of the case studies in Chapter 7. Here then I introduce the alliance, and place 
it in relation to the other strains of informal settlement intervention thinking in South Africa, and to that 
in Brazil. 
As I have already briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, the People's Dia10gueIHomeless People's Federation 
alliance in South Africa was inspired through an international network promoting and linking NGO-
initiated support-based intervention initiatives among the urban poor. In ·1991 an international meeting 
of 'people's networks', to which community workers of the Cape Town based NGO Catholic Welfare 
and Development (CWD) were invited, led to the formation of a new network, the Southern African 
People's Dialogue for Land and Shelter (Bolnick, 1993). Supported by the German Catholic aid agency 
MISEREOR, this autonomous sub-committee of the Southern African Catholic Development Agency 
was to link informal settlement residents (and other equivalently housed people) across South Africa 
and beyond. The objective was to empower such residents through an exchange of experience (ibid.). 
Initially, civic leaders from across the country were invited to participate in debate on 'land and shelter' 
(People's Dialogue, 1991). However, the experience was that homelessness was not a topic that civic 
leaders were prioritising (Hunsley, personal communication, 199823). Therefore, only individual civic 
leaders committed themselves to the new initiative, one being the current president of the Homeless 
People's Federation, whose civic organisation in the Piesang River settlement in Durban has since 
disbanded. The Federation then developed with no direct link to the civic movement. One reason for 
23 In 1998 Patrick Hunsley was president of the Homeless People's Federation, and resident of the 
Piesang River informal settlement. He was interviewed in connection with the Piesang River case study, 
which is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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this was that the DialoguelFederation initiative was taking into account what, from international 
experience, it perceived to be an 'orgamc link between women and shelter,' therefore addressing itself 
primarily, though not exclusively, to women (Bolnick, 1993:99). It found that civic organisations in 
South Africa were in turn 'invariably controlled by men' (ibid.). Indeed, Mayeldso admits that the civic 
movement has been 'notoriously patriarchal,' an issue that only started to be addressed in 1994 
(Mayeldso, 1996:253). 
A further reason for the non-involvement of civic leaders and their structures in the People's Dialogue 
initiative, appears to have been the degree to which the civic movement was politicising development. 
The People's Dialogue initiative instead, was promoting the message that democracy would not 
necessarily deliver houses to the poor. Here, particularly the experience of continuing homelessness in 
India despite 40 years of , democracy', impacted on the new initiative's thinking (Hunsley, personal 
communication, 1998). Instead, of promoting a political solution, the attempt then was rather to 
empower people to take control of their own situation. The People's Dialogue initiative was fmding 
success in breaking through the situation of disempowerment, particularly of poor South African 
women, by exposing them to the achievements of poverty stricken women in other contexts, for instance 
through a mutual exchange programme with the pavement dwellers of Bombay (Bolnick, 1993). This 
recognition of people's own strength was coupled with a realisation of disengagement by those who 
'control and contest power' (the initiative had sought dialogue with both the then government, and the 
contesting ANC) (ibid.: 104). The conclusion then was the need for a 'bottom-up' housing approach 
based on savings and credit groups. In 1993 a revolving fund was initiated through a grant from the 
German aid agency MISEREOR, and shortly before the 1994 elections, an umbrella for the savings 
groups was formalised as the South African Homeless People's Federation. The supporting 
professionals constituted themselves into the NGO People's Dialogue, with the sole function of assisting 
with the Federation activities (Peopl 's Dialogue, 1995). Notably then, this new NGO, in its direct 
alliance with the Homeless People's Federation, stands in contrast to the service-oriented development 
NGOs of the Urban Sector Network, which I discussed above. 
Diametrically opposed to the Urban Foundation thinking, the premise of the People's 
DialoguelHomeless People's Federation alliance was that 'people's direct participation in all aspects of 
the development of their own settlements' needed to be supported and sustained (Bolnick, 1993:94). In 
discussing the attempts at institutionalising this approach below, it is then interesting to see how the 
Federation embraced the Urban Foundation inspired capital subsidy as an individual entitlement. The 
case studies in Chapter 7 suggest that this individual entitlement has distracted the Federation's 
collective and radical development activities into endeavours to achieve the largest possible individual 
housing product through the subsidy amount, in direct competition to profit-driven initiatives. 
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5.4 New forms of patronage: the influential business response in South Africa 
In the 1970s in South Africa, as in Brazil, industrialists had begun to distance themselves from the 
military and apartheid regimes, which were no longer serving their interests. Thus in both countries 
there emerged two broad forms of opposition to the state, one from business, the other rooted in social 
movements (Seidman, 1994:101, 1990:12). Seidman (1994:101) notes that in Brazil a 'largely middle 
class human rights movement strengthened the business opposition.' However, the Brazilian literature 
appears to make no reference to an independent position on informal settlement intervention developed 
and advocated by the Brazilian business sector. In South Africa, by contrast, the business sector created 
the Urban Foundation as a liberal think tank on urban policy. Its proposal for informal settlement 
intervention has been particularly influential. In order to understand the drive behind this influence, it is 
relevant to fIrst examine where the Foundation was situated within South African society, before 
discussing the position it promoted. 
In 1976 the instability associated with the Soweto conflict had sparked a business conference on 'the 
quality oflife in our urban communities' (Urban Foundation, 1994:25), which in turn led to the creation 
, 
of the Urban Foundation as a non-profit organisation funded by leading South African companies 
spanning mining, construction, banking and retaif4. Underlying this seemingly humanitarian concern, 
however, was an economic downturn, which industrialists in part associated with the instability in the 
skilled workforce, and limited consumer markets (Seidman, 1990:8). Thus Seidman (1990:8) argues 
that industrialists in South Africa (as in Brazil) in the 1970s 'were far more concerned with improving 
their own economic prospects and access to state policy-making bodies than with overall 
democratization.' Indeed then, South African business invested in upliftment and social advance 
(through the Urban Foundation) out of 'enlightened self-interest' (Seidman, 1994:135). 
In its initial years the Urban Foundation initiated change in the areas of a) employment, promoting the 
removal of job reservation, b) education, by mobi.lising for non-racial national education, and c) African 
housing, by encouraging banks to provide end-user finance to black home buyers (Urban Foundation, 
1994). For the poorer sector ofthe urban African population, it promoted the concept ofreduced 
standards of housing, and an individualised form of'self-help,2s. It further 'spearheaded' the search for a 
solution to the urban housing situation by launching a research and policy initiative on influx control 
and the role of cities, which in 1985 was formalised into the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation 
(ibid.:25). Indeed, most of the research on informal settlements in the 1980s and into the 1990s26 was 
commissioned by the Urban Foundation. I examine and critique the more recent of these studies in 
24 Listed in Urban Foundation (1994:21). 
2S As early as 1983, the Urban Foundation piloted self-help through the Khutsong project (Urban 
Foundation, 1994). 
26 With democratic elections in 1994, the Urban Foundation was seen to have served its purpose and 
was subsequently disbanded. Continuity in policy related research has however been assured through 
other business-funded organisations such as the NBI (National Business Institute) and the CDE (Centre 
for Development and Enterprise). 
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Chapter 6. v..'hile the carlier studies uncovered many important aspects of the phenomenon ofinfcrmal 
settlement, the research findings as such appear not to have influenc'.:'? the policy proposals put forward 
by the Foundation. Much rather, the research appears to have been commissioned to substantiate a 
proposal that developed primarily from concerns for the position of the profit-making development 
industry and the commodification of the low income housing sphere, and not for the informal settlement 
reality or the popular dev~lopment concepts that were being debated in the civic movement. 
It was then also through the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation, that the Urban Foundation 
promoted permanent housing rights for urban Africans. In the latter half of the 1980s, it more directly 
promoted housing delivery by creating utility companies 'to scale up housing delivery for medium and 
low-income households', while also building capacity for low cost housing in the contracting sector 
(Urban Foundation, 1994). Seidman (1994:243) interprets the Urban Foundation's priQritisation of 
housing for African workers as the business sectors' 'explicit hope of integrating an urban industrial 
labour force into capitalist South Africa.' 
Turning then to the Urban Foundation's central intervention concepts with regards to informal 
settlements, which today essentially make up the national housing policy, it is striking to what extent 
product is emphasised, rather than process. According to its influential 'Proposals for a National Housing 
Policy' published in 1990, a national housing programme was to operate on 'quantitative objectives' 
(Urban Foundation, 1990:ix). The product was envisaged as a serviced site, for which the local 
authorities were to be encouraged to accept 'appropriate' (meaning lower) 'servicing standards', to be 
upgraded over time (ibid.:x). Government funding was to be restructured 'so as to provide assistance to 
the urban poor on a wide scale through the introduction of capital subsidies on serviced sites' (ibid.), this 
applying to 'site-and-service and informal settlement upgrading' (ibid. :vii). Indeed, the proposals include 
for 'upgrading of existing informal settlements wherever feasible, through, in particular, the provision of 
infrastructure services, secure tenure and access to appropriate housing subsidies' (ibid.:x). However, 
through the standardised capital subsidy system, with an individualised product-orientation, the policy 
proposal set itself an obstacle to the actual in situ upgrading of informal settlements, if this were to mean 
minimal disruption to informally established settlement patterns: inevitably, the capital subsidy required 
the replacement of informal settlements with standardised serviced sites, as indeed has been the practice, 
thanks to the Urban foundation, since the early 1990s. 
Not surprisingly, the only support-programmes envisaged in the 1990 proposal of the Urban Foundation 
are to 'protect consumers from exploitation and malpractices in the low-income housing market' (Urban 
Foundation, I 990:x). The neoliberal nature of the Urban foundation proposals lies then, on the one 
hand, in the individualisation and commodification it foresees for the low income residential sphere, 
therefore, the transformation of informal occupiers of land into individual consumers of a standardised, 
technically defined and private sector delivered product. Associated with this individualisation and 
<. 
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commodification then is the favouring of individual title over communal ownership (ibid.:vi). On the 
other hand, the neoliberal nature of the proposal lies in the stakes it places for the profit-making 
development industry. Indeed, no role whatsoever is foreseen for the popular sector, which in complete 
patronage is reduced to a uniform body of consumers. The proposal further indicates a complete 
ignorance of the institutional requirements of organised community groups: grouping organisations such 
as 'community organisations, community-based housing agencies, non-governmental agencies' and 
'utility companies' with 'commercial developers' under the category 'private sector' (ibid.:ix). the Urban 
Foundation assumes that the non-profit organisations all operate on the exact same basis as those of the 
private sector. The Foundation goes as far as to suggest that 'informal housing agencies ... must ... 
operate under the same rules as private sector actors' (ibid.:iv,v). Clearly, it is staking claims for the 
profit-making development industry. This powerful neoliberal bias has transcended scholarly debates, 
as is evident in my analysis of the South African informal settlement intervention literature of the 1990s 
in Chapter 6. 
The Urban Foundation's professional wisdom then, must also be seen in the light of the international 
thinking in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which I discussed in Chapter 2. There I noted that even the 
capitalist-driven World Bank, promoter of the product-oriented twin approach of 'sites and services and 
slum upgrading' since 1972, had in its policy papers by the beginning of the 1990s admitted to the 
limited success ofits early approach, and was instead promoting social processes of poverty alleviation. 
Where then, did the Urban Foundation advisers derive their folly or naivete? Various factors come to 
mind. Firstly, they lacked engagement with the shifts in international debates and practices. Secondly, 
they lacked a consciousness of the functioning of class within an unequal society, thus unquestioningly 
accepting the practice of patronage by the business and professional sector over the working class 
'communities'. This then was legitimised through their commitment to denounce racial discrimination. 
Indeed, they appear to have been unaware of the adversities of capitalist agendas for the working class, 
i.e. the inherent exploitation. Thirdly, then, due to a lack of consciousness of class division, they saw 
little reason to engage with the development thinking of the civic movement. The deep resentment that 
the Urban Foundation professionals had for the civic movement, which becomes evident in the process 
of institutionalisation, which I discuss below, further indicates how uncommitted these professional 
advisers were to a true process of democratisation. 
Societal responses to informal settlement in South Africa then were diverse and opposing, indeed 
conflicting. While the civic movement was envisioning the decommodification of land and shelter, and 
development to be undertaken and controlled by organised communities, the Urban Foundation 
envisioned individualised and commodified intervention through the 'private sector'. I now tum to the 
process through which the Urban Foundation proposal on informal settlement intervention was 
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institutionalised into the current housing policy, and that of the civic movement marginalised. This I 
contrast with the process in Brazil, through which the progressive concepts of the PT were indeed 
institutionalised, with particular implications for local government. 
5.5 Institutionalisation of societal responses 
The processes of transition or democratisation in South Africa and Brazil took different fonns. The 
most striking contrast is the trend towards decentralisation in Brazil, as opposed to a high degree of 
centralisation in South Africa. This contrast has important bearing on the processes through which the 
societal responses to informal settlement were institutionalised in the two countries, and explain many 
of the contrasts in current intervention practice. I will briefly discuss decentralisation and centralisation, 
before examining in more detail the process through which new policy on informal settlement 
intervention was institutionalised. 
Diverging forms of democratisation and decentralisation in Brazil and South Africa 
Both apartheid rule in South Africa and military rule in Brazil were highly centralised systems of 
government (Souza, 1997:32; Schmitter, 1996: 1 0). In Brazil, the process of democratisation then 
implied a process of decentralisation, restoring political powers to states and municipalities, whereas in 
South Africa it was believed that an efficient centralised state would best address the racial and socio-
economic imbalances brought about by apartheid. I will first examine the decentralisation process in 
Brazil, and then contrast this with government restructuring in South Africa, including recent neoliberal 
tendencies which are invariably reducing the powers of all levels of the state. 
In 1966 the Brazilian military rulers had abolished direct elections of mayors in those areas that were 
perceived as threatening to national security, this including most state capitals. Municipal executives 
were instead appointed by state27 governors, who were likewise not directly elected. At the same time, 
the rights of the appointed executives or mayors in relation to the Municipal Council were then 
increased, giving them power over the budget, and allowing them to 'submit legislative proposals and to 
veto laws approved by the Municipal Council' (Assies, 1993:42). In 1982, state governors were once 
again directly elected (Souza, 1997: 101), and in tum nominated mayors for the state capitals and other 
municipalities falling under the security regulations (Assies, 1993:46). As mayors of other 
municipalities were directly elected, the PT was able to elect its first mayor in Diadema, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. National security regulations were lifted only in 1985, allowing all municipalities to 
directly elect their mayor (ibid.:48) - in this election, the PT won only two additional mayors, Fortaleza 
and Vila Velha (Abers, 1996:51). A popular struggle continued for further democratisation, with 
27 Within the federal system in Brazil, 'state' refers to the tier of government that in South Africa is 
referred to as 'province'. 
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demands for political, fiscal, and administrative de(:entralisattion. These demands then, alongside the 
demands for urban reform mentioned above, were taken up in the 1988 constitution (Souza, 1997:52), 
to which I return below. 
Souza (1997) draws attention to the ambiguities surrounding decentralisation. The concept appeals to 
both the neoliberal and left ideologies, in their concern over excessive power based with central 
governments. Analysing the effects of decentralisation in she argues that it may not have been 
able to 'disintegrate old political coalitions or the allocation of public resources' (ibid.:6). This 
leads her to associate decentralisation in Brazil with federalism' and a 
competitive arena' (ibid.). Indeed, many challenges remain. With to housing obligations, local 
governments are restricted by the absence of a democratic national 
1998). In 1990 a petition with over 1 million signatures, calling for such a to 'be int~:gralted 
with the states and municipalities through nmlS1I1tg councils and hnll<:j"I" funds at state and mlml(;ipiill 
levels' was turned down (ibid.:3). Instead, a centralised bureaucratic has lIIl1pe<leo the utilisation 
of the national "V,Ai,..,,/<. fund, which oril~1rultes from a \"Ulll.lpUll)Ul) COIltrlbutlon from workers' salaries 
and from Thus in 1995/96 only one fifth of the available national budget was spent 
Souza (1997) argues that at a sub-national level, 'decentralisation and redemocratisation have caused 
in the way the political system is operated' (ibid.:6,7). with .-..... "'u .. , around the 
Qu'eS!IIOn of favelas taking place at the sub-national level, intervention may differ from one municipality 
to the next, and from one municipal term to the next. In the case of Sao favela lIn,rr,,!'!"," 
programmes including the concept of self management were discontinued after one term of PT rule 
(1989-93) and replaced by the Cingapura Programme of the conservative Malufadministration. As 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1 and 2, this programme demolishes visibly located favelas and constructs 
flats in their place. Delivery of this top-down intervention approach is the 
construction industry, in total patronage over the favela population28• While COl:ltll1Ul1ty in local 
then is not lIarant,~~rl through the decentralised system of gmrenllmmt, political space may be contested 
at the municipal level for the implementation of progressive intervention proipoisals such as those of the 
PT. Such cOIltesitatllon, however, requires a continuous of conscientisation and pOllltl(:lS~thon 
of urban 'i"'\;;;:""vu,~. This then is one important dynamic that is absent with the """"""', .. ," form of 
Cl'l"JP,.,,,,....,pnt in South to which I now turn. 
In the South African transition the particular distribution of power led to a very different debate around 
decentralisation to that in Brazil. In South Africa it was not nT(IPT'~""'lve but rather conservative ,......" ... ".'h' 
28 It may be noted that resistance to this approach from favela communities had led to the of 
favela the construction of flats within the Cingapura programme, one 
the intervention at favela Piqueri (Jose, personal communication, 1997 see footnote 18 
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sectors of the society (primarily the National Party) that were calling for decentralisation and greater 
autonomy oflocal government, as a means to protect minority interests, and in effect minority privilege 
(Cameron, 1996:20). The ANC in turn traditionally had a centralised vision for the state, and while 
softening on this stance during the 1990-1994 negotiations, continued to perceive extensive devolution 
of powers as a mechanism 'to prevent the essential redistribution needed to ameliorate inequalities 
caused by apartheid' (ibid. :21). For the realisation of rights such as housing, a strong central 
government was considered necessary (ibid.). Indeed, the ANC continued to believe 'that central 
government should have the power to intervene directly in local authorities' affairs to ensure that such 
structures conformed to national development policy' (ibid.:35). In this sense then, the Urban 
Foundation's national housing policy proposal of 1991, which I discussed above, was compatible with 
the thinking of the ANC (I return to the negotiation process around housing policy below). 
While constitutional negotiations were underway at national level, local or metropolitan level 
negotiations were likewise debating aspects of local government. The civic movement, since 1992 
largely constituted into a unitary national body, the South African National Civic Organisation, SANCO 
(though individual civic organisations remained independent and others formed federated 
organisations29) disagreed with these local negotiations on two points. Firstly, as these negotiations 
preceded consensus at national level, SANCO regarded them as premature. Secondly, the township 
population was represented through the discredited BLA councillors, who were seen to favour the 
interests of the property-owning township dwellers over those living in back yard shacks, hostels and 
informal settlements (Mayekiso, 1996:218). Only with renewed rent boycotts in the townships in early 
1992, in response to non-delivery by the BLA 'puppet councillors', did the message come across that 
'progress toward democratic cities in the New South Africa' required the 'full and final resignation' of 
the BLA councillors (ibid.:225). This then led to SANCO's initiation of national level negotiations on 
local democratisation through the Local Government Negotiation Forum. Reflecting a demand to 
overcome the racially defmed infrastructure inequalities, which had been maintained through separate 
white and black local authorities, SANCO's primary demand was for 'single non-racial cities with single 
tax-bases' (ibid:211). These principles then were 'ratified in a deal by the multiparty constitutional 
negotiations, after some heated controversy toward the end of the process' in late 1993 (ibid.:225). 
Cameron (1996:36) notes that the constitutional negotiations, primarily between the ANC and NP, led 
to a compromise and in many instances contradictory clauses with regards to the autonomy of local 
government. Further contradiction, particularly with regard to local autonomy and the role of civil 
society has resulted from shifts in ANC approach since its entering of government in 1994. The RDP 
(Reconstruction and Development Programme), on the basis of which the ANC campaigned in the 1994 
elections, ascribed an important delivery role to local government. However, this was primarily defmed 
technocratically - urban policy in turn was to be determined at national level through an Urban 
29 Seekings (1998) discusses the complexity of different civic bodies in Cape Town. 
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Jevelopment Strategy (Chipkin, 1997:8), 'Autonomy' thus only to 'operational independence' 
of local government. Within this context, development' came to mean the 
identification of needs and priorities for infrastructure various forums (ibid.:9). Initially, these 
forums were "' .. 'VI"' .. "" .... as mechanisms for 'direct aeITIOc=rac;y the 'inherent class and race 
prejudice of representative and such bias in the workings of local 
g01tenlllnent' (ibid.: to). However, their function has LU"""",,:uU,15'J been reduced to mere advisory bodies 
(ibid.). Indeed then, SANCO (the of the civic ,""""p."n"'r.tl e){pell1en,ceCl 
in the decision-making by the new govenmnent, this through the provision that the 
go'vernm,enl:'s RDP made for governance 'in consultation with or~:anlSatIOlrlS in civil society' (~c~ekmg:s, 
1997:12). A sinlliar experience then is that of the Homeless Federation, which likewise 
vVJlllLJlQ,U'"" of being sidelined by the new O' .... 'vel'1nm,f'nt and its consultative bodies (People's Dialogue, 
1995:9). 
Chipkin (I 997: 10) highlights a key prolblem in the South African definition of local government, 
namely that it assumed 'that service is in fact uncontroversial,' or simply an administrative and 
task. Inevitably, where local are not seen by individual communities 
to be their such communities have appealed to higher levels of government, which are 
considered 'more capable of addressing local needs' '10). Indeed, this then is the context of the 
case studies in Chapter 7, one of which examines an informal settlement '"'''.A ... ''' .... '' 
Southern Joha1lllesburg), which secured a concession from national 17nvp.I'I'1n,p.Y1 and 
another (Weiters Farm, Southern Joha1lllesburg), which secured a commitment for 
from the provincial tier. In both cases the rel,lnomlru]pS between the organised communities and local 
government have remained strained. 
A further shift in South African policy towards decentralisation has been through the broad shift in 
macroeconomic policy. While in 1994 the RDP (Reconstruction and Development t'ro'gI<annne) was 
seen as the government programme 
infrastructural backlogs in the South African 
to drive a transformation to redress social u .... ,'f ... ' ... ".'"'~ and 
the neoliberal macroeconomic GEAR (Growth 
tmlnh"lVTneTlt and Redistribution) srr~l[e~rv essentially structural adjustment, adopted in 1996 was then to 
take over this function. Thus economic is to drive transformation, with a more modest role 
ascribed to all tiers The 1998 Local Government White Paper has 
then translated this concept to local level. this policy paper, Bond and .. A •• ""' ..... ,'u 
highlight its neoliberal contents and warn of the around pnvatllsatlon 'U~IJ.U',lP'1A functions. 
They further warn of the demobilisation of labour and communities, which the implicitly requires 
in order for citizens to 'trust a technocratic process.' 
This contrast in government transformation in South Africa and Brazil then the different 
processes of institutionalisation nOll1-g;oven::uncmt;al thinking on informal settlement intervention. 
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Indeed, the liberal tendency of discouraging community mobilisation in South Africa is apparent in the 
patronage that the business sector exercised over the civic movement in housing policy negotiations. In 
Brazil, however, ongoing practices of patronage and clientelism (see Souza, 1997:3) reflect similar 
tendencies, discouraging conscientisation and politicisation of urban questions. 
Institutionalising popular favela intervention demands in Brazil 
In examining the Brazilian popular response to infonnal settlement above, I had mentioned that 
decentralisation of power was one of the key concepts of the PT. Indeed then, the constitution-making 
process, culminating in the 1988 constitution, accommodated the concept of decentralisation. Souza 
(1997:73) notes that this was one area of general consensus in the constitution-making process, 
although ambiguities and contradictions around the concept prevailed. Of relevance to the governance 
concept of the PT was that local government was afforded 'the power to enact laws governing the use 
and development of urban space' towards guaranteeing the social functions of the city and its 
inhabitants' welfare (Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998:147). Towards this end, masterplanning regulating 
urban expansion and development became obligatory for municipalities with a population above 20 000 
(ibid.). The concept of 'social function' of private property, which had flrst appeared in the 1934 
constitution, was now given meaning through the masterplan, which was to stipulate such function 
(ibid.). A further obligation attached to the concept of decentralisation, was that all three tiers of 
government were given responsibility in promoting the construction and improvement of housing and 
basic services, and in combating poverty and marginalisation (Fernandes, 1993:220). Concerning the 
Urban Reform Movement's demand for legal instruments to enable land regularisation of favelas, the 
1988 Constitution includes 'the right to adverse possession' or 'usucapiao': after the uncontested 
occupation of up to 250m2 of private property for a period of flve years, the occupier has the right to 
ownership of that property (ibid.). 
With the subsequent local government elections based on the constitution of 1988, the PT presented 'the 
greatest electoral shock in the country's history' by wining mayoral office in 36 cities, including Sao 
Paulo, with over 15 million inhabitants, other state capitals Vit6ria and Porto Alegre, Brazil's largest 
port Santos, the state of Sao Paulo's second largest city Campinas, and various important industrial 
cities (Sader and Silverstein, 1991:98). With the challenge then of translating democratic governance 
into practice, the Urban Reform Movement transferred its attention to the local level, where tasks such 
as democratic master planning and favela regularisation awaited (Souza, 1999:2). In the discussion of 
the PT's concepts for municipal governance earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the role the party 
envisaged for autonomous social movements and grassroots councils. The PT then promoted popular 
participation or public debate on the formulation of the annual municipal budget in Sao Paulo, Porto 
Alegre and Vit6ria (Assies, 1993:50). The PT's experience in such 'participatory budgeting' in Porto 
Alegre was of particular consistence and has drawn much attention (see Abers 1998; Souza, 1999; 
Zimmennan, 1998). More recently, the concept was introduced in Belo Horizonte, and has likewise 
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been portrayed as a successful experience (see Fernandes, 1996; Bretas, 1996). Abers (1998:65) notes 
that the concept of participatory budgeting has recently been recognised as successful, even by parties 
in opposition to the PT. As an instrument of participatory governance it is therefore increasingly applied 
outside ofPT municipalities. In Chapter 3, I have discussed the endeavour of the Belo Horizonte 
municipality to specifically link the instrument of participatory budgeting to intervention in favelas, thus 
breaking with the practice of concentrating capital intensive comprehensive externally defmed 
intervention in a small number of selected settlements. 
With regards to land regularisation in favelas, the constitutional instrument of adverse possession 
(usucapiiio, through which favela households are to acquire freehold titles of privately owned land after 
an uncontested five year period of occupation) requires the development of legal procedures before it 
may be implemented. Thus adverse possession had as yet not been applied in Belo Horizonte in 1997. 
almost a decade after adoption of the constitutional amendment, as efforts were still underway to 
develop such procedures. Land regularisation was instead taking place in the legally less complicated 
situations, namely occupation of public land (Pinheiro and Andrade, personal communication, 19973°). 
It is then evident that the accomplishment of the Urban Reform Movement through the constitutional 
amendments of 1988 in themselves remain meaningless unless translated into legal instruments that 
enable implementation at the local level. Political will for such socially oriented legal endeavours then 
appears to be restricted to the socially oriented administrations, such as the PT municipalities. Ongoing 
political consciousness of the urban challenges therefore remains a prerequisite for any practical change 
to the status quo. This then contrast to the very different route of institution ali sing change in informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa. Indeed, the dominant endeavour in South Africa has been to 
discourage politicisation in favour of a technocratic process. 
Negotiation, patronage and transformation: institutionalising business demands in South Africa 
In the discussion ofthe Urban Foundation above, I have already mentioned the particular housing 
policy proposal that the Foundation developed, and its provisions for informal settlement intervention. 
Here I will examine the undemocratic route through which this proposal was institutionalised in the first 
half of the 1990s, showing to which extent this sidelined existing proposals for alternatives. More 
detailed than my discussion of the Brazilian reform, this section in particular then also forms the context 
for the critical discussion of South African informal settlement literature of the 1990s in Chapter 6, and 
of current South African practice through four case studies in Chapter 7. 
At a general level, the transition in South Africa from 1990 to 1994 is considered a 'process of pact-
making', which 'not only paved the way to democracy but also limited it' (Friedman, 1996:45). I 
mentioned above that with regard to the constitution-making negotiations, the two main players were 
30 See footnote 8 of Chapter 3. 
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the National Party and the ANCJ1 , their differences to some extent being accommodated in constitutional 
compromises. With regardsto policy-making on urban infofj.lal settlement intervention, the divide in 
thinking however, appears not to have been between that of the ANC and the National Party. With the 
business sector as a major force in this policy arena, the thinking of these two political parties converged 
over the central ideas of the Urban Foundation. Vocal opponents instead appear to have been the civic 
movement and to a lesser extent the emerging People's Dialogue/Homeless People's Federation, both 
suspicious of the agendas of the profit-making sector, and calling instead for people-driven development. 
The influence of the Urban Foundation over the National Party became evident in 1990, when having 
gained confidence in the methodologies that the Foundation had piloted, the National Party government 
approached the Foundation's chairman, former judge Jan Steyn, for a proposal for a socio-economic 
upliftment programme. According to Nuttall's (1997) insider review of the programme, Steyn literally 
compiled the proposal over a weekend and within three days the draft was accepted by the National 
Party government and Steyn charged with its implementation. At Steyn's request, R 2 000 million were 
committed by government to an independent development agency, the lOT (Independent Development 
Trust). which was to address poverty alleviation in the areas of housing, education, health/welfare and 
employment (Nuttall, 1997: 10, II). 
The housing context at the time was complex and disjointed, housing being delivered by the separate 
houses of parliament, provincial administrations, homeland governments (through the Development 
Bank of South Africa - OBSA), and the South African Housing Trust (SAHT) (Nuttall, 1997:110). The 
IDT then was seen as an instrument that could to some extent streamline delivery to the poorer section of 
society. Indeed, 100000 households were to benefit. However, the development model did not reflect 
the experience of the target group, which was largely organised and represented by the civic movement. 
Instead, the IDT model reflected the values and thinking in the boardrooms of the establishment, as 
presented in Nuttall's book The First Five Years: the Story of the Independent Development Trust (1997), 
an unapologetic review of the apparently sincere, but naively misinformed (and therefore patronising) 
yet successful, attempts at influencing the post-apartheid poverty alleviation policies. 
In line with the 1990 Urban Foundation proposal for a national housing policy which I reviewed above, 
~ 
the lOT delivery model was based on a 'capital subsidy scheme', delivering home-ownership ofa 
serviced site. Qualifying criteria were first-time property ownership, income under Rl 000, age of 
household head above 21, and dependants forming part of the household. Such households were then 
subsidised to the value of R7 500 through a delivered serviced site. Applications were made on behalf 
31 The third 'major political force', the traditionalist Inkatha Freedom Party, withdrew from the 
constitutional negotiations in 1993, onl)' to recommit a week before the 1994 elections (Friedman, 
1996:49). 
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of beneficiary groups by 'developers', these being either public authorities, private developers, utility 
companies or community trusts. A key criterion for the allocation ofIDT funding for the 
implementation of a proposed project was evidence of the involvement of beneficiary communities. 
However, strict time constraints applied to the project formulation process (Nuttall, 1997:62). Such 
constraints in the blueprint then excluded the possibility of communities taking control of the housing 
process, thus reducing the people-centred ideals to mere rhetoric. Instead, project delivery was 
consultant-driven. A further criterion for funding allocation was the location of the project in relation to 
employment opportunities, social infrastructure and transport (ibid.). However, as land 'suitable' for less 
formal development was inevitably located on the urban periphery. or at best integrated with the 
existing poorly serviced townships, the IDT admitted to having 'a limited impact on urban integration' 
(Nuttall, 1997:142). Indeed, despite legislative reform in 1991 {the White Paper on Land Reform, in 
conjunction with the Less Formal Township Establishment Act} for the accommodation of 'less formal' 
development, the same legislation protected existing land rights and interests of established 
communities (Harrison, 1992: 19). In effect then, a property market based on the spatial exclusivity of 
the 1950 Group Areas Act (though repealed in 1991 through the Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act) ensures that new low income development is separate from middle to high income 
housing and places of economic opportunities32• 
The IDT capital subsidy scheme was targeted largely at informal settlements. The first ofits initial 108 
projects then was the 'upgrade' of the Besters Camp informal settlement on the outskirts of Durban 
(Nuttall, 1997:28,29). In Chapter 6, I discuss van Horen's (1996) evaluation of this project, particularly 
the implications of the IDT dictates on the intervention process. The largest IDT project was targeted at 
the Sow~to-on-Sea informal settlement in Port Elizabeth, where 3 000 families were resettled from a 
flood plain and a further 7 000 receive~ engineering services and freehold tenure through 'upgrading' 
(Nuttall, 1997: Ill). Less successful projects were located in what the IDT referred to as 'political 
hotspots' - Phola Park on the East Rand and Alexandra in Johannesburg (ibid.). Here the attempt was to 
implement capital subsidy projects via 'social compacts', agreements through which all stakeholders . 
were to commit themselves to the development. Hindson et al. (1994:345) thus argue that it was 'from 
the experience of violence-tom communities' that an entire 'project cycle' was developed, 'beginning 
with mediation [and] the formation of social compacts.' In current policy then, applications for 
development projects to be funded through individual households' capital subsidies must include a 
'written social compact' committing all stakeholders to the proposed development. Of the 'community 
based partner' in the development, the application requires commitment 'to create a climate and 
environment that will be conducive to the efficient implementation of the project' (Department of 
Housing, 1995: VOLA-P2, page 11). 
32 Mabin (1993) illustrates retaliation of the property owning class in response to the official search for 
well located land for the orderly relocation of the 'Zevenfontein squitters' north of Johannesburg shortly 
afterthe abolition of Group Areas. A Iso see Berrisford (1998 :223) . 
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The IDT came under disrepute of the civic movement and of the Homeless People's Federation/People's 
Dialogue alliance, both rejecting the concept of providing high standards oftoilets yet no hous.;;s. At a 
project level. civic structures clashed with the IDT on the consultant-driven nature of the development 
process. Various criticisms of the IDT policy (though presumably not those from grassroots) led the 
government to appoint the De Loor task team to investigate a National Housing Policy Strategy 
(Tomlinson, 1998: 138). Disagreeing with the resulting report)), the IDT with the DBSA decided in 1992 
to initiate, with IDT funding, a National Housing Forum, in the hope of influencing the future South 
African housing policy (Nuttall, 1997: 107). Represented in this forum were the business community, 
building industry, financial institutions, development organisations and 'mass-based' political groupings 
(Tomlinson, 1998:137; Lalloo, 1999:38). 
Within these negotiations then, the debate between SANCO and the IDTlUrban Foundation 
representatives polarised. SANCO criticised the market-oriented policies of the IDT and the fact that the 
capital subsidy scheme delivered 'toilet towns' rather than houses, which SANCO considered a human 
right (Nuttall, 1997: 168). The IDT defended itself by listing its project outputs, which had benefited 
some '112 000 very poor families with the security of owning sites which had running water, proper 
sanitation and drainage, and road access in what were far more dynamic environments than the 'toilet 
towns' which the Sanco president liked to portray' (ibid.). Clearly, the IDT was not prepared to reflect on 
questions of ideology and human rights, nor was it prepared to understand the actual grassroots 
experience that SANCO was arguing from. Mayekiso's (1996:271) perspective ,from within SANCO 
therefore was that 'the enemy now included a much more sophisticated crew of development technocrats 
even more intent on co-opting and forcing us to accept their capitalist agenda.' Indeed, Smith (1992:317) 
notes that negotiations were being disproportionately influenced by 'powerful vested interests,' through 
agencies such as the Urban Foundation, with the result that 'major challenges to existing property 
ownership' and to 'predominantly private sector solutions' were being precluded. 
Perhaps most threatening to the IDT was not SANCO's request for people-driven development, which 
indeed was accommodated in the compromises and rhetoric of the NHF outcomes (see Tomlinson, 
1998: 144), but SANCO's request for the democratisation of development fmancing, and therefore also of 
bodies such as the IDT and the DBSA (Nuttall, 1997, Mayekiso and Hanlon, 1994). For this purpose, 
SANCO was calling for a probe into their operations (Nuttall, 1997: 170). Nuttall refers to this as 
'continuing intrusions' into the IDTs 'affairs', and short of launching an counter-probe into SAN CO's 
affairs (ibid.: 177), publicly retaliated by emphasising 'the positive role played by the civic structures in 
assisting the IDT implement its site-and-service schemes across the country' (ibid.). This evident 
patronage that the IDT was exercising over grassroots communities and indeed their national 
representatives was sadly reaffirmed through internal inconsistencies and contradictions that emerged 
J3 The De Loor report did not foresee freehold tenure for the poorest sector of site-and-services 
beneficiaries (Nuttall, 1996: 107; Adler and Oelofse, 1996: 119). 
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within ~rl,n"'~\J. sul,suantiaHj w.;;-• .k',o-• .t"ig the orl!tanisatiion. The IDT in tum has survived, pledging its 
commitment to aS~iisting the ol"l'''Pl'"nml''nt in ;"",,,!p'l"nl"nti,,o the new Reconstruction and Development 
Prog;ralmne (RDP) 1997 book has the purpose of legitimising the 
organisation. and to this end is Illl.:fUIJIU\;I;U as a contribution to a 'symbolic ritual cleansing process' of 
the IDT (Ramphele, 1997:3 - t" ..... .,"'rl1 to 1997). 
While explicit confrontation then took between the IDT and SANCO, there is evidence of more 
subtle manoeuvring of the process by the outgoing apartheid state and business interests, in 
order to ensure 'only nominal changes to the old apartheid order' (Lalloo, 1999:41). In what has been 
interpreted as an attempt by the to re-establish control over the policy-
making process, the then of Housing allocated funding to the National Housing Forum for a 
capital subsidy scheme (Adler and policy negotiations 
were thereby distracted into practical on the implementation of the funding 
(ibid., also Lalloo, 1999:40). Lalloo (1999:42) then also associates this manipulation with the Forum's 
failure to investigate means of spatially or the urban form. the over-
emphasis on the individual capital subsidy then of spatial inequalities. 
Wilkinson (1998:224) argues that the ANC's concern with and to the 
previously disadvantaged, further led to the to redress the apartheid legacy of 
social and spatial division. Continuation of policy from the National Forum with its particular 
dynamics, to the housing of the ANC-Ied govemmerltJ was further gUlU1l11tel:d through the close 
lUIJL:)llJI~ and the National Housing working relationship between the new (post-election) Denat1rnent 
the latter 'soon' being 'reconstituted as the National 1999:40). 
The main difference between the earlier IDT approach and that new go\'errrme'nt's housing policy, 
then was that the capital subsidy amount for the lowest income sector was increased to allow for a 
minimum top structure or 'incremental house'. As will be evident from the case study discussion in 
......... "'.'",. 7, much debate among housing role players and beneficiaries has been around the 
top structure. Sensitive to the demand for bigger houses, the housing minister in the new ,.,,,,.,.,ft, .. , 
subsequent to the 1999 elections, has pledged to ensure that the building industry delivers a minimum 
oDOrn' (Macleod, 1999:37). Also associating community-based construction through the 1:> .. '''·'1 •• •• 
Housing Process with a larger top structure, therefore higher beneficiary satisfaction, the minister has 
pledged to particularly promote this housing approach (ibid.). I will briefly examine the emergence of 
goverument support to community-based housing, before closing with the ,.... ...... ,;." .. inconsistencies in 
the civic movement and their implications for informal settlement intervention. 
34 This policy was adopted through a national Accord between state, building fmancial 
institutions and civic (see 1998:226), followed in late 1994 by a White 
on 
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It is in the National Housing Board, constituted out of the National Housing Forum after the 1994 
elections, that the emerging People's DialoguelHomeless People's Federation alliance with its 
alternative approach to housing, experienced being sidelined (People's Dialogue, 1995:9). Nevertheless, 
several years of consistently demonstrating people's ability to save and to construct houses, given the 
appropriate support, have slowly led to recognition by government. At the 1994 Housing Summit, the 
new government had made a pledge to support a 'People's Housing Process' (Bolnick, 1996: 155). 
Bolnick, from his position within People's Dialogue, however, found that 'this was little more than a 
poorly understood afterthought,' indicating 'how weak the Federation's position was relative to the 
private sector, the public sector and others anxious to deliver housing "entitlements" to low income 
settlements rather than supporting them in defming their own solutions' (ibid.). 
It was then only a gradual process that led to the accommodation of community-based housing within 
the new government's housing policy. This has taken two routes. One is direct support to the Homeless 
People's Federation. Initially, this was through a grant, augmenting the Foundation's 'uTshani Fund', the 
revolving loan fund into which daily savings of Federation members are deposited (see Phadu, 
1997:78). Subsequently, direct government support has been secured through uTshani Fund agreements 
between the Federation and various (though not all) provincial housing boards, whereby the housing 
boards deposit individual members' capital subsidies into the uTshani fund, with house construction 
then administered through the Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance. The other 
route has been the establishment of a People's Housing Process, with international support from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and USAID for the formation of a 'People's Housing 
Partnership Trust', with the purpose of addressing 'institutional capacitation and empowerment at the 
provincial and local spheres of government and among NGOs to support the people's process (Ministry 
of Housing, 1997:3). The People's Housing Partnership Trust operates in partnership with the 
Directorate of Housing Support, within the national Department of Housing. Staffsecondment from the 
UNCHS (Habitat) to the trust (in the fornl of the Chief Executive Officer, Lalith Lankatilleke) ensured 
transfer of expertise from the government-initiated community-based intervention approaches of the Sri 
Lankan Million Houses Programme, which I discussed in Chapter 3. However, both the uTshani Loan 
agreements and the governments' People's Housing Process then submit to the overall framework of the 
capital subsidy system. In Chapter 7, I examine the restrictions this places on the defmition oflocal 
development by organised communities. 
Returning then to the inconsistencies within SANCO, these may well be associated with political co-
optation and neoliberal pressures. At its formation in 1992, SANCO had resolved to remain an 
autonomous civic movement. However, in the run-up to the 1994 elections, it decided to endorse both 
the ANC with its alliance partners and the RDP, seeing this 'in keeping with the civic movement's needs 
and aspirations' (Mayekiso, 1996:235), indeed a contradiction, given the degree to which the new ANC 
government subsequently embraced the IDTlUrban Foundation policy proposals for housing. Seekings 
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(1997: 12) argues that shifts in SANCO's position and problems in its organisational capacity have led to 
weak articulation in negotiations, particularly since 1994. In a bid to redress this situation, SANCO in 
1995 created a Development Research Institute (DR!) (paralleling a similar move in the labour 
movement), with the purpose of training and conscientising civic leadership on development questions 
(Seekings, 1997:14; Mayekiso, personal communication, 1998). However, the national office of 
SANCO, increasingly adopting a top-down approach for the organisation, while also implicitly 
endorsing neoliberal tendencies within government, appeared to perceive the conscientisation of lower 
tiers ofleadership within the organisation as a threat (Mayekiso, personal communication, 1998)35. The 
fmancial crisis that the national office was experiencing (partly due to an unsuccessful membership 
drive and a decline in foreign and local grants) then led to a controversy over a development research 
grant secured by the DR!. This caused increasing sidelining ofMzwanele Mayekiso within SANCO, 
and his eventual suspension in 1997 (Mayekiso, personal communication, 1998; also see Seekings, 
1997:14). The suspension itself, however, being dictated by national office to the Alexandra branch of 
SANCO, violated SANCO protocol. In protest, this branch, followed by that of Soweto and Thembisa, 
withdrew from SANCO and reverted to its former local name (Alexandra Civic Organisation) 
(Mayekiso, personal communication, 1998). 
Withdrawal of key civic structures from SANCO then created space in early 1998 for the formation of a 
new non-unitary federation, the National Association of Residents and Civic Organisations (NARCO), 
with no political affiliation. Its aim is to promote the defmition oflocalised development strategies, co-
ordinating between civic organisations around common issues, and through the DR! (now run by a 
board of trustees ofNARCO) to train local leaders (Mayekiso, personal communication, 1998; also see 
Bond and Mayekiso, 1998:8). During my late 1998 case study research in the four informal. settlements 
that I discuss in Chapter 7, I did not come across knowledge ofNARCO, although the Uitenhage 
Branch of SAN CO had heard of'Mayekiso's new civic'. The SANCO structure in Uitenhage, was 
neither aware of shifts in position at the national level of SAN CO, nor did it appear to be affected by 
neoliberal tendencies itself. In the Weilers Farm settlement in Southern Johannesburg, where the 
SANCO affiliated civic organisation is independently acting as developer in a Provincial Housing 
Board subsidy allocation, community leaders likewise had no knowledge of inconsistencies at SANCO's 
national level. Thus the unitary and top-down nature of SANCO appears not to transcend or affect the 
entirety of the organisation. Notably, however, the organisers of the Kanana invasion (also a case study 
in Chapter 7), had been discouraged by SANCO from occupying the land they had identified, SANCO 
promising to negotiate for land on their behalf As this did not materialise, the organisers eventually 
35 The neoliberal tendency within the SANCO national office is also apparent in its decision in 1996 to 
launch a subsidiary company, SANCO Investment Holdings. Though portrayed as an empowerment 
tool towards a socialist ideal, the business arrangements include the harnessing of SANCO members' 
consumer power through membership deals imposing discounts on purchases and a compulsory funeral 
insurance (Seekings, 1997:18-22). These deals duplicate, and indeed compete with, the numerous 
funeral associations and other co-operatives existing at the grassroots levels (see for instance White, 
1998). 
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formed an independent organisation and went ahead with the invasion. The interface between organised 
informal settlement communities and the formal intervention framework then is the topic of the 
discussion in Chapter 7. From that angle, I return to questions around the civic movement, as well as the 
Homeless People's Federation, both being represented in the case studies. 
5.6 Conclusion 
I have introduced this study (in Chapter 1) by arguing that there has yet to be reform in informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa, to effectively break from the approach introduced by the 
Apartheid state. In this chapter, I have traced the process of continuity in detail, contrasting it with the 
more profound process of reform in Brazil. I have, however, shown that due to the high degree of 
political decentralisation in Brazil, change towards a more progressive informal settlement intervention 
framework is politically vulnerable, thus requiring the ongoing politicisation of the urban question and 
conscientisation of citizens. Deeply critical urban socio-political analyses have thus resulted in the 
Brazilian literature, some of which I have drawn on in this and the previous chapter. Compared then to 
the Brazilian situation, the urban questions predominantly posed in South Africa stand out as being 
technocratic and indeed depoliticised. I have thus examined the product-oriented, deterministic, 
neoliberal nature of the dominant professional position on informal settlement in South Africa, placing 
it alongside fragile radical positions based in the grassroots organisations. 
Early development thinking on grassroots autonomy and democracy within the civic movement in South 
Africa appears to have been largely overridden by the need for autonomy as a tool to protest against 
government control and repression, not dissimilar from the autonomy exercised by the squatter 
movements in the post-war years. With the lifting of racially based state control and repression, the 
demand then turned from that of grassroots autonomy and democracy to a focus on state delivery, in 
order to redress the injustices caus d by racial discrimination. The civic movements' alliance (through 
the dominant civic body SANCO) with the ANC and subsequently the new government was at the time 
not considered (even by progressive activists) as a form of co-optation. Instead, it was perceived as a 
means of ensuring delivery to the disadvantaged sector of South African society. Only subsequent to the 
1994 elections have elements in civil society come to experience the dynamics of co-optation, 
c1ientelism and patronage. These in turn have formed a long tradition in Brazil, starting with the 
populist politics in the post war years and re-emerging with political opening after the mid 1970s. 
Progressive thinking, demand-making and practice in Brazil has then embraced the concept that 
decentralisation of political and administrative powers, as an aspect of democratisation, may counteract 
the dynamics of clientelism and patronage. This position has as yet not entered the South African 
debate. Instead, the academic left, though sympathising with the emerging NARCO initiative (the non-
aligned federation of civic organisations) which supports grassroots autonomy, primarily argues for 
higher standards of delivery to disadvantaged communities. The People's DialoguelHomeless People's 
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Federation in turn pursue their demands through apolitical lobbying, arguing that party politics is an 
inappropriate vehicle for the pursuit of poverty alleviation. The grassroots autonomy they seek is 
freedom from bureaucratic interference in their own development process, and not political autonomy. 
In the third part of this study, I now turn to the current situation in South Africa, examining fITst the 
scholarly debates that have emerged around the question of informal settlements in the 1990s, and 
critiquing them in relation to the Brazilian positions and experiences that I have contrasted here, and the 
international positions I have discussed in Part I. In Chapter 7, I then discuss the current South African 
informal settlement intervention practice, with case studies of informal settlement intervention initiated 
by either the civic movement or the Homeless People's Federation. I thus examine the development 
process these community organisations are able to undertake, in relation to the dictates of the formal 
development framework and its particular structure of funding. This then consolidates an argument for 
the need to release informal settlement intervention from the current housing subsidy framework, in 
order to develop mechanisms more appropriate to the question of informal settlement in South Africa. 
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Chapter 6. South African scholarly thinking j~ the 1990s on the question of informal settlement 
intervention 
6.1 Introduction 
The 1991 proposal by the influential Urban Foundation for a national urban housing policyl may be' 
seen as a benchmark in the South African informal settlement intervention debate and practice. On the 
one hand, it channelled government resources into the delivery of services and freehold title for those 
precariously housed in urban informal settlements. On the other hand, it entrenched a deterministic 
product-driven and individualised approach to informal settlement intervention. In Chapter 5, I have 
reviewed the Urban Foundation's 1990 proposal, and have shown how it was translated into practice 
throughout the 1990s, first through the government-funded Independent Development Trust and, in the 
latter half of the decade, through its undemocratic institutionalisation into the national housing policy, 
sidelining fragile popular! mass-based alternative positions. I contrasted this with a very different 
intellectual engagement with the informal settlement intervention question in Brazil, and the 
democratic and decentralised institutionalisation of the resulting alternative approach into municipal 
governance programmes. In this third part of the study I depart from the comparison with Brazil, in 
order to examine in more detail the current South African situation. The Brazilian scenario remains a 
point of reference, which supports the critical perspective I apply to the South African informal 
settlement literature in this chapter, and to the South African practice in Chapter 7. Further critical 
perspective is gained from the international positions discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The central 
question in this chapter then is: how have scholarly debates in South Africa in the 1 990s responded to 
the influential Urban Foundation promoted position and practice? 
The bulk of the informal settlement research commissioned by the Urban Foundation, was undertaken 
in the 1980s and cast light on diverse aspects of the unfolding informal settlement situation. As from 
1990, the Urban Foundation turned its attention to the formulation of a national policy, and being seen 
to have fulfilled its function, was disbanded after the 1994 elections. The main body of the Urban 
Foundation research on informal settlement itself, therefore, is not the subject of this chapter, which 
discusses the literature of the 1990s. In this chapter then I examine a continuity of the Urban 
Foundation thinking throughout the 1 990s through the work of liberal researchers. As academics, 
consultants or Urban Foundation staff, they had agreed with the liberal stance of the Urban Foundation, 
and through the Foundation formed a unanimous position on low-income housing. They were then 
influential in developing this into the Urban Foundation model, which in the early 1990s was 
implemented through the JDT, and formed the basis of the Urban Foundation proposal for a national 
housing policy. Throughout the 19905, their work has defended this position. I contrast this continuity 
1 See Urban Foundation (1990). 
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in private sector orientation with research findings that have contradicted the positions that underpin the 
.. 'Urban Foundation model. While these findings expose serious flaws in the Urban Foundation position, it 
must be asked, why such evidence has not impacted on the infonnal settlement intervention paradigm in 
South Africa, which continues largely according to the rules set by the Urban Foundation in ] 990. 
This chapter starts by positioning the Urban Foundation paradigm, pulling together discussions from the 
previous chapters. I then review South African research literature that supports this position, critically 
examining the underlying arguments. Next, I tum to research that has contradicted the Urban Foundation 
position, and draw together evidence for the inappropriateness ofthe current Urban Foundation-inspired 
intervention approach. Finally, I discuss why these critical research initiatives have had little impact on 
infonnal settlement practice in South Africa. 
6.2 Positioning the Urban Foundation paradigm 
In the previous chapter, I presented the concepts of the Urban Foundation position, highlighting its 
neoliberal or market-oriented nature. Central tenets were the emphasis on the private sector delivery of a 
standardised product, funded through a once-off household-based capital subsidy and, associated with 
this, the individualisation and commodification of access to land and basic services. In many respects, 
the Urban Foundation proposal of the early 1990s may be comparable to the benchmark in international 
practice, presented in the promotion of the twin approach of sites and services and slum upgrading by the 
World Bank in the early 1970s. Parallels lie particularly in the product-based and civil works oriented 
nature of the intervention. In relation to the discussion in Chapter 3, it falls into the category of 
externally designed comprehensive intervention, in contrast to the support-based intervention 
approaches. A difference between the Urban Foundation model and that of the World Bank lies in the 
funding. The World Bank envisaged this to be recovered from the beneficiaries, thereby burdening 
fragile household economies. The South African intervention through the Urban Foundation-inspired 
capital subsidy in tum is recovered from national coffers. Nevertheless, the delivery of individual 
freehold title through the capital subsidy in South Africa is intended to tie the beneficiary household into 
a system of payment of rates and service charges, likewise a fonn of cost recovery introducing a new 
financial burden to the beneficiary households. 
In Chapter 2, I have discussed the scholarly response to the World Bank promoted position and practice. 
Important in confronting the product orientation of the World Bank's approach was the growing 
awareness in the 1980s that the spatial concentration of poverty was shifting from rural areas to the 
cities. With an increased emphasis on urban poverty, socially oriented poverty analysis tools (first 
developed for the alleviation of rural poverty) were applied to urban areas. The subsequent urban 
poverty debate, partly co-ordinated or hosted by initiatives of the UNCHS (Habitat), including the 
articulation of urban poverty concepts for the various dimensions of vulnerability and resilience, then 
gave recognition to alternative support-based intervention approaches emerging in various developing 
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countries. These alternative approaches, which I have discussed in 3, on 
processes rather than standardised products. In Brazil, as in Chapter S. it was 
through the Urban researchers confronted the concerns of 
urban poverty movements. Through the political space contested by the 
this movement then institutional responses to accommodate alternative fonns of infonnal 
settlement intervention. In municipalities governed by the PT, this has led to responsive and 
product-oriented infonnal settleirneillt '~"a._'=._""~ that gives organised communities the opportunity to 
and intervention In South Africa, in contrast, an externally detmed. 
product-oriented infonnal settlement intervention approach. developed by the Urban FOlunclation. 
been adopted into the national housing policy and detennines the nature 
intervention across all municipalities. 
In Chapter 5, I have discussed the route through 
into the national policy for housing 
Foundation model was institutionalised 
ift+'''~.", S€~ttlf:ment intervention. It is undeniable then. 
that the Urban Foundation position was extremely influential. Various research initiatives in South 
Africa have flaws in Urban In the section of this chapter, I ask 
why on the framework of infonnal settlement intervention in 
South Africa. At point, it is relevant to illustrate the intellectual influence of the Urban Foundation 
the literature is that most South African orients itself to 
the Urban if not explicitly, then by using the ambiguous that the Foundation 
coined in support its paradigm. The result, on the one hand, is that by applying the Urban Foundation 
tenrnlfIOI()gy .... ", ........ ,,,'''''' submit (though not explicitly) to the intellectual supports the 
content of the proposal. On the other hand, through this 
tenrninoiogy have been open to ambiguous interpretation, in a real 
issues at hand. 
A strong bias in the 
phenomenon primarily 
Foundation's 
the perspelctl 
position was its view of the infonnal settlement 
of the housing structures, thus perceiving a .... n''''' .... · .. 1 
than the 
perceived by 
and -environmental situation (the infonnal settlement problem. as 
was then to be solved by the construction industry). 
Foundation terminology, as set out in its 1991 report titled Informal Housing Part I: LurrO'!,m SitUtltion. 
starts with the overarching term 'infonnal housing', which it as 1:J.IIIII;;nll;;' usually 
constructed with unconventional building materials 
housing delivery mechanisms' (Urban Foundation, 1991 
of 'informal housing'. One category is 
fonnal 
It then differen~iates between various 
this comprising both 
'back yard shacks' (in the yards of formal and in infonnal settlements 
(ihid.:4.6). The other category is informal h" •• ",r .... on official serviced sites (ibid.:6). The 
Urban Fountlation report then introduces confusion. the term 'free-standing infonnal 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
144 
settlements', which it first defines as 'clusters of informal structures located on tracts of land within 
'g •.. 
formal townships, in buffer zones between townships, on undeveloped farm land, on tribal land close to 
urban centres, and on vacant land in formerly white, coloured and asian areas' (ibid.:6)2. In the same 
report, the glossary of terms then defines 'free-standing settlements' (note the confusing omission of the 
word 'informal'), as being either 'illegal settlements' or 'planned site-and-service schemes' (ibid.:24). In 
the same glossary, the definition of 'informal settlement' in tum is worded as '[s]ettlements where 
communities are housed and located initially in informal housing' (ibid.). 
From the perspective then of the Urban Foundation, the term 'informal', is equated with 'initial' or 
'temporary', to be replaced by the 'formal'. Informal housing in the 1980s could be afforded temporary 
legal 'transit camp' status through the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and its amendments. As from 
1991 'less formal areas' could be afforded permanent status through the Less Formal Township 
Establishment Act (Republic of South Africa 1991l The Urban Foundation term for 'informal 
settlement', based primarily on the temporary nature of the house, rather than legal status or other 
characteristics, then applied to the entire range, from illegal settlements and temporary transit camps, to 
permanent 'less formal' sites and services areas with informal housing. 
The ambiguity between illegal settlement, transit camp, serviced sites, and also back yard shacks, then 
permeates informal settlement literature of the I 990s4 • This has led in particular to ambiguous statistics. 
One example that can be drawn from the introductory paragraphs of many informal settlement studies is 
the unquestioned reference to a figure of 7 million people. In some studies it is applied to the number of 
people living in informal (squatter) settlements, and in others to those living in informal housing 
structures including serviced sites and back yard shackss. Not surprisingly, the source of the 7 million 
2 The Urban Foundation further differentiates between 'freestanding informal settlements' and 'scattered 
informal settlements', the latter being impermanent 'small clusters of informal structures often found in 
locales such as disused mines and on small-holdings' (Urban Foundation, 1991 :6). 
J This act allows for the exemption of low income residential areas from formal township regulations, 
thus legally accommodating informal structures and low levels of infrastructure, though ensuring the 
possibility of 'subsequent upgrading of services' (Republic of South Africa, 1991 :6). 
4 For instance Tomlinson with Bam and Mathole (1995:8), in their report for the 'independent, 
autonomous research institution' the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), confusingly speak of 'a serviced 
site in an informal settlement'. They refer to sites-and services areas as 'state-aided informal settlements' 
(ibid.: II). 
5 Gigaba and Maharaj (1996:218) state in their introduction that '[a]bout seven million people live in 
squatter settlements in South Africa.' The one source they cite makes no reference to this figure, the 
other (Hart 1992:23) speaks of 'over 7 million people ... in informal houses,' using the Urban Foundation 
definition that includes legal and illegal forms of informal housing. Beavon (1992:232) states that 
'7 million urban people nation-wide live in shacks of one kind or another,' whereas Smith (199'2:2) 
mentions 'the spread of spontaneous 'shack' settlements around the major metropolitan areas to the extent 
of accommodating an estimated 7 million or quarter of the African population today' (no source cited). 
McCarthy, Hindson and Oelofse (1995: 1) state that '[d]uring the 1980s ... more than seven million 
people were living in informal settlements in and around South Africa's urban areas (likewise no source 
cited). Lohnert (1997: I) inflates the 7 million figure without citing a source: 'The fact that about 19% of 
the country's population - these are approximately 8 million people - are living in informal or squatter 
settlements demonstrates the scale of the problem.' 
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figure is the same influential Urban Foundation (1991) report from which I have quoted the confusing 
definitions. It gives no evidence of7 million people living in unplanned or illegally formed informal 
settlements. Instead, it estimates that 'over seven million people live in urban informal housing,' with 
reference to its 'informal housing' definition that includes shacks in back yards, in informal settlements 
and on serviced sites (Urban Foundation, 1991 :4). In this estimation, the informal settlement population 
makes up an unqualified portion of the 7 million people. 
With the continued use of the confusing Urban Foundation terminology, there are to date no clear figures 
on the number of people living in unplanned, illegally formed urban informal settlements in South 
Africa. Subsequent to the 1991 Urban Foundation report, an influential reference on the 'current housing 
context' has been the White Paper on Housing (Department of Housing, 1994). It is clearly based on 
Urban Foundation terminology and concepts. Though attempting to up-date the statistics, it perpetuates 
the confusion by defining 'squatter housing' as shacks 'in free-standing squatter settlements ... and in the 
back yards of formal houses' (ibid.:9). For this category it provides an estimation of 1.06 million 
households, adding an estimated growth of 150 000 households per annum. Even the national popUlation 
census of 1996 failed to give clarity on the national figure of people living in illegally formed informal 
('squatter') settlements. The census collapses informal dwellings on serviced sites with those in 'squatter' 
settlements, though identifying a separate category .for 'informal dwelling/shack in backyard' (Orkin, 
1998). The figure for the former category is 1 049 686 households. Applying an average household size 
of3.6 people for this category6, this results in a figure of approximately 3.8 million people. Of this, 
again, on ly an unqualified portion lived in unplanned informal settlements in October 1996. Indeed then 
even half a decade after the 1991 Urban Foundation report, there waS no evidence of 7 million people 
living in informal settlements, as suggested by Gigaba and Maharaj (1996), Smith (1992), McCarthy et 
al. (1995) and Lohnert (1997). 
While most informal settlement research in South Africa then displays Urban Foundation influence by 
unquestioningly applying its ambiguous terminology, and therefore not contributing to the clarification 
of the informal settlement situation. it is possible to draw a distinction between research that explicitly 
supports the Urban Foundation paradigm and that which contradicts it. I examine these in tum, before 
discussing the limitations of the informal settlement literature in effectively challenging the entrenched 
framework of informal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
6.3 Scholarly responses within the Urban Foundation paradigm 
Most of the studies in support of the Urban Foundation paradigm are evaluations of the informal 
settlement intervention that took place either through the lOT capital subsidies or. after the 1994 
elections. through the "National Housing Policy's capital subsidy. These studies have examined the 
intervention experience primarily from the perspective of project managers and the private sector. A 
'" As suggt:stt:d in Mazur and ()uangule's ( 1(95) survey of Cape Town's low-income population. 
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particularly influential7 private-sector funded study by McCarthy et al. (1995) provides direct continuity 
with the Urban Foundation thinking. Bond (1997:93), critiquing this report from the perspective of the 
academic left, traces the association of the authors (as staff or consultants) with the Urban Foundation, 
the IDT and the National Housing Forum. Indeed, Bond labels them as 'some of the leading architects' 
of the current housing policy. and in his review of the report points to 'the residue ofUF [Urban 
Foundation] arguments and ideology' (ibid.). Bond critiques this report primarily on the deviation it 
promotes from the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which promised the 
mass delivery of housing to specified minimum standards. According to Bond's argument, McCarthy et 
al.'s (l995) presentation of informal settlement 'upgrading' and incremental housing delivery as having 
no alternative, has discouraged the exploration of mechanisms for the delivery of a higher standard of 
housing. The questions I ask of this and similar studies are not about the obstacles to adequate standards 
of mass housing. They are about the relevance of the Urban Foundation's approach as a universal model 
for informal settlement intervention in South Africa. I identify four areas of concern: first, the 
assumption that informal settlement intervention is simply another fonn of housing delivery; second, the 
dismissal of community-based organisation; third, the market assumptions that support the delivery of 
individual freehold titles; and fourth, the stakes placed for the profit-making sector. 
Informal settlement intervention: simply aform ofhousing delivery? 
Characteristic of the studies I review in this section is that they do not clearly differentiate between 
informal settlement intervention and the establishment of new development sites. This position then 
agrees with the current standardised intervention through the capital subsidy, which indeed leads to the 
replacement of informal settlements with orderly township layouts. The only difference between this so-
called 'in situ upgrading' and greenfield development is that in the fonner case, the development site is 
already occupied. The social objective of minimal disruption to the informally established urban fabric 
(and to the intrinsic social ties), as defmes upgrading or 'urbanizm;iio' in Brazil, does not apply. Instead, 
a 'roll-over' procedure is common practiceS. This means removal of all shacks from the land, their 
temporary reconstruction on nearby land, and the installation oflayout and infrastructure according to 
conventional greenfield procedures. As the formal layout generally results in increased plot sizes9 and 
wider access routes, dwelling densities are considerably reduced. Only a portion of the original 
7 Bond (1997) in his critique of this report, associates its influence with the high respect the authors 
enjoy as housing commentators in South Africa, and with the high profile launching of the publication. 
S For instance the Millers Camp, KTC and other settlements within the Integrated Serviced Land Project 
(iSLP) in Cape Town (see Holistic Settlements, 1996). Note that Tomlinson (1996:59) refers to the 
iSLP as an 'upgrade'. 
9 An exception being the Weilers Fann case, discussed in Chapter 7, where remodelling of the entire 
settlement was justified due to the need to reduce the plot size to the maximum of 300m2 as specified by 
the capita) subsidy scheme. 
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population is then re-allocated sites within the 'upgraded' settlement. Others are assumed to be allocated 
sites elsewhere. Where original settlement densities correspond with those of planned settlements, 
shacks may be 'shifted' (and not entirely removed) in order to accommodate a standardised layout lO• 
In accordance with this practice then McCarthy et al. (1995:2,3) state in their evaluation that '[0 ]nce an 
informal settlement has been upgraded in-situ, it does not differ fundamentally from a settlement where 
housing has been delivered on an incremental basis' - the term 'incremental' refers to the current policy 
of delivering a serviced site with a starter house. McCarthy et al. (1995), in their lengthy study (for the 
National Business Initiative) which sets out to evaluate 'informal settlement upgrading and 
consolidation projects,' include case studies of greenfields as well as so-called 'in-situ upgrading' 
projects. The 'Choice of Case Studies' (ibid.:9) gives no explanation to this, other than 'to provide a 
different perspective' and the conclusions of the study do not differentiate between what was found in 
the 'in-situ upgrades' as opposed to the greenfields situation. 
The same limitation applies to the voluminous USAlD-funded evaluation study by Mary Tomlinson of 
the Centre for Policy Studies (Tomlinson, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1997a, 1997b and 1998). This study is 
not as biased to the private sector perspective as that of McCarthy et al. (1995) - it also examines the 
'views' of government and 'beneficiaries' and is willing to point to contradictions in the policy. 
However, it too evaluates the national housing subsidy scheme without differentiating between so-called 
'in situ upgrading' and greenfield development. This delivery-oriented perspective on informal 
settlement intervention then clearly does not seek to address the complex social, political and economic 
realities of poverty, as manifested in informal settlements. It does not recognise the popular initiative 
that created the informal layout (the struggle of the Kanana settlement leadership in having their well 
planned informal layout recognised is discussed in Chapter 7). Nor does it accept popular ideas for 
settlement improvement. The obstacles identified through the delivery-oriented evaluations are those 
that impede formal delivery, rather than those experienced by the informal settlement households and 
their community representatives, in their endeavours to improve their living conditions. The perception 
then of informal settlement as simply a form of housing delivery supports the private sector oriented 
assumptions on community organisation, the land market and the role of the formal profit-making 
sector, which I discuss in the following paragraphs. 
10 An example is the upgrading of the Winnie Mandela Park informal settlement in the Khayalami 
metropolitan area near Johannesburg (Housing in Southern Africa, 1998). The project report explains 
that 'although the occupation was informal, there was quite a lot of order in the way the shacks have 
been laid out. This allowed a town plan to be designed which largely followed the existing layout. This 
presented problems to the project engineers .... as the long straight lines, which are usually built into 
town plan layouts, allowing economical servicing did not exist. ... [I]nevitably there were shacks in the 
way of services .... To allow the installation of pipes, the concept of "shifting" was evolved after 
negotiations with the community. The object of shifting is to get the shack owner to move his shack to 
the nearest planned stand. The other option is 'moving' which means that the shack will have to be 
moved to another area altogether. Obviously the first option is used as much~as possible' (ibid.:33). 
I 
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Dismissal of a role for community-based organisations 
Studies in support of the Urban Foundation paradigm and the current informal settlement intervention 
approach argue for the relevance of an individualised intervention, therefore supporting the notion of a 
standardised, household-based once-off capital subsidy. Intervention structured in this manner makes 
the individual household a player in the development, alongside government and the delivering private 
sector. The role of community organisation and leadership is reduced to that of serving the project 
objectives. Thus McCarthy et al. (1995:69) recommend: 
'Essentially civics need to withdraw from the managerial andfinancial aspects of the development 
process and focus essentially on ensuringfull community participation in the development 
process while acting as monitor and watchdog over development and future local authority 
servicing and maintenance of upgraded areas' (ibid. :69). 
This position does not allow for people's collective control over development, which, as Bond 
(1997: 102) points out, is the objective of many civic organisations. McCarthy et al.'s position on the 
role of civics does not acknowledge the challenges that organised community groups in informal 
settlements present against the Urban Foundation paradigm - I examine such initiatives in Chapter 7. 
The Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance, with its radical people-driven 
development approach and strong criticism of private sector interests in development (see People's 
Dialogue, 1994: 14), are portrayed by McCarthy et al. (1995:39) as no more than 'an organisation 
mainly of women which seeks to promote housing through self-help saving and loans schemes coupled 
with collective construction.' The Tomlinson study likewise, though less explicitly, dismisses the 
relevance of community organisations in the housing subsidy interventions. Her set of publications 
separately examine the views of implementers (1995a), developers (1995b), beneficiaries (1996), 
fmancial institutions (1997a), national and provincial legislators (1997b) and local governments (1998), 
yet entirely omits the views of civic or other community-based organisations. This Tomlinson does not 
explain. However, she does state h r view that alongside developers and 'others with an interest in 
particular forms of housing,' civics pursue 'their interests in a way which disadvantages beneficiaries' 
unless sanctioned or given an incentive to act on the contrary (Tomlinson, 1996:51). Further, she 
suggests that government is 'perhaps the only institution capable of representing beneficiary interests' 
(ibid.:52). In a separate publication addressing questions of citizenship in a sites and services area, 
Tomlinson with Bam and Mathole (1995:57) state the same position in their conclusion, namely that 
'communication between residents and the state is impeded by the existence of civic groups which seek 
to act as intermediaries between them and the state.' 
The dismissal of civic and other community organisations as exploitative, corrupt and self-seeking 
obstacles to government delivery gives justification to an intervention approach that ensures that the 
government administration interacts (be it via a developer) directly with the individual beneficiary 
through a standardised capital subsidy (linked to freehold title), rather than with a collective community 
representation. This position has been justified particularly from studies that have examined the 
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phenomenon of violence in the informal settlements in Durban in the early 1990s, concluding that 
informal settlements, due to the power of community representatives, are intrinsically associated with 
violence. Thus Morris states: 
'As long as the inhabitants do not have an individual de jure right and de facto control over their 
own reproductive resources, shantytowns will always be intrinsically violent, since their 
reproduction is based on forcible control, patronage and arbitrary extraction of surplus in the 
form of cash, kind, labour or quasi.military service to those who control social resources' 
(Morris, 1992:97). 
Morris (1992:98) then recommends intervention that creates individualisation in informal settlements. 
Hindson and McCarthy (1994) argue along similar lines, concluding their synopsis of the informal 
settlement problem in Durban by stating: 
'The challenge at present is to recast power relations within these communities, and more Widely 
within urban areas, through the creation of rationalised, integrated and democratic local 
authorities which are accountable to residents. The reconstitution of local government in this way 
should entail a shift in power elites towards new governmental structures, and a shift from local 
political organisations towards individual residents who are the beneficiaries of development' 
(Hindson and McCarthy, 1994:28). 
The recommendation, therefore, is to reduce the power and role of community-based organisations. 
This might be relevant in exploitative situations, assuming that local government councillors and 
officials are more committed to assisting individual informal settlement communities. However, as the 
case studies in Chapter 7 indicate, accountable civic and other community organisations do exist, as 
does local government incapacity and lack of will to act upon demands for informal settlement 
upgrading. In that context, a blanket reduction in the role of community organisations, as recommended 
by Morris (1992) Hindson and McCarthy (1994) and McCarthy et al. (1995), and implied by 
Tomlinson's various studies, clearly impacts negatively on the process of settlement improvement. 
Market assumptions: support for individual freehold titles 
Support for the individualised approach to informal settlement intervention through the capital subsidy 
then translates into support for the delivery of individual freehold titles. This is a theme in two 
evaluations of the Freedom Square informal settlement upgrading in Bloemfontein ll (Botes, Stewart 
and Wessels, 1996; Marais and Krige, 1997). Marais and Krige (1997) discuss the results ofa post-
upgrading opinion survey, on aspects most appreciated-by the beneficiaries. The overwhelming majority 
is reported to appreciate land ownership above infrastructure and services. On this fmding, the authors 
base their recommendation that 'ownership might be administratively advisable' (ibid.: 186). However, 
the survey and the discussion in their paper fail to explore the concept of tenure security in the light of 
options to freehold title, be they leasehold, communal ownership or the formal recognition of the 
existing informal tenure system. Instead, they defend individual freehold tenure against their own 
II Freedom Square is also one of the 'upgrading' projects in McCarthy et al.'s (1995) evaluation. 
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evidence of its shortcomings. Acknowledging that 'a number of stands have been vacated since sites 
were registered in the names of the owners,' they suggest that 'most residents do not have an 
understanding of the value of their sites' (ibid.: 185). 
This suggestion of ignorance on the part of the beneficiaries is based on questionable assumptions, 
which are invalidated through the evidence in the literature I review in the following section. The one 
assumption is that a property market, operating similarly to that in a middle class suburb, is created by 
imposition of individual freehold titles on an informal settlement. Coupled with this are the 
assumptions, on the one hand, that the exchange value of an upgraded site is equivalent to the subsidy 
investment, and on the other hand that the poor don't understand the market. Along these lines, 
McCarthy et al. (1995) then argue that 'people have an imprecise view of the market value of their 
properties (and this is especially true of the less educated), (McCarthy et al., 1995:22). These authors 
ignore the basics of the functioning of property markets, namely that property value is related to the 
economic power of the demand. The researchers fail to acknowledge that in most instances there is no 
demand for buying into upgraded settlements at a price that would recover the subsidy amount. Indeed 
then it is not the residents, but the private sector oriented researchers, that fail to understand the market. 
Moreover, the researchers show ignorance of the universally recognised problem of downward raiding, 
i.e. the selling of subsidised low income units to middle income buyers who would be able to pay the 
subsidy amount or more l2 . McCarthy et al. (1995:57), by lamenting the lack of a 'viable market in 
housing within the informal settlements,' are in fact promoting downward raiding and displacement. 
Botes et ai, (l 996) present an even more questionable explanation of the vacating of sites by registered 
owners without selling. They argue that '[b ]ecause delivery was free, some registered owne,rs later 
simply abandoned their stands and vanished without trace .... If people had paid even a nominal amount 
for their stands, they would have made more of an effort to sell them when they moved away' (Botes et 
al., 1996:463,464). It is apparent that the evaluators have made no attempt to understand the reality of 
household mobility, a survival strategy that has been documented by socially oriented researchers and 
to which I return in the following section. From the perspective of project management, Botes et al. 
portray this survival strategy as a problem, not only after issuing of titles, but throughout the 
development process. Thus they state: 
'Absentee shack-owners soon became a problem that the Problem Solving Committee had to deal 
with. A number of shacks, apparently deserted or at least temporarily abandoned, posed a 
financial threat to the development because the capital subsidy guaranteed by the Independent 
Development Trust would only be paid once ownership of the land had been transferretl (Botes et 
al., 1996:457). 
12 Bond (1997:96) raises this concern, with reference to the World Bank (1991), in his critique of 
McCarthy et al. (1995). 
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From this perspective it is understandable that the authors do not articulate any need to revise the 
capital subsidy approach with its blanket imposition of individual freehold title. Instead they suggest 
that a 'monetary contribution may be required ... to entrench ownership of a stand' (Botes et al., 
1996:266). 
Increased stakes for the private sector 
The promotion of commodification and individualisation of land, and the flawed market assumptions 
supporting this, form part of a larger agenda of increasing the stakes of the profit-making sector through 
informal settlement intervention. Thus, with reference to McCarthy et al. 's (1995) report, Bond 
(1997:93) emphasises the powerful private sector interests that 'clouded the analytical judgement of the 
NBI researchers.' The private sector interests then are promoted at two levels. At one level, are the 
direct stakes in the delivery process, which is funded through the individual household-based subsidies. 
Thus McCarthy et al. (1995:41) ensure that the 'private sector (business)' be included in the list of 
essential actors required to 'make upgrade a success.' They further argue that 'the role of the local 
authority itself has to change so that its role is very substantially modified ... [with] much stronger 
involvement of the private sector in development, servicing and maintenance' (ibid.:53,54). 
At a separate level, McCarthy et al. (1995) promote individualisation and housing delivery on the 
grounds that it encourages consumerism among the beneficiaries. Thus they state that: 
'Upgrading can unleash the huge consumer markets in informal settlements. The introduction of 
electricity,jor example encourages the consumption ofl/white goods" [meaning refrigerators, 
stoves, washing machines and freezers], kitchen appliances, television sets, etc.' (McCarthy et al., 
1995:77). 
In the following section I will discuss research evidence that confirms that the current intervention 
approach encourages individualism and consumerism (and debt). Indeed then, one may assume that 
such intervention does contribute to the urban economy. However, in the absence of any direct 
economic upliftment accompanying the housing intervention, it must, be asked how individualisation 
and commodification impacts on people's ability to cope with ongoing poverty. Returning then to a 
question raised through my review of the current World Bank urban policy position in Chapter 2: 
should state-funded informal settlement intervention be designed primarily to respond to demands for 
growth in the urban economy (as implicit in the McCarthy et al. (1995) report, and indeed the current 
intervention approach in South Africa), or should it respond to the realities of poverty, as experienced 
by the inhabitants of informal settlements? This then brings me to the research evidence in the South 
African literature, that from various angles contradicts the market-oriented tenets of the current informal 
settlement intervention framework in South Africa. 
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6.4 Scholarly responses contradicting the Urban Foundation paradigm 
While there are various studies and debates challenging the relevance of individual freehold tenure for 
informal settlement residents, no studies in South Africa have explicitly challenged the relevance of the 
Urban Foundation model as a whole for informal settlement intervention. I return to this point later in 
the chapter. In this section, I draw out from the literature empirical evidence that contradicts the various 
positions I have discussed above, which have been used to support the Urban Foundation model. A few 
studies have highlighted problems with the standardised product-driven funding mechanism for 
informal settlement intervention, some have cast light on the realities of civic or community 
organisation, various studies have pointed to the social impacts of the imposition of freehold titles and 
individualisation, and yet others have exposed the impacts of commodification and consumerism. 
Questioning housing/service delivery as a means of informal settlement intervention 
An important case for examining the relevance of the capital subsidy and associated delivery-oriented 
model of informal settlement intervention is that of Besters Camp in lnanda, Durban, documented by 
van Horen (1996) and Merrifield, van Horen and Taylor (1993). The Besters Camp intervention was the 
first attempt at in situ upgrading in South Africa. Though initiated by the Urban Foundation in 1989, the 
initial stages of the intervention preceded the articulation of the capital subsidy approach by the Urban 
Foundation. The Informal Settlement Division of the Urban Foundation at the time was not dictated to 
by the model later promoted by the Urban Foundation, and could therefore explore an upgrading 
approach that was building on the 'de facto' situation in Besters Camp. Indeed, 'the lack of local or 
national precedent provided Besters Camp with considerable room for manoeuvre in the formulation of 
the planning approach' (van Horen, 1996:22). Initially funded through a grant, the intervention allowed 
for the establishment of community facilities, including community halls, health and education 
facilities, and for the mobilisation ofNGOs and government agencies' involvement in health and 
education programmes (ibid.: 18). Planning principles that were adopted at this stage were grounded in 
an understanding of the constant social and physical change in the settlement. The '.ideal end state' was 
to be developed with the residents over a period of time, and was to be based on the existing layout" 
(ibid.:20). External planning and imposition ofa standardised layout was considered inappropriate. 
Planning itself was seen as 'only one element of what needs to be a multi-disciplinary approach to the 
upgrading process.' However, this responsive approach was stopped in its tracks in 1991 with a switch 
in the 'funding regime' from a relatively flexible grant to the IDT's capital subsidy scheme, requiring 'the 
delivery of serviced sites' and freehold tenure through a standardised household-based budget (ibid.: 18). 
As a result, the broader social and developmental aspects of the intervention were discontinued, and the 
intervention instead was limited to the delivery of services and freehold title (Merrifield et ai., 1993). 
Van Horen (1996) and Merrifield et al.'s (1993) case studies of Besters Camp reflect doubt over the 
relevance of structuring informal settlement intervention as simply another form of housing or services 
delivery. This position is supplemented by positions in the recent urban tenure related research and 
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debate. Cross (1999: 15), analysing the blockages in the delivery of secure tenure to informal settlement 
residents, suggests that access to secure tenure through the 'gold-plated vehicle' of the capital subsidy, 
which ties the delivery of freehold title to that of services and housing, neither meets the social reality in 
informal settlements, nor is it likely to reach the current and future scale of the informal settlement 
phenomenon. The reality of continuous social change, hence the limitations of a rigidly imposed 
inflexible intervention (as occurs through the capital subsidy), has led to proposals for an alternative 
approach to land management, based on the concept of 'social change' taking into account and giving 
support to existing community-based mechanisms ofland control (Davies, 1998; Davies and Fourie, 
1998). However, the relationship between this approach and the national housing fmance mechanism, 
the capital subsidy, is yet to be explored. I return to the tenure options, and in particular the evidence of 
continuous social change in informal settlements, later in this chapter when discussing research that has 
questioned the relevance of imposing freehold titles in an informal settlement intervention. Indeed, it is 
the attachment of freehold title to the capital subsidy, a central objective of the Urban Foundation13, that 
has been questioned most rigorously in the literature. It is then through the case studies in Chapter 7, 
that I expose other obstacles that the capital subsidy approach places on meaningful informal settlement 
intervention. 
Acknowledging the importance of community organisation 
The Urban Foundation model associates violence and resulting mobility in informal settlements with the 
particular pattern ofleadership and power that these settlements enable. The intervention then seeks to 
stabilise, by ensuring individual access to services and individual freehold titles. The assumption that 
imposed individualised development leads to settlement stability is contradicted by experience of the 
IDT-funded capital subsidy intervention in the Phola Park informal settlement on the East Rand near 
Johannesburg, documented by Bremner (1994), Adler (1994) and Royston (1993). In this settlement, 
the prospect of being tied to private plot ownership and payment for individual access to services 
(through the IDT-funded capital subsidy intervention) brought social division in the settlement to the 
fore. While the majority of residents originated from back yard shacks in the neighbouring township 
and were willing to settle permanently, the same prospect deeply threatened the livelihood of a separate 
grouping, the migrants, who were planning instead to consolidate in the rural areas (Bremner, 1994). 
This was associated with the pressure of increasing dependency ofa rural survival on wages from 
family members in the city (ibid.:37). A third grouping, illegal immigrants, were threatened by the 
enforcement of a registered title, as their survival depended on an unregistered existence. Thus Bremner 
13 In 1994 the chairman of the Urban Foundation applauded that the 'acceptance ofthe capital subsidy 
approach also means acceptance of home-ownership for low-income households. This has been a UF 
[Urban Foundation] goal from the start and represents a key contribution by the UF to how South Africa 
will be structured in the future' (Urban Foundation, 1994). It is interesting to note that as early as 1977, 
the Urban Foundation chairman argued that 'the absence of meaningful provision for home ownership in 
our Black urban townships plays a significant part in the instability and insecurity so prevalent in these 
areas' (Argus 6/4177 in Ellis, Hendrie, Kooy and Maree, 1977:77). 
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(1994:40) argues that the very intention of creating istability, order and efficiency, ... contradicted the 
function of the infonnal settlement in a sub-region where personal security was limited and economic 
opportunities scarce.' 
The inflexible plans to impose freehold title and services to all households then undermined community 
cohesion at Phola Park. Royston (1993), in analysing the community organisation prior to the IDT 
intervention, notes that cohesion existed due to the unifYing need for access to the city for survival. At 
the same time, the civic organisation had co-existed with a nwnber of other organisational structures, 
including traditional as well as illegal groupings. It was the fonnal development process, requiring the 
civic organisation to represent all residents, that triggered conflict between the various groupings 
(ibid.). The fmding then that the Urban Foundation model is underpinned by a flawed asswnption of 
community cohesion is supported by household level research in Cape Town (Spiegel, Watson, 
Wilkinson, 1994, 1996a). While not exploring the challenges of community organisation in the 
development process, the Cape Town study reveals a complexity of household ties among the African 
urban population, often spanning the city and the region. This leads the authors likewise to warn policy-
makers of the asswnption that people sharing one locality also share common interests and priorities 
regarding development. 
The IDT intervention approach (the basis of the current intervention framework) was built on a flawed 
perception of community representation. Assuming community cohesion, it expected full community 
commitment to the development. The civic organisation was placed in a difficult position between on 
the one hand a divided community it was to represent, and on the other hand a disempowering project 
structure. With reference to the Phola Park case, Bremner (1994) mentions two aspects of the funding 
mechanism that undermined the civic organisation'S role in the development. Firstly, rigid time 
limitations attached to the funding did not allow space for a community-driven process. Secondly, 
control over the capital subsidy funds was placed not with the community organisation but with 
developers and private consultants 14. Bremner (1994:39) highlights the poor record of these private 
sector stakeholders - 'speculation, corruption, poor standards of work and unwillingness to facilitate 
community consultation.' Her conclusion then is that '[s]hort term measures should have been adopted 
to address the immediate needs, while longer term solutions to political conflict, marginalisation, urban 
poverty and spatial segregation were worked out' (ibid.:41). 
A similar recommendation results from a study examining the reasons for continuous on-migration by 
poor households in the Durban Functional Region (Cross, Bekker and Clark, 1994). Tying household 
mobility to the high incidence of violence in infonnal settlements (ibid.:95), the authors identify the 
need to stabilise the population. However, unlike the Morris (1992) and Hindson and McCarthy (1994) 
14 These same mechanisms have been institutionalised into the current housing policy, and govern most 
infonnal settlement intervention projects. 
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reviewed above, Cross et al. are cautious in recommending development as a means of 
stabilisation. As Brenmer (1994), they argue that interventions are since they 
may provoke violence and competition' et ai., 1994.:95). Rather than promoting 
the of 'community in informal settlements 'to 
cope with service delivery and violence' (ibid.:96). Thus the core of their conclusion relates to the 
interface between development intervention and informal settlement leadership structures, whose 
an important role in settlement 
The impact offormal development prospects on civic organisations is particularly evident in settlements 
that have been faced with official plans of relocation. Ardington's (1992) documentation of the Canaan 
settlement in Durban discusses this point. A strong cohesion among the residents of Canaan had been 
fostered around the common threat of eviction. This was reflected in the formation of a settlement 
committee. as the invaded land was officially classified as not for low-income 
residential purposes, the official solution was to relocate the residents. Within this official process, the 
community organisation was expected to ensure that no further shacks were constructed in the 
settlement. Hnw~v~r neither the relocation nor the moratorium on formal construction 
even the construction of pit latrines), met the diverse realities of the residents. Community cohesion 
disintegrated once it became evident that the common resistance to eviction had failed - residents were 
once to make individual about their future. Thus Ardington (1992:33) 
concludes that 'Canaan which appeared well on the way to civic ,nll'Mn1nrv is 
divided and unable either to press its own demands or react to those of the authorities.' 
A further collective social relation that may be impacted upon prospects of serviced sites in 
informal settlements is that between informal settlement residents and neighbouring communities. 
Crankshaw (1996) examines this through the case of the West Rand township where 
social division and conflict exists between council tenants, back shack 'vu~ .. ~, 
'squatters' and hostel residents. Crankshaw (1996) the threat that the population growth 
(through in back shack accommodation and informal settlement poses to 'the ethnic 
and dominance of established Bekkersdal residents' Crankshaw (1996) points to 
various reasons why the of settlement in this context may polarise social divisions. 
On the one such intervention be interpreted by established residents as politically ""l1m,,"n" 
On the other hand, upgrading may be seen to encourage the formation of new informal 
settlements in anticipation of sites and services delivery. The movement from backyard shack 
accommodation into new settlements may be perceived as undermining the rental 
sector, in itself an source of income. Crankshaw's (1996) recommendation therefore is that 
the benefits should not be limited to the residents of one type. 
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While Crankshaw's (1996) study gives some insight into the complex social relations surrounding 
informal settlements that are embedded ill African townships, most studies on the relationship between 
informal settlement and the neighbouring formal 'communities' have focused on invasions that 
challenged group areas (see Sapire, 1990), and particularly the exclusivity of middle to high income 
areas (see Gardener, 1992; National Housing Forum, undated; Emmett, 1992; Nathan and Spindler, 
1993; Oelofse, 1994). I return to the implications of this research bias below. A fmding in economists 
Nathan and Spindler's (1993) study of the informal settlement intervention process in Hout Bay (a 
suburb of Cape Town) gives some explanation to this research bias, while also casting light on the 
nature of community organisation. Nathan and Spindler (1993) apply the theory of pressure group 
reaction, or pressure group competition, to the Hout Bay situation. In the context of waning repression 
ofland invasions by government around 1989, they analyse how the threat that the land invasions posed 
to the property owning class in Hout Bay induced mobilisation. A Property Rights Association was 
formed with the aim of asserting pressure on government to act against the invasion. 'In response to this 
induced rise in political pressure, squatters were induced to form a proactive lobby ... which would 
capture increased gains by increased cohesion' (ibid.:484). Government's response of reassigning public 
land for the permanent settlement of the squatters within Hout Bay in turn led to the formation of 'new 
counteractive and proactive lobbies' (ibid.:485). Nathan and Spindler (1993:485) therefore refer to a 
continuing process of adjustment, as 'new groups entered the political arena to protect self-interests or 
to gain new property rights.' This study then is a useful explanation for the attention informal 
settlements within formerly white Group Areas have received. 
Questioning the relevance of freehold titles and individualisation 
The aspect of the Urban Foundation model most challenged in the South African literature is that of 
imposing individual freehold titles on the informal settlement situation. This aspect has been questioned 
from various angles. Some studies have examined diversity at the household level, exposing a range in 
household types, changes in household composition, and mobility of households. These studies then 
disagree with the notion of a stable nuclear household, to which the Urban Foundation model ties 
freehold tenure. While the Urban Foundation oriented researchers portrayed social phenomena such as 
household mobility as a 'problem' in the development process (Botes et al., 1996), these studies 
understand social change as a response to a complex condition shaped by various degrees of poverty 
and by regionally specific situations. It is the evidence of diversity, both locally and regionally, that 
renders questionable the blanket solution of delivering individual freehold titles to informal settlement 
residents. A separate set of studies has examined the informal system of tenure and land management 
promoted in informal settlements by the civic movement. These studies have highlighted the 
responsiveness of this system to the realities of urban poverty. Yet other studies have examined to what 
extent a legal 'property market' has materialised subsequent to the delivery of freehold titles. These 
studies expose in particular the misfit between the cost of legal transfer of property and the economic 
reality within which post-intervention mobility takes place. 
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In Cape Town, household change through the adjustment of household composition has been 
researched through the concept of ' domestic fluidity', as a coping strategy of the urban poor (Spiegel, 
Watson and Wilkinson, 1994-1999; Ross, 1993, 1996). Though not making explicit reference to the 
universal concepts of urban poverty that I discussed in Chapter 2, these studies give important insight 
into the mobilisation of the non-monetary assets of 'household relations' and 'social capital' 15. The 
contribution that Spiegel, et al. and Ross make to the understanding of household relations as an asset 
of the urban poor, is in the rmding that adjustments to household composition are made at an expense. 
The poorer households were found to remain unchanged for relatively long periods, as 'they could not 
afford to relocate members or to call on others who might have the resources to support them' (Spiegel 
et ai., 1994: 14)l6. The Spiegel et al. study draws its conclusions from surveys across the range of 
African low-income residential environments in Cape Town (family housing, back yard shacks, hostels 
and informal settlements). Their fmding is that the poorest households, least likely to draw on 
adjustments in household composition, are most prevalent in urban informal settlements (ibid.: 19) 17. 
The impoverished context of a peri-urban informal settlement near Cape Town, with high tenure 
insecurity, is examined by Ross (1993)18. This study found a more localised and thus affordable form of 
domestic fluidity, with considerable movement of individuals among homes within the settlements - so 
much so that Ross 'was led to argue that the very idea of household as a simultaneously co-residential, 
comensal and co-productive unit was wholly inappropriate' (Spiegel et al., 1994, referencing Ross, 
1993). In relation to inter-household relationships, Ross found that 'the resources with which to sustain 
intense, long-term relationships of the type associated with kin networks were scarce. Consequently 
people often utilised other relationships of friendship and reciprocity' (Ross, 1996:60). It must be 
added, however, that the settlement Ross researched had a largely 'coloured' population (Spiegel et aI., 
1994:20), with the important distinction that origin and kinship ties are not comparable, culturally or in 
terms of distance, to those of the African population researched by Spiegel et al. 19• 
15 With reference to Moser (1995) I have discussed in Chapter 2 that, alongside infrastructure and 
services, housing and labour, the poor may capitalise on adjustments to household compositions and on 
inter-household reciprocity (the latter termed 'social capital'). 
J6 In the context of violence and disruption of schooling in South African townships, the practice of 
relocating children to rural kin for schooling has been widespread. This practice was interwoven with 
the complex household relations that were necessitated by the migrant labour system, leading to what 
Spiegel et al. (1994: 12) refer to as 'disrupted domesticity'. 
17 It may be noted that a quantitative study of African household dynamics and mobility in Cape Town 
by Mazur and Qangule (1995:42) found that in terms of household income, informal settlement 
populations ranked higher than those of back yard shacks. However, the data analysis ofmis study is 
limited to the Urban Foundation terminology, thus failing to make a distinction between shacks in 
informal settlements and those on serviced sites. The study gives no distinguishable evidence of socio-
economic conditions in informal settlements. 
18 Also reviewed in Spiegel et al. (1994). 
19 The rural areas of origin of the African population in Cape Town are at a distance of at least 900km. 
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The importance of kinship ties to African informal settlement households in Cape Town is evident from 
Lohnert's (1998) study in two informal settlements and one relocation scheme. Her fmding was that 
both informal settlements contained concentrations of people originating from the same rural 
magisterial districts. Kinship relations had played an important role in people's residential decisions, 
and many households appeared to actively maintain such networks. Thus Lohnert (1998) highlights the 
importance of urbanised kinship networks within informal settlements. This leads her to question the 
practice of reallocating sites20, as is commonly associated with the delivery of standardised plots with 
freehold tenure through the capital subsidy. She makes particular reference to the absurdity of the 
technocratic site allocation practice that applied to the sites-and-services scheme she surveyed, to which 
people from 14 different informal settlements within the Integrated Serviced Land Project (iSLP) area21 
. had been relocated (Lohnert, 1998:388). 
Afurther condition, specific to the African population, is the occurrence of households that are 'parts of 
spatially divided income-sharing units with bases in both urban and rural areas' (Spiegel et al., 
1996b:20)22. The ongoing 'circulatory migration,23 between the urban and rural base 'allows households 
to gain access to a wide variety of income generating activities (and services such as schooling) and to 
'spread its risks' as far as exposure to the various sectors of the economy are concerned' (Spiegel et al., 
1994:9). The particular significance of informal settlements in the circulatory migration system is, 
firstly, that 'they make up much of the urban and peri-urban accommodation of the African population' 
and secondly, that they give 'access to a cheap place to live' (ibid.: 10). However, Spiegel et al. argue 
that there is no clear evidence whether circulatory migration in South Africa is transitional and 
eventually leads to permanent migration (ibid.), as is assumed with the issuing of freehold tenure 
through the once-off capital subsidy. Again, it is the poorest households, that do not have the resources 
to travel, for whom the move to the urban area is permanent. Here Spiegel et al. (1999: 153) refer to a 
'fatalistic pragmatism rather than a belief that urban life is appropriate and right.' It is evident then that 
in Cape Town, where the rural base of migrants is likely to be at least 900 km from the city, the cost of 
transport places a particular restriction on circulatory movement, thus giving urban poverty a dimension 
of deprivation that might not be as acute in other South African cities. The particular tenure needs of 
such households have not been explored in the literature. However, Ross's (1993,1996) study (though 
20 Although Lohnert (1998) refers to relocation from informal settlements to greenfields sites, it may be 
noted that even in the case of 'upgrading', it is common practice to redesign settlements according to a 
standardised layout and then to reallocate sites. 
21 The iSLP is an ongoing project, initiated in the early 1990s to deliver serviced sites to all households 
living in shacks in the back yards and informal settlements of the townships of Langa, Nyanga and 
Guguletu. The iSLP operates its relocations from informal settlements to serviced sites/incremental 
housing units by assigning to the various informal settlements in the project area a 'fair' quota of sites in 
each of the big relocation schemes. Thus one informal settlement would be assigned 200 sites in a 
relocation scheme 8km to the north, and a further 200 sites in a scheme 5km to the south (see Holistic 
Settlements, 1996). 
22 With evidence from Mabin's 1990 migration study, Spiegel et al. state that households with multiple 
urban and rural bases are common not only to Cape Town (Spiegel et al., 1994:9). 
23 In Durban this phenomenon is referred to as 'oscillatory migration' (see Cross, et al., 1994). 
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examining a largely coloured and not African community) made the fmding, as mentioned above, that 
extremely poor households resort to more localised mobility and high degrees of household fluidity as a 
mechanism of survival. This does not suggest that tying such households to freehold tenure, in isolation 
of economic upliftment, is an appropriate intervention. 
The regional diversity in poverty and coping strategies then is a further challenge to the uniform 
delivery of individual freehold title. I have mentioned above that in the case of Durban, the particular 
phenomenon of 'on-migration' from one urban location 'to the next has caused concern among 
researchers. Cross et al. (1994) have explained the high occurrence of on-migration as a response to 
violence, and as a strategy to improve the residential situation. Again, the relevance of tying households 
to one locality through a once-off capital subsidy and freehold title is questioned (ibid.). 
With the prevalence of household change in informal settlements, it has been asked, how informal 
systems of tenure and land management have responded to this social reality. Cross (1995), examining 
informal urban tenure in the Durban Functional Region, illustrates how the informal tenure practices 
'have adapted to mobility and to a considerable extent represent portable land rights' (Cross, 1994: 187). 
They comprise 'systems of relative social rights, rather than systems of property rights' (ibid.). In 
Chapter 5 (and with reference to Cross, 1994), I have mentioned that the civic movement in the late 
1980s came to control informal settlements on Durban's periphery, abolishing the practice that 
associated access to land with the payment of rent. Cross (1994) describes how the 'widespread urban 
system of rent tenancy' (ibid.: 180) comprising the lodging of rooms, back yard structures, and site 
rental, with landlords making profits or securing business clientele, and shack lords securing political or 
personal support, gave way to a 'powerful social movement against the practice of paying rent for 
access to land' (Cross, 1995:31). The spread of the civic movement then comprised a shift 'away from 
the ethic of private tenure' (albeit rental and not freehold), towards a system that has similarities with 
communal land holding practices in African rural areas (ibid.:34). 
While appearing then to draw on African rural traditions, the urban informal tenure system promoted by 
the civic movement was not restricted to African settlements. In Cape Town, a study by Dewar and 
W olmarans ( 1994) documents four informal settlements in the Western Cape24, each with a mixed 
population of African and 'coloured' people, therefore no common reference to traditional rural 
practices. The tenure system described by Dewar and Wolmarans is that referred to by Cross (1994, 
1995). Newcomers require introduction to the committee by a resident, are screened and then offered a 
24 The study is based on primary research in the settlements of Bloekombos (Kraaifontein), Sun City 
(near Somerset West) and Site 5 (Noordhoek) on the urban penphery of Cape Town, and Waterworks 
in the rural town of Grabouw. The study compares these settlements with historic data on the 
Crossroads transit camp. 
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'choice of two or three sites,' where possible in the vicinity of their sponsors, and in negotiation with the 
neighbouring residents (Dewar and Wolmarans, 1994:90). Precise boundaries are negotiated between 
neighbours, with the committee intervening in the case of a dispute (ibid.). 
The informal tenure system as promoted by the civic movement provides free of charge access to land 
for the urban poor. However, it is not necessarily responsive to the most needy. Cross (1995) raises 
concern over the sidelining of single people in the entry process into informal tenure. Particularly single 
women, and women with young children, are not welcomed into established settlements, thus often 
having to resort to a) 'clientship arrangements with established householders,' frequently resulting in 
suspicion from established female residents, b) entry into new settlements that are still in the 
recruitment stage, or c) lodging and tenancy within an informal settlement, which then allows the 
collection oflocal information in the search for sites (Cross, 1995:35). Thus the fmding from the 
international review of informal settlement research in Chapter 2 that lodging in informal settlements 
ranks lowest in the residential hierarchy and is largely occupied by women25, appears to apply to some 
extent to the South African situation. 
While there are problems inherent in the informal tenure system, its responsiveness to those in greatest 
need is further impeded by official intervention that requires a moratorium on further construction. I 
have mentioned the practice of affording transit camp status to informal settlements. This is associated 
with the numbering of shacks and a freeze on shack construction, as a flrst step in a process of 
stabilisation that ultimately ties households to individual freehold tenure and regular service charges. 
The settlement committee (usually a civic organisation) is expected to enforce the building moratorium. 
Inevitably, this impacts on the ability of the informal tenure system to accommodate needy arrivals, 
while also changing the role of the committee from that of enablement to that of strict control. This role 
in turn is undennined by the pressing demands for living space. Dewar and Wolmarans (1994:81) 
describe the case where a settlement committee responded to the official imposition of a settlement 
freeze by prohibiting settlement growth. Ongoing densiflcation then appeared to take place without 
consultation of the committee, as established households would cede portions of the land they were 
occupying 'to incoming friends or extended family who would construct their own shacks' (ibid.:92). In 
addition, lodging was being practised, with rent being paid 'in return for a bed or a room' (ibid.). Thus 
both the collective control over settlement expansion, and the concept of free access to living space, 
were undermined. 
There is evidence then that the imposition of a settlement freeze may induce practices of subletting. 
Cross (1994: 187) goes further to warn that the imposition of private title through the development 
process may 'contribute to a loss of equity and a re-emergence of rent tenancy.' This has parallels with 
2S See Volbeda (1989) and Yapi-Diahou (1995). 
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163,164) concern about new forms of exploitation induced the ",r'VlIl,ll:lI 
of public in to\Vl1Ships, and therefore reintroduction of the exploitative landlord-tenant 
amm.srup in the back shack situation. 
The of the process induced through close on a decade of freehold 
title through the capital subsidy system in South Africa has not been researched. 
om:the:less. the misfit between individual freehold title and the has been pointed 
out, with regards to the cumbersome system of title reglSIl"i1WDn, thus re1iiltlrtg the ",rr,,,,prtv 
market 
van Horen 
WUVU'J1J.:> made by the Urban Foundation oriented researchers. In the case of Besters Camp, 
reports that subsequent to the expenditure of the R7 500 of the 
IDT on the of services and individual freehold titles, beneficiaries were the serviced 
sites for R800 to R3 500. he argues, 'is marginally higher than average ore:-Ui)!rr;aae house selling 
in with inflation rates - and in any event considerably lower than the value 
the average [IDT] (van Horen, the 
relevance of the title l"'~l"U"U'Jl1 system in the low income context, mentions similar from 
in where serviced sites were eXf,.;,uan,geu inf()Imallv for R600 to Rl 000. 
Barry adds the useful detail that the legal transfer fee 'would probably be in excess ofR400' 
1995: I casts light on a further area of misfit. In a of land Oc(:up.atIc)D p:atte'rDS 
in sites and services he found an alarming amount of dwellings (up to 28 over 
legal boundaries. While the causes of this phenomenon were still under at the time of his 
this indicates that middle class property-ownership behaviour does not 
necessarily apply to sites and services schemes in South Africa. It may be added that Davies and Fourie 
(1998:242) that formal tenure could 'revert to an informal form of tenure over time.' This 
is also a SUJl:geimolD in current tenure research on urbanised former homeland areas where freehold titles 
are issued as ofa tenure upgrading process (Ambert, 1999). 
What then have been the recommendations by research that has the imposition of freehold 
tenure the Urban Foundation model of intervention? While (1995) explores systems of 
communal land Cross (1994: 188) recommends the formalisation of the informal tenure 
in other words 'a formal version of what shack communities produce for 
she argues, 'while disliked by planners, offers flexible site access to its users and 
can usually secure their in terms short of violence or 
gm!enrun1ent intervention' (ibid.: 187). As mentioned earlier in this 1.,.110'V<I.1. Davies ( 1998) (see also 
Davies and 1998) developed a 'social in informal 
settlements. This is tied back to a conscious redefinition of the term 'informal settlement'. Their use of 
the tenn is not based on the nature of the housing structure, but on the of the land occupation, 
and its to the local authority. As opposed to the of the Urban Foundation use of 
26 There is increasing interest in such a tenure system, even from within government 1999). 
I 
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the term. their defInition of'infonnal settlement' consciously accommodates the concept of change by 
acknowledging a continuum of (il)legality and of development. Their approach to land management 
then allows for 'the transfonnation of indigenous land tenure over time' (Davies and Fourie, 1998:241). 
The approach seeks to draw together the 'extensive local knowledge' of community leaders, and official 
technical expertise (ibid.:242). The authors recommend that community-based land management 
systems are assisted 'even if they contravene existing legislation' (ibid.:243). In the South African 
literature reviewed, this then represents the only explicit proposal for a support-based alternative to the 
Urban Foundation approach to infonnal settlement intervention. 
Exposing the impact of commodification on poverty 
The relevance ofindividualisation and commodifIcation ofland has been questioned through the 
discussion above. Here I turn to recent studies that have critically examined the unleashing 'of huge 
consumer markets in infonnal settlements' through 'upgrading', as predicted by McCarthy et al.'s 
(1995:77) promotion of the Urban Foundation model. One anthropological study (Yose, 1999, reviewed 
and discussed by Spiegel, 1999) examines the ways in which a relocation from an infonnal settlement27 
to a standardised 'incremental' housing scheme nearby impacts on lives and livelihoods. The study 
indeed confmns that consumer markets are unleashed. The orderliness and permanence of the new 
environment inspired modern aspirations. New furniture and appliances were being purchased on credit. 
The individualisation of access to services implied an individualisation of household chores such as 
laundry washing, which in the infonnal settlement had been conducted at public taps, with the sharing 
of bathtubs among women. Each household was now purchasing its own wash tub, this corresponding 
with 'a breakdown of the kinds of inter-household links that had previously prevailed' (Spiegel, 1999:5, 
with reference to Yose, 1999). Households in the relocation scheme were clearly impacted upon by the 
individualisation, which directly undermined 'mutual assistance' or reciprocity. In addition, they were 
being burdened with down payments on their purchases. Some households incurred further expenses by 
transporting old furniture to distant rural homes (Spiegel, 1999:6). 
In discussing these fmdings, Spiegel explains that the perception of 'urban' among inhabitants of 
infonnal settlements and townships is associated with orderliness and individualisation, whereas 
infonnal settlements, though located in urban areas, are perceived as 'rural'. Though not referring 
explicitly to the current model of infonnal settlement intervention which entrenches individualisation, 
Spiegel (1999: 11), in his conclusion, refers to the 'confidence trick' of modernity. While promoters of 
the Urban Foundation model would argue that the modem lifestyle is what the poor aspire to and should 
not be denied, it is of course evident that in the absence of economic upliftment, individualisation is a 
burden to the urban poor. Spiegel notes that there is indeed evidence of 'popular suspicion of modernity' 
27 This research is conducted in the infonnal settlement Marconi Beam and its relocation site Joe Slovo 
Park in Cape Town. 
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(ibid.). He implicitly supports community-based and communal alternatives by stating that: 'Once we 
can see people consciously recognising the cruel hoax that has been modernity's promise, we need also 
to take note that there is chance for them to begin to valorise other forms' (ibid.). 
A more pertinent warning comes from Cross (1999:5), who presents evidence of beneficiaries of 
'incremental' capital subsidy housing having 'moved out again after two months, reportedly due to cost 
factors that were unsustainable on the household's income.' Referring to Spiegel's (1999) paper on the 
implications of commodification, she adds the considerable drain that service charges place on 
household economies. This leads her to question official attempts at integrating the poor 'into the urban 
fabric by subsidizing the up front cost of their move from informal into formal accommodation' 
(ibid.:6). Those households that move out of the delivered housing due to economic problems 'will not 
be eligible for a housing subsidy again' (ibid.). Therefore, such a move 'may result in the permanent loss 
of tenure security' (ibid.). 
I have noted in the discussion on tenure above, that the impact ofindividualisation commences with the 
official numbering of shacks and imposition of a moratorium on building. With reference to this 
particular stage in the informal settlement process, Makhatini (1994) notes that the economic 
opportunities that are created by settlement growth, namely clandestine building activity and the 
growing demand for household commodities, are lost once the official numbering of shacks occurs and 
the settlement committee is given the official mandate to prevent further construction. While the 
individualisation process then removes economic stakes for the clandestine and informal sector, it 
promotes stakes for the formal private sector. That the private sector itself is not necessarily efficient 
and ethical in fulfilling its delivery role has been suggested by Bremner (1994), as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. Cross (1999) gives evidence of how the cost of mismanagement by a private developer in 
Cape Town is borne by the beneficiaries. With the developer having 'folded his operation' due to 
overspending, and the municipality refusing to cover the 'cost overruns', the prospective home owners 
wait indefinitely for the completion of their capital subsidy units28 (Cross, 1999: 15). While warning also 
of illicit practices on the part of powerful community leaders, therefore sceptical of alternatives that 
place [mancial responsibilities with community representatives, Cross seriously questions the relevance 
of the 'route to tenure security' through the capital subsidy approach (ibid.: 17). 
6.5 Limitations in challenging the Urban Foundation paradigm 
In the section above I have referred to a body of evidence indicating that the current model of informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa is based on flawed assumptions and is therefore not responding 
adequately to the realities of urban poverty as manifested in informal settlements. Why then has the 
Urban Foundation model for informal settlement intervention not been successfully challenged? In 
28 Here Cross (1999) refers to a housing scheme in Macassar, in the south-eastern periphery of Cape 
Town. 
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Chapter 5, I have discussed the route through which the Urban Foundation proposal of the early 1990s 
was institutionalised into the current national housing policy, discarding alternative mass-based 
positions. I referred to the powerful interests that supported the Urban Foundation approach in the 
policy-making, and that sidelined alternative proposals. Critical academic positions in tum neither 
appear to have impacted independently on this process, nor were they explicitly supporting the popular 
position articulated by the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). 
The comparison in Chapter 5 between the South African informal settlement policy formulation, and the 
process through which alternative governance approaches were institutionalised in Brazil, gives 
perspective to the South African scenario. In Brazil progressive academics were able to exercise 
considerable influence on policy formulation by acting within a unified Urban Reform Movement which 
included popular movements. Although democratisation and the policy-making process in Brazil took a 
very different route from that in South Africa (as shown in Chapter 5), the comparison does raise the 
question: What is the role of critical academic research in informal settlement policy formulation? In 
Brazil, this role has been that of actively strengthening the collective endeavours of the working class 
and poor. In South Africa, while individual academic research initiatives have built relationships with 
informal settlement communities29, informal settlement research initiatives tend to be isolated from one 
another, and from the two main popular movements that apply to informal settlements, the Homeless 
People's Federation and the civic movement. This tendency to conduct ad hoc or isolated research30 is 
perpetuated by overseas academic researchers, who's valid findings are lost to the South African 
readers, to the popular movements and indeed to the policy formulation process, as they are published 
mainly in learned overseas journals or presented at international conferences3l , often not in a South 
African language. Where publications have been explicitly policy-directed32, the research initiatives 
have undertaken to represent the realities of the poor to the policy-makers. However, the body of 
informal settlement research as a whole, does not adequately represent the informal settlement reality, 
as its coverage is incomplete and restricted by strong biases. I expand on these below. 
29 Examples are firstly, the Urban GIS Research team in the Department of Civil Engineering at the 
University of Cape Town (under the leadership of Professor lohan Abbott), which is exploring a GIS 
supported and community managed approach to informal settlement intervention with the residents of 
the Kanana informal settlement in Guguletu, Cape Town. Secondly, the Centre for Land Development, 
Housing and Construction at the University of Pretoria is building a support-based relationship with 
informal settlement communities in the Eastern District Council, which functionally form part of the 
city of Pretoria. . 
30 Thorold's (1997) very honest account of an anthropologist team's arbitrary attraction to an informal 
settlement that happened to be visible from their office windows, illustrates how informal settlement 
research comes to be conducted not with the aim of impacting on policy or supporting a popular 
struggle, but merely to satisfY academic curiosity. 
31 Van Horen's important work on the Bester's Camp upgrading process, is a valid example. 
32 As is the case with Spiegel et al. (1994-1999). 
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As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is the tenureaspect of the intervention mH~"n:on that is 
actively debated, with increasing networking among researchers and discussions with 
. It is then also from the tenure perspective that alternatives to the Urban Foundation 
model for informal settlement intervention are being developed and Df()mote:d-~. As 
!,.lUliJl...,'" movements do not participate in this debate. Indeed, critical informal settlement research in 
Africa has not strlen~:thjenf:d popular movements in the process. It has also 
llUllore~d pragmatic initiatives the Urban Foundation intervention at a "'~'''''''''''''~'l 
based U""''''''''', as by Adler (1994: 110), research on the 
communities has tended to be based on research in particularly violent informal SetUelnellts· . This then 
has skewed our unideI'standling of community organisations, their vulnerabilities, and the role they are 
able to in the 'rn'rtrn",,·,m,.,nt conditions in informal settlements. 
A further bias in the informal settlement literature, which I mentioned earlier in this chapter, has been 
created the ten:dellCY to research settlements that invaded formerly white 'group areas' or are located 
in 'white' local administrations. This research bias applies to South African informal settlement 
data in et al. (1996) comparing information on Ivory Park (a land 
invasion in a former white municipality) and Tladi-Moletsane (an invasion in the African township area 
of fmd that: 
'The mere fact of being in a formerly white area means that although the residents were under-
rp,\:(Jl1rc~~a the local authorities had resources to survEry the population within their areas. We 
know more about areas such as Ivory Park, only a few years old, than we do about our Soweto 
ne,IJ!Il:Dours who have been living in suburbs such as Tladi-Moletsane since 1955' (Everatt et aI., 
1996:8). 
33 This debate has been through a recent workshop, 'Tenure Security Policies in South 
1""'11'-<11.11. J..l'1""C1UAll, Indian and Sub-Saharan African Cities: A Comparative Analysis' 27-
Institut Fra cais d'Afrique du Sud, Development Works, Joharmesburg, Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policies, Cambridge MA, Department of Land Affaris, Pretoria, Centre National de la 
Recherche CNRS, which is of a larger study on 'Urban Tenure Research' 
ordinated Dr. Alain Durand-Lasserve of the Laboratoire Societes en dans et 
Ie Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Paris VII, and 
Lauren Works, Johannesburg) aiming to redress the hitherto rural bias in land 
tenure reform in South Africa. 
34 See Davies Davies and Fourie (1998) and Barry (1995). 
35 Literature on the Homeless Federation is mainly written by the staff of its NGO 
.uli:11U'~UC, while the civic movement's particular role in informal settlements as opposed to 
IWIlSHJllJS. has been researched. 
exc:em:lOn is Seethal's (1996) of the collective achievement of the Otto's Bluff informal 
settlement and SVInn:lthl~tic civil in Pietermaritzburg, in the context ofpoIitical transition in the 
to mid 1990s. 
be noted that urban administrations and other institutions have at various times coInnlissioned 
informal settlement inventories, see for instance Henessy and Smit (1994), Abbott and 
(1999), Province (1997). However, these are limited to descriptive background data 
derived from aerial (thus rapidly outdating) and are generally not backed-up with 
data from the field. Thus while a quantitative overview, they do not redress the imbalance in 
""',, ..... ,,'" of social relations and community organisation. 
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The bias on the part of administrations is mirrored by the academic research community. This is 
illustrated by the Cape Town context, where much academic literature is available on the informal 
settlements in Hout Bay and their relocation site within that same suburb38 (see Sowman and Gawith, 
1994; Nathan and Spindler, 1993; Oelofse, 1994; Lohnert, 1998, among othersi9, and the Marconi 
Beam informal settlement in Milnerton40 (see Lohnert, 1997, 1998; Saff, 1996, 1999; Yose, 1999). 
Little in turn has been asked about those settlements embedded in, or on the verges of, the African 
townships ofNyanga, Guguletu, Langa and Khayelitsha41 • 
It appears that much of the research focusing on the interface between high income formal residential 
areas and neighbouring impoverished informal settlements in the early 1990s was conducted in the 
anticipation of future urban restructuring, with expectations that vacant land in proximity to high 
income areas would be developed for low income groups. This vision of the future South African city 
would have stemmed partly from an assumption in the early 1990s that the post-apartheid state would 
intervene in the urban land market, creating more equitable and efficient cities by removing many of the 
stakes that were upholding the privileged, exclusively white property markets. Partly, it would have 
stemmed from the precedent set by a small number of high profile land invasions within formerly white 
group areas, which induced municipalities to reassign land for low-income residential purposes within 
the former exclusively middle- to high-income areas. It was perceived that these challenging land 
invasions and the subsequent allocation of land to low income groups represented the beginning of a 
new and growing trend. Sowman and Gawith (1994:561) thus argue that the relevance of their case 
study of the Hout Bay informal settlements and their relocation site lies in the fact that this is 
representative of ' a new pattern of urban growth.' However, such predictions have not materialised, nor 
has much research since the 1994 elections been conducted on how to deal with the 'interface' between 
high and low income settlements. Instead the reality of 'post-apartheid social polarisation' has drawn 
38 Hout Bay is a formerly a 'white' coastal suburb of Cape Town. Several small land invasions in 
picturesque settings emerged in the 1980s, resisting relocation to distant township schemes. Eventually 
a relocation site (Imizamu Yethu) was established within the formerly white group area of Hout Bay. 
39 These studies listed above all (though not exclusively) examine the relationship between the 'invaders' 
and the established white community. It is not surprising that many of the researchers live in that 
particular suburb and have a direct (possibly humanitarian) interest in their own 'back yard'. 
40 The Marconi Beam informal settlement located on privately owned industrial land in the formerly 
white suburb ofMilnerton. A relocation was eventually arranged in a nearby residential and industrial 
development, although a portion of the original settlement has remained to date. 
41 One might note, however, that the aDA-funded study by Awotona et al. (1995, 1996, 1997) redresses 
this to some extent, by studying the range oflow income residential environments in Cape Town, and in 
more detail the complex mosaic of residential types in the Cape Town township ofNyanga East, 
including its informal settlements. However, this overseas initiated study too was ad hoc and poorly 
. disseminated, its working papers being obtainable only from the UK (at considerable cost). Studies 
focusing specifically on the current challenges faced by organised informal settlement communities 
within this fabric do not exist to date. A further research bias, identified by Simpson (1995), is that the 
informal settlement literature has tended to present 'squatting' as a black phenomenon, ignoring that it is 
common too among poor coloured people. 
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recent academic attention (see Lohnert, Oldfield, Parnell, 1998; Singh, 1997). Nathan and Spindler 
(1993) correctly anticipated the actual post-apartheid property market mechanisms (explaining, in part, 
the continuing racial non-integration of the city). In 1993 they predicted 'new, countering, rent-seeking 
innovations and interest-group empowerment which may modifY, stay, or even reverse the present 
course' (Nathan and Spindler, 1993:490). The prediction was supported by evidence of 'changes in 
private behaviour and activity in Hout Bay,' such as fencing and patrolling of privately owned vacant 
land, and pressure to develop vacant land 'in order to eliminate attractive squatting targets' (ibid.). 
A further bias in the informal settlement research body then results from our lack of understanding of 
the dynamics of the post-1994 land invasions in relation both to the predicted 'counter-redistributive 
activities,42 and to the deterministic intervention that sets out to stabilise and individualise settlement 
populations. Indeed, patterns of post-apartheid exclusion in relation to the informal settlement question 
have not been explored by critical scholars. Instead, unfounded statements such as the following by 
Botes et al. (1996:456) in support of problematic official positions remain uncontested: 
'Land invasions and illegal occupation of land, which started out as strategies to oppose 
apartheid structures, have since denigrated into a culture of entitlement and queue-jumping to 
gain access to development funding. This was acknowledged by late Joe Slovo. then minister of 
Housinl3• 
One can, therefore, not presume that the needs of those participating in recent invasions are presented to 
policy-makers through the research body. 
Returning, [mally, to the understanding we do have of the informal settlement reality, I have shown that 
the South African informal settlement literature gives important insights into the diversity of household 
situations, the variety of coping strategies, and their implications. This body of research, however, 
remains isolated from the international debate on urban poverty. It does not make use of the various 
concepts of vulnerability and resilience, which I discussed in Chapter 2. Internationally, debate around 
these concepts has assisted in drawing attention to the realities faced by the urban poor, has exposed the 
limitations of externally designed product-oriented intervention and has promoted alternative support-
based approaches. While World Bank urban policy of the early 1990s then responded by embracing the 
urban poverty concerns, South African policy, as I have shoV'lI1 in Chapter 244, primarily associates 
poverty in informal settlements with social pathologies. This indicates that the poverty insights 
represented in the informal settlement literature have had little impact on official positions in the 1990s. 
42 Nathan and Spindler (1993:490) argue that these 'counter-redistributive activities' might well collapse 
in the future, as has happened in other countries. 
43 Botes et al. (1996) refer to the Sunday Times of 14 August, 1994, page 2. 
44 See footnote 28 in Chapter 2. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that the influential Urban Foundation position on informal settlement 
intervention is underpinned by unsubstantiated assumptions. Critical literature of the 1990s contradicts 
the Urban Foundation position, yet fails to impact substantially on the informal settlement policy-
making, which, as I have argued in Chapter 1, has remained on a continuum since the late 1980s. The 
need for a more flexible approach that is sensitive to the realities of poverty and to the particular 
collective social dynamics in and around individual informal settlements has been identified from 
various angles. However, the isolated way in which informal settlement research is conducted in South 
Africa has meant that individual aspects of an alternative approach are being articulated in isolation of 
one another. It appears that, to successfully challenge the by now well entrenched Urban Foundation 
approach to informal settlement intervention, will require co-ordination among researchers in order to 
develop a cohesive and convincing position. Engagement with the international debates on urban 
poverty, and the concepts that have promoted an awareness of alternative intervention approaches 
internationally, would strengthen such a position. The development of an alternative then should not 
occur in isolation of existing popular initiatives struggling for the improvement of informal settlements. 
In Chapter 7, I show how the household-based entitlement through the capital subsidy approach to 
informal settlements has shaped the strategies through which community-based initiatives currently seek 
improvement. There I argue that they are trapped into the framework of individualisation. A critical 
debate is therefore required, in order to create a common academic, professional and popular awareness 
of the shallowness of the wisdom that underpins the current approach. Indeed, of all role players, the 
academic discussion that I present in this chapter is of most direct relevance to organised informal 
settlement communities themselves. Firstly, they should not be required to accept the official position 
that informal settlement intervention is simply another form of housing delivery, therefore needing to 
replace all signs of popular initiative in settlement formation with a standardised environment consisting 
of freehold tenure, services and an incremental house. Secondly, they should not have to accept the 
dismissal of their ability to lead the process of improvement. Thirdly, the limitations of individual 
freehold titles should be fully understood before households are made to commit themselves to this 
form of tenure. Fourthly, there is no reaSon why the stakes of the private sector in the settlement 
improvement process should be increased, if organised communities have the capacity to undertake 
their own settlement improvement. Likewise, the stakes of the formal retail sector (delivering, for 
instance, the 'white goods') should not replace those of the informal sector, to which livelihoods in 
informal settlements are directly tied. 
While this study does not seek to redress the research biases identified in this chapter, it does to some 
extent address the imbalance in understanding the capacities of community organisations, through four 
case studies in Chapter 7. These explore the experience of community-based organisations currently 
attempting to lead settlement improvement. While this chapter has dealt with the flaws in scholarly 
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positions that underpin the Urban Foundation model, the case studies then bring to the fore the practical 
obstacl~s that have been created thro~gh the institutionalisation of the flawed Urban Foundation model 
into the national framework for infonnal settlement intervention. Of equal importance as the critical 
academic positions that I reviewed in this chapter then are the challenges represented by organised 
informal settlement communities intent on improving their living conditions. 
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Chapter 7. Obstacles to appropriate intervention in South Africa: the P1CI'IIPrlen(~e of current 
people-driven initiatives 
7.1 Introduction 
The effect of the int],ueIltlal Urban "' ... ill"" ... "'" prOJ;IOSi:ll for lnfnTTn~1 settlement intervention is most 
I"Y"l"rll"n,f"l"rI at the level of individual informal settlements. lI;"'lU"''';Y communities 
to secure government commitments for the improvement of living conditions inevitably 
interface with the Foundation model of intervention. In this I examine the interface 
between the standardised intervention four well organised mt,orrnal settlement communities. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the South African informal settlement literature has skewed our 
understanding of community organisations, either discarding their role in development or exposing their 
weakness a bias on violent situations. My m this then is that informal 
settlement or!:anlsatlolns are indeed with relevant for settlement improvement 
Through the case studies, I expose, on the one the distance between that which makes sense from the 
community perspective, and that which is imposed from the level of the national housing 
policy. Thus I examine challenges to the Foundation inspired model of intervention from the level of 
organised communities directly its implications. These those in the 
South African informal settlement literature, in Chapter 6. On the other I expose the 
that the national housing policy, with its household-based entitlement to the capital subsidy, has had on the 
.. u.lJJ" .... ,"5 and within these Due to the direct individual 
household-based lO", •. U,,"UUJ •• OI tend .. a .... ~~1.1".lv work with, rather 
than to oppose, the restrictive framework. I argue, has limited the search for altematives. As a result 
the Urban Foundation inspired framework for informal settlement intervention is effectively challenged 
neither from the level of organised communities, nor through the South African literature which, as shown 
in Chapter 6, remains fragmented and biased. 
In South Africa a number of informal settlements are f'11YTPr.tl being 'upgraded', 1 .... , ... UU15 that a 
development solution is sought on the land that was invaded. In most cases, such settlement communities 
have resisted at relocation, therefore an active role in the nature of the 
government intervention from which they are to This has entailed a range firstly, to 
the de ju.re to the illegally occupied land; secondly, to the formal legal procedure that produces 
eviction to the formal delivery that have favoured orderly relocations; and 
lastly, to the conventional mechanisms ofreso~ce or capital subsidy allocation l . the 
prescriptiveness of the intervention framework that the in such 
settlements are reduced to mere once a commitment is through the 
Provincial Boards which issue the capital subsidies. The settlement committees are then expected 
I This challenge is often interpreted as Jumpmg the , as noted in Chapter 6. 
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to ensure the smooth implementation of an externally designed and standardised solution. The four 
settlements discussed in this chapter are of particular relevance, as their settlement organisations have 
managed to maintain an important role in the intervention, despite the restrictive development framework. 
It is therefore possible to examine their strategies in both challenging and co-operating with the formal 
model of intervention. 
In some of the case study settlements the earlier stages, particularly the resistance to removal, has been 
documented in academic literature or project reports. The recent and current development process in all 
four settlements, however, had to be accessed through in-depth interviewing with key players in the 
settlement organisations, supporting entities, the municipalities and other authorities involved2• Guided 
walks through the settlement allowed for more questions to be raised and issues to be pointed out. Case 
. study drafts reflecting my understanding of the settlement process and the questions it raised were compiled 
for each of the settlements and circulated to the organisations in which I had interviewed3. Feedback has 
been incorporated into the discussion·in this chapter. In many instances, the interviews covered conflictual 
situations. In order to protect the identities of interviewees in relation to such conflict, the approach in this 
chapter has been not to cite individuals, but merely to indicate the perspective from which particular views 
were expressed. 
I introduce the case studies through the processes of settlement formation, turning then in more detail to the 
emergence of people-driven initiatives in the settlements, and the external support on which they have been 
able to draw. Next I review the government intervention programmes to which these initiatives have 
secured access. This then fonus the background for a discussion of the strategies through which the people-
driven initiatives in the four case study settlements have sought to improve their settlements, and have 
engaged with the prescriptive formal development framework. I finally examine the impact that this 
framework, in particular the household-based entitlement to a capital subsidy, has had on the strategies of 
popular initiatives and of those entities 'which seek to support them. This leads me to identify limitations of 
these initiatives in fundamentally challenging the Urban Foundation inspired approach to informal 
settlement intervention. 
2 Settlement visits and interviewing took place in NovemberlDecember 1998. The interviewing was 
conducted in an informal conversational manner, with which the interviewees were most comfortable. 
Many indicated that they would not like the conversation to be tape-recorded, therefore I relied largely 
on hand-written notes taken during the conversations. These were later organised under headings 
broadly reflecting the questions which led the conversation and according to which the interview 
material was then analysed. Depending on the circumstances, interviewing within the settlements was 
conducted partly in groups and partly with individuals. As interviewing was mainly with prominent 
members of community-based organisations, it could be conducted in English and Afrikaans. Where 
residents were interviewed that were not fluent in either of.these languages, other residents volunteered 
for translation. 
3 While government officials tended not to comment and civics responded in broad agreement with my 
interpretation, rigorous critiques were received from the NGD People's Dialogue, clarifying aspects of 
their strategy and thinking that could not be accessed through the interviewing and the existing 
documentation. Each of the organisations in which I had interviewed then received a report on all four 
case studies, with a general discussion of the issues raised (see Huchzermeyer, 1999). 
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7.2 Emergence of the four case study settlements 
and diverse processes have led to the formation of each of the four case study settlements. 
However, two broad categories may be identified. The older Piesang River (Durban) and 
Weilers Farm Johannesburg), date back to the 1960s, and have their origin, not in organised 
1n\raSllons. but in unofficial land agreements on land. Gradual led to subsequent increase in 
settlelme:nt size. In the case ofWeilers Farm, the ofland allowed the settlement to expand at 
low densities, being constructed on well-defined In Piesang River in turn, 
sections of the settlement relatively Wattle-and-daub dwellings are closely 
packed, with no open space or surrounding individual homes. The more recent case study 
set1:lerrlenlts, '-.J1uUi!5Ul'I.1.£,G (Uitenhage) and Kanana (also southern which formed in 1993/94, 
resulted from the org;amsed invasion of unused land within established hnvn(:h1f'<: In these two cases, the 
and densities of SWTOlmamg townships, thus land occupation was modelled on the 
{' .. ",,,ti ... 1>' suitable conditions for in situ upgrading. However (after resistance to eviction orders), the 
I::,U:HI::Jlll.;t; of 'invisible' f''''r! .. ~t,. .. boundaries and servitudes complicated the ""(,,,11,,,, process in both 
cases. I will sketch the f'mlf'''~'f'n,c:f' of each of the four case settlements, to the 
respective cornm.uwty initiatives that led to their Current 
The River settlernellt. near the township 
25km to the north west City Centre 
(and the more recent township of KwaMashu) 
derived its name from the river on the 
the " .......... " ........ _.".1_-'-"'. In the 1960s an unofficial land sale took between an Indian 
vegetable farmer and an African individual who in turn subdivided and allocated land to other African 
households, in return for This was followed by the uncontrolled on 
adjacent portions of land throughout the 1970s, seemingly tolerated by the state. In the early 1980s, as 
demand for housing a new residential trend emerged with so-called 'train houses'. Outsiders 
would commission I.J",." ... "., River residents to build rows of wattle-and-daub rooms, which these absentee 
owners would then rent out. densities with one-roomed units against one 
another. In the mid 1980s an IFp5 leader established control over Piesang River, and is said to have 
convened the first community cleaning and numbered the dwellings. He 
eradicated rent by forcing the owners of train houses to sell the rooms to their While 
such initiative was the residents remember the IFP leader as a war fanatic. Eventually his 
house was burned and he was expelled from .... U":SlITIP' River. The settlement then reverted to its nTf'Vl',II1: 
unl)rg;mi!.ed or anarchic with rent tenancy TI>..l:>.m''''TP'in alongside intense informal business. The fast 
life, 'gamb'lin!!. drinking, stabbing and shooting,' earned the settlement its alternative name 
'Soweto'. The main street is remembered as a strip with various stalls, with people just 
carrying on with life' a 'continuous buzz', attracting many from outside the settlement. A new 
then began with the by the UDF and the formation of civic structures in the late 1980s, 
eve:ntualljl leading to land and the extension of infrastructure into the settlement. 
4 is the Afrikaans word for Banana - the river is said to have once been lined with Banana 
trees. 
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The Weilers Farm settlement derives its name from the farm on which it located, 30 Ian south ofthe 
Johannesburg city centre and 15 Ian south ofSowet06 (see Figure 10). In this case the farm owners 
(the Weiler brothers) had consented to 'illegal African tenants' living on their farm since the 1960s 
(Crankshaw, 1993:41). In 1985, the then landowner, an elderly Mr. Weiler, abandoned the farm, permitting 
the 300 residents to remain living on the land (Black Sash, 1989:S4). With the subsequent lack of control, 
settlement on the land multiplied7• Weilers Fann and similar uncontrolled settlements in the area grew in 
the second half of the 1980s, flrst attracting redundant farm workers from the area, and subsequently 
residents from troubled and overcrowded townships (Crankshaw, 1993:43). In the decision to move from 
townships to Weilers Farm, the disadvantage of the remote location is said to have been outweighed by the 
prospect of a peaceful and free-of-charge family tifes. By 1987, about 13 000 people had established 
themselves at Weilers Farm (Budlender, 1990:67). A settlement leadership is said to have guided the 
settlement expansion. Its early responses to demands for social development are discussed below. 
The more recent Gunguluza settlement derives its name from the highly respected Mrs. Gunguluza9, one of 
three elderly people who in 1993 led the invasion and guided the expansion of the informal settlement. 
Gunguluza is located within a band of informal settlement that surrounds the township ofKwaNobuhle lO, 
9 km to the south ofUitenhage town centre ll (see Figure 11). The land invaded by Mrs. Gunguluza and 
5 Inkatha Freedom Party - see footnote 18 in Chapter 5. 
6 With the current capital subsidy intervention, the settlement is being renamed 'Kanana Park'. In order 
to avoid confusion with the other case study settlement named Kanana, I make use of the name 'Weilers 
Farm' throughout this chapter. 
7 The emergence of uncontrolled squatting in the district appears both to have been influenced by, and 
to have impacted on, the agricultural trends in the district. On the one hand, farming activities in the 
region were disrupted by the rezoning and expropriation offarmland for the establishment of Coloured 
and Indian townships since the early 1970s (Crankshaw, 1993). With the cessation of agricultural 
activities, previous farm workers were displaced, while expropriated farms that were left unsupervised 
became subject to land invasion (ibid.). On the other hand, the abandoning offarms still zoned for 
agricultural land use, as in the case ofWeilers Farm, was itself a reaction to the growing fear of crime 
in the area, conservatively associated with the phenomenon of squatting. According to an official 
document, farming in the area had virtually ceased by the mid 1990s, with 77% of the landowners 
having abandoned their land due to crime (Department of Development Planning and Environment, 
1995:7). 
8 In townships, backyard shack tenants were expected to pay rents to occupants of township houses 
who themselves were boycotting rents charged by the council. Single-sex hostels (where occupants 
were increasingly joined by women and children) were in tum wrought with faction flghting and 
violence. 
9 The fact that contemporary informal settlements in KwaNobuhle were named after prominent flgures 
of the liberation struggle - Ramaphosa (120 households), Chris Hani (87 households), Joe Modise (130 
households) (Uitenhage Town Secretary, 1995) - indicates the respect Mrs. Gunguluza was afforded. 
10 'Squatting' flrst emerged in K waNobuhle in 1991, when the township is said to have been visibly 
bursting at its seems. There was then a general understanding within the municipality that the 'squatters' 
were not newcomers to the town. While merciless removals, from the 1940s township Langa (an ANC 
stronghold adjacent to the 'white' town), to KwaNobuhle township had led to the Uitenhage massacre in 
1986, the official position in the early 1990s was one of tolerance. What has remained to date is a high 
level of political consciousness among the KwaNobuhle residents, and with this a solidarity between 
those formally housed and those invading land. Informal settlement residents make undisputed use of 
taps and toilets in surrounding serviced areas. 
II Uitenhage is an industrial town of approximately 300 000 people near Port Elizabeth in the Eastern 
Cape. 
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others was earmarked for private sector delivery of higher income African housing, in accordance with the 
official thinking of the late 1980s. This was to act as a buffer between the impoverished township and the 
nearby 'white' farms 12. Erven had been pegged in accordance with this plan. The up market development 
did not materialise, the unused land instead attracting criminal elements, as argued later by Mrs. 
Gunguluza, who maintained that the invasion was motivated in part by the need to restore safety to the area. 
Unaware of the demarcated erven, Mrs. Gunguluza with others invaded the section closest to the existing 
township, consciously mirroring the official township pattern, and thereby not deviating substantially from 
the officially planned and pegged layout13. The issuing of eviction notices, despite a policy 'not to evict as 
such', was threatening enough for Mrs. Gunguluza to seek support from the Uitenhage branch of SAN CO 
(South African National Civic Organisation), and for a joining of forces with other informal settlement 
communities through the formation of a 'Squatter Committee' (with representation from the SAN CO 
branch). At that time, 50 shacks are said to have been constructed at Gunguluza, while several other 
settlements had emerged in KwaNobuhle. 
The fourth case study settlement, Kanana 14 was formed in 1994, although planning for the invasion had 
begun as early as 1991. The People's Dialogue (1997) documentation of the settlement process describes 
how dissatisfaction of the backyard shack residents l5 in the Sebokeng township (45 km south of 
Johannesburg, 15 km north of the industrial towns ofVereniging and Vanderbijlpark - see Figure 12) in the 
early 1990s led to the formation of a committee, which planned the invasion of a vacant portion of land in 
the township. As in the case of Gunguluza, residents recall that the vacant land harboured criminals and 
was dangerous to cross. The civic leadership in Sebokeng, however, discouraged the invasion, suggesting 
instead that the committee join the civic structure, whose leadership would then negotiate for the land. By 
early 1994, the land was not secured. The committee then dissolved itself from the civic structure l6, and 
proceeded to plan for the invasion to occur a few days prior to the frrst national democratic elections. As 
one interviewee stated, they were wanting 'to vote with something in our hand' 17. The organisers of the 
Kanana invasion measured surrounding township layouts, and on this they based the informal demarcation 
and free-of-charge allocation of I 500 sites to which backyard tenants relocated their shacks. 
12 Although a strip of market garden had already been established as a buffer beyond the township. 
13 The portions closer to the farmland were invaded in subsequent years and are officially referred to as 
Gunguluza Phase 2 and 3. 
14 From the biblical 'Canaan', a name given to many informal settlements in South Africa. 
IS Though having supported the protest action that led to the boycotting of rents for council houses, 
these subtenants were still being charged rent by the formal council tenants in whose yards they had 
constructed shacks and were living under severely overcrowded conditions. 
16 This was by then affiliated to SANCO. 
17 Such boldness was widespread and is reflected in the names of other informal settlements that sprung 
up in the surrounding, the most explicit being 'Election Park'. 
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Figure 12. Location of Kanana (Southern 
Johannesburg). 
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7.3 Forms of community organisation in informal settlements in South Africa 
In order to introduce the community organisations in the four case study settlements, and the support 
initiatives which they have been able to tap, this section briefly contrasts the two broad types of community 
organisation committed to informal settlement improvement in South Africa. They are, on the one hand, the 
democratically elected representative committees, usually referred to as 'civic' organisations, and on the 
other hand, the membership-based H~meless People's Federation structures lS• This section supplements the 
discussion, in Chapter 5, of the emergence of these two forms of organisation in relation to the socio-
political process in South Africa. 
Representative strnctures: civic organisations or committees 
By virtue of the representative approach, civic organisations or committees cover the entire settlement 
population, even where contesting organisations emerge, usually with opposing political affiliations. 
Through the civic structures, settlements are sub-divided into sections or blocks, each with an elected 
committee. Representatives of each of these committees make up the settlement committee or civic 
organisation. The committees at block or section level deal with day-to-day concerns within their area, 
while broader concerns are brought to the settlement committee, which in turn may tap into regional and 
national structures. As mentioned in Chapter 5, civic structures were set up in informal settlements through 
the UDF (United Democratic Front) in the 1980s, as it expanded from core townships into the more 
marginal urban areas. With the disbanding of the UDF (and the unbanning of the ANC and SACP) in the 
early 1990s, the civic movement created its own umbrella structure, SANCO (the South African National 
Civic Organisation). However, alternative umbrella bodies exist, as do independent civic organisations or 
committees. It may be noted here that although SANCO has aligned itselfto the ANC since the run-up to 
the 1994 elections, SANCO-aligned civic organisations are not official party structures. While the four case 
study settlements do not all have a SANCO-aligned civic organisation, they all happen to be bases of strong 
ANC support. In each of the settlements, the development-oriented community organisations (be they 
representative committees or Homeless People's Federation structures) are supplemented by local ANC 
structures such as women's leagues, men's leagues and youth leagues 19. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the civic movement, as from the mid 1980s, received support from the 
development NGOs that later constituted themselves into the Urban Sector Network. In the early 1990s, 
these NGOs were instrumental in assisting civic organisations secure government funding for development. 
I have argued in Chapter 5 that the requirements attached to such development funding, and the niche that 
these NGOs found as project managers, led to externally designed, individualised development as promoted 
through the Urban Foundation modeL In the Piesang River case, as shown later in this chapter, tensions 
arose around this imposed development approach, particularly once the radical thinking of the People's 
DialoguelHomeless People's Federation initiative encouraged the exploration of alternatives. 
18 The phenomenon ofshacklordism or exploitative non-democratic leadership, which in the South 
African literature discussed in Chapter 6 is assumed to be widespread in informal settlements, was not 
investigated for the purposes of this chapter. 
19 Since the early 1990s the ANC had built its own organisational network oflocal branches as a 
structure for mass-based support (Orner-Cooper, 1994:243). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
182 
Membership-based structures.· the Homeless People's Federation 
In contrast to the representative structure of the civic organisations, the Homeless People's Federation 
operates on active membership based on daily saving20 . Savings groups, consisting mainly of women, 
deposit their daily savings with Federation bookkeepers on a weekly basis. The group structures have 
various functions. Similar to the sectionlblock or street committees of the civic movement, though with a 
higher degree of active participation, weekly group meetings allow space for the discussion and resolution 
of day-to-day concerns, and the discussion of development issues. Beyond this, the daily door-to-door 
collection of savings by the group treasurer, always a woman, gives this person insight into the home 
circumstances of the group members. When individual households experience financial crisis (reflected in 
their not being able to make daily contributions) solutions are sought in the weekly group meetings. 
Emergency credit for income generation is considered in these meetings, provided the member has actively 
participated in the group and has a sound understanding of the Federation philosophy. 
Here it must be stressed that the activity of saving through the Federation is not one of accumulating 
individual capital, to be accessed at a later stage. Instead, the daily contributions go towards building an 
independent collective fund, which ensures Federation members continual access to low interest credit. 
Repayment of credit, together with daily saving, is supervised by the group bookkeeper. Separate credit 
mechanisms exist for emergency loans, small business loans (see Figure 13), and house-building loans. The 
savings activities are supported by the nation-wide Federation structures and the supporting NGO People's 
Dialogue. Learning between various Federation settlements is encouraged through exchanges. Where 
deemed particularly relevant, international exchanges with equivalent Federations (for instance in India) are 
funded through the internationally supported NGO People's Dialogue. It is through the networking and 
learning between settlements, therefore the breaking of isolation, that alternatives are promoted and a 
significant popular challenge may be posed to aspects of the Urban Foundation model. 
Figure 13. Local 'tuck shop' at Piesang River financed 
through a small business loan of the Homeless People's 
Federation. 
20 This distinction was made explicit in an interview with the then BESG staff member and project 
leader at Piesang River, where the divergence between these two forms of organisation had particular 
implications for BESG's involvement in the project. 
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The n.vo case study settlements with Federation structures (Piesang River and .<'>-"llal:!") were recommended 
to me the NGO People's Dialogue for the purposes of this due to their level of Federation 
even in these settlements not all households decide to in daily 
playing an important role in ShapiI1lg velooment. can therefore not claim full 
reI1lre!leI1ltatlvene:ss of the informal settlement21 . As will be evident in the case study discussion to which I 
now tum, this Federation structures in a difficult reliiU]()ru>rnp to IU1"f'T1nmf'nt programmes that seek to 
interact with U",,"",,"""Q'J communities via reT)re:seI1ltatlVe structures. 
7.4 The case study settlements: People..driven initiatives and their external support 
By tracing the emergence of the various forms of community organisation in the case study """U'""""""". my 
intention is to illustrate that such V'f,"""'"'''''"''' undergoes change. This bears on the effectiveness of the 
community organisation's veloplmenL' __ '~""J thus increasing or its to lead the 
development process. From the case discussion that follows, it appears that such is 
in part by the development process, and in by the form of organisation and the it is able to 
secure. The discussion in this section then forms the background for the later into the for 
settlement improvement, and the to which these have been shaped knowledge of the formal 
veloplment framework, and in particular the individual entitlement. 
l-'!I>~I1""U River: from civic organisation with NGO x.nlTlrJjrt to Homeless People's Federation/Peoples 
JlI1U'IG'IJP alliance 
Of the four case the most complex process DeC)'DU:-OlrlV!:ll initiative and support has been that at 
River. Related to this, has been a drawn-out process of formal development commencing in the 
and still at the time of interviewing late in 1998. In relation to the development 
in the form COlmD1Urlity organisation has stn~n~~nc~ne~ct individual process, 
residents to while WCj~.II..CUUJle; their collective ability to resolve the infrastructure 1"1",lll""'''' 
and site allocation recluilred the official framework. The later discussion 
River clarifies many of the ;:'C~;"1Jl");; contradictions reflected in the cnatngc~s in community V'E',"U''''''''''V''' 
In the early I 990s the civic org:alllisatlon was the NGO BESG in its endeavour to secure 
gmrenrunent funding for development. Once this .... JlUUI~ was obtained, the NGO was appOinted as 
manager, therefore changing its position in relation to the civic organisation22 • A new entity was 
introduced in the form of a development trust, intended as the vehicle through which the cornmumty was to 
drive the development process23• As the civic ofl,!aI1l1SBltlO:n at the time did not to have the capacity to drive 
the development itself, the trust was created as a body, though placed under the civic's control 
.4AV,"60"""" its various committees. The civic organisation then had the important role of linking the 
21 This is different in cases where the Federation has secured vacant land and enables its active 
members from various areas to and construct a new settlement. 
22 As the NGO was henceforth remunerated through the emphasis was 
on its this causing an increased distance to the civic ~.<,u .... ~_ 
The trust was to hold the ownership of the land until of individual freehold and to 
control the ae'{elJoprne!u ".lU,uUJ~. 
a. 
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development project, through the area-based block structures, with the community. With the election of 
trustees, disunity within the community leadership came to the fore. As from 1991, the People's Dialogue 
for Land and Shelter (later constituted into the Homeless People's Federation and its supporting NGO 
People's Dialogue) emerged in Piesang River, with a prominent civic leader becoming an important player 
in the Federation. BESG's perception then was that separate 'power bases' were constituted around the civic, 
the trust and the Homeless People's Federation. 
While the approach to which BESG was contractually tied relied on a unified civic organisation that could 
pull through the agreements made at acceptance of the development funding, the reality in Piesang River 
was increasingly a divided one. Under such circumstances, BESG was indirectly required to drive the 
development. While the emerging Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue initiative had the 
intention of strengthening the existing development process, a radically opposed development thinking 
emerged, partly through exchange programmes with India. The new approach sought to built on residents' 
own abilities in planning, surveying and construction. With increasing contestation of the formal 
development project's approach in 1995, BESG found it appropriate to withdraw. While 80% of the 
engineering works had by then been completed (thereby legally enabling the project managers to withdraw) 
official site allocation, dedensification, relocation and issuing of individual freehold titles was outstanding. 
The civic organisation and the trust subsequently collapsed, and the Homeless People's Federation emerged 
as the main organisation in Piesang River, its membership currently estimated between 75 and 90 per cent 
of the 1 600 households. 
The Homeless People's Federation then did not prioritise the completion of the original project, to which 
formal development funding had been allocated through the original project. Instead, it prioritised the 
construction of individual houses of its members. The former leadership divide re-constituted itself in the 
arena of house construction, as a separate NGO, Habitat for Humanity24, established itself in the settlement, 
offering loan funding for house construction25 . In the denser sections of the settlement, formally pegged 
sites remained occupied by more than one household (see Figures 14 and 15). As a result, Federation and 
Habitat houses (see Figures 16 and 17) could only be constructed where respective member households 
occupied an entire site or could claim formal occupancy despite others sharing the site. 
24 Habitat for Humanity is an ecumenical self-help organisation based in the United States and 
operating on conventional principles ofloan finance. The organisation offers an interest-free housing 
loan, though adjusted to inflation (BESG, 1998:28). The 47 creditworthy participants in the settlement 
to date are unable to access government housing subsidies, as their loans are from an international fund. 
Antagonisms exist, as the Federation members are able to access capital subsidies through the uTshani 
Loan agreement. 
25 At the time of interviewing, communication between the two housing initiatives had not taken place 
for several years. 
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Figure 14+ 15. High residential dens ities at Piesang River, with multiple occupancy of the formally. 
pegged sites. 
Figure 16. Formal housing constructed through the 
Homeless People's Federation at Piesang River. 
Figure 17.Formal housing constructed through 
Habitat for Humanity at Piesang River. 
While the Federation is clearly more visible and influential in Piesang River than Habitat for Humanity, 
neither organisation can claim representativeness of the entire settlement population. It was the ward 
councillor, the official representative of Piesang River and surrounding township areas, that then 
endeavoured to arrange for the formal completion of infrastructure and site allocation, as foreseen by the 
original BESG project. In the continuing absence of any single structure able to represent the entire 
settlement in the completion of the abandoned project, the local authority (through a development 
consultant) eventually arranged the election of a representative development conunittee for the duration of 
the project. At the time of interviewing, a site allocation conunittee had been elected to resolve the 
politically sensitive and socially disruptive question as to which households were to be affected by 
relocations to distant sites. No doubt this process will have further eroded social cohesion at Piesang River. 
Weilers Farm: civic organisation securing pragmatic support 
The Weilers Fann case contrasts in many respects with that of Piesang River. At Weilers Farm, a 
representative community organisation has consistently improved its capacity to lead a fonnal development 
processes. When it finally secured a development conunitment from the provincial authority, all aspects of 
the fonnal development process were placed in its hands. With consistent support, the civic organisation 
has then steered formal development within the confines of the capital subsidy development framework, 
while also considering the tasks that lie beyond. 
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Conununity representation at Weilers Farm emerged in the mid 1980s when the farm had been abandoned 
by its owner. An 'informal committee' established itself (Budlender, 1990:77), and with the assistance of the 
Legal Resources Centre succeeded in confronting the eviction tactics of the Provincial Administration. The 
result was a sympathetic court ruling, the expropriation of the land from Mr. Weiler and the affording of 
transit camp status to the settlement in 1987. Transit camp regulations required the constitution ofa 'formal 
committee' with the purpose of representing 'the residents in dealings with the officials' (ibid.:77). The 
'informal committee' then took over this function, therefore co-operating in the strict official control over 
the settlement, in the introduction of a monthly service charge, and in the planned relocation of households 
to Orange Farm 8km to the South (Mashabela, 1990). Resistance to the imposition ofa service charge (in 
the absence of service delivery) led to the formation of a rival organisation, the 'Masakhane Association' 
(Mashabela, 1990). In order to cover up its support for the then banned ANC, this organisation presented 
itself to officials as a funeral association. While various tactics (including beatings) coerced about 1 000 
households to relocate to Orange Farm, new arrivals filled their space, the majority intent on remaining at 
Weilers Farm. The original committee leadership appears to have relocated to Orange Farm, whereas the 
Masakhane Association leadership remained in Weilers Farm, reconstituting into a civic structure (later 
affiliated to SANCO). Legal ANC structures were established with the unbanning ofthe party. Official 
plans for relocation remained beyond the 1994 elections. 
Not supported by an Urban Sector NGO, the Weilers Farm civic organisation independently created a 
Development Team, in order to seek ways of formalising the settlement. In the hope of support from 
influential ANC personalities in the wake of the 1994 elections, the civic leadership eventually made 
contact with a sympathetic businessman working at the ANC's headquarters in Johannesburg. Under his 
guidance, the civic organisation interfaced successfully with government structures, and in 1995 secured an 
approval, 'in principle', for 'upgrading' (Gauteng Provincial Government, 1998). While lack of will on the 
side of the local authority delayed further development decisions, the Weilers Farm civic organisation 
improved its own capacity to lead the development. In 1996 the Development Team was re-established as 
the Weilers Farm Planning Team, with a formal constitution (Rand Afrikaans University, 1997:3). Its 
structure of accountability is to the 'section committee' of the civic organisation, which consists of the 
elected heads of each of the ten settlement sections. Its objectives are the upliftrnent of the conununity 
through 'housing, development, job creation and training, education, health, sport and recreation, and safety 
and security' (ibid.). For the fulfilment of the housing and development objective it then registered a non-
profit organisation, the Thuthuka26 Foundation. Subscribers of the Foundation are the section heads of the 
civic organisation. Its two directors are a long standing conununity leader (and former voluntary teacher) 
and, by invitation from the conununity, the acquainted businessman. By this time, a trusting relationship 
had evolved between the civic organisation and the businessman, who had consistently committed time and 
resources to the support of the civic organisation and its structures. In contrast with the fragmented 
organisational situation at Piesang River, which required a development committee to be set up by the 
authorities, the Weilers Farm civic organisation, through its Thuthuka Foundation, is in a position to drive 
infrastructure and housing development. 
26 Meaning 'Let's Improve'. 
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representative committee supported by broader civic structures 
Less complex then is the organisational context in the two more recent case study settlements. In the case of 
Gunguluza, I on the context as this has enabled a relatively consistent involvement by 
the settlement galllSlltiCID in the formal development process. The Gunguluza settlement is organised 
a representative structure, with a committee consisting of elected heads of each of the five 
settlement sections. a civic the structure itself simply a has 
chosen to remain from the broader civic of SANCO in K waNobuhle. Nevertheless, 
the SANCO local structure has played an role in and guiding the 
uung\lllli~a committee in the process. In the to mid 19905, this SANCO structure, with 
its various branches was supported by the Urban Sector Network the Urban Services Group, 
based in Port Elizabeth. In the context of a non-functioning 'black local authority' for the 
SANCO structure, with its NGO came to a role in the of the township. 
The SANCO structure's 
'development where the 
In accordance with this policy 
on informal settlement was to oppose IOcanon, advocating instead 
, This was with a call for a -ne'OOlle-CIIl';'en- aot)ro:ach to 
SANCO then initiated the formalisation of the various land 
invasions in v ... ~-...r~ ..... "" 1.l!I.,IUU1Ug that of In the surveying and record of this 
process, Mrs. ..... '1, ............. recalls having worked closely with the staff of the NGO Urban Services 
However, once the 'white' and 'black' town councils were amalgamated into one Transitional 
Local the involvement of the NGO in KwaNobuhle appears to have been at odds with 
elected councillors. For the its involvement came to a 'traumatic' whereas to the 'UUllg'u"""" 
committee it seemed ",-'u,,,,u,,, that since local it has been w(],rKJmg !.AlA'"",.", the ward 
councillor and no through the NGO. In the local governance context the SANCO 
structure has maintained a position as of civil and independent 
of It regularly interacts with the Town Council at ward level as well as at the level 
of full counciL Uniquely, too, the official co-ordinator at the Town Council carries the housing-
related portfolio at the Uitenhage local structure of SANCO. A support for people-driven 
development ... .u."""'H5 is therefore reflected in the current of the municipality. It is the supportive 
apl)ro:!Ch of the local and the SANCO structures that have enabled the Gunguluza committee 
work in dose co-operation with the official structures. 
Kanana: reseniWtirve committee and Homeless People's F ederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance 
In the case the insensitive formal de1{elc)prnerlt procedure a process of organisational 
"'11""1';'" As a result, a committed community oIllanlsatiOlll, which boldly planned and the invasion 
and resolved eviction has lost its to drive the vel,oprnerlt which it had itself initiated. Of 
the four case settlements, Kanana has posed the most comprehensive to the formal 
development framework. While I return to the particular of the Kanana leadership later in this 
it is important to note here that this challenge was not tenable. As a result of the individual capital 
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subsidy entitlement and associated framework of development, support for the settlement leadership, its 
organisational srructures and its challenging strategies was eroded. 
From the oulset, the Kanana se«lement was organised through an Independent People's Corrunittee, 
essentially an independent civic organisation. This representative structure has worked closely with the 
membership-based structures of the Homeless People's Federation. While the Federation, with support from 
the NGO People's Dialogue, was instrumental in securing a development commitment for the Kanana 
settlement, it was not able to drive the development process. A divide emerged in the settlement as newly 
elected ward councillors supported the conventional development approach, which was being challenged by 
the Federation. The Independent People's Corrunittee split, and the membership of the Federation 
decreased, as the ward councillors were seen to be drawing supporters away (People's Dialogue, 1997). The 
Federation, challenging the official procedures for intervention, was in turn seen to be causing delays in the 
development. The se«lement divide constituted itself geographically, the split occurring along a power line 
that happened to run through the invaded land. Separate 'Independent People's Corruni«ees' and ANC 
structures exist in the two areas, while Federation membership concentrates in tbe section referred to as 
'Phase 2' of the development. It was in Phase 2, that I conducted interviews with the Federation and 
Independent People's Corrunittee leadership. 
7.S Government intervention programmes in the case study settlements 
Imposing individualisation: informal settlement intervention as a/arm a/housing delivery 
All four case study settlements (at the time of interviewing) were undergoing individualised 
development through the capital subsidies of the National Housing Ministry. The individual subsidies 
are released through the Provincial Housing Boards, whieh crosscheck the eligibility of each individual 
household against a national database. It is thereby ensured that applicants have not previously 
benefited from housing subsidies. In most cases, local authorities are expected to make a project-based 
application On behalf of informal settlement residents, who are then required to individually supply the 
household-based information on which the subsidy allocation is based. Excluded are those with 
household heads that are either not South African citizens, have no dependants, earn above a certain 
amount, Or who themselves or their legal spouses have previously benefited from a government 
subsidy. Such households then are required to either buy into the project, or to move elsewhere. As it is 
impractical to base an intervention in an existing community on such grounds, officials in the case 
study projects had attempted to accommodate non-qualifying households. 'We arrange for them to 
adopt a child,' was the response to situations where, for instance, elderly widows did not qualify as their 
children had formed their own households and might be applying themselves for housing subsidies. 
In accordance with the Urban Foundation model, infonnal settlement intervention then is treated by the 
'v\... "'"'-. \..... \.......,roo,., "'~ • 
subsidy framework as a conventional housing project, as though development were to take place in a 
greenfield situation. Indeed then intervention in all four case studies, though officially referred to as 
'upgrading', has resulted in the imposition of standardised conventional town planning layouts on the 
infonnal settlement pattern. In the case of Gunguluza and Kanana, the orderliness of the infonnal 
layout (consciously modelled on the surrounding townships) allowed for relatively little disruptlOn 
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(see Figures 18, 19 for Gunguluza and 20, 21 for Kanana), although some households were required to 
'shift' their shacks to ensure straight boundary lines. Project engineers explained the connection 
between the capital subsidy framework and their insistence on straight boundary lines. Due to the 
individual entitlement to a 'housing subsidy' of which a portion goes towards collective infrastructure, 
residents and politicians were requesting that the infrastructure expenditure from the subsidy be 
minimised, so as to maximise expenditure on the house or 'top structure'. Infrastructure costs could be 
saved by minimising curves in the underground reticulation of water mains and sewers. In this 
calculation, shack-shifting or relocation is not considered a cost factor. 
Figure 18. Gunguluza: orderliness of the 
original invasion (source: Russel Alison). 
Figure 20. Kanana: layout of the original 
invasion resembling an 'engineer's sketch' 
(source: Urban Dynamics). 
Figure 19.Gunguluza: the fonnal standardised 
layout (source: Uitenhage Municipality). 
Figure 21. Kanana: formal layout design, as 
submitted to the Provincial Housing Board 
(source: LekoalVaal Transitional Metropolitan 
CouncillUrban Dynamics). 
-
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In the case of Kanana, it was only through the insistence of the community leadership that the local 
authority eventually recognised the orderliness of the informal layout. In its application to the 
Provincial Housing Board, the municipality proposed a layout that takes no consideration whatsoever 
of the existing settlement structure (see Figure 21). Only after an aerial photograph proved to the 
engineers that the settlement was designed as ifby an 'engineer's sketch' (see Figure 20), was the layout 
revised (see Figure 22). In the case of Pie sang River, steep slopes and high residential densities (see 
figure 23) required some deviation from conventional layouts, many of the pegged erven being 
accessible only by pedestrian walkways (see Figure 24). The densest section is handled through the 
conventional 'roll-over' procedure, whereby all dwellings are removed and a conventional layout is 
constructed. This then is the approach at Weilers Farm where the informally established plot sizes are 
larger than the 300ml maximum stipulated in the capital subsidy regulations, requiring a complete 
remodelling of the settlement into a standardised plot layout (see Figures 25 and 26). 
Figure 23. Piesang River: high residential 
densities on a steep slope. Formally planned 
in situ layout as pegged (source: BESGI 
Pravin Amar Development Planners). 
Figure 25. Weilers Farm: informal layout 
with plot sizes larger than 300m2 (source: 
EVN Consulting Engineers). 
Figure 24. Pedestrian access to formally 
pegged sites at Piesang River. 
Figure 26. Weilers Farm: planned layout with 
standardised plot sizes within the pennissible 
300m2 (source: EVN Consulting Engineers). 
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Within the Gauteng Provincial Government, an 'Infonnal Settlement Upgrading Programme' has been 
articulated. This, however, does not entail any deviation from the subsidy procedure. The programme 
merely redresses the bias in the Gauteng Province towards large scale greenfield development by 
ensuring that some provincial housing subsidies are channelled into the development of land already 
infonnally occupied. The Weilers Farm development forms one of its eleven pilot projects. Uniquely, 
however, the Weilers Farm project application was not undertaken by the respective municipality. Due 
to lack of action on the side of the local authority, the Thuthuka Foundation applied directly to the 
provincial government, and was then appointed developer in the subsidy project. The remarkable pace, 
at which the Weilers Farm project has progressed, has caused much surprise to the provincial officials, 
who therefore recommended it to me for the purposes of this research. 
Portioning the capital subsidy investment: collective versus individual assets 
The individual capital subsidy is required to cover the three components of township 
establishment/land regularisation, infrastructure delivery and house construction. In the case of the 
Weilers Farm development, the authorities have made an up-front decision as to the portioning of the 
capital subsidy into the three components. In the case of Kanan a, also in the Gauteng Province, this 
decision was made by the local authority through its external project design for the subsidy application. 
The community organisation at Kanana then strongly contested the portioning, and achieved a review 
in favour of greater spending on the individual house. In the case of Gunguluza, the Uitenhage 
Municipality set minimum standards for infrastructure, beyond which it allowed the residents to 
collectively weigh off higher levels of collective infrastructure against greater investment in the 
individual houses. As in the case of Kanan a, the residents' decision was to maximise on the individual 
house. Below I return to the widespread quest for maximum house size, arguing that this reflects a 
major impact of the current intervention paradigm on the collective development strategies ofinfonnal 
settlement residents. 
Piesang River is the only case study settlement that benefited from infrastructure development prior to 
the national housing policy and its subsidy system. Initial funding for Piesang River was secured in the 
early 1990s from the DFR-Forum27 • This was in the form of a grant, in contrast to the individual capital 
subsidies released by the IDT at the time. The DFR-Forum grant funding then appeared to be more 
flexible than the household-based subsidy funding offered by the IDT. Indeed, an earlier application for 
upgrading at Piesang River had been turned down by the IDT, which required the identification of 
additional land for the de-densification of the settlement. The DFR-Forum in turn approved of the 
project application without such additional land being identified28 . However, in effect the DFR-Forum 
grant did not have particular benefits over IDT funding at the time. Unlike the flexible grant that 
allowed the early stages of the Besters Camp development to explore collective social facilities and 
27 The DFR (Durban Functional Region)-Forum was a transitional non-statutory body that was given 
authority over the development capital of the Durban City Council, as the legitimacy of the latter had 
been challenged by the civic movement. 
28 Arguably, this caused problems at a later stage, as the project design did rely on a degree of de-
densification and relocations. At the time of interviewing in 1998 this was yet to be resolved. 
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social development programmes (as discussed in Chapter 6), the DFR-Forum grant was strictly 
assigned to the delivery of tenure, infrastructure and services, including individual toilet structures, as 
was the standard applying to IDT-funded projects at the time. According to the BESG project staff, the 
Piesang River residents rejected this principle, requesting houses rather than toilets. However, the civic 
organisation's acceptance of the funding is said to have been in full understanding of the anached 
conditions. 
Intervention procedures: space for community-based approaches? 
Infrastructure delivery through the capital subsidy in all four case studies was undertaken through 
conventional tender procedures and outside contractors, although residents were employed as 
temporary labourers by the contractors. Only the Uitenhage Town Council was exploring a concept of 
community-based contracting for infrastructure delivery. In the case of Gunguluza, community-based 
contractors had been trained and given the opportunity to tender in the reticulation of electricity in the 
senlement. It must be added, however, that electricity reticulation is funded through a separate grant, 
therefore not fonning a comporient of the capital subsidy of the National Housing Ministry. It should 
further be pointed out, that the approach was one that ensured that community-based contractors could 
compete in a conventional contract procedure. Therefore, it was unlike the community contracting 
system in Sri Lanka discussed in Chapter 3, where the contracting procedure was specifically tailored 
to the realities of community-based initiatives. 
Within the capital subsidy, it is the house-building component that may currently be implemented 
through community-based approaches. In Uitenhage, the Town Council is strongly opposed to 
developer-driven mass-delivery of housing, instead favouring the People's Housing Process of the 
National Ministry of Housing29 Strong support for this position comes from the SANCO structures in 
Uitenhage (and to a lesser degree from individual councillors). In the Gunguluza senlement then a 
Housing Support Centre (see Figure 27) had been constructed through a grant from the People's 
Housing Process. Households were required to 'shift' their shacks to the back of their plots and to then 
build a fonnal house (either through self-construction or the employment of local builders) in the centre 
of the plot, according to approved building plans. The intention of the town council was to not tolerate 
infonnal building at Gunguluza, once all households had participated in the People's Housing Process. 
In reality, however, shacks at the back of the plots were not being demolished once fonnal houses were 
complete. It was suggested that extended family or second households were establishing themselves in 
these structures. Thus, while the town council had gone to great lengths to support a people-centred 
housing process, the conventional regulatory framework had not been adjusted. Again, this contrasts 
with the Sri Lankan experience discussed in Chapter 3, where the People's Housing Process is 
embedded in a responsive regulatory framework. 
29 As discussed in Chapter 3, this approach was modelled on the Sri Lankan People's Housing Process, 
but is confined the capital subsidy framework. 
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Figure 27. The Gunguluza committee with the municipal 
housing co-ordinator, at the Housing Support Centre 
In the case of Piesang River, residents were eligible for the housing component of the capital subsidy, 
as the DFR-Forum grant had covered only the components ofland and infrastructure. Homeless 
People's Federation members were able to access this portion of the individual subsidy through the 
uTshani Fund agreement, which the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government has entered into with the 
Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance. Through this agreement, the Provincial 
Housing Board pays the eligible members' capital subsidy amount into the Federation's fund, allowing 
the Federation to oversee its implementation. At Piesang River and surrounding areas, such building 
was overseen through the Federation's BIT-Centre30 (see Figure 28). At Kanana, likewise the locale of 
a regional BIT-Centre of the Federation (see Figure 29), individual residents had taken out housing 
loans from the Federation's collective savings fund. In the absence of an uTshani Fund agreement with 
the Gauteng Province, subsequent house construction was to take place through the People's Housing 
Process, to which the local authority (at the time of interviewing) had recently conunitted itself. At 
Weilers Farm, Thuthuka Foundation was considering various housing options including the People's 
Housing Process, and at the time of interviewing, it had not taken a decision. 
Figure 28. Savings and building activities at the 
Homeless People's Federation BIT-Centre at 
Piesang River. 
. ; .. 
Figure 29. The leadership of Kanan a Phase 2, 
at the Homeless People's Federation BIT-Centre. 
30 Building, Information and Training Centre - at the time of interviewing, the Federation was operating 
seven BIT-Centres in South Africa, each serving as a regional place of learning and administration. 
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7.6 Popular strategies for settlement improvement 
Each of the four organised infonnal settlement conununities in the case srudies developed unique 
strategies for the improvement of living conditions. In some cases, initial strategies were articulated in 
the ignorance of a formal development framework, and not necessarily with the expectation of 
govenunent support. In other cases, creative strategies were applied in order to access fonnal 
development. In all instances, conununity-based strategies have adjusted once the official development 
framework and its dictates became a reality. In all four case srudies, the choice then has been to work 
within the prescribed approach, although conununity organisations have, to a varying extent, assel1ed 
their own development concepts. It is in the next section, that I then examine the particular impact of 
the individual capital subsidy entitlement, and the associated development framework, on the strategies 
of the conununity organisations. 
Weilers Farm - a pragmatic pursuit of social and physical development 
Turning first to those popular strategies that emerged without direct expectation of govemment 
assistance, I begin with the earlier stages of the Weilers Fann settlement, after the abandoning of the 
land by its owner. With regards to infrastructure, the leadership had arranged a water supply system, 
using the fann boreholes31 (Black Sash, 1989:S5). Despite transit camp starus and pending relocation to 
Orange Fann, it appears that the vision of the leadership was focused on social development at Weilers 
Farm. In 1987 a pre-school was established, catering for 150 children, and in 1988 a primary school, at 
one stage catering for over 900 pupils (Mashabela, 1990:36). The primary school was operating from a 
prefabricated building secured through an educational NGO, and a clinic was arranged to operate from 
the fonner farmhouse. The govenunent tactics to coerce residents to relocate then included the removal 
of the prefabricated school building to Orange Farm, and the demolition of the farmhouse and clinic. In 
response, the leadership that was committed to opposing the relocation organised the collection of zinc 
plates and the building of a large shack for schooling. Four residents, including one of the leaders and 
now a director of the Thuthuka Foundation, volunteered to teach. The plight of the Weilers Fann 
residents had aroused local as well as international sympathies. With various donations, two formal 
classrooms were later constructed (see Figure 30). Attempts were made to formalise the school, and 
outsider sympathies with the educational struggle at Weilers Fann led to the temporary deployment of 
fonnally trained teachers in 1992. 
Figure 30. School buildings at Weilers Fann. 
31 Residents had constructed their own pit latrines, and plot sizes allowed refuse to be disposed of in 
pits on each plot. 
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I mentioned above that the then civic organisation ofWeilers Fann had fonned a Development Team, 
to investigate the fonnaiisarion of Weilers Farm. The search for outside assistance in this endeavour 
met with closed doors in the early I 990s, but was not abandoned. Unaware of the off.cial necessity to 
formalise the settlement layout and tenure prior to house construction, the Development Team pillsued 
the residents' demand for fonnal house construction. A few individual households, with their own 
resources or with employers' assistance, were already constructing fannal houses, while a shop owner 
had fonnally constructed a large store (see Figure 3 I). Concerned about the affordability of formal 
construction, and not aware of the housing policy negotiations which by then were clearly leading to an 
entitlement to a capital subsidy for the lowest income sector, the Development Team endeavoured to 
purchase a brick-making machine of which its members had heard. With the commitment of one 
donation, and the hope of financial support from influential ANC personalities in the wake of the 1994 
elections, they happened to make contact with the sympathetic ANC-aligned businessman mentioned 
carlier in this chapter. He then guided their development strategy towards more realistically engaging 
with the formal development framework, which indeed required first the approval of penn anent 
reSIdential development on the land, formalisation of the layout, reduction of plot sizes to the 
maximum of 300m' and delivery of infrastructure, before house construction could take place. The 
unresponsiveness of this framework is illustrated by the fact that those houses previously constructed of 
pennanent material, including the store, were (at the time of interviewing) to be demolished without 
compensation to the owners. 
How then has the community leadership engaged with this rigid framework? In the case ofWeilers 
Farm civic organisation and its Thuthuka Foundation, a remarkable degree of pragmatism is applied. 
The intention is to secure the best possible deal in terms of land, infrastructure and housing within the 
capital subsidy amount, and then to proceed with aspects of social development and income generation. 
Indeed, through the land agreement required for the capital subsidy intervention, adjacent land was 
secured for an agricultural project. Thus, while subsistence farming (see Figure 32) will be initially 
impeded through the reducrion in individual plot sizes, commercial as well as subsistence fanning is 
envisaged on the adjacent land in the longer tenn. Likewise, concrete plans and fundraising are 
underway for the development of commercial sites and sites reserved for social facilities. There is no 
doubt that the sympathetic businessman, first as a trusted outsider, and more recently as one of the two 
directors of the Thuthuka Foundation, had an influence on the stTategies of the conununiry-based 
organisation. However, his consistent support has strengthened the leadership's capaciry to realise its 
original vision for social development. Requests now come from other settlements, including Orange 
Fann, for guidance from the leadership at Weilers Fann. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Figure 31. FonnaUy constructed store at Weilers 
Farm, to be demolished with the settlement 
upgrading. 
Gunguluza - from self-reliance to co-operation 
196 
Figure 32. Food gardening on large infonnal 
residential plots at Weilers Farm. 
The strategies of the leadership of the more recent Gunguluza settlement have been less dramatic, but 
nevertheless have made their mark. Not having experienced any supportive government intervention, 
Mrs. Gunguluza and others had invaded the area with no direct expectation of government intervention. 
The orderliness of the site allocation, mirroring the adjacent layout, was said to have been for the sake 
of equity, rather than in the expectation of government funded upgrading. 'We were going to manage 
this ourselves,' Mrs. Gunguluza explained in an interview. The fonnalisation of the land occupation had 
then been initiated by SANCO, whose support Mrs. Gunguluza had sought once eviction notices had 
been issued. A process then of adjusting the infonnal settlement layout to the sites that were officially 
pegged on the ground, was driven by SANCO with support from the NGO Urban Services Group. 
Once existing pegs had been located, shacks were shifted accordingly and additional sites were 
allocated to residents of other infonnal settlements in K waNobuhle that could not be fonnalised. A 
total of 745 sites was thereby reached. A team of Gunguluza residents were directly involved in the 
formalisation procedure, while Mrs. Gunguluza is said to have kept detailed household records, not 
only in the fonnalisation but also during the initial invasion. She had followed up the credentials of 
those wishing to join the settlement, thus ensuring the exclusion of thugs Or criminals. An official of 
the then KwaNobuhle Town Council acknowledged that Mrs. Gunguluza ran 'a good administration, 
although informal ... She made everything easy for the Council.' Her courage and initiative were also 
praised: 'Its not easy, sometimes, to help shack people, they talk a lot, they've a lot to say, some of them 
are very rude,' but 'the community understood her, they worked hand-in-hand.' 
After the initial ordering of the land occupation, the resident's first request to the town council (through 
their settlement committee) was for toilets and water. However, in line with the capital subsidy 
entitlement, they had been advised to apply not only for toilets and water, but for 'all of the things at the 
same time,' including housing and individual freehold tenure. Ironically, at the time of interviewing, 
roads, underground services and electricity had been installed, housing was underway through the 
People's Housing Process (see Figures 33 and 34), yet fonnal access to toilets and water was still 
outstanding (see Figure 35). In the following section I return to this point, showing how knowledge of 
the capital subsidy entitlement shifted household priorities away from these 'basic needs'. 
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Figure 33. Formal infrastructure at Gunguluza: 
gravel roads, electricity reticulation, high mast 
lighting and underground sewer and water 
reticulation. 
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Figure 34. House construction through the 
People's Housing Process at Gunguluza. 
Figure 35. Continued use of pit latrines at Gunguluza, 
despite underground sewer reticulation. 
Kanana - respecting engineering dictates. yet challenging procedures 
With the planned and orderly invasion of Kanana, the strategy appears initially to have been one of 
willingness to work hand-in-hand with the new government. The approach was to respect existing 
layout standards, as they were portrayed in the surrounding townships. An existing power line 
servitude, cutting through the invasion site, was likewise respected (see Figure 36). Officials responded 
to the invasion by giving an eviction notice, not on the grounds of illegality of the invasion, but on 
grounds of health, there being no access to drinking water (People's Dialogue, 1997). The organisers of 
the invasion, with financial contributions from the residents, then arranged the installation of 117 taps 
(ibid.). The laying of water pipes and the unauthorised connection to water mains were undertaken not 
with the intention of pirating water, but in full expectation that the authorities would respond by 
installing water meters and by charging for consumption. The officials in turn half-heartedly threatened 
legal action against the pirating of water, and then chose to ignore the settlement for the following two 
years (ibid.). People's Dialogue's documentation of the settlement process juxtaposes the 'people's 
development' with the 'formal development', showing how the community was 'pushed' by the officials 
'to act autonomously' (People's Dialogue, 1997:7). The resulting strategy of self-reliance was then 
strengthened through exposure to the Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance, and the 
I 
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formation and growth of Federation structures in the settlement. With the creation of savings groups, a 
'people-driven housing development process' was initiated (ibid.: 10). A new dimension that the 
Federation enabled in the community's strategy was its lobbying with 'the highest level of government' 
(ibid.). In early 1995, the new minister of Land Affairs visited the settlement and its BIT-Centre 
building, through which the Federation members demonstrated their self-construction and sel f-
management skills. The minister encouraged the Federation's endeavours and instructed the hitherto 
unwilling local government to apply for development funding from the Province for the formalisation 
of the settlement. 
While the minister's visit to Kanana encouraged the auto-construction of houses through the Federation, 
it also triggered the imposition of the inflexible Urban Foundation inspired model of informal 
settlement intervention. The experience at Kanana then exposed the hostility of this development 
framework to community self-management and self-reliance. At the time of interviewing in 1998, 
several Federation houses were to be demolished, as they violated the boundaries that had been pegged 
according to the approved layout plan (see Figure 37). It is relevant to note that the planners, on request 
from the Federation members, had been willing to adjust the layout plan to accommodate most of the 
existing buildings. However, the imposition of the rigid development framework had caused a 
seemingly irreconcilable divide within the settlement. The ward councillors, in support of the official 
orderly procedure, were said to have encouraged a portion of the residents to oppose the Federation, 
which was seen to be delaying the formal development. It was the opposing residents then, that voted 
against having the layout plan adjusted to accommodate the houses of those that had violated the 
council's instruction not to build prior to the formal pegging and allocation of sites. The Federation 
members at Kanana in turn hold that this instruction had not been clearly made prior to construction32 . 
Indeed, the various parties interviewed considered the communication between officials and the 
community-based structures throughout the project inadequate, the local government officials relying 
heavily on engineering and town planning consultants, rather than attending project meetings 
themselves. 
Figure 36. Power line servitude respected by 
the Kanana invasion. 
Figure 37. Homeless People's Federation house in 
conDict with the formal approved layout for 
Kanana. 
32 Further demolition of Federation houses was pending due to a planned road servitude that bisects 
Phase 2 of the settlement, where the majority of Federation houses are concentrated. The plans for the 
road had also not been mentioned by officials in their early dealings with the settlement representatives. 
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Piesang River - from a submission to development dictates, to the exploration of alternatives 
In the Piesang River settlement, despite a history that goes back to the 1960s, a consistent strategy for 
settlement improvement emerged only in the late 1980s with the formation of the civic organisation, 
which was then supported by the NGO BESG. Through this support, the strategy then was to engage in 
a formal development project. As mentioned above, the funding framework at the time did not fulfil the 
wishes or meet the priorities of the residents. However, the civic organisation pragmatically agreed to 
the development approach. As mentioned above, the settlement, prior to the intervention, had been 
characterised by a high dwelling density. Individual shacks or wattle-and-daub structures were not 
fenced in (see Figure IS) , and unbuilt space was used communally, accommodating residential, 
commercial and recreational activities. The official planning solution that was agreed to in turn was 
purely residential, with a highly individualised notion of a single dwelling centred on a well defined 
plot33 . 
I discussed with the former civic leader, now president of the Homeless People's Federation, the 
distance between plan and reality. With hindsight, after almost a decade of engagement in the radical 
development thinking of the Homeless People's Federation, he gave two reasons for the acceptance of 
the highly individualised proposal in the early 1990s. Firstly, crime levels had risen in the settlement 
with the introduction of official policing control through the 'Black Local Authority' in the second half 
of the 1980s. As the former community control over crime was undennined by ineffective official 
structures , 'the criminals got their space.' In this context, the notion of an individually fenced-in plot 
appealed , as it seemed defens ible. Secondly, the development NGO is believed to have had an 
influence on the development thinking in the civic organisation. It is thought to have created a culture 
in which its professional technical advisors felt comfortable. A 'trench' was thus created, whereby the 
civic organisation had to adopt what the professionals had learnt. The NGO professionals were thereby 
defining a strategy for the community-based organisation. This then contrasts with the role that the 
Homeless People's Federation/People's Dialogue alliance foresees for professionals, namely not to 
define a strategy, but to support and strengthen the existing strategies of community-based structures. 
The emergence of the Homeless People's Federation at Piesang River, eventually leading to the 
withdrawal of the NGO BESG, may suggest that the NGO People's Dialogue influenced the 
strategizing of a portion of the Piesang River leadership. However, it must be noted that the emergence 
of the Federation at Piesang River was itself part of the initial articulation of the Federation strategy in 
South Africa. In 1991, the Piesang River civic leader was invited (on nomination by BESG), alongside 
civic leaders from across the country, to a 'meeting on Land and Shelter', with delegates from 
neighbouring states, Europe and Asia (People's Dialogue, 1991) . The civic leader recalled a 
revolutionary turn-about in the development thinking of many of the civic delegates . While they had 
33 It may be noted that the agreed minimum plot size of 150m2 at Piesang River, allowing for. a 
buildable platform of 100m2 on sloped portions of the settlement, was considered unconventionally 
small, in comparison to the standard plot size of 250m2 that applied to IDT-funded projects at the time. 
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each been using their political affiliation as a strategy, they now recognised that all the landless had 
something in common, irrespective of political affiliation, and that their concerns were the priority of 
no one but themselves. It was therefore recognised that networking among the poor might be an 
important strategy towards taking control of the situation. The civic leader from Piesang River was then 
invited to tour the country in the first networking exercise. Other early activities were at1empts at 
negotiating, with the formal sector, means by which the lowest income sector could access credit. The 
disappointing outcome of these negotiations then led to a recognition that financial self-reliance was an 
important notion for the poor. A strategy of pooling savings and experience therefore emerged, Piesang 
River being the first set1lement in South Africa to establish a savings group. 
With the emergence of the Homeless People's Federation in Piesang River, it is then understandable, 
that those residents that agreed with the emerging Federation approach began to question the former 
strategy of the civic organisation, to which the NGO BESG was contractually bound. Indeed, the 
Federation leadership explained that 'a whole new culture developed ... the people were talking about a 
development revolution.' Piesang River then was the first venue for a 'Community-driven Shelter 
Training Programme' in South Africa (People's Dialogue, 1993), in which four Federation members 
had previously participated in India. The intention with this training programme at Piesang River was 
to mobilise women for the savings schemes, and to strengthen the formal development process by 
undertaking a physical survey and gathering household information (ibid.). An additional exercise was 
the building of cardboard models of the ideal house (ibid.). Implications of this training programme 
then were twofold. On the one hand, individual priorities were focused on a complete, freestanding, 
four-roomed house, although the People's Dialogue (1993: 17) documentation argues that participants 
'knew that there was a long road ahead before they could live in houses like the ones they had 
modelled'. On the other hand, it was recognised that a development alternative to that of the formal 
infrastructure project underway in Piesang River did exist. However, neither house construction nor a 
more people-centred development could be realised through the existing development project. It is the 
housing aspect that the Federation at Piesang River then successfully pursued (see Figure 38). Below I 
discuss how the capital subsidy entitlement amplified the Federation's strong focus on the freestanding 
four-roomed house. 
I mentioned above the distance between the actual residential density in sections of Piesang River and 
the official pegged layout that was developed through the project that BESG had managed. Official site 
allocation and relocation to other development areas to ensure that pegged sites were occupied by only 
one household (then able to build their freestanding house), was the task of the official council project 
that later picked up the loose ends of the abandoned project. At the time of interviewing, formal site 
allocation, partial relocation and the issuing of individual freehold titles was due to commence. In the 
interim, the Homeless People's Federation at Piesang River had established in a door-to-door survey 
that residents were not wishing to relocate (People's Dialogue 1998:6). The Federation, with People's 
Dialogue, had then explored a housing alternative that could accommodate higher densities at Piesang 
River (see Figure 39) and would therefore foreclose the need for relocation (see People's Dialogue, 
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1998:6). According to the council's consultant, the demand for an alternative had not been 
communicated through the fonnal consultative channels that had been set up for the completion of the 
original project. The same applied to the Federation leadership's intention to hold the Piesang River 
land communally. Thus the legal procedures for the issuing of individual freehold titles had been set 
into motion. While a fonnal anangement for group ownership of shared neighbouring plots had been 
made at the request of the Federation leadership, a considerable amount of relocation or 'de-
densification' was nevertheless to occur. 
Figure 38. Homeless People's Federation 
members at Piesang River involved in the 
construction of their houses. 
Figure 39. Semi-detached two-storeyed e 
piloted by the Homeless People's Federation! 
People's Dialogue alliance as a solution to 
multiple site occupation at Piesang River. 
The strategy of the People's DialoguelHomeless People's Federation initiative of paralleling existing 
fonnal development with an exploration of alternative concepts then did not significantly impact on the 
formal solution at the Piesang River settlement itself. However, People's Dialogue explained that such 
exploration of alternatives was imponant as a learning exercise for the Homeless People's Federation as 
a whole. The concepts of higher density housing and of communal land holding were being applied in 
some of the Federation's greenfield settlements elsewhere in the country. As argued by People's 
Dialogue, the Federation strategy then is not primarily one of resolving development problems in any 
single settlement, but of increasing the capacity of the Federation country wide. The incompatibility 
between this strategy and the fonnal procedure into which most official role players are tied has caused 
much frustration, People's Dialogue therefore being perceived by officials and consultants as a 
disruptive and evasive initiative. 
7.7 The impact of the capital subsidy entitlement on popular and support-based strategies 
I have shown in Chapter 5 how the emergence of the current informal settlement intervention 
framework in South Africa was not through consideration of popular demand, but by placing faith in 
the proposals of the influential Urban Foundation, which represented the liberal demands of the private 
sector. In Chapter 6, I have exposed flaws in the intellectual position that underpins the Urban 
Foundation model of informal settlement intervention. In the cunent chapter, I have positioned four 
informal settlements and their people-driven initiatives in relation to the official Urban Foundation 
inspired intervention framework, showing how insensitive this is to the informal settlement reality and 
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to popular strategies for settlement improvement. I now examine the impact that the Urban Foundation 
inspired model, and in particular the individual entitlement to a capital subsidy, has had on the 
strategies of the people-driven initiatives in the four case studies. I argue that the individual capital 
subsidy entitlement, and the associated distraction of collective attention into endeavours to seek the 
largest possible individual house, have prevented the people-driven informal settlement initiatives from 
initiating a fundamental review of the intervention framework. 
Seeking the largest possible house 
Informal settlement intervention is currently packaged as housing delivery, through the individual 
household-based capital subsidy which covers land regularisation, collective infrastructure and 
individual house construction. While originally intended by the Urban Foundation as a sites-and-
services approach, the current government amplified the capital subsidy to include a minimal top 
structure, henceforth terming it a 'housing subsidy'. Politically, focus has been placed on the individual 
entitlement to a freestanding house on an individual plot. Popular response to this entitlement has been 
to demand a house of adequate proportions. In most of the case study settlements, residents' concerns 
for a larger house appeared to be overriding any endeavours to address collective aspects of informal 
settlement improvement or social upliftrnent through the capital subsidy funding. As an individual 
entitlement, the subsidy in most cases was being considered a means of acquiring an individual 
household-based asset in the form of a house. An exception was the case of Weilers Farm. There, the 
provincial government had defined the portion of the subsidy that was to go towards the top structure 
( or house), and the Thuthuka Foundation, on behalf of the residents, was intent on securing the best 
possible housing deal within this amount. At the same time, the Foundation had ensured that future 
social development was to be secured through the capital subsidy entitlement. As mentioned above, the 
land agreement included the acquisition of adjacent land for an agricultural project, while the layout 
plan ensured employment creation through commercial sites. At the time of interviewing, the Thuthuka 
Foundation, though managing the installation of infrastructure, was also pursuing means of realising 
the planned agricultural, commercial and social development. 
I turn then to those cases where house size was the overriding concern. In the case of Gunguluza, an 
awareness of the capital subsidy entitlement had shifted the residents' priorities from the basic needs of 
water and toilets to the maximum size of the individual house. At the time of interviewing, the 
residents were content with not having access to the basic commodities (toilets and water) they had first 
demanded, although underground services had been laid. They had even turned down the local 
authority's offer for temporary toilets, which was to be fmanced through a separate grant, and not 
subtracted from the individual subsidies. Being confronted with options in the development process, 
the residents had chosen, firstly, the lowest permissible standard of infrastructure, in order to maximise 
capital subsidy expenditure on the individual house. As a result, internal roads in the settlement were 
not tarred34• Secondly, they chose, not to have freestanding toilet structures installed with service 
provision (as was common practice with sites-and-services projects of the IDT), but to include toilets 
34 Dissatisfaction with the state of the roads was voiced in an interview with the settlement conunittee. 
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under the roof of the house. This saved building material costs, allowing the house size to be increased. 
Thirdly, residents had then chosen the People's Housing Process as a means of house construction, as it 
saved on profit making and labour, thus increasing the expenditure on building material and therefore 
house size. With household control over house construction through the People's Housing Process, 
some households had then gone as far as to exclude toilets from the house construction altogether, 
wishing instead to save on the plumbing and rather increase house size. In such cases the local 
authority was intervening, as the official building regulations applying to tbe capital subsidy 
intervention in that town stipulates that it is illegal to reside in a house without a toilet. The plastering 
of walls, likewise not a priority of the residents, was also a requirement for building approval. The final 
phase of the subsidy intervention, the issuing of freehold title, in turn could only be undertaken once 
the house construction was approved by the local authority,-
At Piesang River there was likewise a shift away from the concern for basic needs of water and 
sanitation. Funding for the initial intervention that was managed by BESG and the development trust 
had required the installation of basic services, though allowing the residents a choice of service levels. 
The outcome ofa participatory decision-making process through the block structures of the civic 
organisation had been a choice for conventional service levels: on-site water borne sanitation, 
individual yard taps and tarred roads. Although house construction was not a component of the BESG-
managed project, towards the end ofBESG's involvement formal house construction had become a 
reality. On the one hand, the national 'housing subsidy' policy had been launched. Piesang River 
residents, having already benefited from subsidised land regularisation and servicing, were still eligible 
for the housing portion of the individual subsidy. On the other hand, house construction was being 
explored through credit from the Homeless People's Federation's savings funds. Similar to the case of 
Gunguluza, the residents at Piesang River bad then requested that the BESG-managed project postpone 
the construction of toilets until fonnal houses were being built, rather than constructing freestanding 
structures as with IDT sites and services projects. At the time ofBESG's withdrawal then, individual 
sites were not connected to the water and sewerage mains. However, the plan was still for conventional 
on-site access to water and sanitation. 
Supporting individualisation: the Homeless People's Federacion paradox 
With the emergence of the People's DialoguelHomeless People's Federation initiative and its training 
programme from India, it appears then that a paradox emerged at Piesang River. On the one hand, 
members were encouraged to act collectively and to pool resources. A collective facility, the BIT-
Centre and its fenced-in yard (see figure 28) is the locale of a continuous buzz of collective activity, 
reminding some of the layers of collective activity that characterised the settlement prior to the BESG-
managed project. On the other hand, as mentioned above, people's minds were focused on the ideal 
four-roomed house, within an individualised development model with on-site access to water and 
sanitation. I asked a Federation leader at Piesang River, what the Indian delegates had suggested with 
regards to access to serviccs. Upon reflection, I was told that the Indians had pointed out the 
importance of communal water points, as places where women could meet and talk about the 
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Federation. I was then told, that women in Piesang River had rejected the concept of communal 
facilities, their minds instead being s~t on individual yard taps. Accordingly then, the physical 
development model of the Federation has been one that mirrors conventional townships in all respects. 
Responding to this observation, People's Dialogue explained to me that: 
'the Homeless People's Federation is not about gelling rid of apartheid models (even national 
government has failed to do this, in fact they produce houses worse than the apartheid models). 
The Federation is about addressing the root of oppression through self-reliance.' They further 
explained that 'people start from where they are and development priorities they select reflect this. 
They begin with what they know and understand, and their knowledge builds on this point.' 
From this perspective then, the individualised capital subsidy is considered part and parcel of what 
comprises the reality and knowledge of the poor, and is not challenged as such. 
The impact of the capital subsidy on Federation thinking and action, however, appeared substantial, 
and not necessarily in the members' best interest. Through my conversations at Piesang River, it was 
evident that the Federation was actively comparing its houses with those built by developers. The 
Federation's negotiated access to the capital subsidy through the uTshani fund agreement in some 
provinces, enables it to compete directly with developer delivery. Indeed, the fact that the Federation is 
able to secure larger houses within the capital subsidy amount than those delivered by developers 
appeared to be a major draw card for Federation membership. People's Dialogue justifies the fixation 
on the house size by arguing that poor women universally prioritise houses. This, however, might be 
contradicted by some of my fmdings in non-Federation settlements. In the case of Weilers Farm it was 
on demand by the mothers that the leadership prioritised the organisation of a pre-school and primary 
school. In the case of Gunguluza, it was the demand for water and toilets that first took the 
representative leadership to the local authority. My fmding then is that to a large extent it is the 
individual entitlement to the standardised capital subsidy that unifonnly focuses priorities on the house, 
possibly at the cost of ignoring a complexity and diversity of actual needs. 
Whereas the representative civic structure at Weilers Farm is able to consider the development of 
collective facilities despite the capital subsidy entitlement, it appears that the membership-based 
structure of the Federation, in the context of an individual entitlement to a 'housing' subsidy, has led to 
a prioritisation of individual over collective needs. Indeed, the NGO People's Dialogue appears to stand 
back as Federation members stretch their resources to achieve their ideal township house. In Piesang 
River, house size was increased to the extent that members were required to pay themselves for 
plumbing, plastering and other finishes 35 . Thus, of many houses constructed through the Federation, 
only one was pointed out as 'already flushing'. People's Dialogue, aware of the problems brought about 
by the capital subsidy, have adopted the attitude that once the government subsidies run out, the 
Federation will explore alternative and possibly more collective models for development. They 
therefore refrain from challenging as such the fundamentals underpirming the capital subsidy approach, 
although on a case-by-case basis, aspects of the Urban Foundation model are confronted. 
35Here the local authority appeared not to be enforcing building regulations. 
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Limi{QTions in challenging The Urban FoundaTion paradigm aT sealemenr level 
The settlement process at Kanana then is an interesting case of the impact of the capital subsidy 
framework on popular srrategy, exposing both conformity with, and opposition to, the official 
framework. As mentioned above, the initial infonnallayout conformed broadly with conventional 
engineering standards, as it was modelled on surrounding township layouts. The local authority's 
application to the provincial housing board, however, had foreseen an engineering layout that took nO 
consideration of the existing layout of tbe settlement. The portion of the capital subsidy that was to be 
spent on layout and infrastructure was then budgeted aeeording to the new design. The Kanana 
leadership, convinced not only of the adequaey of its own layout, but also of the people's ability to 
supply infrastrueture at a lower cost, challenged the official plans. The intention thereby was to free a 
larger portion of the subsidy for individual house construction. This challenge took two forms. On the 
one hand, they insisted that the planners and engineers eonsult an aerial photograph to see the 
conventionality of the layout. On tbe other band, with their own resources, the residents then 
demonstrated a more affordable service reticulation in a portion of the settlement. In support of this 
endeavour, the NGO People's Dialogue arranged an exchange with the Orangi Pilot Project in Pakistan 
(People's Dialogue, 1997:13), where, as mentioned in Chapter 3, residents have been financing, 
planning and constructing their own sewerage reticulation. The achievement at Kanana was not an 
official acceptance of the self-constructed infrastructure, but instead a review of the layout plan and 
budgeting. The Kanana leadership then pragmatically agreed to an engineering design based on the 
existing settlement layout, and on a lower expenditure on the infrastructure component of the' capital 
subsidy. The infrastructure was carried out through conventional contracting procedures, and not 
through the popular skills that were gained from exposure to the Orangi Pilot Project. 
The process of official engagement with the existing layout then had an interesting impact on the 
residents at Kanana. At seeing the informal layout on an aerial photograpb, the engineers had been 
surprised by its resemblance of an engineering drawing, yet felt compelled to point out to the residents 
that inaccuracies existed in the layout. Some boundary lines were not straight, and plot sizes varied. 
Until this point, residents had been content with the informal layout, and were not aware of differences 
in plot sizes. The engineers' intervention then focused their minds on the entitlement to a maximum 
plot size of 300m' through the capital subsidy. According to the development consultant, the individual 
residents then insisted on the standardisation of the layout. In the process then of formalising the 
layout, residents voted against accommodating those fonnal houses which Federation members had 
constructed prior to the formalisation of the layout, and which now violated the standardised and 
straightened boundary lines. It appears then that the residents' consciousness of their individual 
entitlement turned their collective support away from the leadership that had selflessly arranged the 
invasion, secured a development conunitment from government and was actively seeking the most 
advantageous deal within the capital subsidy amount. The majority of residents shifted their support to 
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the official process to which they were entitled through the capital subsidy, and in which they were 
represented by their ward councillor. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this then undermined 
Federation membership at Kanana, and caused a divide in the settlement. 
A further impact then of the capital subsidy is that it discourages the construction of permanent houses 
through community-based resources in informal settlements, prior to settlement formalisation through 
the official framework. It therefore requires provisional housing arrangements, with ongoing costs 
going towards the repair and upkeep of temporary shac\<s, rather than gradual investment in a 
permanent structure and asset, as in the case of the rapidly consolidating fa velas in Brazilian cities. 
While the intention of state delivery of standardised housing may be commendable, the reality remains 
that only a small proportion of informal settlements are undergoing government intervention. The vast 
majority of informal settlement households in this country will be spending many more years awaiting 
their turn in the capital subsidy intervention. In the case of Weilers farm, early construction of 
permanent houses was being responded to with demolition without compensation. At Kanana, the 
pending demolition of a number of permanent houses unknowingly violating a planned provincial road 
reserve had resulted in an agreement that the individual households should be compensated. 
Responsibility for the compensation then was being negotiated between the local authority, the 
Provincial Roads Department and the NGO People's Dialogue36. However, at the time of interviewing, 
a deadlock had been reached, with neither party admitting responsibility. On the part of the local 
authority, the resolution was not to set a precedent for compensation. Indeed, Kanana was not the only 
settlement in its jurisdiction where Federation building had violated official procedure. 
Limitations in challenging the Urban Foundation paradigm at policy level 
It may then be asked: will a boldness in house construction prior to regularisation eventually lead to a 
review of the intervention framework? The housing right in South Africa is currently interpreted as a 
right to the standardised product attainable through the capital subsidy. If an increasing self-
determination through, for instance, the Homeless People's Federation's credit mechanisms will lead to 
increasing house construction in informal settlements prior to capital subsidy intervention, then the 
interpretation of the housing right may shift to a broad demand for the right to occupation, or to 
legalisation of permanent structures. In Chapter 3, I mentioned that this is the case in Brazil, showing 
how the PROFA VELA law in Belo Horizonte represented an appropriate institutional response to the 
popular demand for the right to occupation. However, it must be noted that this demand in Belo 
Horizonte and elsewhere in Brazil was articulated through a strong popular movement of mobilised 
informal settlement residents, supported by sympathetic church leaders, professionals and politicians. 
Alternative proposals were articulated by this movement and brought to the attention of policy makers. 
In South Africa no such movement exists. The civic movement at national level, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, is plagued by internal inconsistencies, and does not primarily focus on the question of 
informal settlement. The Homeless People's FederationJPeople's Dialogue alliance likewise is not 
36 Surprisingly, national government which, through its ministerial visit to the settlement, encouraged 
the early house construction was not being called upon to compensate. . 
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primarily concerned with the particular question of informal settlement. As a membership-based 
organisation, its concerns are to a large extent parochial. Many of its explorations of alternatives in the 
case study settlements were said to have then benefited its members in greenfield development projects 
elsewhere. As suggested in the discussion above, the Federation's strategies in informal settlements 
appear to be influenced by the individual entitlement to the 'housing' subsidy, which ties informal 
settlement intervention into a framework of housing delivery . Finally, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
informal settlement research in South Africa is likewise limited in supporting a popular challenge to the 
individualised intervention paradigm. 
In closing then, it appears that the community-based initiatives in informal settlements in South Africa, 
while exposing shortcomings in the formal intervention framework, are not in a position to 
fundamentally challenge the dominant Urban Foundation inspired paradigm that I discussed in 
Chapter 6. The only underpinning of this paradigm that has been challenged on a case-by-case basis (as 
shown in the case studies in this chapter) is the flawed assumption that community-based organisations 
have no important role to play. However, this challenge is not brought to higher levels of government, 
where informal settlement intervention policy is formulated . With regards to house construction, the 
Homeless People's Federation has challenged this aspect at provincial level. As a result, some 
provincial governments have entered into the uTshani agreement, thus allowing eligible Federation 
members' subsidies to be managed by the Federation. In a greenfield situation, this has enabled 
Federation control over all components of the subsidy (land, infrastructure and house construction). In 
informal settlements, however, Federation membership has never reached full coverage. As a result, 
Federation control over development has been restricted to individual house construction. 
Turning to the other underpinnings of the Urban Foundation model, it is important to note that the 
Federation appears to question the relevance of individual freehold title, therefore the commodification 
of land. However, it is only in its greenfield settlements, where the Federation has full control over the 
capital subsidy intervention, that individual freehold title has been successfully challenged, and 
communal land holding has been explored . In the case of Pie sang River, the Federation had requested 
communal ownership of the land. However, non-member households have the right to individual titles. 
The official solution was to offer group ownership in those instances where neighbouring Federation 
members wish to share their plots. At Kanana, the concept of individual freehold titles was not being 
questioned. The Federation then has an ambivalent position on the relevance of individualisation and 
commodification to the alleviation of poverty. I have mentioned above the paradox that on the one 
hand encourages communal means of combating poverty through pooling of savings, and on the other 
hand encourages individual households to stretch their resources to acquire the largest possible 
individual asset through the capital subsidy. It is the focus on the house, amplified by the capital 
subsidy entitlement, that has prevented the Federation from fundamentally challenging the Urban 
Foundation inspired position that informal settlement intervention is simply a form of housing delivery. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
Two of the support-based initiatives into which organised informal settlement conununities in the case 
studies were able to tap, are modelled on international experience of responsive infonnal settlement 
intervention. The People's Housing Process, as mentioned in Chapter 3, is based on the support-based 
approach of the Sri Lankan housing policy. There, people-managed house construction, alongside 
conununity contracting and conununity action planning enable conununity management of the various 
components of infonnal settlement intervention. The Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue 
approach in tum is strongly inspired by the Indian National Slum Dwellers Federation and its 
supporting NGO SP ARC, which explore responsive means of settlement improvement. The case study 
discussion in this chapter shows the extent to which initiatives in South Africa that are modelled on 
support-based approaches abroad, are distorted by the entitlement to the standardised capital subsidy. 
Their focus is distracted from the support of ongoing settlement-based processes of improvement, 
towards the once-off acquisition of a maximum sized house for individual households. Neither the 
People's Housing Process, nor the Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance, have been 
able to place aspects of informal settlement improvement other than house construction into the control 
of organised informal settlement conununities. Where the provincial government has, as an exception, 
placed control over the subsidy investment with a conununity-based developer (the Thuthuka 
Foundation in Weilers Fann) the dictates of the capital subsidy framework define the nature of the 
intervention product. 
The informal settlement intervention framework in South Africa thus requires that priorities are 
externally defined through the capital subsidy components. These are then realised through a once-off 
injection of development funding into an informal settlement. The efforts of residents, local 
government officials and professionals (even those of support-based initiatives) go towards the 
realisation of the best possible individual product within the capital subsidy amount. Indeed, this 
amount is artificial, bearing no relevance to the ongoing resources of the poor or of local authorities. 
The combined development efforts then are towards an intervention that is never to be repeated in one 
settlement. While professional consultants and officials may subsequently apply their skills in other 
capital subsidy projects, the settlement-based initiatives have acquired skills that they are unlikely to 
use again. Even in the case of Kanana, where the Federation enables exchange with other settlements, 
the leadership that had actively engaged in the capital subsidy investment was frustrated with the skills 
it had developed and was unable to make use of again. 
The case study discussion in this chapter then consolidates the argument throughout this study that for 
informal settlement intervention in South Africa to be appropriate, it must depart from the Urban 
Foundation inspired paradigm. In the final chapter I will draw together the contributions of the 
comparison with Brazil, in enabling a more appropriate way of understanding and furthering the 
question of informal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
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7.10 Personal communication 
WEILERS FARM (SOUTHERN JOHANNESBURG) 
Government: 
• Dumisa Dlhamini: Assistant Director of Land Affairs and Housing, Gauteng Department of Land 
Affairs and Housing, 31.7.98, 23.11.98 and 12.1.99. 
• Johann Axel: Manager, Housing Projects, Southern Metropolitan Local Council, 3.12.98. 
Thuthuka Foundation: 
• Wilson Bangisa: Director, Thuthuka Foundation, 26.11.98 
• Steven Poullouras: Director, Thuthuka Foundation, 24.11.98. 
• Nomawethu Gwalempi: Secretary of the Allocation Committee, Thuthuka Foundation (also 
Secretary of the local ANC Women's League), 26.11.98. 
• Bethwell Dondashe: Chairman of Section Committee Forum, Thuthuka Foundation (also 
Chairman of Section B), 26.11.98. 
Weilers Farm Civic Organisation: 
• Randell Mjempu: Branch Secretary, SANCO (also Labour Officer of Thuthuka Foundation), 
4.12.98. 
Outside individuals: 
• Yvette Berkovits: Film producer and activist, 24.11.98. 
• Madelaine van der Steege: Dispute Resolution Consultant (involved during the construction of the 
community hall), 27.11.98. 
GUNGULUZA (UITENHAGE) 
Local Government: 
• Roelf Basson: Town Secretary, Uitenhage Local Government, 11.11.98. 
• Tinus Blignaut: Senior Engineering Technician, Town Engineering Department, Uitenhage Local 
Government, 10.11.98. 
• Mr. H. J. Botha, Senior Engineering Assistant, Town Engineers Department, Uitenhage Local 
Government, 10.11.98. 
• Anton Crause: Deputy Town Engineer, Uitenhage Local Government, 12.11.98. 
• Toni Ferreira: Chief Town Planner, Uitenhage Local Government, 12.11.98. 
• Johan Gerber: Building Control Officer, Uitenhage Local Government, 12.11.98. 
• Bidwell Mzwandile Made: Housing Co-ordinator, Uitenhage Local Government, 11.11.98, 
13.11.98. 
• Councillor Mtana: Deputy Mayor ofUitenhage and Ward Councillor for Gunguluza and, 
Uitenhage Local Government, 11.11.98. 
• Philip Nel: Deputy Town Treasurer, and Zandra Cotzee: Accountant, Office of the Town 
Treasurer, Uitenhage Local Government, 11.11.98. 
• Peter Nielson: Assistant Electrical Engineer, Uitenhage Local Government, 12.11.98. 
• Gawie Rousseau: Assistant Town Secretary (Estates and Housing), Uitenhage Local Government, 
11.11.98. 
Housing support consultants: 
• Dorelle Sapere: formerly Housing Support Specialist with BOUTEK (CSIR), currently with the 
People's Housing Partnership Trust, 21.7.98. 
• Tinus Kruger: Housing Support Specialist, BOUTEK (CSIR), 22.7.98. 
Gunguluza Committee: 
• A group discussion was held with the following members of the Gunguluza Committee, 9.11.98: 
Mrs. Rosy N. Gunguluza, Malanga, Bertha Jobo, Peter, Tbamsanqa Manana, Miriam Ndimba, 
Esther Stokwe, Thandeka Rarnnewa (Acting secretary), Bertha Vuyelwa Jobo, Milton Nyiki, 
Zalisile Mana. 
• A written history of Gunguluza was also contributed by Mrs. Rosy N. Gunguluza, 9.11.98 
(translated from Xhosa by Patrick Mashiyi). 
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Civic organisation structure in KwaNobuhle: 
• Sipho Nyanga: Human Resources Executive, KwaNobuhle local Branch, SAN CO, 12.11.98. 
• Bidwell Mzwandile Made: HOD Housing, Land and Services, KwaNobuhle local Branch, 
SANCO, 12.11.98. 
NGG supporting the civic organisation: 
• Russel Alison: formerly with the NGO Urban Services Group, 13.11.98. 
Person running a business in the Gunguluza settlement: 
• Mr. M. G. Mqulwana: owner of a container shop in Gunguluza, former Township Manager for 
KwaNobuhle Town Council, 31.11.98. 
PIESANG RlVER (DURBAN) 
Local Government: 
• Nati Mdlala: Ward Councillor for Piesang River, member of the Homeless People's Federation, 
19.11.98. 
Consultant to Local Government: 
• Max Singh: project manager for current infrastructure and tenure investment, Pravin Amar 
Development Planners, 12.1.98. 
Homeless People's Federation: 
• Patrick Hunsley Magebula: President of the Homeless People's Federation (national level), resident 
of Pie sang River, 18.11.98. 
• Sam MWongo: Media Work and Communications, Homeless People's Federation (national level), 
resident of Pie sang River, 16.11.98 
• Thembelihle Mkhize: Responsible for Enumeration, Homeless People's Federation (national level), 
and at Piesang River member of the Allocation Committee and responsible for building material 
ordering and deliveries (Homeless People's Federation), resident of Pie sang River, 20.11.98. 
• Joyce Melwasi Makosi: Regional Convenor for house savings schemes, Homeless People's 
Federation, resident at Piesang River, 18.11.98. 
• Thandasile Spengani: Regional Convenor of the uTshani Fund of the Homeless People's 
Federation, resident at Piesang River, 20.11.98. 
• Constance Dwayisa: Bookkeeper for the region, Homeless People's Federation, 20.11.98. 
People's Dialogue: 
• Joel Bolnick: People's Dialogue Cape Town, 2.6.98. 
• Diana Mitlin: Consultant to People's Dialogue, Cape Town, 6.4.99. 
Habitat/or Humanity 
• Joyce Mkhize: Project co-ordinator, Habitat for Humanity, also resident at Piesang River, 
18.11.98. 
Residents 0/ Piesang River: 
• Mr. Mabusa: resident and shop owner in Piesang River, member of Homeless People's Federation, 
19.11.98. 
• Majayiya Shaqa: elderly resident of Pie sang River, member of Homeless People's Federation, 
19.11.98. 
• Betina Mbambo: elderly resident of Pie sang River, member of Homeless People's Federation, 
19.11.98. 
• Juliet Gumede: elderly resident of Pie sang River, member of Homeless People's Federation, 
19.11.98. 
• Mr. and Mrs. Gurnede: elderly resident of Pie sang River, members of Homeless People's 
Federation, 19.11.98. 
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Built Environment Support Group (BESG) 
• Norah Walker: previously with the Built Environment Support Group (BESG), currently Director 
ofDAG (Cape Town), 14.1.99. 
• Heather Maxwell: previously with the Built Environment Support Group (BESG), currently with 
the Cato Manor Development Association (CDMA), 20.11.98. 
KANANA(SOUTHERNJOHANNESBURG) 
Local Government: 
• Ace Mataung: Ward Councillor for Kanana Phase 2 (this was not a separate interview - he was 
present during the interview with the Independent People's Committee), 1.12.98. 
• Maretha Jordaan: Manager: Urbanisation and Development, Lekoa Vaal Metropolitan Council, 
4.12.98. 
Consultant to Local Government: 
• Bruce Welchman, Project Manager, Civemech, 4.1.99. 
• Jon Busser, Town planner, Urban Dynamics, consultant for the Kanana housing subsidy 
investment (infrastructure and tenure), 12.1.99 
People's Dialogue: 
• Vusi Ntuntsha: People's Dialogue Johannesburg, 30.7.98. 
• Joel Bolnick: People's Dialogue, Cape Town, 2.6.98. 
Homeless People's Federation: 
• Agrenette Madwai: Regional Land Convenor, organiser and resident of the nearby land invasion 
Agrenette Hills (named after her), 2.12.98,4.12.98. 
A group interview has conducted with the following members of the Homeless People's 
Federation, 1.12.98: 
• Jacob Diamond: Regional Technician for the Homeless People's Federation (also secretary of the 
Independent People's Committee), resident of Kanana Phase 2. 
• Elizabeth Ramaesa: responsible for catering at the Kanana BIT-Centre, 
• Paulina Sikonjelo: Savings Scheme Collector, 
• Martha Molefi: Bookkeeper for the Kanana BIT-Centre, 
• Petrus Madona: Store Man / Caretaker of the Kanana BIT-Centre, 
• Agrenette Madwai: Regional Land Convenor, resident of the nearby infonnal settlement Agrenette 
Hills. 
• Rose Radebe: Regional Housing Schemes Convenor, resident of the nearby infonnal settlement 
Agrenette Hills. 
Independent People's Committee: 
• Jan Maduna: Chairperson of the Independent People's Committee of Kanana Phase 2, and 
Community Liaison Officer for the housing subsidy investment project, 1.12.98. 
• Jacob Diamond: Secretary of the Independent People's Committee of Kanana Phase 2 (also 
regional technician of the Homeless People's Federation), 1.12.98. 
Local ANC structures: 
• Daniel Mokoena: Secretary of the ANC Youth League, 4.12.98. 
• Esther Motloung: ANC Women's League - responsible for women's complaints (also a Homeless 
People's Federation member), 4.12.98. 
Private developer: 
• The owner of Vusani Amadolopa Emerging Contractors (private developer with shqw house in 
Kanana Phase 1),2.12.98. 
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Appropriate informal settlement intervention: prospects and challenges for 
South Africa 
8.1 Introduction 
Informal senlement intervention, as currently practised through the national housing policy framework 
in South Africa, is not appropriate to the reality of informal senlement. as it reduces this complex 
phenomenon to technocratic concerns afOlmd the delivery of standardised housing units. This study has 
critically explored this hypothesis through a comparison with the way in which the informal settlement 
intervention question is neated in Brazil. I have started this study by placing current practice in Brazil 
and South Africa in relation to shifts in international thinking, and in relation [Q the intervention 
approaches that have emerged internationally. 1 have then compared how informal settlements emerged 
and were treated differently within the socio·political contexts of Brazil and South Africa, both by the 
stale and by civil society. Through this comparison I am able to critically examine the positions in the 
South African literature on informal senlement intervention) and the current South African practice. 
What has this comparative research approach contributed to our Wlderstanding of informal senlement 
intervention in South Africa? On the one hand, it has confirmed my hypothesis that thinking on informal 
senlement intervention in South Africa has stagnated aroWld a powerful technocratic (product-driven) 
market· oriented approach. While there is evidence that this approach does not adequately address the 
reality of informal settlement, it has remained largely unchallenged. This lack of critical debate in South 
Africa contrasts with a progressive debate in Brazil, emanating from a movement for urban reform. 
which is politically backed by the PT (Workers' Party). This movement, comprising academics, 
practitioners, politicians and organised residents, has challenged product-oriented market-driven 
infonnal senlement intervention, developing instead an approach based on the demands of mobilised 
infonnal senlement residents. The lack of critical debate on informal senlement intervention in South 
Africa also contrasts with the urban poverty debates conducted at the international level in the 1990s. 
These debates have challenged the technocratic market-oriented informal senlement intervention 
promoted internationally by the World Bank since the early 1970s. 
On the other hand, this comparative approaeh has conflJTT1ed distortions in the current South African 
informal senlement intervention framework. Here I have exposed an overemphasis on standardisation of 
the individual delivery product: the residential plot with freehold tenure, on-site services and a minimal 
house. As a result of this distortion, progressive process-oriented intervention, as promoted 
internationally by the debates on urban poverty, remains unthinkable within the South African 
framework for infonnal settlement intervention. However, even technocratically driven in situ 
upgrading, as promoted by the World Bank in the early 1970s, which minimises physical disruption of 
the existing senlement, is rendered impossible in South Africa. Instead, informal senlements are 
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remodelled according to standardised layouts. I have argued that the distorted delivery model in South 
Africa is underpinned by the entitlement of most low-income households to a once-off product-linked 
capital subsidy. The inherent restrictions and rigid controls exercised through this model of 
intervention, while in conflict with the realities of the urban poor, are legitimised due to the access that 
the capital subsidy entitlement promises to an individual asset, in the form ofa house. I have shown that 
popular strategies have in tum been distorted by an endeavour to secure the largest possible individual 
house through the once-off capital subsidy entitlement. 
Having confumed that South African infonnal settlement intervention has stagnated around a distorted 
model, the comparative research approach has enabled me to explore the reasons for this status quo. By 
engaging with the international thinking and practice I have been able to view the South African 
intervention approach not simply as an inappropriate policy solution, but as the product of an entire 
paradigm ofdevelopmem. By examining the origins of the contrasting informal settlement intervention 
in Brazil and South Africa, I have been able to ask why this paradigm, with its distorted model of 
informal settlement intervention, could be entrenched in spite of the process of democratisation in South 
Africa. The comparison with Brazil, therefore, has not only exposed the shortcomings in the South 
African informal settlement intervention approach, but has exposed the socio-political conditions that 
allowed a particular development paradigm to gain dominance in South Africa. This understanding 
allows me to realistically engage with the prospects in South Africa for a paradigm shift that would 
create the space for a more appropriate form of informal settlement intervention. 
8.2 ShortCOmings in the South African informal settlement intervention framework 
What are the shortcomings in the current South African informal settlement intervention repertoire that 
have been identified through this comparison with Brazil? Various forms of in situ intervention are 
practised in Brazil, ranging from comprehensive externally designed upgrading seeking minimal 
disruption of [he physical envirorunenl, 10 support-based and community managed settlement 
improvement. In contrast, in situ upgrading in South Africa has come to mean the replacement of 
informal settlements with formal township layouts, standardised plots with freehold title, and formal 
housing. In South Africa, therefore, informal settlements are regarded as temporary transit areas 
awaiting replacement by an individualised model of development. The inherent, though fragile, abilities 
of the informally established settlements to respond to the demands of urban poverty are officially 
ignored. Likewise ignored are both the informal systems through which these settlements are managed 
and the community-based strategies through which they are improved. Indeed, unofficial settlement 
improvement, particularly individual investment in pennanent construction, is discouraged due to the 
pending remodelling and standardisation of the settlement layout according to the nonns and standards 
attached to the intervention funding. 'Shanty to\Vl1.S' or shack settlements are therefore perpetuated until 
they are replaced through official intervention. This absence of consolidation applies even to recently 
established informal settlements, where organisers of the invasion have anticipated the standardised 
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narure of formal intervention and have planned the layout accordingly. In a few exceptions, as in 
Kanana and Weilers Farm (two of my case study settlements). individual households have mobilised 
resources and construe ted permanent dwellings prior to formalisation and standardisation of the layout. 
However, such buildings are not treated as permanent in the formal layout planning. The need for 
standardisation of the layout, resulting from the standardised capital subsidy entitlement, overrides any 
consideration of early consolidations, or of settlement diversifieation through individual investment . 
Demolitions are the rule. 
A funher shortcoming in South African informal settlement intervention that has been identified 
through this comparative study, is the absence in South Africa of any support-based approaches to 
informal settlement improvement. The only space which support-based approaches have been afforded 
in informal settlement intervention in South Africa is in the construction of houses once layouts have 
been standardised. While progressive approaches in Brazil have been developed and institutionalised in 
the PT municipalities, which allow for community-managed upgrading according to localised priorities, 
the national housing policy in South Africa dictates a Wliform product-driven treatment of informal 
settlements across all designated urban areas. Even in exceptional cases such as Weilers Farm (one of 
the case study settlements), where a community-based organisation has been appointed as developer for 
the intervention, the dictates associated with the capital subsidy do not allow the comrnWlity-based 
developer to derme product and procedures. The same dictates have distorted the internationally 
inspired support-based initiatives. Both the People's Housing Process of the national ministry of 
housing, and the independent Homeless People's FederationlPeople's Dialogue alliance, have become 
mechanisms for the production of the largest possible capital subsidy houses on standardised plots with 
freehold titles. 
8.3 Exposing stagnation in the thinking on informal settlement intervention in South Africa 
As mentioned abovc, this study has confirmed that both popular and scholarly thinking on informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa is largely trapped in the product-oriented confines of the current 
intervention framework, and has therefore stagnated. Widespread consensus On the entitlement oflow-
income households to a unifonn product has sliOed debate on imervenlion in existing irregular informal 
sen)emems. With regards to popular initiatives' limited challenge to the official intervention framework, 
my finding has been that it is the individual household's awareness of its entitlement to the once-off 
capital subsidy thaI has resulted in relative complicity of CODUntUlity-based initiatives with the dictates 
of the formal development . Any substantial popular challenge to the national framework is discouraged 
by the residents' prospects for an individual asset that is to be gained through the capital subsidy system. 
The South African informal settlement literature gives evidence of the failure, of various aspects of the 
standardised capital subsidy approach, to address the social and economic reality in informal 
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settlements. However, the literature too has failed to substantially challenge the intervention framework. 
How then has the comparison in this study explained intellectual stagnation in South Africa, as opposed 
to the continuous search for more progressive informal settlement intervention in Brazil? 
The socio-political causes of informal settlements in South Africa differ from those in Brazil. The 
diverging ways in which the exclusion of a substantial portion of society from formal housing was 
achieved in South Africa as opposed to Brazil resulted in diverging ways in which this ongoing 
exclusion has been interpreted and challenged. In Brazil, exclusion throughout the 20th century, was 
based primarily on class divisions, and was achieved through the WlIestricted pursuit of economic 
interests. Brazilian cities were thus shaped, not by planning and regulation, but by processes of property 
speculation. Amongst the popular class and intellectuals, this fostered a consciousness of class 
divisions, and of the exploitative and exclusionary nature of market-oriented policies. An intellectual 
left in Brazil has critically engaged with informal settlements through the question of exclusion, and has 
aligned itself with popular movements, developing strategies to secure a physical and political stake for 
the working class in the rapidly changing urban environment. Alternative approaches to informal 
settlement intervention emerged within this framework. Politically, these alternative approaches have 
been supported and promoted by the PT, which is home to social movements and to progressive 
academics and practitioners. The decentralisation of government and political power has then allowed 
the PT to institutionalise alternative approaches at municipal level. Political competition at municipal 
level in turn requires ongoing popular mobilisation around the realities of exclusion, and an ongoing 
search for more democratic government intervention, in order for the PT to contest against conservative 
parties that promote a market-oriented and product-driven informal settlement intervention. 
In contrast to the Brazilian situation, exclusion of a portion of the population from formal housing in 
South Africa was primarily the result of race-based control through rigid urban planning and regulation. 
This fostered a popular and intellectual consciousness primarily of race, although class has increasingly 
become a barrier to overcoming urban poverty and exclusion. The attempt then has been to redress such 
exclusion through the abolition of racially discriminatory legislation, though legitimising the 
continuation of the rigid urban controls, which underpin the segregated urban land markets and 
perpetuate class-based spatial exclusion. It is market-oriented considerations that have inspired the 
current individualised informal settlement intervention framework. Widespread consensus among the 
middle class, around the same neoliberal considerations, has then also prevented a substantial challenge 
to both the urban regulatory system and the framework for informal settlement intervention, and has 
discouraged the exploration of alternatives. In addition, the centralised nature of urban policy in South 
Africa, in which local government acts merely as implementer, has discouraged the exploration of 
alternatives from within local government. In this context, the informal settlement question has not been 
politicised. A critical popular and intellectual consciousness of the flaws that underpin the market-
oriented intervention framework does not exist. 
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8.4 Exposing the market-oriented paradigm in South Africa 
The comparison with Brazil, in relation to international thinking, has then allowed me to associate the 
shortcomings in the South African informal settlement intervention framework, and the intellectual 
stagnation around this framework, with a particular market-oriented paradigm. This contrasts with the 
progressive paradigm of the pragmatic Brazilian left, which has pioneered democratic informal 
settlement intervention in close alliance with the favela movement. While the democratic approaches to 
informal settlement intervention practised in the PT municipalities in Brazil may have relevance to 
other contexts, the argument throughout this study is not for the direct transfer of more appropriate 
intervention approaches from Brazil to South Africa. The comparison between the two countries has 
revealed that not all aspects of the favela situation in Brazil have direct parallels to South Africa. 
Brazilian solutions are therefore not necessarily relevant to the South African informal settlement 
situation. 
The question of tenure, as compared in this study, illustrates this divergence. In Brazil, the continuous 
displacement of favelas through processes of land speculation has triggered a popular demand for 
freehold title to the occupied land. As a result, progressive municipalities have taken on the legal 
challenge of delivering freehold title in favelas. In South Africa the delivery of freehold title to informal 
settlement residents is not the progressive equivalent to that in Brazil. In contrast to the favela 
movement in Brazil, the civic movement in South Africa promoted a communal and de-commodified 
relationship to urban land, thereby responding to the realities of urban poverty and exclusion as they 
were being experienced in South African urban areas. Policy in South Africa did not respond to this 
approach, instead imposing freehold title within a neoliberal or market-oriented paradigm. My 
examination of South African lite ature on informal settlements has confinned that this neoliberal drive 
for freehold title is underpiIUled by flawed arguments. Yet, the market-oriented framework remains 
unchallenged. 
The argument in this study is for a paradigm shift in South Africa that would allow the development of 
progressive approaches to informal settlement intervention that respond, not primarily to business 
interests (as is currently the case), but to demands from the informal settlement population and its 
organised initiatives. 
8.5 Prospects for a paradigm shift in South Africa 
What does the comparison with Brazil tell us about the prospects for such a paradigm shift in South 
Africa? This study has compared the processes of gradual democratisation in Brazil and South Africa 
since the mid 1970s. Here a divergence berween the rwo countries became evident at various levels. In 
Brazil the socio-political conditions for a shift towards more responsive and democratic informal 
settlement intervention existed. Social movements such as those representing the favela population were 
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articulating demands for favela legalisation and upgrading, and for a say in urban policy-making. This 
position was consistently supported by the pragmatic intellectual left and politically promoted by the PT. 
A broad-based movement for urban reform then advanced this position. The challenge to exclusionary 
policies was successful, in part, through the adoption of constitutional amendments and, in part, through 
democratic institutional mechanisms in those municipalities that are governed by the PT. As mentioned 
above, political contestation at local government level in Brazil requires ongoing conscientisation and 
politicisation around questions such as favela intervention. From this conscientised position, the 
Brazilian movement for urban reform has then also been able to critically engage with, and actively 
contribute to, the international debates on urban poverty. 
In South Africa, the socia-political conditions for a challenge to unresponsive intervention did not exist 
The closest equivalent in South Africa of the favela movement in Brazil was the civic movement, though 
representing not specifically the informal settlement population, but the African urban population at 
large. As mentioned above, this movement articulated a development position of its ow , based on the 
decommodification of land and other basic needs commodities. While extending this approach to 
infannal settlements, thus eradicating the practice of tenancy. the civic movement was prevented from 
further articulating this development concept. Throughout most of the 1980s, the political struggle 
centred around the need to secure democratic non-racial government. Therefore, the primary focus of the 
civic movement was to protest against the imposition of illegitimate local government structures in urban 
townships. In response, the movement was violently repressed by the state. At the same time, the 
influential business-funded Urban Foundation was developing a market-oriented position on informal 
settlement intervention. In 1990 it published a benchmark proposal for a national housing policy in 
South Africa, articulating a market-oriented position on housing and informal settlement intervention. 
Policy-making in the early 1990s, in which both the fragile civic movement and the powerful Urban 
Foundation were represented, was then dominated by the market-oriented positions of the latter. The 
central ideas put forward by the Urban Foundation in the early 1990s were adopted into the national 
housing policy after the 1994 elections. Through this policy, the once-off household-based capital 
subsidy channels housing intervention, be it on a greenfield site or in informal settlements, into the 
standardised delivery of plots with freehold title, on-site access to services and a minimal house. 
In this study I have found that this intervention framework in itself is not likely to be challenged by its 
beneficiaries, as it promises an individual household-based asset in the form ofa house. Thus collective 
community-based strategies have tended to co-operate with the official framework, even if in 
disagreement with the imposed standards and procedures. While the South African literature has pointed 
to the insensitiviry of the market-oriented intervention framework to the diverse realiry of the urban 
poor, there is no co-ordinated intellectual challenge to the Urban Foundation inspired approach. 
Indeed, the intellectual left in South Africa has not rigorously and pragmatically engaged with the 
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question of informal settlement intervention. Nor has it actively participated in the international debates 
on urban poverty. My sobering conclusion therefore is that to date the conditions do not exist in South 
Africa for a paradigm shift towards more responsive informal settlement intervention, as has occurred in 
Brazil. 
8.6 Challenges for South Africa 
What concrete suggestions can this srudy then put forward for the pursuit of more appropriate informal 
settlement intervention in South Africa? No doubt, the stagnation and distortion in South African 
practice must be redressed. Exposure to international debates on urban poverty, as well as progressive 
practice such as that backed by the PT in Brazil, would increase awareness in South Africa of the 
distorted nanue of the current intervention framework. Such exposure should stimulate, not the direct 
transfer of approaches from abroad, but the search for appropriate means of intervention in South 
Africa. 
However, the current intervention approach in South Africa is entrenched through a rigorous 
framework, on which local govenunents and practitioners have shaped their operations, and within 
which consultants and development NGOs have found a secure niche. A substantial challenge to the 
starus quo is therefore not likely to come from within these ranks. It may be noted that alternatives are 
starting to be explored in the area of tenure, with scholars searching for options to the imposition of 
freehold titles. However, the promotion of freehold title by the Urban Foundation is siruated within a 
broader paradigm. It promotes the product-oriented treatment of informal settlement intervention as a 
form of housing delivery, dismisses a role for community organisation in favour of a top-down 
engagement with the individual beneficiary, and primarily promotes stakes for the private sector, both 
in project implementation and through consumerism, encouraged through individualisation and 
commodification. This paradigm must be challenged as a whole. 
For a deparrure from the Urban Foundation inspired paradigm, a critical level of popular. intellecrual 
and political consensus will be needed on the inappropriateness of its neoliberal underpinnings to the 
reality of urban poverty as manifested in informal settlements. Only then may policy on govenunent 
funding in South Africa move away from the product-oriented once-off capital subsidy to the provision 
of support through flexible longer term grant funding. Government subsidisation of informal settlement 
improvement would then be designed for maximum impact in the form of direct poverty alleviation, and 
not as a means of building the urban economy by providing opporrunities for the profit-making sector. 
With this orientation. unauthorised settlement improvement and consolidation through permanent 
building of houses. shops and social facilities would be encouraged, rather than the current perperuation 
of a transitional existence until the formal imposition of an individualised and standardised model of 
residential development. Such an orientation would likewise trust the poor in understanding their own 
siruation. allowing the identi fication of improvement projects by community-based 0~gu"isu;i0i15 
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themselves. It would then allow the release of government subsidies for such projects, and their 
management and implementation by community groups. Ultimately, it would acknowledge the existence 
of community-based strategies for the uplifunent of living conditions in infonnal settlements. These 
would be taken seriously, affording them space, rather than moulding them according to the role 
assigned to community organisation by the profit-making sector. 
How then will a change in orientation be achieved in South Africa? I have argued that increased 
exposure among South African development professionals to progressive international insights, such as 
those gained through the debates and enquiries on urban poverty, might build professional awareness of 
the need for change. However, a co-ordinated challenge from within this sector is unlikely to occur. The 
demand for alternative intervention might well have to be made from infonnal settlement residents 
themselves. In this regard, progressive long-tenn support for community organisations is required. Such 
support should encourage community groups to associate democracy with the right to demand 
government intervention which responds to the diverse dimensions of poverty as experienced in 
infonnal settlements, rather than the right to be at the receiving end of government delivery of a 
standardised product. Funding support for such a conscientisation might not be mobilised within South 
Africa. Here progressive international initiatives may have an important role to play in enabling the 
question of infonnal settlement intervention to enter popular and political debates. I have indicated in 
my introduction to this study that engagement with the Brazili n PT already exists in the civic and trade 
union movements in South African society. It is in this area then that a conscientisation of the way the 
infonnal settlement situation is treated within the framework of the PT may contribute to building 
critical demand from below. 
In this study I have identified various gaps in our understanding of the infonnal settlement situation in 
South Africa. Many of these gaps would be addressed by conventional surveys gathering quantifiable 
data in areas hitherto ignored. However, I would argue that the fundamental intellectual challenge with 
regards to infonnal settlement intervention in South Africa lies not in filling these gaps, but in 
furthering a change of paradigm in our treatment of the infonnal settlement question. This requires an 
intellectual engagement with the current contours of social exclusion, including those created by the 
current intervention paradigm, and with the thinking of those collective initiatives within infonnal 
settlements that are committed to struggle for greater inclusion. It is in the relationship between 
intellectuals and community-based organisations or social movements, that four decades of Brazilian 
experience are of relevance to the struggle against exclusion and the search for more appropriate 
infonnal settlement intervention in South Africa. 
